AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION IN THE WEST

A SYLLABUS

Eighth Edition

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AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION IN THE WEST

A SYLLABUS

Eighth edition, revised

PREPARED BY
COLUMBIA COLLEGE ASSOCIATES IN
ECONOMICS, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC
LAW, HISTORY, AND PHILOSOPHY

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NOTE TO THE FIFTH EDITION

The Faculty of Columbia College determined at its meeting in January, 1919, to discontinue the required courses in History and Philosophy and, beginning in September, 1919, to substitute a course on Contemporary Civilization which should meet five times a week and be required of all Freshmen.

The purpose of the entire course is to raise for consideration the insistent problems of the present. Giving the student, early in his college course, objective material on which to base his own further studies and his own judgments, it is believed, will aid him greatly in his attempt to understand the civilization of his own day and to participate effectively in it.

The early part of the course is a preparation for the consideration of the problems of the present. The first book considers the ways in which nature conditions the course of civilization and the ways in which man in turn modifies his natural conditions by his inventive genius. The second book discusses human nature itself, man's social interdependence, the wide range of stimuli to which he responds, and the nature of intelligent readaptation in the face of the problems which grow out of his changing environment. In the third book some of the achievements of man in society are considered — the creation and transmission of a cultural heritage, the formulation of standards of conduct, the institution of family life, the flowering of intellectual and emotional life in art, science, and religion. These are presented to make more intelligible the general structure of our civilization and the materials at hand for dealing with its needs.

The more immediate setting of the problems is next developed, through the study of the historical background of the present and through a historical and analytical survey of those characteristics of contemporary civilization which dominate the economic, cultural, and political life of the great national states of today. The intellectual tools, or concepts, which have played an important part in attempted solutions of human problems are also treated in their context: the application of exact science to the control of nature, the idea of mass production for world distribution, and the belief in the participation of the governed in their own control.

Then, in turn, and in considerable detail, there are presented the chief problems and difficulties arising out of the major relationships which men sustain. The problems of imperialism and the "backward peoples," of nationalism and internationalism, of political control, of our contemporary industrial life particularly as it determines the standard of living, and of education are treated, with an attempt in every case to state the alternatives at issue and to relate them to the materials on the use of which reconstruction depends, to the dominant concepts of our day, and to their own historical setting.

The Syllabus in its previous editions was prepared by certain of the instructors of the course who include members of the Departments of Economics, Government, History, and Philosophy: W. E. Caldwell, H. J. Carman, J. J. Coss, A. Gordon Dewey, D. L. Dodd, Irwin Edman, A. P. Evans, H. L. Friess, E. D. Graper, C. A. Gulick, Jr., A. L. Jones, B. B. Kendrick, S. P. Lamprecht, R. D. Leigh, F. C. Mills, P. T. Moon, Thomas Munro, H. W. Schneider, and W. E. Weld.

In this, the fifth edition, which, while retaining the structure of the earlier editions, represents new material and reorganization and benefits by the teaching of five years, the following members of the staff have coöperated: R. C. Atkinson, H. J. Carman, J. J. Coss, D. M. Fisk, H. L. Friess, James Gutmann, E. B. Hewes, H. B. Howe, J. E. McGee, J. D. McGoldrick, R. F. Nichols, P. H. Odegard, J. H. Randall, Jr., I. W. Raymond, H. W. Schneider, John Storck, R. G. Tugwell, and B. D. Wood.

Columbia University
August, 1925

NOTE TO THE SIXTH EDITION

The revision of the Syllabus for Contemporary Civilization prepared for use in 1926–1927 has been completed under the editorship of T. C. Blaisdell, Jr., E. B. Hewes, J. D. McGoldrick, John Storck, and Horace Taylor. Suggestions have been received from many members of the teaching group.

Columbia University
August, 1926

NOTE TO THE SEVENTH EDITION

The seventh edition of the Syllabus for An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West is a complete rewriting of the material which comprises it. The greater number of sections included in this Syllabus appeared in the previous editions, but in this, the seventh edition, new outlines have been prepared and in many cases new readings adopted.

The preparation of the seventh edition of the Syllabus is made necessary by the decision of the Faculty of Columbia College, made at its meeting in April, 1928, that the students should be required to take a two-year survey course in the social studies. By decision of the Faculty the *first year* of the survey course is to follow a general outline of the present course in Contemporary Civilization, but is to include basic work in American History and some further presentation of the philosophical or intellectual history as it has developed in the western world. As heretofore, the first-year course is to meet five times a week. The *second year* of the required course is to be devoted to the consideration of the political and economic problems of contemporary society, mainly in the United States. These problems have heretofore been treated in the last third of the one-year course. The course during the second year is to meet three times a week.

The Syllabus presented in this volume covers the work in the first of the two years required. For each of the major periods from the Middle Ages until the present, three great questions have been raised: How do men make a living? How do they live together? and How do they understand their world?

The seventh edition has been prepared by the following instructors participating in the course during 1927–1928 or previous years: Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., John B. Brebner, Harry J. Carman, Harold K. Chadwick, John J. Coss, G. Reginald Crosby, Frederick E. Croxton, John F. Fennelly, Daniel M. Fisk, Horace L. Friess, James Gutmann, Herbert B. Howe, Walter C. Langsam, Joseph D. McGoldrick, Samuel McKee, Jr., Dwight C. Miner, Peter Odegard, John H. Randall, Jr., Irving W. Raymond, Herbert W. Schneider, John Storck, Rexford Guy Tugwell, Stephen S. Wilson. The departmental affiliations of these instructors are to Economics, Government, History, and Philosophy.

For the section on art in the contemporary period and for advice and notes on all the illustrations having to do with fine arts, the instructing group of Contemporary Civilization is indebted to Meyer Schapiro, of the Department of Fine Arts of Columbia University.

This edition of the Syllabus is the first to carry charts, maps, and illustrations. For most of the charts and maps we are indebted to the research of Mr. J. F. Horrabin, who drew them originally for the *Outline of history* by Mr. H. G. Wells. These are reproduced by the kind permission of Mr. Wells and The Macmillan Company, New York City. These and many other charts and illustrations are to be found in the various editions published by The Macmillan Company and in particular their large pictorial edition. Some maps and charts have been prepared under the direction of Mr. Roy E. Stryker, of the Charting Bureau of Columbia University.

The editing of the volume was undertaken by four members of the staff: John J. Coss, John F. Fennelly, Joseph D. McGoldrick, Irving W. Raymond.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
July, 1928

NOTE TO THE EIGHTH EDITION

The eighth edition of the Syllabus for the course on Contemporary Civilization is the second edition of the Syllabus prepared for use in connection with the two-year sequence. It contains special articles written for the use of the students in the course but differs in no essential respect from the seventh edition. The plan for the revision was made by Robert L. Carey, Harry J. Carman, Shepard B. Clough, Charles W. Cole, John J. Coss, Lawrence W. Cramer, Addison Cutler, Robert S. Ford, Horace L. Friess, Corliss Lamont, Walter C. Langsam, Samuel McKee, Jr., Dwight C. Miner, George S. Mitchell, Irving W. Raymond, and John P. Seward, who gave instruction in the course in 1929–1930. In addition, valuable assistance was rendered by T. I. Cook and William F. McDonald, instructors for 1930–1931.

To Dr. Clarke F. Ansley for his expert and kindly help in all technical matters of editing and to Miss Anne L. Brown for her care in reading the proof the staff wishes to express its indebtedness.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
July, 1930

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INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION IN THE WEST

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The nature and aims of the course.

First Semester

Assignment one: The nature and aims of the course
* *Syllabus*, 1–6.

It is probable that men have always been concerned about the events in which they have participated. There have doubtless always been social problems, problems of how to get enough to eat, a roof over one, something with which to keep oneself warm, and protection to shield one from beasts or savage men. When we think of ourselves today as interested in contemporary problems, we should not consider ourselves unique in the history of man. We too, however, are concerned with problems of how to make a living, how to live together with peace and profit, and how to understand the world. In recent years, the study of these problems has come into formal education itself and has become a part of the curriculum of secondary school and college.

The perplexities of our contemporary situation have caused the development in Columbia College of two courses which together form an introduction to the social studies. The first course is called an Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West, and the second, An Introduction to Contemporary Problems in the United States.

The Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West is concerned with the appearance and the development of certain institutions, and of certain problems which are the common possession of the peoples of Europe and the United States and to a greater and greater degree of all the peoples in the world. We begin with the study of the Middle Ages partly because many of the elements of our intellectual heritage arise in this period and partly because its manner of life and, in particular, its economic situations present such a contrast to those of our own day as helps us to appreciate the effect of our contemporary highly industrialized economic life upon the whole range of human problems. The course continues through the various periods in Europe and the United States, considers the coming of the World War and the reorganization of European and Near Eastern life thereafter, and also traces the history of the growth of political, economic, and intellectual life in the United States from the beginning to the present time. The course is primarily concerned with western life, but because at the present time the West is so involved in the affairs of India, China, and all the Near East, brief excursions are taken for the consideration of some of the problems of these three eastern groups.

Always in the first and in the second course the attempt is made to study the interrelationship and co-development of the economic, political, and intellectual elements, on their historical background. In particular, during the first year five chief elements are seen in their growth — the rise of political self-government (democracy), the rise and development of aggressive large-scale group consciousness (nationalism), the application of exact knowledge to the control of nature (applied science), the spread of commerce until the world era is the scene of trade (the commercial revolution and world distribution), and the production of goods by the power machine process and in enormous quantities (the industrial revolution and mass production).

In the first year, as we have seen, the economic development and to a considerable degree the political and intellectual development of the United States are presented. During the second year attention is directed to some of the problems which absorb our interest here and now in the United States.

In the second year the industrial enterprise is the first contemporary element studied, as it is probably first in influence. About the industrial enterprise capital is organized, by it form is given to holdings of the most stupendous size, and from it comes the volume of goods which supply our needs, create profits for investors, and call out for their distribution the facilities of commerce and transportation throughout the world. Sustaining the industrial enterprise, the credit structure of modern society arises, and this in turn is studied.

No group in contemporary society is unaffected by industrialism; small competitors, consumers, wage earners, the farmer, and the utilities


800/or/80 million years ago
600/or/60 "
360/or/30 "
260/or/26 "
140/or/14 "
40/or/4 "
Azoic or Archæozoic
Possibly without life at all
Proterozoic
Without visible traces of living structure. Age of Animalculae, Jelly fish,— Green Scum and the like
Early Palæozoic
Before the appearance of any vertebrate animals Age of Sea Scorpions & Trilobites
Later Palæozoic
Age of Fishes, Amphibia, and Swamp Forests
Mesozoic
Age of Reptiles.
Cainozoic Age of Mammals, Grass & Land Forests

The age of the earth before man appeared. Human history is but an instant in world time.


End of the Early Palæolithic Period
Later Palæolithic Period
Age of Cultivation
50,000 B.C.
35,000 "
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
1920
Steppe Period
Forest (transition) Period.
Modern Conditions
Fourth and last Glacial Age—
Aurignacian Age—
Solutrian Age—
Magdalenian Age—
Azilian Age—
Neolithic Age—
Bronze Age
Iron Age
Mousterian type of implement
Well-made implements, statuettes, and cave pictures
The best Palæolithic implements
Smaller stone implements, bone fish-hooks, engraved bones.....
Painted pebbles
Polished stone implements, axe-heads, arrow heads; pottery; and domestic animals...
Neanderthal Men
Reindeer Men
Existing Races

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Neanderthal men appeared in what is now France. Note the brief period which we call historic.

are all concerned, as is also the entire public in its control of natural resources, of power, and of the channels of trade and transportation. These several groups are studied, and thereafter the international aspects of industrialism are considered in a section on the struggle for markets, raw materials, and economic control, and another on tariffs and international combinations.

The place of law in the contemporary order is the next topic presented. Some purely descriptive material is included in order to give some idea of law as a social instrument. Lawmaking, civil justice and its administration, and crime and society's responsibility are specific topics in the section on law.

The extent to which society has come to recognize its responsibilities furnishes the content of the next division of the course. The family and standards of living, including rural and urban conditions, housing, health, recreation, education, and community planning, are the topics discussed.

There follows the consideration of the financing of the tasks of government and society, with sections on the budget, taxation, and public control.

At the end of the two years there is placed a division which presents the appraisal and criticism of contemporary society by itself. Literature, religion, freedom of thought, capitalism *versus* socialism, and the machine age are all discussed through the medium of contemporary estimates coming from diverse points of view.

For the work of the second year, two volumes of selected readings have been published, since the range of material is unique for instruction in a single course and because so large a number of books and periodicals would be required as to render the purchase cost prohibitive for either student or library. Several new treatments have been written for inclusion in the books of readings.

The two-year course is an introduction to many of the problems of contemporary life and as such is placed in the first two years in college. It serves a further purpose. It is a first course in the social studies and has the virtue of presenting them not as isolated subject-matters but in their interrelations. The cross-influence of economics and politics, the interpretative and directive functions of philosophy, the integration of art and religion with the social fabric, and the merging of all these in


Palæolithic Stone Implements
(all roughly to scale of hand shown)
Three views of a rostro-carinate (earliest period) implement.
Chellean Age
Hand-axes
Chopping tool
[N.B. This is a modern — not a Neanderthal — hand]
Point
Mousterian Age
Piercer
Scrapers
Points
Reindeer Age
J.F.H.
Neolithic Implements
(drawn to differing scales)
Stone 'tranchet' (cutting implement)
Stone pick
Stone
and horn axe and hammer
Stone mallets
Flint knife
Axe-hammers of polished stone
Flint arrow-heads
J.F.H.
Bronze Age Implements
(drawn to differing scales)
Copper axes
Bronze celts (axes)
Swords
Dagger
Lance head
Bronze 'lur' (trumpet)
Sword & scabbard
Bronze Age pottery
J.F.H.

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Tools in their history outline the story of man's accomplishments. Specimens of early tools are in the Metropolitan Museum.

the historic totality of each period are some of the features which are emphasized in such a course.

Upon the two years of foundation work there are built the courses in the special subject-matters of the particular social studies. These courses constantly presuppose and utilize the materials and interpretations of the two years preceding, and are freed from much introductory material and enabled to begin on a level of greater maturity and understanding than is usually possible in courses in economics, history, government, and philosophy.

The staff for the course is composed of members of the departments just named, the Department of Psychology, and such other academic groups as are desirous of coöperating in preparing the syllabus and giving instruction. Each staff member teaches a section of thirty students for the entire year. Many of the members teach both years, and an effort is made to give opportunity to all the members of the staff to teach the first year before they teach the second.

In 1930, the first year, which earlier contained also the materials of the second in large degree, enters upon its eleventh year, the second upon its second year of inclusion within the curriculum as a required subject. The syllabi have been subject to constant revision and improvement, but the idea of the course is the same as that which guided it at the outset — to give to men at the beginning of their college course an insight into the society in which they live and an appreciative and reasoned attitude toward its problems.

2. The culture concept.

Assignment two: The culture concept

[1] * Storck, *Man and civilization*, 28–47.

A. Man today and in every past period and situation is dependent upon and conditioned by his social environment.

B. The theoretical consideration of this fact and the study of how people behave either as individuals or in groups have led to the development by anthropologists of the term *culture*.

C. The culture concept.
  (*a*) Definition: "Ways of looking at things and ways of doing them, together with the tools and devices required to make them possible, collectively constitute the culture of a group." The term has no reference to quality.

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[1] The asterisk represents a required reading. See list in Appendix.



Paleolithic sculpture from Mentone
in southeastern France.



Bison, cave painting of Aurignacian age, from Altamira Cave in northern Spain.

(*b*) A culture includes —
  i. Material apparatus — natural objects, tools, instruments, devices, furniture, books — all kinds of utilized, manufactured, and constructed articles.
  ii. The psychological human factor — techniques, crafts, arts, skills, knowledges, attitudes. These ways of using material apparatus, whether with mind or body, and whether persons, situations, or things are the matter dealt with, may go on quite unconsciously.
  iii. Conventional acts — customs.
  iv. Institutions — "forms in accordance with which men enter into social relations." Not the real *doing* of things but *how they get done* when they happen. Institutions are numerous and varied.

(*c*) Cultures offer satisfactions to match human needs.

(*d*) We inherit many and basic cultural achievements from the remote past.

(*e*) Cultures changed by —
  i. Borrowing.
  ii. Invention.

(*f*) Man in his whole life, including his personal behavior and his judgment of right and wrong, is conditioned by the particular culture of which he is a part.

(*g*) Culture diseases.
  i. Material apparatus may last longer than it ought if human needs are to be best served.
  ii. Culture offerings do not always fit human needs. This may be due to —
    (*i*) Ignorance.
    (*ii*) Interference of special interests.
    (*iii*) Changes in conditions of life unaccompanied by correlative social changes.
  iii. Institutions may be compelled to function together even though they cannot function harmoniously.
  iv. Institutions may last on unsupported by vital allegiance.
  v. One culture may impose itself on another, causing maladaptation and adaptation and loss.
  vi. Cultures chain us to the past even while they support us in the present; only the most original persons strike out new paths.

QUESTIONS

1. Make clear the difference between the meaning of "culture" as associated with "cultured" and the meaning of "culture" as here defined.

2. Name some culture elements which appeared early in man's history.

3. How do culture elements come into existence in any given group?

4. What are some of the meanings of "cultural lag"? What may be elements in a culture which lag behind others?

5. Do various groups in the same society have the same culture patterns?

6. Can one group exercise pressure upon another group? How? To what practical advantage or disadvantage?

7. What reasons help to account for slow change in culture patterns?

3. Geography and history.

Assignment three: Geography and history

* Robert L. Carey, "Geography and history," *Syllabus*, 9–33.

GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

By Robert L. Carey

Instructor in Economics, Columbia College

Close relationship between geography and history, and between natural environment and culture, is an obvious fact. Some writers go so far as to say that "history is geography set in motion" and that "history is born of geography." While such remarks as these are not to be regarded too literally, it is indisputable that knowledge of geography and of the rôle that geographical factors have played in the drama of history enables the student of history to understand his material much more clearly. The term "geographic factors," of course, signifies the various elements of the physical environment, including climate, topography, river valleys, inland seas, oceans, mountains, deserts, mineral resources, and other factors, including flora and fauna. The growth and decay of cultures, of the works and institutions of man, should be studied in view of the geographical environment in which they have been set. One brilliant authority has expressed this idea in the following way:

> Man is a product of the earth's surface; the earth has mothered him, fed him, directed his thoughts, confronted him with difficulties that have sharpened his wits, given him problems of navigation and irrigation and at the same time whispered hints for their solution. Man can no more be scientifically studied apart from the ground which he tills, or the lands over which he travels, or the seas over which he trades, than polar bear or desert cactus can be understood apart from its habitat. Man's relations to his environment are infinitely more numerous and complex than those of the most highly organized plant or animal.

The purpose of this section of the course is to acquaint the student with some of the general functions of man's natural environment in relation to culture and to historical events, and then to turn to a discussion of the effects of a few specific geographical factors upon man's life at various stages in world history.

GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND CULTURE

The more palpable correlations between human culture and environment have long been observed. As far back as the fourth century B.C., Hippocrates discussed the influence of climate and physical environment on man's life. Aristotle considered the question of the influence of geographical position as affecting national character and the forms of law and government. Following this, little attention appears to have been devoted to the matter until the fourteenth century, when an Arabic historian, Khaldun, attempted to explain all history in terms of environmental effects. Bodin in the sixteenth century and Montesquieu in the eighteenth discussed the influence of climate and soil upon the culture of any people. In the nineteenth century, the great English historian Buckle and many historians of the German school, who sought to emphasize the compelling force of environment, made use of this same point of view. In America, two of the most recent and able students of geographical environment have been Miss Semple and Ellsworth Huntington, the latter tending to stress the influence of climate alone in shaping cultures and ways of life.

Our consideration of natural environment may be begun by differentiating between the physical and the cultural influences which it may exert. One must be warned at the outset against the temptation to overemphasize the significance of geographic factors on the life of man. Environment is more often permissive than mandatory. It would be regrettable if an obsession for the geographical interpretation of history should preclude from our view the importance of non-geographic factors in influencing history.

The demonstrable physical effects definitely attributable to environment are few. The belief that the skin color of the Negro and other dark-skinned people is the direct result of the tropical climate can no longer be maintained in the light of present knowledge. The black-skinned Tasmanian lived for countless ages in a temperate climate like that of southern England, while the peoples of Indonesia and tropical America are little darker than many Europeans. Stature is in some measure indirectly affected by climate through environmental opportunities to produce food supply.


The World according to HERODOTUS
EUROPE
Danube
SCYTHIA
Tanais (Don)
THRACE
Caucasus
Caspian Sea
Sardis
Athens
Pillars of Hercules
Carthage
LIBYA
Memphis
Thebes
EGYPT
Nile
ETHIOPIANS
ASSYRIA
MEDIA
ASIA
Susa
Babylon
PERSIA
ARABIA
INDIA
Indus
J.F.H.

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
Map of the WORLD according to ERATOSTHENES (200 B.C.)
Parallel of Thule
Thule
Northern Ocean
Brettannia
EUROPE
Celts
Massilia
Danube
Borysthenes
Tanais
Byzantium
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN
SCYTHIA
Jaxartes
Oxus
BACTRIA
Parallel of Borysthenes
Parallel of Byzantium
Sacred Pr.
Athens
Alexandria
Sidon
Issus
Taurus Mts.
Ganges
Parallel of Rhodes
Parallel of Alexandria
Carthage
LIBYA
Nile
Euphrates
Tigris
ASIA
PERSIA
PERSIAN GULF
Indus
INDIA
Tropic
ARABIA
RED SEA
NUBIANS
Meroe
Parallel of Meroe
ERYTHRÆAN SEA
Taprobane
Southern limit of known world
Atlantic Ocean
Pillars of Hercules
Meridian of Alexandria
Meridian of the Indus
Meridian of the Ganges

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Physical and mental energy, furthermore, is in part a consequence of climatic factors. In regard to this matter, Huntington has worked out some very interesting conclusions. He has studied the relative status of civilization and of "cultural efficiency" of all peoples and has mapped out the world into zones of cultural achievements and correlated these with climate. The optimal temperature and humidity for physical and intellectual efficiency is supplied, according to him, by the eastern United States and northwestern Europe, areas which, he alleges, have attained the world's highest cultural achievements. That is, he maintains that cultural development is a direct function of the climate. This is not the place to criticize this ingenious idea, but it should be said that his conclusions are, to say the least, very sweeping. It is obvious that what is an optimal temperature for some peoples would not necessarily be that for others. The peoples of China or India bred under tropical conditions would not necessarily find their highest efficiency in a temperature they rarely experience. Furthermore, the high cultures of Peru and of the Maya were developed in hot climates far removed from the theoretical optimum, to say nothing of the cultures of Egypt, Babylonia, and the Indus valley.

Another scholar, J. F. Horrabin, who is likewise interested in the study of the geographic factors in history, remarks that the history of the world is mainly the history of the temperate regions lying roughly between latitudes 30 degrees and 60 degrees. Horrabin does not go so far as Huntington in directly correlating civilization and climate. He takes the position that while no climate is absolutely intolerable to man, some climates are better adapted than others to encouraging his development. Thus, he concludes that because the temperate zone provided a greater stimulus to man than the tropics, human history came to be the history of temperate zones. This conclusion also is too broad. It is true that our attention in this course is directed mainly to civilization falling within the north temperate zone. This, however, is not the scene of all "human history." Furthermore, it should be remembered that as man's technological powers grow, climate becomes a less potent factor in influencing culture.

The other kind of environmental influence to which reference was made is cultural, and is concerned with the effects upon the institutions and the ways of life of man. Such an influence may be either direct or indirect. For example, the use of the snow house by the Eskimo and a high development of navigation in Polynesia are direct effects of the respective environments. Another illustration of this influence is afforded by the present industrial might of the United States, the basis of which is found in the presence of vast natural resources. The absence of strongly centralized government among desert tribes is an instance of indirect influence. Desert inhabitants live in small, widely scattered groups on account of the scarcity of food. Again, the distinctions between the culture of New England and of the southern states in eighteenth and nineteenth century America rested partly upon the difference in geographical backgrounds. Back of the Massachusetts town meeting, her commerce, her industry, her active abolitionist movement, historical geographers see the rugged topography, the granite soil, and the boulder-strewn fields of New England; back of the aristocratic slaveholding culture of the south, they see the broad fertile plantations of Virginia and the Carolinas.

Direct environmental influences are, as a rule, more evident and demonstrable in the material aspects of life, such as dress, diet, dwellings, implements, and industries. The material side of culture is largely dependent upon climate, topography, and raw materials, and it is in this field that environment makes itself most clearly felt. Indirect influences are commonly indicated in the more immaterial phases of life, such as social, political, and religious organization. It is often difficult to ascertain the precise part played by natural environment in influencing the social and religious characteristics of a people. Obviously, the more complex and highly developed a culture is, the greater is the number of factors other than geographical which may be responsible for these results. It is evident that the most primitive cultures lean most heavily upon the environment. Geographical conditions tell most directly upon primitive man because he is not adequately equipped with tools and knowledge to become master of his environment. "Civilized" man is much less affected by the pressure of geographical conditions. Throughout the ages, he has been engaged in a process of slowly conquering the obstacles of natural barriers, climate, space, and even time. It is possible to regard the history of civilization, from one point of view, as the story of man's increasing control over his natural environment — his decreasing dependency upon it.

Another distinction to be observed with reference to the influences exerted by geographical conditions is that they may be either positive or negative. They may restrict a percent development or they may offer positive opportunities. Thus, to take extreme examples, an arctic or a desert environment prevents the development of agriculture and tends, because of the limitation of food supplies, to restrict the population to scattered groups of small size. On the other hand, a fertile region with a favorable climate and well-indented shore line offers opportunities for the development of agriculture, commerce, and large centers of population. How effective the restrictions are depends upon the stage of cultural advancement of the inhabitants. The positive opportunities are more significant for the growth of cultures than the negative features of the environment. In the well-favored localities civilization had its origin, and in them it has made its advance.

It must be remembered, as has been said already, that in the main geographical environment is more permissive than compulsory; it offers opportunities which man may take or leave, although there are some natural barriers upon which it is written, "Thou shalt not pass." The most geography can do for a country or a culture is to make some things possible and other things impossible to the inhabitants. If certain conditions of land and sea, of river and mountain, of wind and rain, of heat and cold, are present in a country, it is likely that its history will correspond somewhat to the actions of these natural forces. Within the limits of these conditioning of factors, however, the people themselves determine what they can do and become.

Changing Significance of Geographic Factors

Having outlined very briefly some of the general relations between geographical environment and culture, the next step is to explain the changing significance of geographic factors at different times in history. It is customary to think of such factors as climate, topography, distribution of land and water, as virtually constant and unchanging. In a physical sense this is true, barring the changes due to erosion, movements of the earth's crust, variations in temperature, and the like. In another very real sense they may, however, undergo very marked change in their effects and their importance when considered in the light of their relationships to the technical, economic, and cultural growth of man. What is at one time or under one set of conditions a geographical obstacle to mankind's growth may, at a later time, become a direct aid to progress and expansion, and on the contrary, an advantage may later become a disadvantage. Natural barriers, such as deserts, swamps, oceans, and mountains, have been and often still are negative and restrictive forces in the environment. In so far as man has learned to scale mountains, to drain swamps, to navigate the seas, and even to irrigate desert lands, these one-time barriers have been conquered, often turned to good account.

One of the best illustrations of the changing significance of a geographic factor at different times is the desert, which has been the most formidable barrier to growth and to communication between peoples. Living on it or even crossing it demands a prodigious expenditure of effort. At an early stage of human development, such a barrier to communication proved to be a distinct advantage for further growth behind the protecting desert. Formidable natural barriers served to protect early centers of civilization from devastation by more primitive nomadic tribes. The Nile River valley in Egypt was the seat of a flourishing civilization for many centuries, partly because it was protected from the rest of the world by natural barriers. On the north was the sea and on the east, west, and south was the desert. Good climate and fertile soil, combined with such a high degree of natural protection, provided the geographically favorable setting in which the earliest of known civilizations was developed. Such barriers to communication, however, may at a later time become a disadvantage. There comes a time in the growth of a particular culture when the barriers set by the environment must be overcome, since further progress may depend upon contacts with other peoples and civilizations. Here again, the culture of ancient Egypt may be cited. Once the inhabitants of the Nile valley had solved most of the problems set by the immediate environment and developed a flourishing culture, the comparative isolation due to the desert frontiers was unfavorable to them. The paucity of contacts with other cultures was partly responsible for the stereotyping of Egyptian institutions, such as law, religion, and social patterns. Some authorities ascribe the stereotyping of Chinese culture traits to similar causes.

Two more illustrations of the changing significance of geographical factors may be given: the ocean and what is called "geographical position." Cultures in America had been practically isolated from those of the Old World because of the existence of a broad ocean on either side of the continent. These natural barriers may be said to be disadvantageous geographical factors in the sense that they precluded frequent and extensive contact between American and Old World cultures. As soon as man mastered the art of navigating the high seas, they became transformed from barriers to links of communication with many lands. In this way, America was thrown open to cultural influences from many sources. A geographical obstacle to growth had become a favoring circumstance.

Geographical position, the other factor to which reference was made above, can be clearly illustrated by the island of Great Britain. It is obvious that much of Britain's maritime power and prestige is traceable to her favorable geographic situation. While Britain, of course, has been in this same position for countless ages, it is only during the past three centuries that she has risen to prominence as a commercial, financial, and political power. Something will be said later concerning natural resources as the basis of her industrialism. Geographical position is a favorable or unfavorable factor in relation to the development reached by a people of a particular area or by the peoples of regions near that area. As long as civilization was centered about the Mediterranean Sea, as it was for thousands of years, Britain remained on the outskirts of the world of trade and commerce. Her situation was relatively a disadvantage to her inhabitants. As trade spread northward through the Rhine valley from the Mediterranean cities and as the Baltic and North seas gradually became the scene for increasing commercial enterprise, Britain was brought into closer contact with the world. And when the great discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries opened up the new worlds to the west and the east, Britain found herself in a very advantageous location almost at the very center of the world's carrying trade. Today, the opening of new routes across the Pacific and of new land routes since the advent of the railway has caused the advantages of that position to become relatively less. Perhaps the development of air transport in the future will change the significance which many important geographic factors possess today.

Having indicated by three examples the change in character of geographic factors in relation to the social and economic development of mankind, the remainder of this section will be devoted to an endeavor to show the student how specific factors have conditioned the life of man and historical events at different times in history. It is scarcely necessary to consider all geographic factors. Our discussion will be confined to the following: first, the river valleys and their influence upon two of the oldest civilizations; second, the inland sea, with special reference to the Mediterranean and the cultures located near it; third, the ocean and the effects of the opening of the transoceanic routes in the fifteenth century; fourth, the conditioning of historical events by topographical and physiographic features; and fifth, natural resources, their distribution about the earth's surface, and their effects upon national growth, international relations, and other historical phenomena.

River Valleys

Civilization has been described as a "fresh-water plant." The earliest known civilizations were situated near river valleys, largely because these regions afforded the geographical conditions essential to their maintenance and development. Primitive man often settled on the banks of streams or along water-bearing strata in which he could sink wells. The Nile, the Tigris and Euphrates, the rivers of India and China, the Rhine, the Seine, the Tiber, the Po, each developed its own culture. Civilization, among other things, involved settlement in one particular area, a characteristic which distinguished it from semibarbaric nomadism. It also meant an advancement over nomadism in the art of procuring a living through improvements in the technique of agriculture, which, in turn, led to greater division of labor and made possible a larger social unit. During the higher stages of nomadism, the unit of society was comparatively small, a self-sufficient tribe or clan of a few hundred individuals. The social unit in civilization has become much larger and may range from a self-contained village community or town to a great nation. The geographical conditions necessary for the development of such a settled agricultural life were fertility of the soil, natural protection against invaders, and fairly defined natural area forming a "geographic unit" with fairly easy means of internal communication, a unit not too small to accommodate a large population nor so extensive as to be beyond the control of the population.

Four river valleys in the ancient world, the Nile in Egypt, the Tigris and Euphrates in Mesopotamia, the Indus and Ganges in India, and the Whang-Ho in China, offered in more or less varying degrees these favoring conditions. In each was found a fertile soil and natural protections in the form of mountains, sea, or desert; each was a natural geographic unit with the river acting as the means for internal communication. The differences in degree in which these geographic factors operated partially account for certain distinctions in the culture of each area. It has been shown earlier how sea and desert provided the protection to Egypt against invasion and almost complete cultural isolation, which at a later time, when contact with other cultures was essential to the stimulation of further effort and growth, became a distinct disadvantage. In Mesopotamia, however, the natural barriers did not prove to be as effective as those near Egypt in resisting invasions from enemy tribes. It is true that there were protective features — mountains, swamps, and deserts forming a vast ring about this region. But the presence of several gaps through which marauding tribes could move from the habitable mountain regions to the north and east opened the rich fertile valley to repeated attack. According to one historian, "the history of the Tigris and the Euphrates from 2500 B.C. onwards is the history of the endeavors of surrounding peoples to become possessed of the fertile farm lands." Not being able to depend upon natural defenses as much as the Egyptians, the Babylonians and the Assyrians were obliged to develop the art of war and the organization of the military much more fully than the Egyptians. Again, in view of the greater facilities for contact with surrounding peoples, the economic aspect of the Mesopotamian civilization, while originally, as in Egypt, agricultural, came gradually to rest upon trade. In this way impetus to further technical and economic growth in Mesopotamia was provided. Contact with outside groups also made possible a wide dessemination of the cultural achievements of the peoples of the twin rivers. From the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates in early times and on until the expansion of Muhammadan power had ceased, there went out into the eastern and European countries countless influences in a wide range of cultural elements.

Perhaps another point may be added with regard to river valley civilizations. The river itself, apart from the advantages of the valley and its protection, may be a factor conducive to social and political unification. It is a bond of union between great numbers of men, setting them common problems and giving them certain common interests. The unifying power of a river may again be illustrated by the remarkable Nile valley civilization of thousands of years ago, the economic basis of which was agricultural. The periodic overflow of the river and fertilization of the valley led the inhabitants to perceive the great value of coöperation to the end of utilizing this natural force for their own benefit. If the floods of the powerful Nile were to be controlled for man's purposes, then most of the dwellers in the valley were obliged to act in unison. Together they transformed a force of destruction into an agency serving mankind. Great irrigation projects were undertaken. In this way, the river, encouraging coöperation between large groups of men, laid the economic foundation for the Egyptian political state. In the valley of the Yellow River in China, similar development took place, and the ruler who led in irrigation became a national hero, almost a demigod.

INLAND SEAS

We have observed how the beginnings of civilization have been linked with favorable natural surroundings and with certain technical advancements in the art of agriculture and in the development of public works such as water control and irrigation. The utilization of rivers as a means of communication has also been mentioned as another civilizing influence. The simple craft used for river transport were of various sorts, including the primitive raft and hollowed tree, vessels of skins and hides, and fairly large boats propelled by oar, used by the Egyptians thousands of years before the Christian era. At first, there was very little navigation beyond the river. As long as water transport was confined for the most part to rivers, and as long as contacts and communication were internal, civilization tended to remain localized. When man had so far developed the technique of water transport that he was able to sail upon the seas, civilization spread from the ancient centers to other lands. In ancient times, this diffusion of culture traits could take place only upon sheltered inland seas, where the natural obstacles to these early navigators were not too formidable. A chain of inland seas of this character existed in the Old World and ran between the African and Eurasian continents. What are now known as the Perisan Gulf and the Red, Black, Aegean, Adriatic, and Mediterranean seas constituted a major part of this great chain. Obviously, the most important of this group as a factor in facilitating the spread of civilization was the tideless Mediterranean, whose islands, peninsulas, and harbors offered haven for these primitive mariners.

Under these geographical conditions it was natural that the earliest European civilizations were in large measure maritime in character. The earliest and one of the most fascinating of these was the culture of the island Crete in the eastern Mediterranean. Its civilization was nearly as ancient as the Egyptian and spread gradually over the islands and coasts of the Aegean Sea, reaching its climax about 2000 B.C. While many features of Cretan life were borrowed from Egypt, and especially from southern Asia Minor, the inhabitants erected a flourishing and original culture of their own. The Cretans probably developed the art of sea navigation at a very early date, since this was the only means of contact between themselves and other island and mainland peoples. By means of direct trade with Egypt and by overland transport across Asia Minor, contacts between the oldest of known cultures were maintained for many centuries. The close relationship between the Cretan and the oldest of Greek civilizations, the Mycenaean, is another result of the contacts made possible by sea navigation. About 1800 B.C., Cretans migrated to the mainland of Peloponnesus and established themselves at Mycenae.

By 2000 B.C., the Phoenicians, another seafaring people, were sailing the waters of the Mediterranean. Their homeland, located on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and possessing two fine seaports, was of such a character that maritime habits were encouraged. The maritime feats of these venturesome people attracted traders from the Mesopotamian hinterland who were in search for broader markets for their goods. In this way, the Phoenicians were a very important connecting link between the Mediterranean and the Mesopotamian trading centers, and between the Orient and the Occident, sailing, as they often did, on the Red Sea and along the coast of Arabia. They helped to spread traits of the civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Crete first to the coastal regions of the eastern Mediterranean and later to that part of the West which is now Italy, southern France and Spain, and northern Africa. The sea, to them, had become a favoring circumstance of the environment, a positive opportunity, and was no longer a forbidding barrier. The value of the services which these daring traders have rendered to the cause of civilization's growth is inestimable. Along with other maritime peoples of the Mediterranean region, they transported traits of civilization from isolated centers to points far removed from their origins. By 1000 B.C., a whole group of peoples had become part of a loose Phoenician confederacy, a sort of geographic and economic unit, held together by Phoenician sea power and trading activities.

A long stride forward in the march of civilization was taken when iron implements and weapons were substituted for bronze. In the eastern Mediterranean setting which we have been describing, this great change took place about 1000 B.C. Inasmuch as nothing is known about the people who first discovered and used this new metal, we cannot look to geography or any other factor to help us to understand the place and character of its origin. We are assured, however, that geographic factors conditioned the spread of this new technique. The eastern Mediterranean was not a naturally protected area such as the older isolated centers of civilization had been. It was open to invasion from Barbarians from all directions except the south, where the Sahara Desert formed an invincible barrier. Much of the history of the Mediterranean peoples for thousands of years consisted of repeated incursions by tribes from beyond the fringe of civilization and of the consequent absorption of these groups.

Among the invading nomadic peoples who poured into the world of the Aegeans, Phoenicians, Egyptians, and Cretans, were the Greeks, the first people to construct a civilization based upon the use of iron.

The bronze age, characteristic of Aegean culture, was thus overthrown. The Greeks probably learned the use of iron from the Hittites of Asia Minor or the Danube barbarians. With their superior equipment they were able to conquer the whole peninsula. Availing themselves of the fairly highly developed art of navigation, they became seafarers, destroyed the Aegean civilization of Crete, sailed eastward into the Black Sea and westward to southern Italy and Sicily. They became traders, built a great merchant fleet, and engaged in competitive battle with their principal rivals, the Phoenicians. During the great period of Athenian ascendancy in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., the basis of Greek prosperity was primarily commercial and agricultural, a condition which was governed in considerable measure by the natural environment of Greece. Geographically, she was situated at the center of the ancient Mediterranean world and, though her mineral resources were not abundant, the quality of the soil and climate made possible a fairly prosperous agriculture. After Alexander the Great had welded the eastern Mediterranean into a political unit for a brief time, from 335 to 323 B.C., commerce continued to expand, a phenomenon attributable to the spread of Greek civilization. Great cities, such as Antioch, Alexandria, Carthage, Athens, Syracuse, Corinth, Rhodes, and Rome, grew rapidly as centers of trade and culture.

The next great power in the Mediterranean was the Roman. Living on the western side of the Italian peninsula, the Romans looked westward toward Carthage, a great city which had been founded by the Phoenicians about 800 B.C. on the North African coast where a somewhat elevated fertile strip of territory caught the rain-bearing winds and made habitation possible. While Greek power had been supreme in the eastern Mediterranean, Carthage was dominant in the West. An important step toward the unification of the Mediterranean area was the conquest of Carthage by Rome in 146 B.C.

Within the next century, the Romans invaded Gaul by way of the Rhone valley, penetrated deeply into the eastern Mediterranean region, and by 100 A.D. conquered Mesopotamia. The Roman Empire in the Mediterranean world emerged as a gigantic political unit, the various parts of which were in some measure economically dependent upon each other. Fundamentally, the empire was a geographical unit with the inland sea as its heart. In the words of Miss Semple, the Romans effectively utilized "the cementing power of the Mediterranean and the fairly unified civilization which their enclosed sea had been evolving since the dawn of Cretan and Phoenician trade." European civilization from this time was to take the lead in the history of the western world.

Another factor which aided the Romans in maintaining unified control over the territories to the north and northwest was the construction of roads and highways. This significant technical advancement in land transport was partly a consequence of their desire to avoid dependence upon circuitous and winding river valleys and other natural routes. These avenues facilitated the process of spreading civilization toward the north, away from the Mediterranean inland sea area as the center. Yet many centuries elapsed before the Mediterranean ceased to be the center of western civilization. Even after the fall of the empire, this region dominated European civilization. The Papacy was a Mediterranean power, with the Pope occupying a position of prominence in secular and religious matters. Great Italian cities like Genoa and Venice rose to positions of commercial preëminence. At Venice the waters of the Mediterranean system approached nearer to the lowlands of central Europe than at any other point. Natural avenues led northward into south Germany by the Brenner, the lowest of the Alpine passes. These natural and man-made lines of communication radiated northward and northwestward from the Mediterranean, which remained the heart of the western world until the great geographical discoveries of the fifteenth century.

Before leaving this subject of inland seas, reference must be made to another inland sea area farther north, linked by geographical and economic ties to the Mediterranean. From Venice and Genoa, traders moved northward through the Alpine passes and the Rhine valley to the coast of the North Sea. Important cities grew up along the banks and at the mouths of the rivers flowing into the North Sea. In the Middle Ages, the enterprising merchants of Germany, Flanders, and England, with commercial bases in the important seacoast towns, unified the North and Baltic seas and extended their trading operations to nearly all of their inland sea region. The area of civilization was being extended by trade under conditions not unlike those which had acted upon the earlier traders in the southern sea. As one writer expresses it, "the Baltic Sea played the rôle of a Northern Mediterranean."

THE OCEAN

In the preceding section, we observed how European civilization for centuries clustered about one inland sea, the Mediterranean, and how it spread gradually by land and river routes northward and westward over the mainland of Europe. The Sahara Desert to the south was an almost invincible barrier which shut out African peoples from the influences of civilization's progress. In the present section, an attempt is made to demonstrate the tremendous significance of the opening of ocean routes to mankind.

If there is any period in world history when geography cannot be ignored, it is the latter half of the fifteenth and the early sixteenth century. The geographical explorations and discoveries of these eventful years reacted in manifold ways upon the intellectual, social, and political ideas of the time. The discoveries had been made possible by the development of the technique of navigation on high seas far from the sight of land. This remarkable technique is described by one historical geographer by the following words: "The transformation of the ocean into a highway by the development of navigation is a late occurrence in the history of man, and is perhaps the highest phase of his adaptation to environment, because an adaptation which placed at his disposal that vast water area (three quarters of the earth's surface) from which he had previously been excluded." Not only was this vast area opened up to man, but the highways to all the seacoasts of the world lay before him. Doubtless, man's conquest of the ocean is one of the greatest events of history.

The actual area of sea and land opened up during the last fifty years of the fifteenth century alone was about as large as that discovered during the preceding nine centuries and almost as large as the whole civilized world in Roman times. Furthermore, the discoveries of the Middle Ages has been made for the most part in unprofitable regions, while those of the fifteenth century were made in countries rich with spoils and resources. Without doubt the Crusades had led to the far eastern journeys of men like Marco Polo in the thirteenth century, but such traveling was exceptional. In the fifteenth century and still more in the sixteenth, probably hundreds traveled where one had traveled in the thirteenth century. The explorers and travelers were followed by crowds of merchants and missionaries who took possession of the newly discovered lands in the name of state and church. The discovery of America was highly significant to the Old World. It was not until the seventeenth century that colonization and exportation made the new land a real economic power, but as early as the sixteenth century people in Europe were thinking of it as a possible haven for the politically and religiously oppressed and as the scene of economic advantage.

A thoroughgoing change was brought about in the trade routes of Europe by the geographical discoveries of this period. Hitherto, all commerce between the East and the West, whether in Phoenician, Greek, Roman, or Venetian vessels, had passed up and down the Mediterranean. Suddenly, the old trade routes became less important and new channels of trade opened up which avoided the Mediterranean altogether.

The Portuguese were the first people to open up the ocean way to India, when Vasco da Gama in 1498 rounded the Cape, sailed up the east coast of Africa, and landed on the western coast of India. Meanwhile, Spain, the rival of Portugal, had sponsored the project of a Genoese sailor, Christopher Columbus, who hoped to reach India by sailing westward, believing that the world was round. When Columbus landed on the islands off the coast of Central America, he thought he had reached the Spice Islands somewhere near China and he named them the West Indies. About twenty-five years later, Magellan conducted an expedition around the southern extremity of South America across the Pacific to Asia, finally reaching the East Indies by a western route. Three great oceans, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian, had been sailed by man.

The immediate effect of the new route to India was to give Portugal a monopoly of the eastern trade and to swell the profits of the Lisbon merchants. The Indian Ocean, as one geographer states, became "a Portuguese lake." Portugual, however, was unable to keep its monopoly very long. The merchants of England, Holland, and Germany secured an increasing share of the spoils. This was due directly to political rather than geographical reasons. Portugal lacked the population and the military power to sustain her monopolistic control. Indirectly the character of the land of Portugal played an important part by imposing limits on her internal development.

Another effect of the great maritime voyages and the discovery of a new world was the shift in the center of western civilization from the Mediterranean inland sea region to the eastern and northeastern Atlantic. On account of the Cape route to India, to wealth and prestige of the Mediterranean trading centers — Venice, Genoa, and others — declined rapidly. Political power in Italy fell into the hands of tyrants who called in foreign powers to help them against their rivals, thus encouraging the French invasions of Italy at the end of the fifteenth century. The Atlantic routes to the New World, furthermore, gave the countries situated on the northwest coast of Europe a great advantage. Because of man's technical growth and because of happy geographical accident, the lands facing the Atlantic found themselves on the main highway of the world's commerce. The civilization of the Old World was carried from there to vast and hitherto unknown areas of the earth. "The Atlantic had become the maritime field of history."

Topography as a Geographic Factor Affecting History

Up to this point, we have adhered fairly closely to the course of history in our illustration of the influences of river valleys, inland seas, and the oceans. It does not follow from this that our purpose is to sketch chronologically and in geographical terms the growth and spread of civilization down to the present time. In discussing the conditioning of historical events by topography, only a few illustrations, selected at random and without reference to historical sequence, need be given.

Some very interesting speculations have arisen out of the attempt to associate topography, landscapes, and even geology with historical phenomena and human character. Lord Bryce believed the minds of the American people to be directly affected by the scenery of the United States. John Ruskin thought that the gray sandstone country in northwestern Switzerland was the most perfect for the development of human intelligence. André Siegfried holds that those parts of France based upon limestone have tended to be radical while those based on granite have been conservative. It is doubtful if such conclusions, even though locally verified, hold true when applied to a larger field of observation. Yet the conditioning influence of topographical features on historical events is unmistakable, as passing allusions previously made relative to this matter have probably shown.

The tragic history of Poland in the latter part of the eighteenth century was partly a consequence of her topographical condition. The partitioning of that country by Russia, Prussia, and Austria has been ascribed to the corruption of the governing classes and to the vicious character of her constitution. No doubt there is just cause for stressing these failings, but the physiography of Poland as a flat country with no natural frontiers offered a standing temptation to the three powers by which she was surrounded. It was an easy matter to pour armies from all directions into that unfortunate country. By way of contrast, the mountains of Switzerland, as a natural protection, have been instrumental in enabling a people speaking three different languages, professing both the Catholic and the Protestant religion, and even of different racial stocks, to maintain her national independence.

A most interesting phase of our study of the geographical background of history is the conditioning of great migrations and movements of peoples by physiography. Thousands of examples could be presented. To choose a very old one, geological evidence tells us that a subsidence of part of the shores of the Baltic Sea in prehistoric days caused a considerable migration of Goths from that region to the Black Sea and the Danube valley. Again, some of the reasons for the break-up of the unified control of the Mediterranean area in the early Christian era were physiographic. The fall of the Roman Empire has been attributed — along with other causes, of course — to the repeated invasions of Huns and Goths in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries A.D. The general topographic features of central Europe and the flatness of the Russian steppes facilitated these epoch-making incursions. The Roman northern frontier in Europe was not a natural line of defense, and it was too long to fortify adequately. Attracted by the pleasant climate and the natural resources of Italy, waves of barbaric nomads broke through the frontier lines. The weakest spot in the Roman defense was the Danube valley, which in three places bent, in sharp angular fashion, toward Italy. Other waves poured in through the natural gateway between

Europe and Asia, which ran from south central Asia, through the way cleared by main blocks of mountains on either side, past the northern rim of the Black Sea, into Europe. Some historians maintain that because the nomads of central Asia could not successfully prey upon the East, owing to the effective defenses established by China, they turned their attentions to the West. The astounding career of conquest of Jenghiz Khan and the Mongols in the early thirteenth century, which he carried to the very threshold of Europe, was also made possible by the topography of central Asia and the same natural gateway described above. Had Europe been ruled off from Asia by a great and continuous mountain range, the history of western Europe would not have followed the course it has taken.

The migration of the Arabs into the western Mediterranean region constitutes our last illustration of topography as a historical factor. These invaders were not barbarians but were highly skilled in mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. The movement of these people from their homeland in the seventh century A.D. is not to be ascribed solely to the fanaticism inspired by the preaching of Muhammad. It had begun before the great prophet was born. The rigors of the climate compelled, and the topographical conditions facilitated, these movements. Migration was the sole alternative to starvation for a large part of the population, since it was becoming increasingly difficult to support a growing population in that environment. Arabia had been undergoing a process of desiccation for centuries before Islam came upon the world. These natural factors were combined with another cause, a decline in commercial prosperity, in their effects upon these migrations. The flatness of North Africa made it easier for the Arabs, after sweeping across Syria to the Taurus mountains and westward across Egypt, to move along the northern fringe of the African continent as far as the westernmost extremity of the Mediterranean Sea. From this point, they invaded Europe through southern Spain. It was another topographical feature which helped to break the incursions of the Moslems into northwestern Europe — the Pyrenees mountains. Although it is true that the Moslems poured through the mountain passes into Gaul, where Charles Martel stopped them at Tours in 732 A.D., they did not venture to invade Europe again by crossing the range.

Natural Resources

Natural resources, as a geographic factor, have exercised a profound influence on history, especially since the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a movement which involved a large, but not complete, substitution of machinery for hand labor in the manufacture of goods. While the industrial revolution itself was conditioned by geographic factors, such as the presence of abundant coal and iron in Britain, where the movement is considered to have begun, it would be erroneous to interpret this prodigious industrial and social change by geography alone. Many other factors of a non-geographic character must be taken into account in order fully to understand it. However, the industrial revolution was responsible for creating a situation in which the problem of raw materials and their distribution became one of paramount importance to all industrial nations.

The natural resources are indispensable to national industrial and political growth is an evident fact. Two of the geographic factors which have contributed heavily to the growth of the "great powers" — the United States, England, France, Germany, and Japan — are: first, the accessibility of raw materials and the ability to exploit and use them; and, second, trade routes essential for the transportation of raw materials and finished goods to the markets of the world. The presence of natural resources in a country is only a permissive factor. It does not necessarily follow that a nation richly endowed with natural wealth is also a great economic and political power. If it were a matter of availability of resources alone, Russia, China, Manchuria, and parts of South America would be among the most powerful nations today. In the words of one historical geographer, "Soil and climate, forest and minerals do not make an empire; they furnish merely the physical basis for one." China possesses the largest coal resources in the world, the United States excepted. Besides coal, China has iron and considerable deposits of tin, lead and oil, and is the third largest producer of raw cotton. Manchuria also is heavily endowed with natural resources. The existence of this vast natural wealth was one of the most important reasons for partitioning the Far East into spheres of influence by western imperialist nations and by Japan.

Japan's rise to a position of importance in the family of nations has been, in part, conditioned by her geographical environment. For a long time, the Pacific Ocean assisted her in maintaining isolation from western cultures, but when her isolation broke down in the middle of the nineteenth century, she adopted many institutions of western civilization. Her expanding industrialism demanded raw materials. Her own mineral resources are relatively insignificant, and it is for this reason that she has become vitally interested in securing control of coal and iron in China, a policy which has brought her into conflict with other powers. In the struggle for the exploitation of untouched mineral wealth of China, Japan enjoys considerable geographical advantages. Her bases are near at hand; her islands command much of the Asiatic coast; her possession of Korea and of strategic ports on the mainland give her a greater access to these materials than the British bases in Hongkong and Singapore or the American bases in the Philippines. This tends to make Japan the dominant power in the Far East. During the World War, she made full use of her geographical advantages by procuring for herself special concessions in China, especially in Shantung, a "key position" rich in natural resources.

For further illustration of the relationship between resources and national growth, a few facts may be noted about Britain, Russia, and the United States. The industrial might of Britain was built upon her copious and easily accessible supplies of coal and iron. For over a century, Britain was the "world's workshop" and leading industrial power. During the years immediately preceding the World War, however, Britain fell to third place as an iron, steel, and coal producing nation. Her supplies of raw material were becoming relatively smaller and less accessible, and this was especially true of coal. It would be far from the truth to ascribe Britain's relative decline to this geographic fact alone, but taken in conjunction with other circumstances, such as the war and the rise of national competitors, it is a matter of no little importance.

Potentially, Russia is in a position to become one of the greatest industrial powers in the world. Her vast resources are said to be second to America's only, and perhaps second to none, inasmuch as they are still largely an unknown quantity. Her coal and iron supplies are considerable; her petroleum output is second only to that of the United States; her timber resources are by far the greatest in the world; and with the Ukraine, she is one of the greatest wheat producing areas in the world.

It is scarcely necessary to enumerate the geographic factors in the United States which have been the physical basis for her mighty empire. Favorable climate, fertile soil, navigable rivers and lakes, good harbors, and immense wealth in natural resources are among these factors. As in Britain, the economic power of the United States has been based upon this vast wealth of raw materials and upon the development of a skill and technique capable of utilizing it. Nearly three-quarters of the world's coal reserves are in North America, and the largest part of these are in the United States, which produces nearly one-half of the world's output of coal. Over a third of known iron reserves are in the United States. The greatest single iron-ore field is in Brazil, and the fourth largest in Cuba, areas which are near enough to the United States to be developed by American coal and controlled by American capital. Of cotton, wheat, meat, and other agricultural products, the United States produces not only her own supplies but a large surplus available for export. Further, in 1920 two-thirds of the world's petroleum output came from the United States. It is true that a threatened exhaustion of a particular raw material in any country, as well as its possession, may affect the history of that country. Inasmuch as American oil resources are reported to be rapidly diminishing, the United States has sought concessions in other oil producing lands of Mexico, Central America, and the Orient, and has become involved in the politics of these lands. Many authorities attribute American imperialism in Latin America to a desire on the part of American bankers and industrialists to gain control over the oil wells of Central America and the Caribbean region, the wheat and meat of Argentina, the nitrate beds of Chile, and the mineral wealth of Peru.

Natural resources are not only indispensable to national industrial expansion, as has been explained, but also have been partly responsible for drawing the various parts of the world more closely together. Nature has not scattered coal, iron, copper, timber, oil, and wheat lands in the lavish way in which she has distributed air and sunshine. These highly essential things are localized in particular areas. Some areas produce more of these raw materials than they can consume, while others are destitute of or inadequately supplied with them, a condition which necessitates trade and exchange. The world's economic system is based upon an interchange of products involving natural resources and finished articles. Each area tends to become dependent upon some other area or group of areas. Even the United States, which is more self-contained than any other modern nation, must depend upon other countries for such essential commodities as coffee, rubber, tin, silk, vegetable oils, and tropical fruits. The interdependent character of our contemporary world has increased international contacts and has made impossible complete isolation by any important part of the world from other nations and from world problems.

The facts of economic geography described above, having drawn the nations more tightly together, have had the effect of increasing international tension and rivalry. In the name of nationalism, they have provided zones of friction in the struggle for control over strategic sources of supply of raw materials and over markets. The friction between France and Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for example, has been in some measure due to geographic facts. The victory of Germany over France in 1871 lost to the latter the valuable Lorraine ore fields, a circumstance which is alleged to be one of the basic causes of the "war of revenge" of 1914–1918. Again, French industrial development in the nineteenth century was retarded, relative to the growth of Germany and other countries, by her lack of coal. France's lust for coal was displayed in the treaty of 1920, by which valuable coal fields, formerly belonging to Germany, were ceded to France.

To illustrate this point further, reference may be made to the national rivalry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries over the struggle for concessions in the Far East involving all the great powers of the world. Japanese and American rivalry has been particularly keen over the competition for control of coal and iron in China, not so much because America needs these supplies as Japan does, but because of the geographical distribution of the coal inside the United States. Most of the great American coal fields lie near the eastern seaboard. As her Pacific coast develops industrially, it is believed that Chinese coal mined by cheap labor can be brought to the west coast of the United States more cheaply than American coal transported either by railroad or through the Panama Canal. To refer to another geographical area, the markets of South America are likely to become an acute cause of conflict between Britain and the United States.

Allusion to just one more illustration of the geographic background of these world "zones of friction" brings our whole discussion to its end. Three great world groups are involved in it, Japan, Russia, and the British Empire. Japan, looking across the Pacific east and south, sees the lands of the United States, Canada, and Australia reserved for white men. Her own dreams of Asia for the Asiatics are shattered by the British occupation of India and by British interests in China. Russia, seeking a gateway from her Black Sea ports into the Mediterranean and Atlantic, finds she also must reckon with Britain and other world powers fearful of Russia's economic competition. Furthermore, Russia's geographical location on the borders of those Near Eastern lands leading to India, which is so precious to Britain, is a permanent threat to British security. Perhaps there is much truth in the ominous words of one noted economic geographer who says "in a world constituted as ours is today, its geography provides not a few seeds of future wars."

QUESTIONS

1. What is meant by the statement that "environment is more often permissive than mandatory" with respect to the physical influence of geography on man?
2. To what extent has the development of civilization been confined to the north temperate zone?
3. Give examples of the influence of geographical environment on human cultures, *i. e.*, institutions and ways of life.
4. Why is civilized man less affected by the pressure of geographical conditions than non-civilized man?
5. When and how do natural barriers, such as deserts, mountains, open seas, and oceans, aid the development of civilization, and when and how do they hinder it? Illustrate.
6. In what regions did early civilizations develop? What conditions favored that development?
7. Describe the historical development of civilizations in the Mediterranean area.
8. What were the effects of ocean navigation on trade, trade centers, and political power?
9. Illustrate by several examples the effect of topography as a determining factor in history.
10. What are the geographic factors which condition Japan's world position?

II. WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES

(1200–1400)

1. Political life in the Middle Ages.

Assignment four: Political life in the Middle Ages

* Irving W. Raymond, "Political life in the Middle Ages," *Syllabus*, 34–65.

POLITICAL LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

By Irving W. Raymond

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Men have always shown more interest in their fellow men than in their physical environment. As Aristole has put it, "By nature man is a social animal." This social nature of man and his necessity of living together in order to enjoy to the full the benefits of civilized life made imperative the establishment of some institution that would order and regulate his relations with his fellows. This institution possessing supreme power over the relations between men is loosely called the government. Once founded, the government begins to extend its jurisdiction. It not only regulates the relations between citizens but also those between members of the state and their government. It takes care to insure not only the peaceful and orderly conduct of affairs at home, but also provides protection and security for the community from the attacks of hostile neighbors without. In origin often conceived as a gift or foundation of God, the government also has come to some understanding with the Divine whom it may accept or reject. Thus government is essentially a complex institution with a vast field of relationships to supervise.

THE POLITICAL HERITAGE OF THE ANCIENT WORLD

The political life of the Middle Ages inherited a rich legacy from the peoples of the ancient Mediterranean world. From Palestine came the idea and form of a theocratic kingship. The king was anointed of God by His priestly representatives and placed in charge of a "Chosen People." To be treasonable to the king was to be rebellious to God.


The TRACKS of various MIGRATING & RAIDING PEOPLES
between 1 AD and 700 AD.
Circles represent phases of settlement.
The reader must bear in mind that there was also an annual north-&-south oscillation (between Summer & winter pastures) of all the nomadic peoples…
Huns 1st C.
Chinese Imperialism
Yue Chi
1st C.
Turks
Ephthalites (White Huns)
Indo-Scythians (2nd C.)
Ephthalite Raids (5th C.)
Magyars 6th C.
Avars 6th C.
Bulgars 4th C.
Finns
Alans
Teutons
(Lapps)
Esthonians
Slavs
Jugo Slavs
Czechs
Goths
Vandals
Lombards
Saxons
Jutes
Angles & Saxons
Picts & Scots
Franks
Suevi
Visigoths
Arabs (7th C.)
Arabs 7th C.
Arabs
Huns
HUNS 1st to 4th C.
OSTRO-GOTHS 3rd C.
HUNS 5th C.
VANDAL KINGDOM 5th C.
GOTHIC KINGDOM 5th C.
710
British
J.F.H.
Inset Map showing GOTHIC Migrations separately..
Don
OSTRO GOTHS 3rd C.
VISI-GOTHS 2nd C.
1st Century
Danube
V.G.
O.G.
GOTHIC KINGDOM 5th C.

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The earthly Jerusalem, under priest and king, was to lead the way to the heavenly Jerusalem. Moral values were to be the supreme values in life, and politics was to be subservient to the ends of the moral order. From Greece came the very name of "politics" and its common vocabulary — "aristocracy," "oligarchy," "democracy," and the like. In Greece it may truly be said that man first became a political animal, a freely acting being directing his own destiny to his own ends. From Greece also came many of those basic political ideas and practices that have enriched the political life of mankind. Such were the basic Greek notions of society as a way of living to promote a richer life for all; and ordinances as those authoritative general principles of divine or human origin which govern behavior; of justice, law, nature, and freedom in their several Greek interpretations. Greece indeed was a veritable laboratory of political experiment. From Rome came not only the individual Roman emphasis on order, might, common sense, integrity, and sternness, but also the fusion of that strictly Roman contribution with the great inheritance of political principles and practices of the Mediterranean world. This fusion resulted in those great Roman administrative institutions and methods — the empire, the province, the city — and above all in her magnificent system of laws, which was one of the greatest political achievements of ancient times.

New Lands, New Peoples, and New Kingdoms

Whereas the environment of the great peoples of antiquity had been the lands surrounding or adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea, the scene of the political life of the Middle Ages included the lands of central, western, and even northern Europe. France, the Germanies, and England were no longer just provinces of an empire, but kingdoms slowly developing a political life that was later to mature into our modern national states. This new physical environment enabled political experiments to be made and a new society to be constructed, not so much by the destruction of the old as by the blending of the cultures of the South and of the North.

The new peoples — barbarian invaders, or Germans, as sometimes they are loosely called — brought into the political life of Europe a new culture. Earning their living largely from herding and agriculture, and


Map of EUROPE about 500 A.D.
Picts
Scots
Britons
Anglo Saxons
NORTH SEA
Jutes
Saxons
BALTIC
Slavs
Elbe
Kingdom of the Franks
Loire
Rhine
Burgundians
Rhone
Lombards
CARPATHIANS
Danube
Po
Suevi
Kingdom of the Visigoths
Kingdom of the Ostrogoths
Ravenna
Danube
Eastern Roman Empire
Constantinople
CORSICA
Rome
SARDINIA
Kingdom of the Vandals
MEDITERRANEAN
SICILY
Carthage
J.F.H.

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dwelling in small villages, they developed simple and direct political institutions. The elements of political life were developed from the family and the tribe. There were in the young northern peoples an extraordinary sense of loyalty and honor and a great love of freedom. These energetic peoples brought an invigorating strain of blood that enriched the depleted blood of the decadent Romans. The new inhabitants of Europe, blending with the native and Roman stocks of the empire, formed a composite race which was toughened and strengthened by a cruel physical and social environment which constantly weeded out those unable to meet its inexorable demands.

These peoples of barbarian origin in the course of the fourth and fifth centuries founded kingdoms on the former territories of the Roman Empire in the West. In place of the Roman provinces of Italy, Gaul, Spain, Africa, and Britain, there arose the kingdoms of the Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Vandals, Suevi, Franks, Burgundians, Anglo-Saxons, and other barbarian peoples. These kingdoms lasted for several centuries until nearly all of them were destroyed either by the Eastern Roman Empire or by new invasions of Lombards, Moslems, and Northmen. Those western lands which survived these hostile attacks fell under the aegis of the Carolingian house of the Frankish kingdom in the late eighth century. In the closing years of that century and the beginning year of the ninth century Charlemagne, the greatest of the Frankish kings, united most of the countries of the West into a mighty empire that sought its political model in the old Roman Empire and its spiritual life in the religion of Christ. This great western empire was surrounded on all sides by hostile neighbors. To the east there lay the mighty Roman or Byzantine Empire, to the south there stretched the lands of the Moslem caliphates, to the north the warlike and covetous barbarian peoples, and to the west the ocean tossed its angry waters.

THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE IN THE EAST

In contrast to the untutored, crude, and unorganized groups of younger peoples in the North, there existed in the Eastern Roman Empire a highly developed culture. For over a thousand years, from the end of the fourth century to the middle of the fifteenth, the Byzantine Empire was the center of a civilization equal to that of any age in brilliancy, certainly the most brilliant known to the Middle Ages, and possibly even the only real civilization which prevailed in Europe between the close of the fifth century and the beginning of the eleventh.

> While the barbarian states of the West were laboriously developing the elements of a new culture from the scanty remains of the Roman tradition, Byzantium — Rome's successor, and imbued with the spirit and teachings of Hellenism — never ceased to be the center of refinement and the home of a great movement in thought and art. Byzantium, indeed, was no mere transmitter of the tradition of antiquity. Contact with the East had modified her, and the influence of Christianity had left a deep imprint; and, contrary to a still widely spread opinion, she was capable of originality and creation. Hellenism, Christianity, and the East met and combined in forming Byzantine civilization; and by the characteristic forms it assumed, by its superiority, as well as by the long and profound influence it exercised in both the eastern and western world, this civilization played a prominent part in the history of the Middle Ages, the history of thought, and the history of mankind.



Byzantine mosaic, Justinian and his court and Bishop Maximianus: c. 540 A.D. San Vitale, Ravenna, Italy.

For over a thousand years, Constantinople, the capital of the empire, was the most brilliant and characteristic expression of this civilization. For over a thousand years the whole world gazed with feelings of admiration and greed at the city which Byzantines called "the City protected by God," or merely "the City," the magnificent, mighty, and prosperous city which has been felicitously described as "the Paris of the Middle Ages." The whole medieval world dreamt of Constantinople as a city famous for beauty, wealth, and power, seen through a shimmer of gold. "She is the glory of Greece," wrote a Frenchman in the twelfth century; "her wealth is renowned, and she is even richer than is reported." "Constantinople," said another, "is the peer of Rome in holiness and majesty"; and Benjamin of Tudela adds: "Except Baghdad there is no town in the universe to be compared with her." According to Robert of Clari, it was said that "two-thirds of the world's wealth were in Constantinople, and the other third was scattered throughout the world." And everyone knows the celebrated passage in which Villehardouin declares: "No man could believe that so rich a city existed in all the world," and asserts that the city was "queen over all others." The fame of the imperial city resounded throughout the whole of the then known world. Men dreamt of her amid the chilly mists of Norway, and on the banks of the Russian rivers, down which the Varangians sailed towards matchless Tsarigrad; they dreamt of her in western strongholds, where trouvères sang the marvels of the imperial palace, the floating hall swayed by the breezes of the sea, and the dazzling carbuncle which gave light to the imperial apartments during the night. Men dreamt of her alike among the barbarian Slavs and the needy Armenians, who aspired to seek their fortunes in the service of an emperor lavish of pay. Men dreamt of her in Venice and the commercial cities of Italy, and calculated the magnificent revenues which the Byzantine sovereigns yearly derived from their city. Even up to her final days of decadence, Constantinople remained one of the most beautiful and illustrious cities of the universe, the splendid center and ornament of the empire, the home of matchless wealth and culture, the pride and glory of the monarchy.

In this vast city there dwelt an enormous population whose numbers during the period between the fifth and the thirteenth century may be fixed without exaggeration at from 800,000, to 1,000,000. It was a motley and cosmopolitan population in which might be met every type, garb, condition, race. From every province in the empire and every country in the world men flocked to Byzantium for business, for pleasure, for litigation. There were Asiatics with hooked noses, almond eyes under thick eyebrows, pointed beards, and long black hair falling over their shoulders; Bulgars with shaved heads and dirty clothes, wearing an iron chain round their waists by way of belt; fur-clad Russians with long fair mustaches; Armenian or Scandinavian adventurers, who had come to seek their fortunes in the great city; Moslem merchants from Baghdad or Syria, and western merchants, Italians from Venice or Amalfi, Pisa, or Genoa, Spaniards, and Frenchmen; there were Chazars of the Imperial Guard, Varangians "tall as palm-trees," Latin mercenaries with long swords, who in their armor "looked like bronze figures." There was a confusion of every tongue and every religion. And in the midst of this animated and picturesque crowd, the inhabitants of the city might be recognized by the rich silken garments embroidered with gold in which they were clad, the fine horses on which they were mounted, and the exhibition of such luxury as gave them, as was said by a traveler, the "semblance of so many princes." Anyone who visited Constantinople a few years ago will remember the spectacle offered by the Great Bridge at Stamboul. Medieval Byzantium offered a somewhat similar spectacle, and foreigners who visited the imperial city carried away a dazzling picture of the Byzantine streets.

But in this magnificent Constantinople full of splendid sights, where extravagance of costume vied with beauty of architecture, three things were specially characteristic of Byzantine civilization: the pomp of religious ceremonial as displayed by the Orthodox liturgy on great feast days; the brilliant ostentation of imperial life shown in the receptions and the etiquette of the Sacred Palace; and the amusements of the Hippodrome, where was manifested the mind of the people. "In Constantinople," says A. Rambaud, "for God there was St. Sophia, for the emperor the Sacred Palace, and for the people the Hippodrome." Round these three poles there gravitated a great part of Byzantine life, and in them may best be studied some of the leading features of this society.[1]

The government of the Byzantine Empire was a military despotism. The emperor regarded himself as the heir of the Roman Caesars, an Asiatic master before whom all were as slaves, and finally the elect of God, His vicar on earth. From this combination of Roman, Asiatic, and Christian elements resulted a power that knew no limits theoretically, though actually it was tempered somewhat by the wishes of Senate,

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[1] Charles Diehl, in *Cambridge medieval history*, IV, 745–746, 750. The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

People, Church, and Army. The central government was run by a gigantic bureaucracy that determined its social and political hierarchy. Great departments carried on the business of government in their respective spheres of jurisdiction. Imperial spies watched over the whole system. The lands outside the capital were divided into provinces or "themes," military divisions which were governed by high military officers of the emperor or by local magnates who were almost completely independent. Mercenaries, highly trained in siege operations and cavalry maneuvers, supplemented the native levies in protecting the empire. Corrupt though the government was at times, it nevertheless was strong enough to protect itself from barbarians in the Balkans, Persians in Asia Minor, and Arabs in the Levant.

The real head of the Byzantine or Orthodox Church was the emperor, not the Patriarch of Constantinople or his fellow patriarchs of Alexandria and of Jerusalem. The ideal of Caesaro-Papism was "one State, one Church." In the early Middle Ages this church had broken with the church in the West. The causes of this schism were complex and the course of the quarrel long and shifting. Much of the controversy centered around the use of images in worship. One faction of the East demanded that these images — they might be mosaics, pictures, or statues — be destroyed and thereafter their use interdicted. Closely allied to and aided by a friendly government, these iconoclasts (image-breakers) persecuted those who cherished and used images in their devotions. When the issue was referred to Rome, the popes usually ruled that it was proper to use images as aids to worship but that the images themselves should not be worshiped. The eastern government and the Patriarch of Constantinople broke off relations with the western church and, though now and then the schism was healed, for the most part East and West remained apart until finally two stubborn and uncompromising men, Pope Leo IX and the patriarch Michael Cerularius, made the breach irreparable in 1054. Back of the specific iconoclastic controversy were fundamental issues that were the real causes of the break. The East was Greek and the West was Latin, two distinct civilizations with different ways of viewing and experiencing life. Then there were the quarrels over ecclesiastical jurisdiction in southern Italy and the Balkans, but above all there was a basic difference in conception over the nature of the government of the church. Was it a monarchy under the western patriarch (the Pope) or was it an oligarchy ruled by a group of patriarchs from both East and West? Was the ruling order of the church the papacy or the bishops? Such a fundamental question could not be compromised, and a separation of the western and eastern churches ensued that has continued to our own day, exerting a strong and persistent influence on the course of history.

As ruler of the East and guardian of the precious heritage of Greek civilization, the Byzantine Empire served as a bulwark to western civilization. For centuries enemies beat in vain against the fortresses which, though thousands of miles away, nevertheless protected the West from northern and eastern invaders. The overthrow of this protective bulwark, to which the westerners in the Fourth Crusade contributed a large share, made Europe later realize, when brought face to face with hostile invaders in the sixteenth century, the important function that the Byzantine state had so ably performed in earlier centuries. Yet before the fall of the empire, Byzantine culture had spread north to the Balkans and to Russia. These lands became the intellectual children of the Eastern Roman Empire as Gaul and Spain had been the children of the Western Roman Empire. Misunderstood and ridiculed, the Byzantine Empire actually has played a very important rôle in the history of western civilization as a protector, preserver, and mediator of a high culture.

THE ISLAMIC EMPIRES OF THE SOUTH

While the fusion of Hellenistic-Roman civilization and barbarian culture was taking place in the West — particularly through the offices of the Christian Church — and the Byzantine Empire was continuing the tradition inherited from the Greek and Roman predecessors, a new religion had arisen in the East. The humble conditions of its origin gave little promise for its brilliant future. Yet before many years had passed, the faith of Muhammad swept on, with few checks to its gathering momentum, until those lands, which centuries earlier had witnessed the spread of the Christian faith, now saw the Crescent of Muhammad supplanting the Cross of Christ.

The home of Muhammadanism was Arabia, a vast land of varied


The GROWTH of the MOSLEM POWER in 25 years
ARMENIA
PERSIA
Oxus
Indus
SYRIA
Tigris
Euphrates
EGYPT
ARABIA
Medina
Mecca
Moslem Empire at the death of Muhammad, 632 . . ▨
at the death of Othman, 656 . . . . ▨
J.F.H.

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geographic features. On the eastern shore of the Red Sea stretched a long ribbon of fertile lands. It is here that the population was most dense; and as that density increased, its less fortunate members were forced eastward through the dry valleys toward the desert. The life of these economic refugees became more simple and difficult as they settled on poorer lands. Those on the fringe became nomads rather than settlers. The pressure of population caused some to migrate across the desert to the fertile groups of oases in north central Arabia, where, when life no longer offered satisfactory opportunities, they again streamed along desert routes broken by oases, northwest to Syria and Damascus, northeast to Mesopotamia and Baghdad. Thus geographic features not only laid the foundation of their economic life, but also explain why and in what directions the Arabs have expanded in the course of history.

The contrasts of the varied geographic features of Arabia are hardly more striking than those of its religious life. Arabia early had become the home of diverse cults and beliefs. Primitive nature worship and crude fetishism of native tribesmen were practiced side by side with the more refined rites of the Jew, Christian, and Zoroastrian. Polytheism and fatalism mingled with monotheism and ethical idealism. What religious unity there was became centered in the city of Mecca, where the faithful flocked on periodic pilgrimages to pay homage and devotion to the holy objects of the Kaaba, the sacred temple where were housed the famous black stone sent by the angel Gabriel and the three hundred and sixty idols worshiped and adored by devout tribesmen.

In such surroundings was born about 571 A.D. the prophet Muhammad. We cannot here trace in detail the life of that sensitive child, the care of his successive guardians. The story is told in many a book. But we may briefly note the successive stages through which this spiritually minded prophet passed — his traveling to foreign lands, his marriage to Kadijah, his periods of prolonged prayer and visions, his pious fulfillment of religious obligations, his call to be the prophet of the one God, and his acceptance of that mission. A new faith had dawned. Allah, the one and omnipotent God, is proclaimed and Muhammad as His greatest prophet. The contents of the heavenly Koran are revealed to Muhammad and are later gathered in the earthly Koran which, because of its heavenly authority, binds all the faithful. The Moslem must believe in angels, devils, a heaven and a hell, a final judgment, and absolute predestination of his lot. He must perform certain religious practices: daily prayer, fasting at certain seasons, almsgiving, and a pilgrimage to Mecca. Moral and political life are one — Church and State indissolubly linked in the regulation of life. Such in short was the message of the great prophet.

Failure at first greeted his mission. Only his wife and a few followers rallied to his side. Persistence, however, gradually won important converts to his message, and soon the number grew until his followers produced a religious crisis in Mecca. Muhammad was then forced to flee from that city to Medina, and this flight, or Hegira, in 622 A.D., begins the year one of the Muhammadan calendar.

The flight from Mecca brought in a new method of conversion. The scimitar supplanted the spoken word as the chief instrument of persuasion. Religious feuds and desert plundering gave plenty of opportunity for the development of a fanatical spirit and a strong army. Hostile tribes now sued for peace. Mecca opened its gates without fighting, and the personal triumph of Muhammad was assured. Death, however, soon cut short the further attempts of Muhammad to extend his religious empire outside Arabia.


The MOSLEM EMPIRE, 750 A.D.
SPAIN
Sardinia
Sicily
Danube
Constantinople
CAUCASUS
Taurus
ARMENIA
TURKESTAN
Kashgar
Oxus
PAMIRS
PERSIA
Indus
Tigris
Euphrates
SYRIA
ARABIA
EGYPT
Medina
Mecca
Moslem dominions unshaded
Eastern (Byzantine) Empire ▥
J.F.H.

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At first it seemed as if the death of the prophet would destroy his life's work. Revolt blazed forth all over Arabia. The faithful crushed these revolts and again united the people of Arabia into conformity, outward at least, to the faith of their prophet. The spread of religion by the sword, begun of necessity, proved in practice not only to insure acceptance of the faith, but also to enrich the faithful with tribute and booty. Henceforth Islam was to be a missionary religion with the soldier, adventurer, and trader clearing the way for the religious leader.

With Arabia subdued, the hordes of the prophet under his successors (caliphs) began their career of conquest. A fatalistic Islamic army, ably led and eager either for a life of bliss in Paradise or for rich booty on this earth, faced a disorganized Christian world. The Byzantine rule in Palestine and Egypt had been oppressive, and the natives consequently had little loyalty to their masters. Religious discord further destroyed harmony and good will between ruler and ruled. It is therefore easy to understand how the Islamic armies captured Damascus in 634, crushed the Byzantine forces on the Yarmuck in 636, and crowned their series of victories by the capture of Jerusalem in 636. The armies then pressed eastward from Syria toward Persia, and after much hard fighting, conquered that country and established a new base. From there Muhammadanism spread, largely by peaceful means, into the very heart of Asia, where it waged a constant struggle with Judaism, Christianity, and the eastern religions for the religious allegiance of the people.

In the meanwhile other Islamic armies were attacking the Byzantine possessions in Egypt. Alexandria fell in 642, and then began that expansion by sea and land that threatened to introduce the Moslem rule and religion into Christian Europe. The fleets of Islam swept the seas clear of Christian vessels. From northern Africa they raided the cities of Italy, attacking Rome in 846. They plundered the islands of the Mediterranean, annexing some land in Sicily; and they even conducted a great but unsuccessful siege against Constantinople in 716–717. While Islamic fleets dominated the water, Islamic armies, joined by the Berber tribes to whom the Muhammadan faith proved peculiarly congenial, slowly but surely occupied the lands of northern Africa and supplanted its civilization by an Arabian culture. The Islamic armies from Africa had little difficulty in breaking up the weak Visigothic state of Spain and ruling most of the country. The attempt, however, to extend their conquests north to France was frustrated by the Christian armies under Charles Martel near Poitiers in 732, and about thirty years later when the Islamic raiders retreated beyond the Pyrenees, northern Europe was saved from the Moslem control.

The Muhammadan world now stretched from Spain to Persia. Its unity, however, was soon broken by wars arising from rival claims for the caliphate and by conflicting religious beliefs. Baghdad, Cario, and Cordova became the capitals of three Muhammadan empires. Sunnite and Shiite, two Moslem sects, became more hostile to one another than to the Christians. Though the Muhammadans were rent by internal struggles and religious discord, the faith and the language of the Arabian prophet were adopted by millions of people in these regions and formed a barrier more effective than armies to the advance of the Christian civilization of the West.

The capitals of the Muhammadan world were centers of a brilliant if ephemeral cultural life. After the military struggle for empire had been won, the Arabs prepared to enjoy the rewards of their victory. Tribute and taxes flowed into their coffers; scholars and poets flocked to their courts. The income of the empire made possible matchless palaces and mosques. Gifted retainers gave an enviable reputation to their courts for learning and poetry. Though the Arabs themselves were untutored, like many warriors they came to admire the cultivated fruits of peace. Their conquests had brought them into contact with the highly developed civilizations of Greece, Palestine, and Persia. Arab culture really did not assimilate to any great extent these different civilizations; rather it dressed them in the language of Arabia and infused into them something of the spirit of the prophet. As soon as the Arab had assimilated as much as he could, his culture ceased to advance. The decline set in when the cultured Arabs in turn were overthrown by barbarian Muhammadans or by Christian armies.

The unity of faith and language of the Muhammadan world made possible the spread of its richer material civilization to the Christian world of the West. Silken garments, perfumes, water clocks, windmills, new plants, carpets, spices, new words, became familiar to the people of the West. The Christians also learned much from Islam in agriculture, medicine, mathematics, and philosophy. Much of the intellectual treasures of the Greeks and Hebrews had been translated into Arabic; in Spain, Italy, and Sicily, scholars — largely Jewish — translated these works from Arabic into Latin and thus made available those materials which caused an intellectual revolution in the philosophical schools of the West.

The Barbarian Peoples of the North

In sharp contrast to the complex and often brilliant civilizations of the Byzantine and Islamic empires was the simple culture of the northern lands. From the centuries of the great migrations southward, many changes had taken place. With the breaking of the Roman line of defense that divided the Roman and barbarian worlds there was an easier transit of the southern culture northward. New barbarian peoples had also gradually taken the places of the old. In the north were the Scandinavian peoples — Norsemen, Danes, and Swedes — who were collectively known as Northmen. They were children of the sea, for their lands were too small to offer a good living for an increasing population. Their voyages, in which the business of piracy and trade was mixed with the pleasures of plundering and carousing, brought their adventurous warriors to the shores of England, Scotland, Ireland, and


EUROPE at the death of CHARLEMAGNE — 814
To Iceland & Greenland
Northmen
Finnish Tribes
Ireland
Welsh
ENGLAND
Swedes & Goths
Danes
Frisians
Prussi
Elbe
SAXONY
Slavs
Wends
Poles
Khazars
Turkish Tribes
Volga
CASPIAN
Rhine
AUSTRASIA
NEUSTRIA
Allemanni
Avars
Magyars
Burgundians
AQUITAINE
ASTURIAS
Spanish March
Emirate of CORDOVA
Corsica
Venice
ITALY
Danube
Bulgars
Serbs
BLACK SEA
Constantinople
ARMENIA
Rome
Beneventum
Sardinia
EASTERN EMPIRE
Sicily
Cyprus
Damascus
Bagdad
Caliphate of the ABBASIDS
Frontiers of Charlemagne's Empire
Moslem
J.F.H.

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France and also to the coasts of the Mediterranean. Settlement and trade followed hard in the wake of conquest. Wherever these Northmen went, they readily mingled with the conquered peoples and adopted alien cultures. Yet they brought a strong, vigorous racial element and real powers of governing to peoples sorely in need of these traits. Another group from the north, the Swedes, expanded across the plains of Russia and became the founders of the Russian state. Their conquests opened up trade and intercourse between Byzantium and the north as had the Norse conquests the lines of traffic between north and south Atlantic countries. Less spectacular and troublesome to the western groups were the Slavs, who inhabited the vast stretches of land on the north and eastern borders of the European kingdoms. Lacking any strong political organization, the Slavs became easy prey to more powerful peoples. Teutonic and Asiatic peoples held them in bondage for centuries. At the same time they acted as a sort of buffer state between the Teutonic West and the Asiatic East. The third great group of barbarians were of Asiatic origin. The Finns, Huns, Khazars, Petchenegs, Magyars, and Mongols were terrible and pitiless conquerors and masters. Their empires were apt to be the work of some great military genius and often vanished as quickly as they sprang into being. The lands of the vast Northeast bear many marks of these Asiatic invaders in their racial stock and culture. Like the Norsemen and Swedes, they too opened up the lanes of intercourse and, largely as the result of the enormous empire of the conquering Mongols, Europe and the Far East became connected by overland communications. The culture of these northeastern lands was a compound of their own barbarian cultures with the refined Hellenistic-Christian civilization of Byzantium and the cultures of the Asiatic East. With the opening of the seventeenth century these lands became subject to strong currents of western European civilization.

FEUDALISM

As a result of repeated invasions of Moslems on the south and barbarians on the north, western Europe became a beleaguered fortress. Old social forms proved inadequate. A period of internal anarchy ensued in which the structure of society was profoundly altered. The feudal régime that resulted was the foundation on which the later medieval institutions were built. Without a thorough knowledge of its nature, the later political institutions are difficult to understand.

As we have seen in an earlier reading, new social institutions are constantly arising to satisfy new needs in a corporate manner. There are, however, many basic needs, like food, shelter, and religious and social grouping, that are satisfied by relatively stable institutions. Like individuals, society also develops habits through persistent repetition. These social habits or institutions usually become intertwined with one another and their relationships shift constantly. What we call change in society more often is a shifting of elements already in society than any introduction of new elements. A society in any age, therefore, has its form and character determined by the importance of some institutions as compared with others.

In the feudal age the great problem was that of defense and protection. All social arrangements had to be readjusted to attain these ends. The society that resulted is commonly called *feudalism*— a word derived from one of its most characteristic bonds, the feodum or fief. Feudalism may be defined as an organization of society upon the basis of contract, or if we expand the meaning of contract, upon the basis of mutual personal rights and obligations resting upon the holding of land. Before describing feudalism in full operation, we may perhaps secure a fuller grasp of its nature by briefly reviewing its development.

In the days of the decaying Roman Empire political anarchy ran rife. The constant struggles for the imperial crown among amibitous generals backed by their soldiery, the constant revolts of a local nobility grown so powerful that they even defied the state and ruled their own lands subject to no outside interference, and, above all, the increasing disturbances caused by migrating and invading barbarian groups brought about the breakdown of the government. In these circumstances the state could no longer furnish orderly administration and protection to its citizens. To save themselves from the avaricious tax agents of the state or the land greed of some powerful local nobles, the weak had to turn to whatever sources of protection they could find. The strong noble and the church alone could offer aid. The freeman, therefore, following an old Roman institution called *patrocinium*, offered his free services to some strong noble in return for protection and support. This set up a personal relationship based upon an exchange of obligations. There was another Roman institution, however, the *precarium*, which permitted the leasing of land to a tenant at the will of the grantor. This institution easily developed into a special type of leasing called *commendation*. Because of the unequal bargaining power of the parties, the poor man, in order to obtain protection, had to forfeit the ownership of his lands in return for a life lease. The future of his children was sacrificed to the safety of the present. It was but a step to have them succeed to the holding upon the payment of a fee. The church, in similar fashion, received lands, established some saint as the legal owner, and regranted the lands on a life tenure. There was thus a widespread movement toward the formation of large holdings and dependent relationships.

The invaders of Gaul brought with them an institution very similar to *patrocinium*. The personal relationship that a free German established by attaching himself to the bodyguard of a war leader was called *comitatus*. The honorable aspects of the feudal contract — the investiture with its acts of homage and oath of fealty, the strong tie, and emphasis on mutual loyalty — can be traced to this institution. Its fusion with the Roman *patrocinium* took place without friction and emphasized the personal side of the feudal relationship.

Yet feudalism did not grow only from the bottom of the social and economic order. In the early Carolingian times kings and great nobles needed fighting allies. Methods of war were changing. The heavily armed knight was becoming the mainstay of the army. The ranks of the old free soldier were sadly thinned by the decimations of constant foreign and local campaigns. Besides, the equipment for war was costly, and legally the free man was responsible for his arms. The church too had need of protection from the rapacious nobles, and she held surplus lands. Therefore king, nobles, and church, all sought military allies and, in exchange for armed assistance, granted lands on certain specified conditions. The military element of feudalism had come into being.

There also grew up another practice that became one of the chief elements of feudalism. Immunity had long been a common practice in the early Middle Ages. The church of course had frequently secured immunity from outside control. With the anarchy and weakness of the government, limited immunities once granted to an official tended to become absolute immunities when that official failed to be loyal to his royal master. Coupled with the general slackening of governmental ties and the lack of effective communications, excessive grants of immunity gave rise to small states within states. The real independence of these states became patent when they finally took over judicial jurisdiction, minting, coinage, financial administration, military and police forces — indeed all the very elements of sovereignty in their domains. Since the government could not stop this process of disintegration to keep up the appearance of its sovereignty, it had to compromise and formally grant these rights according to a feudal contract. The new bond of society was based not upon rights of citizens, sovereignty of the people, or private property of the earlier times, but upon a division of rights and obligations based upon a contract, usually written, and founded upon a holding of land. These semi-independent communities and the government of the older state together constitute the main elements of the feudal order.

Such in brief were the main elements of feudalism and their development into what may be called the feudal system. We may now describe its most characteristic features in the complete system. In reality, feudalism was anything but systematic. As one writer has said, "Feudalism is confusion roughly organized." From place to place and from age to age, there was the greatest diversity. Feudalism of the Anglo-Norman type, with its stress on a strong centralized monarchy, seems a strange companion to the French type, with its stress on huge independent fiefs and its excessive subinfeudation, or to the German type, with its stress on great ecclesiastical fiefs and the ministeriales, who were armed domestics who had risen to a free status.

Yet with all these variations there were many fundamental principles and relationships that were common to all feudal systems. There was the relation of lord and vassal; the fact that a tenant holds the land but does not own it; that his tenure is honorable, being moral and political in character, rather than economic; that all society from top to bottom is bound by mutual obligations of loyalty, protection, and service; and that the law rests upon the contracts which determine the precise obligations of the parties. These common factors gave every feudal society related forms whose kinship became more marked by their common source and standard in French feudalism.

The fief which was the essence of the feudal relation was usually a holding of land but could also be anything that produced an income, such as rights of toll, fees for use of ovens and mills, payments of fixed taxes. For this fief the vassal did homage by kneeling down and placing his hands within the lord's and promising to be his man; after homage he swore to be true to his lord and was then invested with his fief. As long as the vassal observed his contract, he and his heirs held the fief as if they were full owners. Fiefs could be held from any number of different lords, and often much confusion resulted when the services owed by different holdings to different lords conflicted. The count of Champagne, in France, held lands of the Holy Roman Emperor, the duke of Burgundy, two archbishops, four bishops, and one abbot. The general terms of the contract were usually fixed by custom and were loosely stated, though both sides knew full well what was involved. While the services varied much in place and time, there were certain general principles accepted everywhere, such as the ideal of loyalty to the lord's person, interests, and family. To be a traitor to your lord was one of the most heinous of medieval crimes. Specific obligations, usually quite carefully defined, were military service in the field, protection of the lord's castle, court service, and duty of giving one's lord counsel. Then outside the specific terms of the feudal contract were certain financial obligations which had to be met. There was an inheritance tax called *relief* and there were *aids* to defray the cost of extraordinary expenses like ransom, knighting of the lord's son, or the marriage of his daughter. Then there were certain privileges which at times considerably enriched the lord. Control over wardship and marriage of widows and minors was among the most lucrative of these.

In addition, the lords enjoyed many rights and privileges of a social nature. Lords were very jealous and proud of their position in the ill-defined ladder of the feudal hierarchy. They had an exaggerated sense of honor and professed to live by the code of chivalry. They despised the peasant in the fields and the laborer in the towns. They were very class-conscious, rude, and overbearing in their relations to other social groups. They were devoted to their own selfish interests and in turn were envied and disliked by other social groups.

Government in the Feudal Age in Western Europe

It was characteristic of the Middle Ages to stress corporate life. The individual realized his personal ends through his inclusion in a group. In a society that was aristocratic, uneducated, and scattered over a wide area, and in which communications were wretched, these groups tended to be local and small. The guild, the quarter of a city, the town, the manor, the parish, the district — these were the groups that the great mass of the population knew and loved. They recognized and bowed before the authority of the feudal noble, the town leader, the priest, and the local representative of the king who looked after the king's property. They knew too that they were the children of a far-away king and pope. Some had even heard of German kings who styled themselves Holy Roman Emperors. The inhabitants of cities of course had a more intimate acquaintance with these great political figures. Their active and intensive life made them well acquainted with the meaning and importance of the different European kingdoms, the city-states, the Holy Roman Empire, and the church.

Kingdoms were a natural form of government for the Middle Ages. Together with the city-states and empires of antiquity, they had descended from the past. Accustomed to the authority of the father in the family and to a feudal hierarchy that demanded an apex, the idea of a king and his land (kingdom) was not difficult for the medieval man. In spite of their many defects, kingdoms had little competition from other forms of grouping. Democracies and republics were out of the question for any large group without ease of communication, concentration of population, and education. Empires in actual practice were hard to hold together when once acquired. They tended to be too large. On the other hand, city-states, except through strength attained by combinations, alliances, or peculiar circumstances, were too weak to withstand powerful kings.

In the heart of the Middle Ages, western Europe was divided into many kingdoms, of which those of France, Spain, England, Germany, Scandinavia, and central Europe were the most prominent. At the head of such a kingdom stood the king. His powers varied greatly from place to place and from time to time. His greatest rivals for power were the nobles. The church and the city-states at times also contested his authority. These kings were more than mere barons holding a superior title and raised to a position of great dignity. They were anointed of God to their office, which thereby became a sacred trust. Their highest duty was to administer the divine law of God and the customary law of man according to the dictates of justice. The king was to be the shepherd of his flock, the loving father of his wayward children. He, as well as his subjects, was subject to the law, even though at times he blustered about absolute powers which his clever lawyers had found for him in the texts of the revised Roman Law. As the representative of authority, a certain dignity and inviolability surrounded his person and gave him in popular opinion a sacredness not usually merited by his true character. Like most medieval officers, kingship tended to become hereditary.

To assist the king in the business of government there were certain permanent officials and bureaus. These originally grew out of the king's own household. The very names — chamberlain, seneschal, chancellor, etc. — show this. In time these earlier household offices became state offices, and their incumbents no longer household servants but the great lay and clerical dignitaries of the realm. These officials headed the great divisions of the administration and also served the king in his great council, the *curia regis*. This council represented the most powerful forces in the state — the feudal nobility, who were important for their military services, and the great churchmen, who were not only important as feudal nobility but also for their education and religious offices. The *curia regis* sat in different capacities. It might sit as a court, as a legislative body, as an executive council. Its jurisdiction touched almost every matter that affected the government. Its decisions were given, after discussion, by weight and number of the advocates, and when approved by the head of the council, the king, had the force of law. In time, as the business grew in volume, the functions of this council became more distinct. Its legal functions were concentrated in a general court and then into several courts covering specific fields of jurisdiction. This process of division and specialization of function developed in other branches of the administration as well. The officials who held these high offices of state not only served the king but also took care to further their own interests. A constant struggle was in progress between the king and his nobles for the control of the government.

If the *curia regis* represented the great landholding interests of the kingdom, the lower house, by whatever name it was known — whether the Commons, the Third Estate, or some other title — represented the bourgeoisie of the city and the wealthier free farmers of the country. Wealth in money and the stubborn militia of these groups were not to be despised. Kings so needed these assets that representatives of these groups were summoned to court to hear the king's will and to give information. Gradually this unequal arrangement gave way to a more equitable proceeding. The monied groups won certain privileges in exchange for their taxes and services. Written promises in charters were obtained from reluctant kings, certain parliamentary prerogatives attained. While the upper clergy in their feudal capacity were apt to be members of the *curia regis*, the lower clergy either joined their social groups in the lower house or else, as in England, withdrew to their own church councils. In the medieval period the social groups who formed the lower estate or council were usually too weak to express their corporate will very effectively against the king and nobles. Their power lay in lending their weight to one side or the other in the strife between the controlling forces of the government.

The central government depended for its army on its feudal nobles, free militia, and whatever mercenaries it could afford to hire. It tried to keep down local castles and local wars. There was declared what was called the "King's Peace." Whoever made war without the permission of the king, became an enemy of the king. The king would take arms against anyone who disturbed his peace. The church also by its "Truce of God" and "Peace of God" tried to stop the curse of the local warfare of feudal kingdoms. The central government was supported from the income of the king's estates, court fines, income taxes, tolls, dues of all sorts, etc. Though the expenses of government were small, most medieval kings were relatively poor. They liked displays and wars. Both were costly luxuries.

The central and the local governments were connected by the local officials of the main territorial divisons and the king's representatives. Each group of officials at first had its own duties and sphere of activity, but gradually the king's jurisdiction began to broaden. Royal finance and justice brought local representatives to the king and royal representatives to the people. Criminal justice became the king's, and feudal justice, refined and standardized by royal lawyers, became the law of the people. In the attempt to exert more effective control over their peoples, kings came into conflict with the nobles, the church, and the communes. These struggles were incessant in the Middle Ages, and while the king usually succeeded in bending the church and communes to his will, the feudal nobility were difficult to subdue. They reigned like kings over their lands and resented any outside interference with what they considered their rights. It was only with the help of the church, the cities, and the free citizens that the king succeeded in curbing their powers. Yet the dawn of new methods of fighting and new sources of great wealth was not far off. Gunpowder and money were to curb the power of the feudal nobility and to make their control over government a thing of the past except in purely agricultural countries.

The revival of town life in the eleventh century found many towns under the control of feudal and clerical lords. So long as this control remained, life in the towns could be strangled at the will of the lord. Under such intolerable conditions the towns gradually bought off their various dues and services by making lump payments. At times they brought immunity from these local lords by securing the intervention of the king. They usually paid a good price for their freedom, but need of money caused by such movements as the crusades often played into their hands and led the nobles, bishops, and kings to initiate negotiations that eventuated in favorable terms for the citizens. All towns, however, did not secure control over their affairs by such peaceful means. Frequently there were communal revolts and freedom was won at the cost of blood.

The government of towns varied greatly. Some had a despotic city-manager chosen from another town; some were ruled by royal officials; some were controlled by local nobles; many were governed by commercial oligarchies; others were held by adventurers backed by mercenaries. The poorer elements of the city population were usually excluded from the government. Political feeling ran high in the cities. Riots and street fighting were common. The cities were usually hostile to neighboring cities and carried on incessant wars with one another. They formed leagues to protect themselves against strong outside invaders. Many cities in Italy, the Germanies, and the Low Countries won and maintained their independence, but elsewhere many cities fell and became subject to the royal authority of the kingdoms in which they were situated.

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

The Holy Roman Empire, or the Medieval Empire as it is sometimes called, was regarded as the most imposing political institution of medieval Europe. The three words of its title reveal its nature. As an empire it was one in a procession of empires that had come down from antiquity. However, it was not a new creation but a survival of the Roman

Empire. Philosophers had spoken of the Roman Empire as the last in the cycle of empires. It was to embrace all mankind, to be indivisible and eternal. The Christian church strengthened this reputation of the Roman Empire by giving it a religious unity and by making it coterminous with Christendom. The theorists loved to talk of one Empire and one Church.

In actual fact the Medieval Empire was the creation of Otto I, and his coronation by John XII on Candlemas Day, 962, may be said to have launched it on its eventful career. It was even less Roman than was Charlemagne's revival of the Roman Empire, for Otto's empire embraced only the German duchies and the lands of northern Italy, together with Burgundy, which was related in feudal ties with it. Even in these territories the emperors had to struggle to maintain the imperial rights. In theory, however, the emperors claimed a much wider jurisdiction. They regarded themselves as at the very apex of the feudal pyramid and sought to have neighboring kings do homage to them as their vassals. The emperors held of God; the kings, of the emperors; the nobles, of kings. That was the imperial theory. The claim to universal lordship brought them into conflict with the popes who also claimed, as vicars of Christ on earth, the feudal overlordship of all Europe.

If the real power of the emperors is sought, another story must be told. Their extensive claims weakened their successful control of any one part of the empire. While primarily king of Germany, emperor after emperor sacrificed his interests at home in Italian campaigns abroad to maintain and extend the imperial position. The weakness of the imperial government allowed many a city in Italy and Germany to set itself up as a sovereign state, many a noble to maintain a practically independent status, and many an ecclesiastical prince to develop vast estates and powers. While the empire brought unity in theory, in practice it left a wreckage of disunity in its wake.

The reason why the emperors like Frederick Barbarossa could not make good their authority is to be found in the character of their office. Germany was really ruled by tribal divisions which had come down from the remote past. Each was jealous of its position and saw to it that the German king did not enjoy unlimited powers. In fact kingship brought troubles, and the emperorship even more troubles, to the ruler of a great ducal house. The real strength of any ruler depended on his family estates and his personal following. When these were strong, the emperor could accomplish his will; but when these were weak, he had only a shadow of real power. In a very vital sense, the history of the Medieval Empire is a record of family history.

We cannot leave the subject of the empire without mentioning briefly one of the famous episodes of medieval history — the struggle of the empire and the church. Like other national monarchs, the German kings were concerned with such practical questions as elections, legal jurisdictions, and taxes. As emperors they were concerned with these same questions, but larger issues were involved by the fact of their emperorship. The emperors maintained that God had bestowed His authority on two powers, one temporal and one spiritual, king and emperor having exclusive jurisdiction over the temporal, pope and bishop over the spiritual. Emperor and pope were both agreed on this division, and theoretically there would appear to have been no basis for the century-long conflict between church and state. The lack of any clear definition, however, as to what was secular and what was spiritual made conflict inevitable. Who was to delimit the jurisdictions and in case of disagreement which power was to prevail? The church said "the church"; the state said "the state." The church won the theoretical argument as a rule, because of the type of argmuent employed (appeal to the Old Testament, where the priest was superior to the civil magistrate) and because of the temper of the times (widespread belief in the church's control of individual salvation). Yet her inability to enforce her anathemas and excommunications, together with the shifting of strong social groups, like the bourgeoisie, to the opposition, gradually turned the practical issues in favor of the secular powers. Though defeated on practical issues, the church has not ceased to maintain her theoretical position and thus has left as a legacy to us that perplexing and difficult problem of how two authorities can both demand absolute allegiance in what in many instances is only one jurisdiction.

The Medieval Church

The medieval church must be viewed not only as a spiritual institution but also as a secular state. It possessed a *de jure* sovereignty over a fairly compact group of lands in central Italy, known as the Patrimony of St. Peter, and enormous holdings of land in all the countries of western Europe. These lands sometimes comprised half the territories of those countries. In addition there was a large field of jurisdiction governing matters like marriage, wills, contracts involving oaths, over which the church had supreme control to the exclusion of the secular government. This dual character of the church as a sovereign state and a spiritual institution gave rise to many of her difficulties and furnishes the key to an understanding of much of her history.

The government of the church in the heart of the Middle Ages was a splendidly organized absolute monarchy. At its head stood the pope. Basing his spiritual and ecclesiastical headship upon the Petrine foundation of an exclusive charge by which St. Peter was given powers of loosing and binding, as well as the keys to heaven and hell, the pope was virtually an absolute monarch checked only in teaching by the accepted dogmas of the faith once delivered and in administration by the necessity of being on good terms with his officials. Whether his power was exercised in executive, legislative, or judicial fields, it was absolute and carried terrible penalties for those who dared to withstand it. The pope was elected by the College of Cardinals, which was composed of a selected group of the higher clergy. Though being bishops, priests, and deacons attached to local churches in the city of Rome, the cardinals devoted themselves to the business of the church at large and formed the curia or council of the pope. A red hat and a purple robe gave dignity and color to these princes of the church. From their number the pope was usually chosen. He was invariably old when elected. Owing to the short span of life in those days, the standing curia often was more powerful than the pope. In reality, then, the papacy was an oligarchy, usually, though by no means always, reflecting Italian interests. The papacy ruled the church by sending its commands or bulls (named after the lead ball that helped seal the parchment) to those in authority over the different divisions of the church, by issuing orders through special legates who had power to speak for the pope, and by passing binding legislation in councils or legal decisions in courts.

The church outside the Papal States was organized on a royal basis. There were the several separate churches — Spanish, French, English, etc. — under primates and archbishops who were the ranking bishops of the church. The countries were subdivided into provinces and dioceses, and finally into parishes, ruled respectively by archbishops, bishops, and priests. The bishops were the real rulers of the church and possessed almost unlimited powers in their jurisdictions. They were closely allied with the secular state and went to war, held courts, and paid taxes just like the secular lords. At times their lives were scarcely to be distinguished from the lives of their worldly brethren. In social status they were commonly classed with the nobility. Below the bishops were the priests, who were grouped with the common people. In the actual work of the church, apart from administration, the priests were the backbone of the church. The church advanced and retrogressed as the character of her priesthood rose and fell. Most of the priests lived hard lives, struggling patiently against grinding poverty and the spiritual indifference and materialism of their flocks.

The clergy who lived in the world (*secula*) did not comprise all the orders of the church. There was a group of men and women who ordered their lives according to rules (*regula*) which usually demanded poverty, chasity, and obedience. These were the monks and nuns, who either passed their lives in prayer, meditation, study, and labor in isolated monasteries and nunneries or went abroad to teeming centers of population to help the spiritually and physically distressed. These monks and nuns were the heroes of the church, for they had chosen the hardest path to follow. Though in all periods few in number, they wielded an enormous influence and power. They served as counsellors of kings and advisers of popes. A St. Bernard could truly sway kingdoms.

The church had an elaborate financial system. The papal exchequer (*camera*) in Rome was the central treasury and the bishops at large were the local responsible agents. Legates, Knights Templars, and commercial houses carried the balances not expended locally to the Papal See at Rome. There were many sources of income: revenue from the Papal States, feudal dues from vassal states, pious gifts and bequests, fees of all kinds, benefice taxes usually annates, Peter's pence, special income taxes on the clergy all over Christendom, and taxes for special purposes like the crusades. Most of the money was spent locally. The concentration of excessive wealth in a few centers has given a false picture of the wealth of the church as a whole. Most of the time the local churches were sorely in need of funds, and their poverty was as great as that of many of the small parishes today.

The church had her own law, called the Canon Law, as well as her own courts and prisons. Whoever enjoyed the legal status of the clergy was under her jurisdiction. Numbers of cases were reserved to ecclesiastical courts, as mentioned before. From lower courts there was appeal to appelate courts and finally to Rome. Courts always cost money. In addition to spiritual control in the confessional, with its spiritual penances, the church wielded the weapons of excommunication and interdict. Excommunication was usually applied to individuals and, by putting them out of the church, made them social outlaws. Interdict involved a strike of the clergy; they refused to perform publicly all offices save baptism and burial. It was laid upon a community to bring pressure on the disobedient to force them to yield to the church. With excessive use and abuse, both excommunication and interdict lost much of their force.

In dealing with heretics the church had a terrible weapon at her command. The secular government, forced by the people and church authorities, could as a last resort burn heretics alive after trial and condemnation in the courts of the Inquisition, a special ecclesiastical court established to root up heresy. Most heretics taught opinions destructive of the social order and were regarded as we view traitors in time of war. The church regarded a trial that did not convert the heretic as a failure. She gave severe forms of penance to some of the convicted; others she turned over to the state for the extreme penalty, since the church, according to her rules, could not shed blood. Most of those burned — and there were really few — were second offenders, or "relapsed heretics" as they were called. The Inquisition in time became a tool of the civil government and wrought much harm before finally abolished.

The medieval church undoubtedly was a steadying and mediating influence in the political life of those days. Her ethical principles curbed many a wild and wanton act and saved many a defenseless person from the hands of the more powerful. Ideally she represented divine justice and ruled over the moral lives of men. Her public attempts to control the conduct of important kings were spectacular, but produced less influence on morals than the quiet teaching of her faith. In popular opinion she held the keys to the hereafter. The widespread acceptance of these beliefs in society gave her an enormous importance and power.

Expansion Movements

The greatest political adventure of the Middle Ages was the crusades. The name "crusades" suggests to our minds the crusades to the Holy Land, but the term really includes all movements undertaken in pursuance of vows against infidels. In this sense the wars waged by the Spaniards against the Moors constituted a continual crusade from the eleventh to the sixteenth century; in northern Europe crusades were launched against Prussians and Lithuanians; in southern France the Albigensian heretics were all but exterminated by a crusade. John Lackland and Frederick II were objects of crusades. The crusader took a solemn vow, and on receiving the cross became a soldier of the church.

The most spectacular of all crusades was that directed against the Moslems in the Holy Land. In response to the urgent appeal for help from the eastern emperor Alexius Comnenus and to the widespread complaints of atrocities perpetrated upon Christian pilgrims in the Holy Land, Urban II preached one of the most moving sermons in history at Clermont in 1095. The marches and sailings eastward of the crusaders to meet the Seljuk armies cannot here be recounted. The first alone of all crusades to the Holy Land attained its objective. The establishment of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was its greatest accomplishment. Later crusades were losing battles against overwhelming odds. Dissension and strife in the ranks of the enemy and the presence of the hostile Mongols, rather than the high ideals and strength of the crusaders, enabled them to achieve any successes. As soon as the infidels had recovered from disorder and become united, they speedily overthrew the crusading states established in the East and wrested the control of the Holy Land from the Christians.

But the reëstablishment of Islam in the Holy Land did not end crusades. The crusading spirit lived on both in Christianity and in Islam. In Spain the Christian crusades against the Moslems became a national movement that steadily gained momentum until the close of the fifteenth century saw the fall of the last Moslem stronghold in Granada and the final disappearance of Islamic rule from western Europe. The crusading spirit in Islam burned especially fiercely in the peoples recently converted to the Muhammadan faith. The attack of the Christians on eastern possessions of Islam furnished the motive for a counter crusade. Under the leadership of the fierce and zealous Ottomans, the forces of Islams first consolidated their conquests in Asia Minor and then extended their dominion to the shores of Europe. The crusaders had borne the brunt of the fighting against Islam, and their defeat left the Byzantines without military resources to cope with the invader. Constantinople, the last line of resistance, was broken when the crusaders, diverted from their true object by greed and hatred, hurled their armies against this capital of eastern Christendom and captured and looted it in 1204. A unified Christian front was now impossible. The small Christian states that succeeded the Byzantine Empire in the East were no match for the invader. The Ottomans crossed the waters that separated Europe and Asia Minor and, although they were unable to capture Constantinople until 1453, they were successful in subduing one after another of the Christian states in the Balkans, which had been weakened through internal strife and foreign wars. The Balkans, once the home of a Christian civilization, became lands subject to the Crescent of Islam. Christendom had indeed sacrificed eastern Europe to save western Europe.

Though Christendom had lost her eastern frontier in Europe, she continued to expand her northern borders. In northern Germany the Teutonic knights hewed their way through hostile foe and forest to the shores of the Baltic. Lands were placed under cultivation in regions where swamps and forests once reigned. Cities began to spring up and laid the foundations for future trade. Prussia, once the home of the barbarian, became a Christian country. To the southeast of Prussia, warrior, churchman, and peasant pressed over eastward from Saxony and occupied lands left vacant by the dispossessed natives. This migration spread German peoples and culture in the midst of a Slav population and laid the basis for that division of culture that has so complicated the history of Austrian lands and for that movement of the nineteenth century — *Drang nach Osten* — that so alarmed Entente statesmen with its dream of a solid German Middle-Europe.

The crusading movements in the western Mediterranean lands of Spain, France, and Italy had only freed lands which were once the southern boundaries of Christendom. They had added no new permanent lands for European colonization, but they had tremendously stimulated the movement of expansion. The disappearance of the Danubian frontier that has so effectually divided barbarian Europe from the Roman Empire had already begun the gradual spread of European civilization northward and eastward.

The Germanic movements just mentioned pushed the boundaries of European civilization much farther north and eastward. Together, the earlier and later movements of expansion added a vast territory into which the rapidly increasing population of Europe could spread and a vast resevoir of material wealth upon which Europe could draw. Europe had begun her career of territorial and cultural expansion, but she was to wait until the sixteenth century for her ships to span the oceans of the world, until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for her settlers to populate the inland plain of Siberia, until the nineteenth century for her railroads to open up for settlement and exploitation the vast inland plain of Siberia, until the nineteenth century for her railroads to open up for settlement and exploitation the vast inland continents of North America, South America, and Africa, until the twentieth century for her airships to conquer hitherto inaccessible regions of the world.

QUESTIONS

1. In what ways did the political heritage of the ancient world influence medieval political theory and forms?
2. What were the causes for the rupture between the eastern and western churches?
3. How do you account for the military successes of the Islamic armies in the centuries immediately following Muhammad's death?
4. What is meant by the statement, "Feudalism was confusion roughly organized"?
5. What were some of the mutual obligations of lords, vassals, and serfs?
6. What was the *curia regis?* the "King's Peace"? the "Truce of God"? a town charter?
7. What were the conflicting views that led to the long strife between the church and the Holy Roman Empire?
8. Describe the hierarchy of the medieval church. What sources of income did the medieval church have?
9. Discuss the crusades as a phase of European expansion.

2. The economic life of the Middle Ages.

Assignment five: Medieval agriculture

A. Agriculture.

* Knight, *Economic history of Europe to the end of the Middle Ages*, 167–197, known also as *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel*, I. There may be substituted,* Waters, *An economic history of England*, 32–51, 101–120, or * Gras, *History of agriculture*, 78–96, 98–99.

(*a*) The manor.
- i. Appearance.
  - (*i*) The village.
  - (*ii*) The proprietor's house.
  - (*iii*) Enclosed fields.
  - (*iv*) Open fields.
  - (*v*) The glebe.
  - (*vi*) The three-field system.
- ii. Exploitation.
  - (*i*) Divergent views.
    - *a.* A village enterprise.
    - *b.* The lord's estate.
  - (*ii*) Allotment of strips.
  - (*iii*) Common pasture.
  - (*iv*) Crops.
    - *a.* Method of cultivation.
    - *b.* Yield.
  - (*v*) Live stock.
- iii. The domain farm.
  - (*i*) Week work.
  - (*ii*) Boon work.
  - (*iii*) Work on buildings.
  - (*iv*) Special services.
  - (*v*) "Farming" of the manors.
  - (*vi*) Burden of entertainment.
- iv. Village Organization.
  - (*i*) Classes.
    - *a.* Freemen.
    - *b.* Virgatees.
    - *c.* Socmen.
    - *d.* Cottages.
    - *e.* House servants.
  - (*ii*) Officials.
    - *a.* The bailiff.
    - *b.* The reeve.
    - *c.* The hayward.
  - (*iii*) The manor court.
- v. Economic unity.
  - (*i*) Isolation.
  - (*ii*) Sociability.
- vi. The condition of the people.
  - (*i*) Fairly pure food.
  - (*ii*) Few material comforts.

        (*iii*) Oppression by lord.
        (*iv*) Good treatment on church lands.
- (*b*) Development of the manor.
    - i. Reclamation of land.
        - (*i*) The efforts of rulers.
        - (*ii*) The example of monasteries.
    - ii. The example of the Netherlands.
        - (*i*) Inundations.
        - (*ii*) Individual farming.
    - iii. The rising of towns.
        - (*i*) The provision of markets.
        - (*ii*) The buying of land by rich townsmen.
    - iv. Better methods of agriculture.
        - (*i*) Forage crops.
        - (*ii*) Veterinary science.
    - v. The more general use of money.
- (*c*) Decline of the manor.

While the manor and serfdom were declining in England, they were also declining in certain parts of the Continent. The revival of the town life with its money economy spelled the ruin of feudalism. The rise in the standard of living accompanied by a growing demand for money and by an increase in land values and revenues caused a struggle among the various groups to secure a greater share in the general economic gain. The increase in population further intensified this struggle. The strong baron, the king, and the peasants managed to gain somewhat at the expense of the weak barons and the communal holdings. Thus in many regions of Europe, new groups of landowners rose to importance.

As the manor declined, its special type of laborer, the serf, won a new social and legal status. Many of the economic servitudes remained, but the peasant was no longer at the mercy of the lord's justice. He now enjoyed the legal protection and rights of a freeman. The peasant had fought a long fight before he had won this new freedom. By the thirteenth century, signs of victory were already apparent. The emancipation movement, sustained largely by economic forces, though aided also by Christian principles and the Roman law, had gained such headway that it could not be halted. Its effects became cumulative, its progress irresistible. Henceforth the country-dweller was to be legally free, but he still had to struggle for economic freedom and political rights to safeguard and extend his hard-fought victory.

Yet this movement of emancipation of land and people did not affect all Europe. In some regions the peasant won partial freedom, but in many others the peasant had to wait centuries for the coming of his release. In Prussia, Austria, and Russia we can still see the unfree peasant working on the manor in the nineteenth century. Legal emancipation did not come in Prussia until 1807, in Austria until 1848, and in Russia until 1861. Even in the last decade, conditions approaching serfdom existed in the Balkans.

i. Specialization.
ii. Commutation.
iii. Growth of population.
iv. Enclosures.
v. The Hundred Years' War and the Black Death.
vi. Statutes of Laborers.
vii. Revolts: Jacquerie, John Ball, The Peasants' Revolt.
viii. Growth of trade.
ix. New agrarian systems.
  (*i*) Peasant proprietorship.
  (*ii*) Métayer system.
  (*iii*) Large farms.
  (*iv*) Tenant farmers.

QUESTIONS

1. Was the movement from status to contract shown in the breakdown of feudalism a genuine gain for the common man?

2. Do you think that the manorial possessions of religious bodies were in the interests of true religion?

3. To what extent was the manor a good training-ground for popular government?

4. Does a study of the manor justify one in the belief that an agrarian culture is basically sounder than an industrial civilization such as that in which we live?

5. How can the manor economy be regarded as a stage in the evolution of modern agriculture? Contrast the problems faced by the cultivator then and now.

6. Would the subsequent commercial and industrial development of Europe have been possible without the break-down of the manor?

7. Illustrate from the history of the manor the advantages and disadvantages of customary as against written law. Are there any analogies with this contrast in modern legal systems?

8. Compare the ideals and methods of the leaders of the revolt against feudalism with those of modern reformers and our own social rebels.

9. Discuss the relationship of the central government and the manors, and consider their effects on one another.


Principal EUROPEAN TRADE ROUTES of the 14th Centy
HANSEATIC SPHERE
Iceland
Bergen
Stockholm
Novgorod
Moscow
Wisby
Riga
Konigsb'g
Dantzig
Lubeck
Stralsund
Bristol
London
Lynn
Bremen
Hamburg
Cinque Ports
Bruges
Cologne
Magdeb'g
Vistula
Oder
Elbe
Breslau
Kieff
Dnieper
Volga
Don
Tana (Azov)
Paris
Orleans
Loire
Frankf't
Nuremb'g
Basle
Rhine
Augsburg
Vienna
Theiss
Bordeaux
Lyons
Brenner
Drave
Danube
Milan
Venice
Save
Kaffa
Lisbon
Barcelona
Marseilles
Genoa
Pisa
Florence
Ragusa
Trebizond
Rome
Naples
Constantinople
Messina
Tunis
Rhodes
Cyprus
Euphrates
Aleppo
Beyrout
Alexandria
Land routes
Sea routes :—
Venetian ----V----
Genoese ----G----
Hansa ----H----
J.F.H.

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Assignment six: Medieval commerce and industry

B. Town life, commerce, and industry.

* *Knight*, 199–226, or * *Waters*, 51–80.

- (*a*) Early medieval trade.
    - i. The fairs.
        - (*i*) Foreign commerce as their object.
        - (*ii*) Foreign control.
        - (*iii*) The Law Merchant.
        - (*iv*) Emergence of guilds.
        - (*v*) Money-changers.
            - *a.* Forerunners of bankers.
            - *b.* Sharp practice.
        - (*vi*) Dangers and expenses.
            - *a.* Bad roads.
            - *b.* Brigands and pirates.
            - *c.* Tolls and strand laws.
        - (*vii*) Types of commodity.
    - ii. Local markets.
        - (*i*) Regional products.
        - (*ii*) Ruled by the custom of the locality.

    - iii. Development of towns.
        - (*i*) Growth in the amount of trade.
        - (*ii*) Need for permanent markets.
- (*b*) The rise of the guild merchant and the Hanse.
    - i. The port or township.
        - (*i*) Origins.
        - (*ii*) Status.
        - (*iii*) The burgess.
        - (*iv*) The guildman.
    - ii. The Flemish Hanse.
        - (*i*) Area covered.
        - (*ii*) Goods traded in.
        - (*iii*) Government.
    - iii. The staplers.
    - iv. The merchant adventurers.
    - v. The Hanseatic League.
        - (*i*) Sources of trade.
        - (*ii*) Monopoly powers.
        - (*iii*) Customs and government.
        - (*iv*) Military power.
        - (*v*) The Steelyard.
- (*c*) The functions of the guild merchant.
    - i. The supervision of foreign commerce.
    - ii. The laying down of rules for crafts.
    - iii. The control of trade in the town.
        - (*i*) Price-fixing.
        - (*ii*) Suppression of individual monopoly or advantage.
- (*d*) The growth of craft organization.
    - i. The increase in specialization.
    - ii. The break-up of house industry.
    - iii. The evolution of the craftsman.
    - iv. The growing exclusiveness of guilds.
- (*e*) The personnel of the craft.
    - i. The apprentice.
        - (*i*) The development of skill.
        - (*ii*) The learning of social duties.
        - (*iii*) Mutual obligations of apprentice and master.
        - (*iv*) The control of apprentices.
        - (*v*) Entry.
    - ii. The journeyman.
        - (*i*) Preparation to become a master.
        - (*ii*) Effect of increasing capital.
    - iii. The master.

QUESTIONS

1. Compare the medieval fair with the modern international exposition as a means of promoting trade.

2. What services to later civilization were performed by the Hanse?

3. What institutions today have we to perform the function of medieval apprenticeship? Compare the lot of a beginner in a trade then and now.

4. What share had the medieval trade in creating the conditions necessary for the emergence of a later world economy?

5. Discuss the similarities and differences of the control of economic life by the guilds and the present-day interest of governments in economic matters.

6. Compare the guild with the modern chamber of commerce.

7. What features of modern business may be said to have originated in the Middle Ages?

8. Of what importance to the future was the emergence of the craft guild?

9. Do you think that medieval economic organization was likely to produce a higher business morality than that of today? How do the two differ in conception and in source?

Assignment seven: Nationalism and economic change

C. The growth of the nation and the decline of medieval economic methods.

* *Knight*, 226–253.

(*a*) National governments and guild evolution.
    i. France.
        (*i*) The king gains control of the towns; mercenary armies.
        (*ii*) The admission of burgesses to parliament.
        (*iii*) The financial difficulties of the town.
    ii. Flanders.
        (*i*) The political partisanship of guilds.
        (*ii*) Export and local trades.
        (*iii*) The creation of day laborers.
        (*iv*) Oligarchic capitalists.
        (*v*) Death of local freedom.
    iii. England.
        (*i*) Early control of towns by central government.
        (*ii*) The settling of foreigners.
(*b*) Changes in the objects and powers of the guild.
    i. Monopoly by craft guilds.
        (*i*) Local self-sufficiency.
        (*ii*) Craft disputes.
    ii. Workmanship.
        (*i*) Supervision.
        (*ii*) Quality.
    iii. Price regulation.
        (*i*) Uniformity as basis.
        (*ii*) Growth of commodities.
        (*iii*) Wage-fixing.
    iv. Associations of journeymen.
        (*i*) Class solidarity.
        (*ii*) Strikes and grievances.
        (*iii*) Repression by masters.
        (*iv*) Want of leadership.
    v. Social and religious aspects of guilds.
        (*i*) Privileges.
        (*ii*) Friendly society activities.
        (*iii*) The mystery plays.

(*c*) The increase of town populations.
(*d*) Money.
  i. Feudal coinage.
    (*i*) Want of uniformity or standard.
    (*ii*) Debasement.
  ii. Mediterranean "favorable" balance.
  iii. Mining.
  iv. Credit instruments.
  v. Royal coinage.
  vi. Spread of money economy.
(*e*) Invention and science.
  i. Changes in industrial technique.
    (*i*) The water wheel.
    (*ii*) Windmills.
  ii. Paper production.
  iii. Arabic mathematics and improved accountancy.
  iv. Scientists: Pope Sylvester II, Roger Bacon, Vitello.
  v. Gunpowder.
  vi. The clock: Vilar de Honnecourt.
  vii. Geographical and nautical (teaching) knowledge.
  viii. Printing.
(*f*) The break-down of medieval economic organization.
  i. The decline of the guild.
  ii. Rapid strides in craftsmanship.

QUESTIONS

1. Do you think that, from an economic point of view, the bringing of the great trading towns under the power of central government was good or bad?

2. Compare the medieval idea of a just wage and a just price with our present-day conceptions of these matters. Was it in any way justified, and what advantages did it possess?

3. Certain modern thinkers have held that a return to the guild system would bring about a more real democracy, as well as developing and freeing the ordinary worker. Do you think there is any sound basis for such an idea, and would it be practical?

4. Compare and contrast the medieval associations of journeymen with the modern trade union.

5. What were the social advantages of the guild system? Have its social relationships been entirely lost today?

6. Compare the monetary problems of the Middle Ages with those of the post-war world. Are there any fundamental similarities in the solutions adopted?

7. Evaluate the contributions to civilization in invention and science made by the Middle Ages. How does the attitude taken toward such matters then differ from that of today?

8. What classes, in your opinion, profited most from the gradual decay of medieval economic organization?

3. Spiritual and intellectual life in the Middle Ages.

Assignment eight: The Christian epic

* John Herman Randall, Jr., *The making of the modern mind*, 9–20.

It is quite difficult for us today to understand the beliefs, attitudes, and feelings of the medieval man. He really lived in so different a world of ideas. Just as we today live in a cultural environment that has been bequeathed to us from the past, so did the medieval man live in his own past. But his heritage was not so rich and complex as ours. Much of the cultural legacy of antiquity had been lost in the process of repeated transfer. The barbarian peoples were too untrained to assimilate much of it, and there were few books to preserve it until it could be absorbed into the minds of men. Those who could assimilate it were small in number and generally confined to a few professions. That is why certain interests were stressed and why today we have more sermons of the early church fathers than works of the great Greek writers of tragedy. The clergy naturally preserved those works which particularly interested them.

The contrast between those who were able to assimilate a considerable part of the cultural heritage of antiquity and those who, unable to read, led a life of intellectual blindness was much sharper then than now. This contrast was further increased or lessened in proportion to the distance of the individual or groups from cultural routes and centers. Ideas then spread rapidly along certain cultural routes, but usually they were slow in spreading over large areas and even slower in spreading into the whole range of social groups of one area. Local habits and customs were strongholds of conservatism which were just as difficult to capture in the Middle Ages as now.

Yet there were also strongholds of culture from which and between which ideas spread. The most important of these were the monasteries, the cathedrals, the various courts (feudal, episcopal, and royal), the towns and cities, the fairs, and the universities. In spite of difficulties of transit, a constant stream of men and books carrying ideas flowed along the channels of communication. Those who lived at the terminals or along the routes could reap the intellectual harvest of the age, but those who lived in the dark world outside could gather in only the scant



Chartres, West Portal. A king of Judah, c. 1145 A.D.

crop of ideas that grew in the barren fields where stray beams of light had warmed seeds scattered by some chance traveler from the cultivated areas of thought.

Medieval civilization, a blend of barbarian, Christian, and Hellenistic-Roman elements, differed from ours not only in content but also in interests and emphasis. All ages appear to reflect their dominant interests in some form of expression. It is no accident that the Egyptian built pyramids; the Greek and Roman, buildings devoted to civic purposes; the medieval man, cathedrals and monasteries; and the modern man, buildings given over to business and material interests. Religious views have always been important in all great civilizations, but they were the dominant and controlling individual and social forces in the Middle Ages as they had been in the ancient empires of the Near East. They gave unity, coherence, value, and meaning to the parts as well as to the whole of medieval culture. In order to understand the Middle Ages and to realize the force of those Christian conceptions of life that have come down into our own civilization, we shall concentrate our attention mainly on this phase of medieval culture.

A. The coming of age of the western peoples.

* *Randall*, 9–16.

(*a*) Conflicting interpretations of the course of history.
(*b*) Western civilization, a blend of Hellenistic ideas and barbarian invaders.
(*c*) The western peoples, barbarians, younger than the Mediterranean stock.
(*d*) The history of Europe after the Roman decline called "dark," but really that of a frontier period with a sparse population.
(*e*) By the twelfth century the barbarians had assimilated the older learning enough to use it with ease.

B. The world as the scene of the drama of salvation. The Christian epic.

* *Randall*, 17–20.

(*a*) The Christian epic and its setting.
  i. Contrast between modern and medieval attitude.
  ii. Belief in Christian purpose of the world.

QUESTIONS

1. What is the Hellenistic heritage?
2. Who are the western peoples?
3. Where was the highest cultural life in the eleventh century?
4. What factors were present in the twelfth century renaissance?





Gislebertus, Last Judgment. Tympanum of Autun Cathedral, c. 1135 A.D.

Paray-le-Monial, Burgundy. Northeast end of abbey church, early twelfth century.

5. How was the rebirth of intellectual pursuits aided by economic changes? By monastic reforms?

6. The medieval mind is often called naïve or childlike. Discuss some characteristic beliefs that might justify the epithet.

7. Outline your own City of God and compare it with Saint Augustine's. What is the significance of such a comparison?

Assignment nine: The vocation of the scholar

(*b*) The educated man and the average man.

* *Randall*, 20–22, 92–102.

i. The world of the educated man.
  (*i*) Vocation of the scholar.
  (*ii*) The method of scholastic science.
  (*iii*) The scientific ideal of the Aristotelian-Thomistic system.

QUESTIONS

1. What class distinctions limited the intellectual life in the thirteenth century? What substitute for such a life arose in the larger towns?

2. How did the church look upon the introduction of the ancient learning during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries? What did the older generation fear?

3. Define the word "scientist" and determine whether Thomas Aquinas should be included under that category.

4. What would a modern fundamentalist think of the fourfold interpretation of texts acknowledged by medieval writers? Which side is more childlike? Why?

5. Who was "The Philosopher"? How was he regarded in the thirteenth century? What do we think of his system of thought at the present time?

6. What apparent relation existed between scholastic science and the medieval synthesis? Does the course of events justify such a view?

Assignment ten: The world of the common man

ii. The world of the common man.

* *Randall*, 23–36.

(*c*) The unseen world.
(*d*) The ordered universe of Thomas and Dante.
(*e*) The divine governance of the world.

QUESTIONS

1. What sources of consolation in adversity are open to the common man of today? Contrast these with their counterparts in the thirteenth century.

2. "To the man of six hundred years ago, anything might happen in this world." What is meant by this? Would the same saying be true today? Why?

3. What is a modern research worker looking for? What was the goal of the medieval scientist's labors? Are the two views mutually incompatible?

4. What is man's unique place in the hierarchy of beings recognized by Dante? What are his relations with the parts of the series above and below him?

5. How would our scientific instruments have affected medieval astronomical views? Discuss the comparative importance of quantitative and qualitative analysis in medieval science.

Assignment eleven: The chief end of man

C. The enjoyment of eternal life.

* *Randall*, 38–49.

(*a*) The richness of the Christian tradition.
(*b*) Hebrew righteousness.
(*c*) Gospel love.
(*d*) Hellenistic love of wisdom.
(*e*) Platonism.
(*f*) Oriental religious asceticism.
(*g*) The medieval system.
(*h*) Medieval virtues and vices.
(*i*) Life eternal.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the elements of medieval life which have survived to our own day? Are they likely to disappear in this transitional age? Why?

2. What apparent differences in moral ideals are there between the Law of Moses and the Gospel of Jesus?

3. In what ways is the interpretation of the Kingdom of God as something we realize individually more acceptable now than in the Middle Ages? In what ways is it more unacceptable now than then?

4. If the Christian church had become centralized in Byzantium, in the hands of Greeks, what deviations from its actual course of existence as a Latin church might legitimately be inferred?

5. How was the early Christian sect, one of many oriental mystery cults promising salvation, transformed into a religion acceptable to the trained Greek mind? What difficulties inherent in such an amalgam are still with us today?

Assignment twelve: The medieval system

D. The City of God.

* *Randall*, 49–68.

(*a*) Functional ideal of society.
(*b*) Organization of religious society.
(*c*) The saintly ideal.
(*d*) The monastic life.

QUESTIONS

1. With what sanctions did the church surround every event in the lives of her children? What sanctions our actions today?

2. What abuses tended to weaken the medieval system? What is the strength and the weakness of the reforms brought in by Protestantism?



Amiens, interior, thirteenth century.



Rheims Cathedral, thirteenth century.

3. What is the principal connotation borne by the word "morality" today? Contrast this position with the medieval views on virtue and vice.

4. Why do we find more representations of hell than views of heaven in the sculpture of the Middle Ages? Why will men always retain some version of the latter?

5. Why is it difficult to consider any one class of men within the medieval system as a unit apart from the other orders of society? What were the aims, accomplishments, and weaknesses of the class known as monks?

Assignment thirteen: The medieval system — Continued

(*e*) St. Bernard — the monk.

* *Randall*, 68–80, 102–106.

(*f*) Saint Francis — the mendicant.
(*g*) The church as the City of God and the Body of Christ.
(*h*) The idea of organized spiritual power.
(*i*) The ideal of a unified Christendom.

QUESTIONS

1. Compare the character and work of Bernard of Clairvaux with that of Saint Francis of Assisi. Point out some modern duplicates of both types.

2. With what weapons did the church control the individual and the state during the Middle Ages? What aim kept all this machinery in motion?

3. Compare the activities of the Dominicans with those of the Franciscans during the thirteenth century. In what ways would a return of monasticism be desirable today?

4. What would be Dante's criticism of modern efforts toward a world state?

5. What are the gains and losses of the modern world in its substitution of liberty for the unity of medieval Christendom?

III. FACTORS OF CHANGE IN THE MIDST OF THE OLD
(1400–1600)

1. The beginnings of European expansion.

Assignment fourteen: Discoveries and their effects

* Harry J. Carman. *Social and economic history of the United States,* I, 1–17.

A. General introduction.

To the western European of the Middle Ages the world was but a relatively narrow and circumscribed area. His knowledge of geography was strictly limited, and he often found it difficult to distinguish between fact and fable. His conception of the outer fringe of the earth was frequently a confused jumble of superstition, conjecture, and awe, with here and there a sprinkling of real knowledge and truth. "To the north lay the polar seas with icebergs and mists where only a few hardy fishermen and whale-hunters ventured." Eastward, he knew, were Poland and the Scythian plains — wild areas inhabited by wilder peoples. Eastward, also, were Constantinople and Cairo, the gateways to the unbounded treasures of oriental potentates who believed not in the true faith and had numerous wives. Hideous monsters were said to inhabit the domains of these despots, and the people were a cunning lot. Southward was the sunny but treacherous Mediterranean, dotted with the sails of Italian, French, and Aragonese merchant vessels, and blackened by the presence of Moorish and Saracen pirates. Still farther south was Africa, unknown and therefore terrible, a veritable hell in its subequatorial parts. "Westward was the Atlantic Ocean, limitless, ominous, unexplored."

But with the dawn of the modern era there came a change. The equator was crossed, the southern tip of Africa was rounded, India was reached from the sea, the Atlantic was conquered, an entirely new "world" was discovered, the globe was circled. The horizon was broadened and new contacts made — contacts with the age-old civilizations of the Middle and the Far East, and with the primitive cultures of the New World. Expanding Europe had begun to impose its civilization upon the hitherto "undeveloped" areas of the western hemisphere and to mingle its culture with that of the orientals in the eastern hemisphere.

The United States, Latin America, Canada, and Australia stand out as living proofs of the dynamic Europeanization of the world. And these in turn have helped to spread the veneer of European civilization even farther afield, establishing commercial and intellectual bonds with all the corners of the earth.

It was inevitable that so powerful a movement as this expansion of Europe in early modern times, involving as it did the uncovering of vast new resources and opportunities, should also effect a most complete readjustment of European economic and social life — should have, in other words, a reciprocal influence on European institutional developments. Trade centers and trade routes shifted from the inland seas to the Atlantic Ocean. New commercial and industrial methods and processes had to be devised to meet the new and more complex conditions. And western Europe was becoming more and more powerful at the expense of central Europe, where the Hapsburgs, fighting with political rivals and hostile Turks, had little time and energy for overseas interests. The balance of power marched shoulder to shoulder with the balance of trade.

The reasons for this westward trend of commerce are not far to seek. The westward route offered an all-water passageway to the tempting treasures and much desired commodities of the real and of the supposed Indies. True, there were still a great many hardships to be encountered on the sea, but there were also compensations: no hot deserts to cross; no bleak mountains to climb; no laborious loading, unloading, and reloading; much greater speed; and, though Christian and Moslem pirates were bad enough, Asiatic robbers were even worse. And most important was the relative cheapness of sea, as compared with land, transportation.

Moreover, the relatively small amount of disorder and turmoil in western Europe as compared to central Europe, after about 1500, enabled the former area to take better advantage of the revival in trade and commerce. Henry VII, Louis XI, Ferdinand of Aragon, were all busy strengthening central control at the expense of the nobility of the blood and the nobility of the road. The new economic order was gradually taking away from the peer his twofold function of soldier and manorial lord. The advent of gunpowder and the appearance of mercenary armies paid for with gold made the knight more or less unnecessary from the military point of view, while at the same time an agrarian revolution was converting him from a manorial lord into an estate-owner who simply leased or rented his land to tenant farmers. And as the power of the noble declined, the power of the king and of the merchant increased.

The rise of more westerly trade routes, furthermore, brought about a decline of the Italian city-states, as well as of the German Hanseatic League and the Danubian valley region which had served as the connecting link between northern Italy and the northern Germanies. Their citizens had acted as middlemen in the past. Now these middlemen were no longer required. Iberians, Dutchmen, Frenchmen, and Englishmen established direct contact with Asia, with Africa, and with the Americas. They were through with filling the coffers of wily Italians and shrewd Germans. Simultaneously Nature herself seemed to play a trick on the Hansa towns. The herring in the Baltic Sea had long been a source of profit to German fishermen and German merchants. But about the year 1500 the herring went westward, finding the North Sea more to their liking, and thus incidentally helping to lay the foundations of Dutch commercial greatness. The *coup de grâce* to the Italian towns was delivered by the Turks, who succeeded in defeating and destroying, at least temporarily, even the large Genoese and Venetian fleets. Proud Venice was too poor to build another armada! Thus while the central European towns were declining and often decaying, powerful and wealthy commercial cities were rising in western Europe — Amsterdam, Bruges, Nantes, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Bristol. Here the bourgeoisie was building up the fortunes which were to make it a factor, the chief factor, not only in the economic, but eventually also in the political, aspects of our civilization.

It might be well at this point to turn back for a moment and investigate some of the motives for European expansion in the late fifteenth and the sixteenth century. The humanism of the Italian Renaissance had brought with it a very noticeable spirit of curiosity, a desire to discover the why, the wherefore, and the whence of all phenomena. Coming at the very time when a renewed study of the masterpieces of antiquity was at its height, when geographic knowledge was spreading rapidly, when nautical skill was increasing markedly, and when the invention of printing was making possible a much wider dissemination of the marvelous accounts of travel in the East, this spirit of curiosity naturally found one of its outlets in the search for new routes, new lands, new marvels, and new treasures.

Moreover, the great demand for eastern products, especially spices and luxuries, and the desire for new sources of the precious metals, which were being shipped to the Orient in large quantities since the European exports to the East were relatively less valuable than the imports therefrom, were further motives in the expansion of Europe.

Again, although the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the general advance of the Ottoman Turks into southeastern Europe had very little direct influence on the availability and security of the old trade routes, there always remained the possibility that some whimisical autocratic Sultan *might* close the trade routes and thus precipitate a serious crisis in the West. Accordingly it would be much safer to secure a new, direct, unencumbered route.

The religious factor was also exceedingly important. Christianity is a proselyting religion, and Christian missionaries had penetrated to the Far East as early as the thirteenth century. The prospect of discovering new heathen areas and of converting new millions to the "true faith" was too tempting to be overlooked. In addition, there was the incentive of the legend of Prester John, the fabled king of a Christian country nestled away somewhere in the Antipodes, surrounded by heathens and barbarians. More than one bold missionary set out on a long exploring expedition in the vain attempt to find this John and to make his kingdom a bulwark against further encroachment by the Turks, and the headquarters for further extensive missionary activities.

The rise of national states along the Atlantic seaboard was a further factor in the westward movement. England, France, Holland, and Spain became unified under strong and ambitious rulers during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These rulers were determined to spread their might beyond the confines of their natural borders, and they found the East and West "Indies" very well suited to their designs and their ambitions. Nor must the importance of the relatively large class of adventurers of the time be overlooked. Hiring themselves out to one king or another, they opened to civilization many a valuable but unexploited area. The Cabots, Henry Hudson, Verrazano merely stand out from a host of their fellows. They personified the "spirit of empire."

With this brief survey in mind, we are now in a position to study in somewhat more detail the beginnings of European expansion and to indicate how that movement affected and was affected by those other interrelated movements which were transforming the Middle Ages into the modern world.

B. Medieval Europe discovers Asia and Africa.

* *Carman*, I, 1–17; Gillespie, *History of Europe*, ch. 4.

- (*a*) Forces encouraging expansion.
  - i. The economic revival.
  - ii. The crusades.
  - iii. Work of missionaries and travelers.
    - (*i*) Carpini.
    - (*ii*) Marco Polo.
  - iv. Changing notion about shape of earth.
  - v. Maps and portolani.
  - vi. New inventions.
  - vii. Commercial rivalry.
- (*b*) The opening of the Orient.
  - i. Portugal as a pioneer in exploration.
    - (*i*) Prince Henry the Navigator.
    - (*ii*) African explorations.
    - (*iii*) Discovery of Cape of Good Hope.
    - (*iv*) Vasco da Gama reaches India.
    - (*v*) Establishment of Portuguese power in India.
  - ii. The discovery of the New World.
    - (*i*) Early conjectures on possibility of transatlantic voyages.
    - (*ii*) Motives for Spanish voyages of discovery.
    - (*iii*) Columbus discovers America.
    - (*iv*) The papal line of demarcation.
    - (*v*) Magellan circumnavigates the globe, 1519–1522.
    - (*vi*) Establishment of the Spanish Empire.

QUESTIONS

1. How large was the world to a peasant of 1200? To a Venetian shipper? To Marco Polo?

2. Sketch the rise and fall of the trade of the Italian cities; of the Hanseatic League.

3. State the elements making for the rise of the European Atlantic seacoast to prominence in trade.

4. Give an account of the preliminaries that led up to and made possible the voyages of discovery.

Assignment fifteen: Discoveries and their effects — Continued

C. Effects on Europe of overseas expansion plus other transitional factors.

Read any one of the three references: * Knight, Barnes, and Flügel, *Economic history of Europe in modern times*, 297–327; * Gillespie, 81–102; * Clive Day, *History of commerce*, 141–160.

(*a*) Economic.
  - i. Increase in volume and variety of trade.
  - ii. Increase in precious metals.
    - (*i*) Scarcity of, in the Middle Ages.
      - *a.* Relatively few mines in Europe.
      - *b.* Constant drain to Orient.
    - (*ii*) Acceleration of European output.
    - (*iii*) Influx from New World.
    - (*iv*) Effect on prices.
  - iii. The rise of mercantilism.
  - iv. Extension of credit economy.
    - (*i*) Early banking houses.
    - (*ii*) Legalizing of interest.
    - (*iii*) Founding of government banks.
    - (*iv*) Development of trading companies.
  - v. Changes in industrial organization.

(*b*) Social.
  - i. Decline in influence of privileged classes.
  - ii. Rise of bourgeoisie.
  - iii. Growth of cities.
  - iv. Position of labor in country and city.
  - v. Poverty and unemployment accompanying the transition from medieval to modern conditions.
    - (*i*) Vagabondage.
    - (*ii*) Poor relief.
  - vi. New social customs.
    - (*i*) Spread of use of luxuries: new luxuries.
    - (*ii*) Vogue of gold, silverware, and jewelry.
    - (*iii*) Appearance of cheap textiles: muslin, gingham, and calico.
    - (*iv*) Changes in diet: new beverages.
    - (*v*) Introduction of tobacco: smoking.
    - (*vi*) Changed aspect of European houses and gardens.
    - (*vii*) European culture overseas.

QUESTIONS

1. Give some notion of the place played by barter and by exchange for money in the trade of the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century.
2. What is mercantilism?
3. What real duties did the nobles perform in the Middle Ages? How did these duties fall from them?
4. What new customs followed the new contacts and new trade and work of the sixteenth century?

2. The Renaissance.

Assignment sixteen: The Renaissance

A. General introduction.

* *Randall*, 111–121.

Accompanying the economic and political changes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there were important changes in thought and in-


Map of the World
to show the
CHIEF VOYAGES
of EXPLORATION
(to 1522)
(Later) English & Dutch attempts to find a North-East Passage
GREENLAND
ICELAND
Northmen (before 1000)
SCANDINAVIA
Labrador
Cabot-1497
Cabot-1498
VINLAND
1494
Azores
Columbus (1) 1492
Columbus (2)
Columbus (4)
Columbus (3)
Canaries
C. Verde
Portuguese 1445
West Indies
MEXICO
Panama
P A C I F I C
O C E A N
Ladrones
Magellan 1520
West of this line to Spain
The Pope's Line
Magellan-1519
East of this line to Portugal
Str. of Magellan
Return of Magellan Exped.n
V. da Gama-1497
Diaz-1486
C. of Good Hope
Diaz 1487
V. da Gama 1498 Calicut
INDIA
CHINA
JAPAN (Zipangu)
Philippines
Ladrones
Moluccas
Java
Return-of-Magellan Exped.n
Columbus' (outward) voyages – 1492, 1493, 1498, 1502 – are numbered 1 to 4.
Coasts visited by European navigators up to 1522 (the year of the return of Magellan's expedition)
J.F.H.

Reprinted by permission of Mr. H. G. Wells and The Macmillan Company, New York City, terest and outlook upon life. These include the rise of humanism and the humanistic spirit, the widespread criticism of monastic and ascetic ideals, and an increased interest in nature and the natural man. The representation of natural forms and experiences in literature and the plastic arts was cultivated with exceptional genius and technical proficiency. Writers in the vernacular languages and artists, realistically portraying their environments, brought various national cultures to new levels of articulateness. There was growing appreciation of industry and craftsmanship; the spread of culture to distant places was made easier by technical advances in navigation and warfare, while its spread within groups was facilitated by such developments as printing. Medieval class standards were modified, and new conceptions both of individual excellence and of government arose.

The very earliest centers of Renaissance culture on a brilliant scale were the prosperous cities of northern Italy, but the above tendencies were widely diffused in western Europe, and their development should not be regarded as the mere spreading of influences from Italy. In fact, one of the most important aspects of the period is the further emergence during these centuries of the distinctive national traditions of modern Europe. Modern culture is a joint creation of many places, and presents a somewhat different complexion in each. In this connection, it is also well to remember that many rural districts, especially in eastern Europe, were but slightly and tardily affected by the Renaissance, if at all.

* *Randall*, 111–121.

B. The gradual growth of the humanistic spirit.
  (*a*) Its relation to the economic growth of European society.
  (*b*) Its place in medieval life and culture — Boccaccio, Chaucer.

C. The discovery of the humanity of the classics.
  (*a*) Medieval interest in the classics — Dante.
  (*b*) The humanists — Petrarch, Bruno, Lefèvre d'Etaples, Colet, Reuchlin Erasmus.
  (*c*) The culture of Rome and Greece reinterpreted.

Assignment seventeen: The Renaissance — Continued

* *Randall*, 121–141; * *Syllabus*, 90–94.

D. The development of printing.
  (*a*) Paper and movable types.
  (*b*) The rapid multiplication of books.
  (*c*) Significance for the diffusion of culture.

E. The humanistic spirit in some of its different forms.
  - (*a*) The revolt from the Christian ethics — widespread attack on monasticism.
  - (*b*) Different developments in the northern and southern countries. (For Italy, see J. Burckhardt, *The Renaissance in Italy*, a classic work, scholarly and profound on its aesthetic side but not so reliable for other aspects.)
  - (*c*) Various interpretations and glorifications of the natural man in literature and art — Michelangelo, Leonardo, Raphael, Cellini, Rabelais, Dürer, Rembrandt, Shakspere, Marlowe, Erasmus.
  - (*d*) Individualism — new conceptions of individual excellence. The ideal of the gentleman.
  - (*e*) The new ethics of industry and thrift.

J. H. Robinson, *History of western Europe*, 321–347.

This reference is assigned for the further illustrations it provides, both in words and in pictures, of some of the above features. It should be read in connection with the following notes.

F. Notes on Renaissance culture.
  - (*a*) Plastic arts. The nature-copying mode.

NOTES ON RENAISSANCE CULTURE

By comparing the plates in *Robinson* between pages 342 and 343 and between pages 346 and 347 and those in the *Syllabus* on page 90, one finds artists of the Renaissance period working upon the same religious subjects that engaged their medieval predecessors, but with a striking difference in interest and spirit, and with more diversified technique. A greater technical mastery of various mediums has been attained, and the interest has shifted from cultic and didactic motives to the treatment of natural forms. In the development of this new interest, the imitation of Greek and Roman models played its part, as it did throughout humanistic culture.

The nature-copying mode of the Renaissance has prevailed in the plastic arts down to our own day, but in the last century a minority of artists began either to modify it or to depart from it. Recent decades have seen not only much experimentation, but also a renewed appreciation of the less exactly nature-copying art-forms of earlier times, which admirers of Renaissance art had often passed by as products of inferior technique. A cult of the "primitive" has appeared, and in addition there is a growing realization that aesthetically valuable results can be secured in conventional, artificial, and freely imaginative as well as in representational forms.

  - (*b*) The development of printing in the Renaissance.

H. G. Aldis, *The printed book*, gives a brief and attractive résumé of book-printing.





Giotto (1266–1336), Baptism of Christ, Arena Chapel, Padua.
Signorelli (c. 1440–c. 1523), School of Pan, Berlin.

Appearing in the decade between 1440 and 1450, the art of printing developed and spread with astonishing rapidity. "By 1500 there were in Europe at least nine million books of thirty thousand titles, and over a thousand printers." At the same date the essential features of producing a printed book had reached the form in which they remained until the invention of power printing and the paper-making machine in the early nineteenth century. The fact that the reading public was limited to scholars put printing at first at the service of learning primarily. "The dominant feature of the sixteenth century press is the succession of scholar-printers who in various centers — Aldus in Venice, Froben in Basel, Badias and the Estiennes in Paris, Plantin in Antwerp — by their learning and their personal character and influence, directed its power into channels which nourished and fed the desire for knowledge and learning." Printing itself very quickly provided an additional incentive to becoming literate, by placing books within reach of people of more moderate means. Before 1600, both churches and states had recognized in the form of censorships the power of the press as an organ for the dissemination of ideas and opinions among the people. In the eighteenth century, the hope of human progress was definitely associated in the minds of many with the idea of popular education; and in the nineteenth century, public schools greatly extended the sphere of literacy in almost all western countries. Under the circumstances the press, now harnessed to artificial power, became an indispensable adjunct of mass culture in all its phases — economic, political, and recreational, as well as educational. Its connection with the advancement of learning was no less intimate, but far less exclusive and consecrated than in the initial stages.

These stages in the growth of printing and also the uneven spread of literacy in various countries should be kept in mind when considering the growth of democracy in western civilization. Literacy spread more rapidly in Protestant than in Catholic countries, a fact which will be considered presently in studying the Reformation.

(*c*) Humanism, natural science, and religion.

Ancient Latin authors used the word *humanitas* to suggest the "civilizing and refining influence of polite letters and of the liberal arts."

The term *humanist* began to be used toward the close of the fifteenth century to designate those who cultivated the study of Latin and Greek literature for the sake of this *humanitas.* In a sense, this humanistic learning was a continuation of the process of rediscovering ancient culture, which took place throughout the Middle Ages, but it also involved a change in attitude toward ancient culture, and indeed toward learning and life in general. Medieval learning fitted what it possessed of pagan culture into a scheme of things which it explicitly avowed to be unpagan, and defended the practice on the ground that the basic ideas of the system were sound, and that pagan culture got its true interpretation only in relation to those ideas. By the middle of the fourteenth century, however, scholastic discussions of theological and metaphysical subjects in the universities had pretty clearly revealed weaknesses and limitations in the medieval intellectual synthesis and in its prevailing methods of interpretation. Also culture and learning were now sufficient to favor the development of different intellectual tastes and interests. The specific taste of the humanists was for the fine style of ancient letters, for urbanity, for love of life and beauty, and for the mature and mellow wisdom of the classic philosophers. Of this wisdom a late French humanist, Charron, writes in his book *De la sagesse* (1601):

> The virtue and probity of theologians is altogether morose, austere, depressed, sad, apprehensive, and commonplace; philosophy, such as this book teaches, is altogether free, joyous, and if we may say so, merry, but nevertheless very potent, noble, generous, and rare.

From the emphasis which they placed on the study of man, we ought not to infer that the humanists were in general antagonistic to theological and religious pursuits. (The author of the passage just quoted was himself a priest.) Some simply professed an interest in supplementing sacred learning by humanistic studies, while others hoped to exercise a humanizing influence over religion itself. The tendencies of the latter were: to criticize monastic ethics, to favor tolerant inclinations, and to urge simplified doctrine as over against scholastic subtleties. In the following section on the Reformation (*Syllabus*, pp. 100–114) we shall observe the rôle played by this humanistic program in reforming religion, as well as the reaction provoked both among Catholics and among Protestants by some of the more purely pagan forms of humanistic feeling.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that the humanistic tradition did not replace the older scholastic tradition, but that the two continued side by side. And in addition to exercising a continued influence upon moral and religions life, some of the leading ideas in scholastic philosophy, and especially the rationalistic spirit underlying the whole, were still to play a large part, when fertilized by careful and continuous observation of nature, in building up our present natural sciences. These results, however, were slow in coming, through the more or less isolated efforts of specially interested individuals and schools (*Syllabus*, pp. 123–128). The humanistic movement contained within it various stimuli to increased observation of nature, and by its liberating influence also helped to create favorable conditions for the rise of modern science. But the literary interests and habits of thought of the typical humanist were not the ones that directly brought about that new mathematical and experimental analysis of physical nature upon which our natural sciences depend.

> We talk of the work of the humanists in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a renaissance. They recovered the forgotten classics and enlarged the perspective of history to include the pagan world. It was an important service, an essential step in the emancipation of the intellect. But compared with the outlook of a humanist, the horizon of today has become almost infinite, and we bring to this larger knowledge instruments of analysis unknown before. We have acquired the elements of a scientific method, which the humanists lacked. Viewed from our standpoint of today, theirs was but another type of the medieval mind. They did not get outside the mold of western thought, but merely deplored what the schoolmen exalted and exalted what the schoolmen deplored. If, in spite of their limitations, the new knowledge which they brought was sufficient to restate the whole process of European history, to awaken a spirit of criticism which brought rationalism and science, the larger revelation of the renaissance of today will surely supply a new interpretation of ourselves.[1]

QUESTIONS

1. What is the Renaissance of the twelfth century?
2. Define humanism and give some idea of the history of the term. (See Oxford *New English Dictionary*.)
3. What did printing do for trade, education, democracy, pleasure, nationalism, world union?
4. What is meant by "the nature-copying mode"?
5. What elements of the medieval synthesis were most distasteful to the leaders of the Renaissance? How was this dissatisfaction expressed in political, economic, and religious phenomena?

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[1] James T. Shotwell, *The religious revolution of today*, p. 39. Houghton Mifflin Company.

6. Compare the modern attitude toward the classics with that of the Renaissance. What changes in the purpose of an education does this comparison argue?

7. How were the ethical, social, and artistic ideals of the Middle Ages changed by the Renaissance? Name some new types of artistic endeavor which engaged the attention of the Renaissance?

8. In what ways did a Renaissance personage in Florence differ from his counterpart in Nuremberg? What caused these variations?

9. What effect did the spirit of Luther and Calvin exert on the rise of industry and the bourgeois class?

3. European political forms at the opening of the sixteenth century.

Assignment eighteen: Sixteenth century political forms

* C. J. H. Hayes, *Political and social history of modern Europe*, I, 3–23; * *Syllabus*, 94–100.

A. F. Pollard, *Factors in modern history*, chs. 1 and 3.

A. General statement.

The student of history who desires to arrive at a real understanding of the past should recognize early in his study that society is continually changing — that it is not a static thing. He should realize that changes create new problems, and that these problems in turn give birth to new institutions. Sometimes institutions take on such importance that they mold society, and all too frequently they become so well established that they outlive their usefulness. Underneath the surface, however, scarcely noticed by the mass of the body politic, alterations go on and effect such a thorough transformation that finally old institutions have to give way to new.

Feudalism came into existence, as we have seen in the last few lessons, to meet a very special set of circumstances. It became extraordinarily well rooted in the soil of the Middle Ages, and it gave a special character to the economic and political life of medieval times. No sooner was feudalism well established, however, than beneath its bold and seemingly healthy exterior germs of change began to work, sapping its strength and preparing the way for a new institution — the national state. At the end of the Middle Ages conditions were developing in nearly every phase of man's interest — intellectual, economic, social, religious, and political — which pointed to the fall of feudalism and to the rise of nationalism.

In the intellectual life of western Europe, national languages and national cultures were growing. Latin, which had been used universally by the professional and educated classes during the Middle Ages, gradually gave way to national vernacular tongues, which had been spoken up to that time only by the masses and which had been looked down upon by scholars as vulgar dialects. Their development was accompanied by the growth of national literatures and national cultures that made vast inroads into the universal Christian culture of the church. In the late thirteenth and the early fourteenth century, Dante Alighieri gave grace and form and, what is more important, a reputation to the Italian dialect of Florence and thus launched a linguistic and literary movement that was to give Italy a national language and a national culture. In the period from the eleventh century to the fourteenth, the authors of the *Chansons de geste* gave birth to a French literature in the two main dialects of the country, the *langue d'oïl* of the North and the *langue d'oc* of the South; the former eventually became modern French. In the twelfth century the author of *El Cid*, in the fifteenth century the author of *La Celestina*, and in the sixteenth century Cervantes helped to establish the vernacular tongue of Castile as the chief literary dialect of Spain; in the fourteenth century Chaucer with his *Canterbury tales* and Wycliff with his translation of the Bible helped to lift the dialect of London to the position of a national tongue and to found a national literature; and in the sixteenth century Luther's translation of the Bible paved the way for the establishment of the dialect of Saxony as the cultural language of Germany. These facts are of the utmost significance, for language and cultures became perhaps the chief centripetal forces in bringing peoples together into nationalities. A comparison of a linguistic with a political map of present-day Europe will show how closely political boundaries have come ultimately to coincide with linguistic frontiers.

In the economic life of Europe changes were also taking place which augured the decline of feudalism and the rise of national states. The development of commerce between districts far removed from one another broke down the economic self-sufficiency of the feudal manor and led to specialization in production and interdependency of tradesmen. Trade, which had been regulated previously by guilds and by feudal lords, now became too large and cumbersome to be handled in the old ways. Commerce needed the support, encouragement, and protection of organizations great enough to meet the exigencies of world trade; and



EUROPE at the time of the FALL of CONSTANTINOPLE

NORWAY
K. of SWEDEN
Republic of Novgorod
K. of Scotland
Kingdom of DENMARK
Ireland
K. of ENGLAND
Knights
Duchy of Moscow
Volga
Dy. of LITHUANIA
KIPCHAK (Golden Horde)
Teutonic
Elbe
Vistula
K. of POLAND
Dnieper
Flanders
Rhine
THE EMPIRE
K. of FRANCE
Burgundy
Switzd
Austria
K. of HUNGARY
Moldavia
Leon
Navarre
Aquitaine
Wallachia
Danube
(to Genoa)
K. of Portugal
K. of CASTILLE
K. of ARAGON
Republic of Genoa
Rep. of Venice
Bosnia
Trebizond
Constantinople
States of the Church
(to Genoa)
K. of NAPLES
Albania
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Sardinia
Granada (Moslem)
Moorish Kingdoms
Sicily
(to Venice)
Crete
Cyprus
MAMELUKES
J.F.H.

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it looked to national states as the only possible agencies to satisfy its requirements. National states met this call for aid with enthusiasm. They endeavored to develop the economic interests of their own nations even to the injury of foreigners and rationalized their policies by the economic doctrine of mercantilism, which was indeed a national economic philosophy.

Commerce brought with it the growth of capitalism and the development of overseas imperialism, both of which tended to destroy feudalism and stimulate nationalism. The institution of capitalism made it possible to meet feudal obligations by payments in money rather than by payments in kind or in labor. The serf might now free himself from the bonds which held him to the soil. He was no longer the serf of the manor, but a citizen of the state, and his allegiance to the latter was to increase at the expense of his attachment to the former. The institution of imperialism led to bitter rivalry for the acquisition of colonies. Each nation wanted the precious metals, raw materials, and markets that overseas possessions provided, and conflicting interests led to long-drawn-out national wars that contributed greatly in the formation of national traditions, national hostilities, and national interests.

These economic changes were reflected almost immediately in society. As serfdom declined, there developed a working proletariat which was dependent upon its wages for its existence and which was to furnish labor for the commercial and industrial undertakings of the next centuries. But more important for the early phase of the growth of national states was the middle class, the new bourgeoisie, the creature of expanded commercial activity. This class gradually became the richest in the state, and as its interests conflicted with those of feudal economy it fought the feudal system. In time it was to become so important that its standards became the standards of all social classes.

The growth of the powers of national states and of national sentiment is reflected in the changes which took place in the Roman Catholic church. Not a little of the unity of western Europe during the Middle Ages may be accounted for by the universality of this institution. In later medieval times, however, its unity began to be challenged by national states. England by the Statute of Provisors (1351 and 1390) deprived the pope of the right to appoint to English benefices, and by the Statute of Praemunire (1353 and 1393) prohibited its nationals from appealing from English to Roman courts. France, following the same vein, left the pope by the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1438) scarcely any right of appointment, of jurisdiction, or of raising revenue. Finally the Protestant Revolt (the Reformation) in the sixteenth century delivered the universality of the church its *coup de grâce.* From that time on, the national churches were to be the rule rather than the exception, and in some places the head of the state was *ipso facto* head of the church.

Accompanying all these other developments, there was the growth of the political organization of the national states. Monarchy was the most common form of government, and the new monarchs were, in almost every case, feudal lords who, by war, marriage, diplomacy, inheritance, or theft, had increased the size of their holdings and their power at the expense of their neighbors. Gradually national boundaries, conditioned by geographical features, by language, and by tradition, were extended until they met other national boundaries and the nations fought for choice morsels on their frontiers, like Alsace, Roussillon, and Picardy. These wars required national armies and national navies, characteristic adjuncts of national states. At times rival claimants for a national throne came to blows, as in the War of the Roses in England and the War of the Three Henries in France. After the conclusion of such hostilities the victor usually applied himself to the task of fortifying his position against all future trouble. This resulted in periods of despotic rule, as the Tudor despotism in England and the absolutism of Louis XIV. The monarchs strengthened still further their hold on their thrones by the doctrine of divine right, phrased in France by Bishop Bossuet, in England by Thomas Hobbes, and on the Continent by the lawyers trained in the schools of Roman law. Frequently in their rise to power the new potentates allied themselves with the commercial middle class, seeking aid in the form of military supplies and credit. The heavy taxes that the bourgeoisie were called upon to bear were so burdensome that the members of the middle class demanded to share in the disposition of their money. National parliaments, the outgrowth of advisory councils to feudal masters, thus came into being, and after a long struggle against the traditional feudal character of such bodies, the middle class became a vital element in government.

National states were, then, the result of a long series of circumstances. National languages and cultures, national economics, classes with national interests, national churches, and national political organizations, all contributed to the formation of a new institution, the nation. In some parts of Europe the change went on more rapidly than in others, but the general trend became clear by 1500. Specific examples of the phenomena noted above will be found in the reading prescribed to accompany this brief introductory note.

B. The national monarchies.
  (*a*) England.
    i. Geographical limits. Note position of Scotland and Ireland. The English nationality. The Hundred Years' War, 1337–1453. The reign of Henry VII (1485–1509), the first of the Tudors.
      (*i*) Increase of royal power.
      (*ii*) Foreign relations.

- (*b*) France.
    - i. Extension of the boundaries of "France" from the time of Hugh Capet (987) to Charles VIII (1483–1498).
    - ii. Growth of royal power.
        - (*i*) Allegiance to king.
        - (*ii*) Centralized political institutions.
        - (*iii*) Weakness of the Estates-General.
    - iii. Foreign relations of the French kings.
- (*c*) Spain and Portugal.
    - i. Geographical divisions of the Iberian peninsula.
    - ii. Portugal a real monarchy.
        - (*i*) Prince Henry the Navigator.
        - (*ii*) Portuguese language.
    - iii. Spain a real monarchy.
        - (*i*) The Spanish language.
        - (*ii*) Marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella.
        - (*iii*) Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia dominated by Spain (1504).
        - (*iv*) Increase in the royal power.
            - *a*. Abolition of the Cortes.

C. The Holy Roman Empire.
- (*a*) The idea of "empire": the idea of nationality.
- (*b*) The Holy Roman Empire in theory and practice.
    - i. Practically limited to the Germanies.
    - ii. Internal weaknesses — decentralization.
    - iii. Election of the emperor.
    - iv. The Diet.
    - v. The Hapsburgs elected regularly after 1273.
    - vi. Vain attempts at reform.

D. The city-states.
- (*a*) Self-growing municipalities.
    - i. Reasons for their existence.
    - ii. Found largely in Germany and Italy.
- (*b*) Milan.
    - i. The Visconti family.
    - ii. The Sforza family and *condottieri* (professional soldiers).
- (*c*) Venice.
    - i. Commerce.
    - ii. Aristocratic republican government.
- (*d*) Genoa, Florence.
- (*e*) Other sections of the Italian peninsula.
    - i. Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
    - ii. The Papal States.
    - iii. Duchy of Savoy.
- (*f*) Netherlandish city-states.
    - i. Languages of the Low Countries. Netherlandish and Walloon.
    - ii. Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, etc.
- (*g*) The Duchy of Burgundy.
    - i. Consolidation under Charles the Bold.
    - ii. Goes to Austria by marriage, 1477.


The OTTOMAN EMPIRE at the death of Suleiman the Magnificent 1566 A.D.
GERMAN EMPIRE
Vienna
POLAND
HUNGARY
Moldavia
Venice
Wallachia
Danube
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
NAPLES
Naples
Otranto
Lepanto
Constantinople
Trebizond
ARMENIA
SYRIA
Crete (Venetian)
Cyprus
Damascus
Bagdad
Jerusalem
EGYPT
Cairo
J.F.H.

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E. Northern and eastern Europe in 1500.
  (*a*) Scandinavia.
  (*b*) Russia.
  (*c*) Poland.
  (*d*) The Ottoman Turks.

QUESTIONS

1. How did royalty increase its power in the sixteenth century?
2. Trace in France and England the beginnings of nationalism.
3. Describe the life and organization, economic and political, in an Italian city-state.
4. What powers and limitations characterized the papacy in the sixteenth century?

4. The Reformation.

Assignment nineteen: The Reformation

* *Randall*, 143–169; * *Syllabus*, 100–103.

A. General introduction.

The continuous development of a united Christian church within the developing civilization of western Europe had meant a more and more elaborate religious system embracing very diverse tendencies. Long before 1500 the difficulty of reconciling some of these tendencies with one another had given rise to recurrent conflicts, not only between church and state, but also within the ecclesiastical system itself between different parties and points of view. The viewpoint and interest of popes often conflicted with that of bishops, that of the monks with that of the secular priesthood, while scholars, mystics, and laity each tended to have their own, scarcely coinciding, outlooks. When we speak of the medieval church, however, we mean a system in which each of these groups, while developing along its own lines, gave recognition and support to the others. In the Reformation, on the other hand, a large portion of some of these groups repudiated the authority of the rest and discontinued coöperation with them. More specifically, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a large portion of the population in Switzerland, the Germanies, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, England, and Scotland repudiated the authority of the papacy and in most cases of the bishops too; they attacked the monastic system and the separation of the priesthood from the laity by their celibacy and their privileged position in relation to the sacraments; finally, they formed independent Christian churches, in which such features were minimized and greater emphasis was placed upon instructing the laity in the Word of God as interpreted by the reformers. In these Protestant churches worship in the vernacular languages, instead of Latin, was introduced, with preaching and Bible reading occupying a larger place in the worship at the expense of the Mass. The sacramental system of the medieval church, and especially the moral abuses with which the penitential system had become associated, were attacked; the veneration of saints and the pilgrimages to their shrines declined. It was taught that the saving grace, which made one worthy of heaven, came directly from Christ to the believer, and that the sign of it was in the latter's inner conviction and in his living according to the Gospel in the ordinary ways of life. The elaborate system of ecclesiastical works, the worldly splendors, and the monastic asceticism of the medieval church were alike regarded as prejudicial to Christian living.

In these reforms, as in all widespread religious movements, we see a great many tendencies and circumstances of the times at work. We see the regional interests of certain dynasties and groups revolting against foreign domination; we see a widespread protest against extravagant ecclesiastical costs, a protest intensified by the belief that the church raises its funds by stimulatng the superstitions of the people instead of enlightening them. In this demand that the church give more attention to teaching the people, we see the influence of humanism and of a quickened interest in learning. Humanism, moreover, joins hands in the Reformation with new economic interests in criticizing the unproductiveness of monasticism and in praising a life of diligence. Finally, we see among the driving forces of reform the continued vitality of certain basic Christian conceptions of sin and pureness of heart; it is the incongruity between the worldly splendor and corruption of the medieval church and these simple essentials of Christian spirituality that emboldens religious reformers to preach a salvation independent of Roman sanction. Thus, the Reformation was not a movement in some single domain of life, but part and parcel of the changes that were taking place in economic conditions, in political and class relationships, in arts and crafts from printing to architecture, and in intellectual temper, as well as in moral and religious sentiments. In the Reformation days there was no single conspicuous factor rapidly transforming the common circumstances of life or the intellectual equipment of men as did science and the machine at a later time. The changes were produced by a fairly loose and shifting coöperation between preachers attacking church abuses and restating church doctrines, princes opposing the politics of pope and emperor, humanistic scholars criticizing monasticism, merchants inclined to promote worldly enterprise, and popular protest against foreign domination, feudal and ecclesiastical burdens.

Most of the tendencies which compose the Reformation had appeared at an earlier time. In the Middle Ages there were both individuals and sects that criticized the hierarchy and the sacramental systems in favor of a simpler Christian life. There were also secular rulers who fought the papacy. Many doctrines of the reformers had been expressed long before their day. But before 1500 these tendencies had not affected large enough groups, nor did they support each other enough, to reform the church or to cause a widespread defection from her ranks. The fourteenth century had seen the papacy defeated by the king of France and transferred to Avignon from 1308 to 1370; it had then seen two rival popes dispute each other's claims and cause a schism in the western church from 1378 to 1417; it had also heard the reformist teachings of Wycliffe. But these breaches were closed, and in the following century John Huss, whose teachings in Bohemia were influenced by those of Wycliffe, was burned at the stake. The Councils of Constance (1415–1417) and of Basel (1431-1449), designed to substitute constitutional for absolute government in the church and to establish the right of the national civil government to order the church in its realm, failed and the papacy emerged stronger than ever. In the same century the humanism of the Renaissance likewise failed to find a stable and wholesome reception in the church; on the contrary, it was espoused fitfully by interested individuals and in some cases gave rise to abuses which called forth a puritanistic reaction.

The Reformation, when it finally did come, took a devious and complicated course according to circumstances prevailing in different countries. One may distinguish an early period, roughly from 1517 to 1539, in which it became evident that the reforming tendencies within the church were not to subside without causing a widespread revolt, and in which the religious leaders of the revolt — Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, and others — formulated the doctrinal principles of the Reformation. There ensued a longer period of a hundred years or more, in which various groups of contending parties fought each other over mixed political and religious issues, and during which most of the major forms of Protestant Christianity acquired definite ecclesiastical shape. In order to understand the various Protestant churches which emerged, it is necessary to consider at least three factors: the religion of their respective founders, the policies which these and their followers adopted in the circumstances which confronted them, and the characteristics of the people who came to compose them.

Before considering these factors in detail, however, and thus trying to understand the separate churches, it seems desirable to have a fuller interpretation of the general significance of the Reformation in the making of the modern mind and modern culture. This is the theme of the following reading assignment.

* *Randall*, 143–169.

Preserved Smith, *The age of the Reformation;* Preserved Smith, *A history of modern culture*, I, 356–391; T. M. Lindsay, *History of the Reformation.*

B. The compromise of the Reformation.

C. The spirit of reform in the Middle Ages.

D. The religious revolt.
  (*a*) The gospel of Luther.
    Valuable supplementary references are A. C. McGiffert, *Martin Luther, the man and his work*, and *Luther's primary works*, edited by Wace and Buchheim.
  (*b*) The Calvinistic system.
    The edition of *Calvin's Institutes* by B. B. Warfield and the *Life of Calvin* by W. Walker are the most important supplementary references.

E. The Catholic Reformation.
Hayes, I, 156–164.
  (*a*) Spanish ascendancy in the sixteenth century.
  (*b*) Loyola and the Jesuits.
  (*c*) The Council of Trent, 1545–1563.

F. Puritanism: its moral ideal and social significance.

G. Political aspects of the Reformation.

H. The outcome of the Reformation.
Its relations to the Renaissance, and the relations of both of these movements to the making of the modern mind.
NOTE: *Randall's* treatment of topics *D*, *F*, and *H* deserves particular attention.

I. Notes on the Reformation.

Assignment twenty: The Reformation, special phases

* H. L. Friess, *Notes on the Reformation; Syllabus*, 104–114.

NOTES ON THE REFORMATION

By Horace L. Friess

Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Columbia College

(*a*) The question of indulgences.

While the sale of indulgences was but one of the church practices attacked in the Reformation, it was the one which first led Luther into open criticism of the church, and the discussion of the question illustrates very well the kind of issue raised by the reformers and the complex motives involved.

An indulgence is a partial remission of the penalties incurred by sin, which the church grants to those who fulfill specified conditions. The granting of indulgences raises two questions: (1) What penalties is the Church actually able to remit? and (2) Upon what conditions should it exercise this power? When sins are confessed to a Catholic priest, he may impose penalties upon the penitent, such as fasting and special devotions. The ability of the church to remit these penalties which it has itself imposed, in view of some other consideration, such as donations or service to the church, is unquestioned. The only question is as to *what* considerations should govern such a practice. What is the sacrament of penance for? Theoretically, it is to help remove the effects of sin; it is to help the sinner gain pureness of heart, for "the pure in heart shall see God." The distinctive meaning of salvation in Christianity is the enjoyment of the eternal fellowship of God, and the condition of it is the removal of the power to sin. The sacrament of penance is to contribute to this result.

In practice, however, a system of imposing and remitting penalties may lend itself better to ecclesiastical needs and benefits than to the interests of sinners. Indulgences were first granted on a large scale during the crusades to those who imperiled their lives in the fighting; later they were commonly sold to help defray the expenses of wars, the building of churches, etc. Furthermore, the church began to claim authority, not only to remit such penalties as it might have imposed upon the sinner in this life, but also to release him from further penalties that still awaited him in purgatory after death. In making this claim the idea that the church could draw upon a fund of merit accumulated by the saints played a part and served to connect the veneration of saints with the system of indulgences. By another application of the idea of transferred merit, it was also maintained that a man could buy an indulgence releasing deceased relatives from a portion of their purgatorial penalties. Such extensions of the indulgence idea very naturally raised doubts, not only as to the conditions on which the church was granting indulgences, but also as to its power to fulfill the sort of promises it was making. Was it not merely impoverishing the people by playing upon their superstitious fears?

To Tetzel, an agent who sold the indulgences against which Luther protested, is attributed the statement that "as soon as the money rattles in the collector's chest, the soul interceded for flies out of purgatory." Luther's ninety-five theses discussing indulgences raise various issues, among them the following: (1) What are the pains of purgatory? "Do not hell, purgatory, and heaven appear to differ as despair, almost despair, and peace of mind differ?" (Thesis 16.) Hence, considering the nature of penalties incurred by sin, "the pope, when he speaks of plenary remission of all penalties, does not mean of all, but only of those imposed by himself." (Thesis 20.) (2) "Do not the dying pay all penalties by death?" and "Do not those priests act wrongly and unlearnedly, who, in the case of the dying, reserve canonical penances for purgatory?" (Theses 13 and 10.) (3) If the church claims such extreme power to influence the state of the dead, "why does not the pope empty purgatory for the sake of most holy charity and of the supreme necessity of souls — this being the most just of all reasons — if he redeems an infinite number of souls for the sake of that most fatal thing, money, to be spent on building a basilica — this being a very slight reason?" (Thesis 82.) (4) "Should not Christians be taught that, unless they have superfluous wealth, they are bound to keep what is necessary for the use of their own households, and by no means to lavish it on pardons?" And "should they not be taught that he who gives to a poor man, or lends to a needy man, does better than if he bought pardons?" (Theses 46 and 43.)

When Luther raised these questions, he probably intended them merely as an appeal for the reform of church practice in the matter of selling indulgences. But it is quite obvious that, if he tried to defend one side of the question against papal affirmation of the other side, he might naturally be led, in seeking basic arguments, to question the whole appropriateness of the traditional penitential system as a way of dealing with sin. In so doing he would be driven to reinterpret the fundamental Christian concepts of sin and salvation, and to seek authority for his interpretations elsewhere than in the papacy. This is precisely what happened. (The major concepts Luther developed were discussed above. *Randall*, 148–150.)

(*b*) The main forms of early Protestantism.

i. Lutheranism.

The Germanies in Luther's time, unlike the new national states, lacked political integration; neither the pope nor the Roman emperor was able to control the hundreds of princes, knights, and towns, and a sufficiently strong native dynasty, comparable to the Tudors in England or the Bourbons in France, did not exist. Despite this fact, Luther, it seems, relied upon government to carry out his reforms. More mystical and fervent than statesmanlike, he gave little thought to building up a religious organization that could stand on its own feet;[1] he early proclaimed the right of civil authorities to discipline the clergy; and while he sympathized with the grievances of the common people, he opposed their revolting against their superiors. Hence although Lutheran religious sentiment spread very rapidly among both laity and clergy, its adherents depended for protection upon whatever civil powers chose to protect them. In north Germany and in Scandinavia there were not lacking princes who, from mixed religious and secular motives, were willing to assume this function. But under the circumstances it is small wonder that until 1648 there was intermittent strife between coalitions of these princes and those who remained faithful to the Catholic system. It is also not surprising that in one German state after another Lutheranism formed a little patriarchal system. The prince became the absolute ruler of the church, the noble patron became the tyrant of the pastor. Lutheranism tended thus to be aristocratic, socially conservative, and devotional.

ii. Reformed or Calvinistic Protestantism.

Quite different were both the personal and the social conditions in which Reformed or Calvinistic Protestantism arose. Huldreich Zwingli (1484-1531), who preached against the sale of indulgences in Zurich in 1519, was a different sort of person from Luther, and he preached to a small self-governing body-politic which he was able to convert into a kind of church-state. He also appealed directly to patriotic sentiment in attacking the church's traffic in Swiss soldiers. After he had carried the clergy and the town council with him, he was the first citizen of Zurich. The church and the state were to be one body under different aspects and administered by the same persons, who were to make it a strong moral commonwealth. Zwingli was not, like Luther, a runaway friar who had passed through the pangs of spiritual trouble. He was a humanist and something of a rationalist. He used the idea of God's absolute omnipotence to attack the necessity of sacramental salvation. He took a moderate view of original sin, criticized ascetic practices, and would allow nothing in worship unless it had the sanction of the Bible. The last principle had the effect of stripping worship in the Reformed churches still further of ritualistic elements than was the case in the Lutheran. In fact Luther, with his strong belief in the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, protested passionately against Zwingli's treatment of this sacrament, and this proved one of the differences which made it lastingly difficult for these two Protestant groups to combine.

Zwingli was killed in battle against the Catholic cantons of Switzerland, but within five years of his death there appeared at Basel a work on *The institutes of Christianity* (1536), which gave Reformed Protestantism a doctrine, charter, and code more systematic and comprehensive than any hitherto brought forward by the reformers. The author was John Calvin (1509-1564), a native of northern France, trained in humanistic and juridical studies, and early affected by reformist teaching which was already current in his youth. On the foundation of God's absolute sovereignty to save and condemn whom He chose, and on scriptural authority, the *Institutes* were to build an impregnable wall of argument against medieval Rome and secularism alike, a doctrine free at once of Catholic errors, Luther's inconsistencies, and Zwingli's too human rationalism. (The salient features of Calvin's position were summed up above by *Randall*, 150 ff.)

By the cast of his thought and by his activities in Geneva, where he took over the leadership of reform in 1540, Calvin produced a self-governing church that was able to stand up against adverse political pressure and to take political power into its own hands under favorable circumstances. "Calvinism created a highly organized middle-class theocracy in which God is represented by His elect who choose their ministers, elders, and synods, who learn how to govern and exercise discipline." Particularly in states where the civil authorities did not take Protestantism under their protection, or where reformist opinion was dissatisfied by the compromises made with Catholicism, Calvinism proved a first-class fighting force in organizing groups of independents. Thus it spread from Switzerland, and predominated among the Huguenots in France, and among dissenters in England and Scotland, where John Knox from 1560 to 1572 laid the Calvinistic foundations of Presbyterianism. It likewise spread among groups in Germany that found themselves ill served by Lutheran and Catholic princes alike — for example, the Anabaptists, whose radical views on toleration, property, etc., made them generally suspect to government. One of the greatest tests which it had to meet, and which it met successfully, was in the Netherlands, where Reformed Protestantism emerged victorious from the Wars of Liberation against Spain and the Spanish Inquisition (1566 -1607). The career of Calvinism is too complicated to be summed up briefly, but in Switzerland, Holland, Scotland, and some American colonies it exercised a controlling influence over government for a considerable time; while in France, England, and Germany the Reformed Protestants, if not persecuted, generally suffered political and civil disabilities. The Commonwealth period under Cromwell in England (1649–1660) is an exceptionally drastic illustration of the issues with which Calvinism was connected in its attempt to impose a fresh theocratic discipline upon a society already possessing varied institutions and vested interests.

In New England the theocratic ideal seemed more practical, for there were no existing structures to compete with it, and the settlers in the wilderness found comfort and discipline in the idea that they were under the direct guidance of God. Furthermore, they were inspired by the belief that the Reformation was being brought to its completion in New England, where the kingdom of God was freed from Antichrist (the pope), from persecution, and from worldly politics, and where the congregations of the saints could invest their ministers with that divine authority which in the past had been handed down through the apostolic succession. But soon this theocracy became an exclusive minority conception of the New England clergy, who found themselves in a position, as the colonies became more diversified, to tyrannize over others as much as their predecessors in the old country had been tyrannized over.

Thus experiencing the most varied fortunes, Calvinism developed a far greater sense of international life and common action coupled with individual responsibility than we find in Lutheranism. Its vicissitudes helped to stimulate a brilliant line of scholars, controversialists, and jurists to discuss toleration, the rights of man, war and peace, and civil and natural law.

iii. Anglicanism.

Supplementary reading: *The book of common prayer.*

In England the institutional outcome of the Reformation was largely determined by the existence of a strongly centralized national government in dynastic hands. From the reign of Henry VIII onward, the monarchs (with the one exception of Mary) became interested in controlling the church for personal, financial, and political reasons — the last, because papal control of the church seemed likely to be an aid to national rivals, such as Spain, France, and, for a time, Scotland. The crown succeeded in bringing the church offices under its authority, in dissolving monastic orders, and in confiscating their lands. These changes of course required the support of patriotic and reformist sentiment, but many Anglicans take pride in the fact that their religious reformers pursued a middle way and molded the customs of the Church of England so as to preserve elements of Catholic tradition which continental Protestants had rashly discarded. While the compromise produced some remarkably fine testimonials — for example, *The book of common prayer* — it has not proved entirely stable. Instead of appealing to one party of believers, the Church of England has sought to unite on a national foundation different strains of Christian belief, and as a result there have been movements within the church, now in a Catholic and now in a Protestant direction, from the days of the Reformation down to the present day. In the sixteenth century, after the establishment of state control of the church, we have, first, the favoring of Protestant tendencies under Edward VI, then a Catholic reaction under Mary, and then the safeguarding of Protestantism by a compromise reached under Elizabeth. In the seventeenth century we have the great rebellion under extreme Calvinistic auspices and then a restoration in which dissenting Protestants suffered disabilities along with Roman Catholics. In the eighteenth century we have the rise of evangelicalism in the church, which issues in a new Protestant party and emphasis;

but close upon this, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, comes the Oxford movement, a reaction in the opposite direction of Anglo-Catholicism. And now in our own time the differences between Catholic and Protestant elements in the Church of England, far from being composed, seem likely anew to threaten the unity of the structure.

iv. The more radical groups.

Besides the major of early Protestant sects — Lutheran, Calvinistic, and Anglican — there appeared in the course of the Reformation smaller groups that favored more extreme departures from Catholic tradition in one direction or another. The Socinians were a group established in Poland by two Italian humanists who fled persecution in Italy. Their radicalism took the direction of an emphasis upon human ability and human reason, which led them to question both Catholic and Protestant doctrines of sin, atonement, and salvation. They were, in a sense, forerunners of the Unitarians. (*Randall*, 284.)

In the lowlands of Germany and the Netherlands there early appeared groups of Anabaptists whose radicalism took a communistic and pacifistic direction. That is, their interpretation of Christian living stressed toleration and the sharing of all things in common. By the beginning of the seventeenth century these Anabaptist groups, having experienced difficulties both from within and from without, had become pretty thoroughly absorbed in the Calvinistic movement that prevailed in their neighborhood. But during the seventeenth century a radicalism in some respects similar to theirs reappeared among the Quakers in England, who professed to be guided by the "inner light" alone, rather than by custom or tradition, and who repudiated ministers and coercion — hence favoring toleration, passive resistance, etc. They were not communists, however.

(*c*) The Catholic Reformation and Counter-Reformation.

The forces which operated to produce Protestant churches in the northern countries were not absent in the countries that remained Catholic (France, Spain, Italy), but they were present in lesser degree and were qualified by other circumstances that worked to preserve a continuity of church tradition amid reform and change.

i. France.

In France the government was less tempted to support Protestantism than in neighboring countries of northern Europe because a large measure of national independence and royal control had already been established over the Gallican church. The Council of Basel had granted supreme power to the French bishops in council, and the Concordat of Bologna (1516) put the appointive and taxing powers into the king's hands. Thus certain political and ecclesiastical objectives that were elsewhere sought during the Reformation had been gained in France without breaking with Catholicism. When reformist ideas began to take hold in France, the rulers, in the main, though not consistently, set themselves against the Protestants. Persecutions recurred intermittently throughout the sixteenth century and again as late as 1685, when Louis XIV, by revoking the Edict of Nantes, caused thousands of Huguenots to leave the country. Nevertheless, despite the failure of institutionalized Protestantism to get a secure footing in France, the ethics of its worldly application throve there virtually as much as in any Protestant country, and the spirit of medieval Christianity remained as a modifying rather than as a basic element of the national culture. The spirit of learning was also active in France, so that in this regard the French church became for a time the most illustrious within Catholicism.

ii. Spain.

"Spaniards reckon the age of the Counter-Reformation as the golden age of the Church of Spain. The country was reveling in new wealth and knowledge. The Castilian language had just passed from youth to manhood. The church was more episcopal and less papal than it became in later times, and was in the forefront of the work of education. The faith of the people was fanatically Catholic, tempered hard by their long struggle with the Moors and sharpened by their hatred and suspicion of the Jews. A few Protestant books, now of excessive rarity, were printed in Castilian, but the majority of the people were in no mood to inquire into new religions; they were enthusiastically eager to express what they already believed. And this enthusiasm produced leaders of religion as original and bold as the Spanish writers of imaginative literature." St. John of the Cross, Ignatius Loyola, Francis Xavier, and St. Teresa are among the most illustrious of these.

Loyola was a soldier who, while recovering from a wound that permanently disabled a leg, resolved to redirect his energies to the warfare of the church. He founded the order of the Jesuits, basing its discipline on the military principle of unquestioned obedience to superiors. The order became one of the most important instruments, not only of Catholic missions generally, but of papal loyalty and of reclaiming portions of the European population that might otherwise have been lost to Protestantism.

Under Emperor Charles V (1519–1555) Spain became the chief power supporting the papacy. The policy of the emperor, however, far from being one of subservience to the pope, was rather to champion reform and strengthening of the church in the interest of keeping his far-flung empire intact against the encroachments of strong independent dynasties and princes (French, German, and English). This policy was continued with less astuteness and more religious fanaticism under Philip II, who set up the Inquisition in the Netherlands and struggled vainly to keep those countries under Spanish and Catholic rule.

iii. Italy.

The beginning of church reform in Italy shows a consciousness of the antagonism which existed between the paganism of the Italian Renaissance and the Gospel. Almost immediately after Luther's excommunication we find in Italy a growth of new religious orders, some of which were concerned directly with the education and improvement of the clergy. We find also little groups of well-educated ecclesiastics, literary men, and noble ladies, animated by a really religious spirit, and disturbed by the thought of the moral disorder and theological degeneracy which weakened Christianity. Interest in these questions gradually developed three distinct tendencies. The first tendency was that of men who went not only as far as Luther but far beyond him in their negation of traditional Christianity. [Such were the founders of Socinianism (*Syllabus*, 111).] The second tendency appears in John Valdes and Gaspar Contarini and their followers. Theirs was a party of aristocrats and academicians, whose genuine fervor and mystical devotion represented the highest and most uncorrupt Catholicism of Italy at the time. They were unable, however, to reach the common people, or to exercise much influence through institutions, since the distracted condition of Italian politics at the time meant the surrender of control to outside powers, principally Spanish.

Under these circumstances the principal agency of reform in Italy was the party that met Protestantism with the whole force of resistance and reaction. Paul III, an ascetic, anti-humanist pope, who at first favored Contarini, gave his sanction in 1540 to the newly formed Spanish Society of Jesus, and by the introduction of the Inquisition in 1542 he definitely checked the circulation of books of a Protestant character. And in his honest anxiety for reform he summoned in 1545 the Council of Trent, which laid the dogmatic and the disciplinary basis of the Counter-Reformation.[1]

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[1] Leighton Pullan, *Religion since the Reformation*, 8–10.

iv. The Council of Trent (1545–1563).

The measures of this prolonged council, which undertook at once to institute needed reforms in the church and to check the spread of heresy, include: (1) the more exact definition of the conception of salvation as a process involving the grace of God, the faith of the individual, and the works of the church; (2) the reform of church government and discipline, including the establishment of the "Roman Congregations," which were groups of cardinals assisting the pope in the work of administration and discipline; and (3) the reaffirmation of the exclusive perfection of the Catholic faith and the adoption of vigilant measures for its protection and advance. Since the Council of Trent, Catholic Christianity in the West has been more definitely Roman than before, but at the same time more definitely constitutional than despotic, more practical and moralistic than speculative or liturgical. The profuse multiplication of special devotions to saints, Virgin, and Lord, which characterized the medieval period has been retarded, and theological speculation seems less basic in character than in the days of the schoolmen, while, on the other hand, undoubtedly more uniform and persistent instruction is given to the laity in faith and morals. Thus, many of the major emphases of the Reformation period in the sphere of morals and worship came into Catholic Christianity without the adoption of Protestant doctrines or the denial of priestly authority.

QUESTIONS

1. What was old and what new in the theology of the Reformation?
2. In how far was the Reformation a political movement for (*a*) peasants, (*b*) rulers, (*c*) the emperor?
3. What precursors did Luther have in the reform of the church?
4. What measures did the Council of Trent take to strengthen the Catholic church?
5. What is an indulgence? What is the popular view, what the exact ecclesiastical?
6. Name the chief characteristic emphasis and points of difference of: Lutheranism, Calvinism, Anglicanism, Socianism.
7. How does the Catholic church of today differ from its counterpart in the Middle Ages? What caused the change?
8. Contrast the moral ideals typified by John Milton and a Renaissance figure such as Benvenuto Cellini. Why does the Puritan ethic create Rockefellers and Edisons?
9. What are the most significant contributions of the Renaissance and the Reformation to the building of the modern world?


EUROPE in the time of CHARLES V.
K. of SCOTLAND
K. of DENMARK
RUSSIA
Ireland
DY. of PRUSSIA
K. of ENGLAND
Hamburg
Lithuania
POLAND
K. of POLAND
Vistula
Oder
Elbe
Calais
Cologne
NETHERLANDS
THE EMPIRE
Silesia
Bohemia
Worms
Brittany
Paris
Dniester
Dnieper
Vienna
Austria
Transylvania
K. of FRANCE
Burgundy
Franche Comté
SWISS Conf.n
HUNGARY
Styria
Savoy
Milan
VENICE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Pavia
Danube
Genoa
Florence
States of the Church
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5. **The early dynastic enterprises in Europe and the political contributions of the Reformation.**

Assignment twenty-one: Sixteenth century political organization and political theory

* *Syllabus*, 115–119; * *Randall*, 181–188; *Hayes*, I, 74–106, especially chart on 107.

In the period when the religious controversies of the Reformation formed the subject of discussion and served as the real or artificial basis of division, there were present great political schemes of unity and concentrated power. Of these the Hapsburg plan or design was the greatest, and in this plan Maximilian was one of the most important figures.

There was a saying in Europe in the early sixteenth century to the effect that other states gained territory by wars, but that *felix Austria* gained them by marriage alliances, thus referring to the extraordinary good luck of Emperor Maximilian in enlarging his family possessions. We shall take his policies as a starting point, because they are such an excellent example of the dynastic conception — the idea that territory and its inhabitants can be regarded as family and heritable possessions to be added to in all possible ways, regardless of geographical and ethnical considerations, not to speak of natural economic organization or the wishes of the peoples concerned. This idea was so long-lived in Europe that it formed one of the guiding principles as late as 1815, when European statesmen in congress at Vienna tried to redistribute the European territories which had been so thoroughly (and equally dynastically) distributed by Napoleon.

The Hapsburg attempt to dominate the continent of Europe became involved in religious issues, as did other political movements of sixteenth century Europe. In some instances religion became the guiding motive in the determination of political policy; in other instances it became merely the force used by those in control to achieve their political purposes. Reformation and Counter-Reformation divided Europe into hostile religious groups. The religious affiliation of the people commonly followed that of the king or prince. This is well illustrated by the Compromise Agreement which kept the religiously divided Germanies fairly tranquil from 1555 to 1618. The agreement was summarized in the Latin phrase *cujus regio ejus religio* — *i. e.*, that each prince might dictate the religion (Roman Catholic or Lutheran) of his subjects. The spirit of this settlement was the spirit of all the religious settlements in Europe for over two centuries except, as time went on, where popular participation in government defeated or diluted the simple recipe so congenial to despotic princes, or where skepticism combined with successful despotism made the princes themselves less concerned with the religious uniformity of their subjects.

With these considerations in mind, when we look at the dynastic designs of two typical heirs of Maximilian, Charles V and Philip II, we notice how the religious element introduced powerful influences to stimulate and thwart them, and to alter the lives not only of the men who lived in the territories which they regarded as family heritages, but of others whose kings' or whose own interests lay athwart the Hapsburg path to European hegemony.

The politics of Europe in the sixteenth century was largely dominated by two commanding figures — the emperor, or Charles V, and his son, Philip II. Charles, born in 1500, was the son of Philip of Hapsburg and Joanna, daughter and heiress of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. His two grandfathers were thus Maximilian, Austrian Hapsburg, Holy Roman emperor, and Ferdinand, rich and powerful king of Spain. By the death of Ferdinand in 1516 and of Emperor Maximilian three years later, the young man came into possession of vast and polyglot dominions including such cities as Vienna, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Brussels, Milan, Naples, Madrid, and Cadiz. In his twenty-first year he was crowned emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Charles was able and industrious, though sometimes irresolute and obstinate. Above all, he was thoroughly disposed to take himself and his rôle seriously. There were fully forty separate units in his realm, each with its own political institutions and customs. During his entire reign he was at war with France, besides which he had to contend with rising Protestantism in Germany, while in Italy he was in constant difficulty with the Catholic popes. More menacing was the threat of Turkish invasion. The year before Charles was crowned, Suleiman the Magnificent had become sultan; he had begun a war upon Hungary which led to the complete conquest of that country and imperiled the security of Austria and other Hapsburg possessions.

The most important and constructive program that Charles attempted was his effort to unify Germany. The national unifications of England, France, and Spain, completed in the previous century, pointed the way. In each case a strong monarch had overcome feudal princes and ambitious nobles, deprived cities of many of their liberties, and curtailed the privileges of representative assemblies. In every such case it had been necessary to secure the support of some important popular elements. Charles's great handicap was his unwillingness to forego his position as emperor to become a German monarch. Groups that elsewhere had furnished strong enthusiasm for nationalism were here lukewarm to efforts that merely looked to the personal aggrandizement of the ambitious Charles, who could scarcely pose as a genuine national leader. His aims were rendered even more futile by the spread of Protestantism in Germany, for Charles was a Catholic. In this, as in every problem that confronted him, Charles was handicapped by the multiplicity and complexity of the problems requiring his attention. His rule made altogether excessive demands upon his time, so that at fifty-five he found himself an old and tired man. He therefore abdicated and divided his dominions between his brother and his son. His brother, Ferdinand, received the compact eastern possessions — Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary — and the title of Holy Roman Emperor. Charles's son, Philip II, received the remainder — Spain, the Netherlands, the two Sicilies, Milan, and the colonies in America.

The affairs of Ferdinand, apart from his endeavors to regain Hungary from the Turks, are of no special interest and need not concern us here. Philip II, on the other hand, left a profound and lasting stamp on every country in his realm. His father, Charles V, had been born in the Netherlands and had always regarded that country as his home. Philip was born in Spain and had lived there most of his life. He was thoroughly Spanish and was determined to make Spain the greatest country in the world. Even more energetic and indefatigable than his father, he was also less tolerant in religion and more Machiavellian in his politics. Like his father, he also failed because of the very number and variety of the projects and problems to which he gave his attention. Yet each of his foreign activities was epochal in the country affected.

In Spain, Philip sought absolutism and uniformity. The Inquisition was employed with great vigor and cruelty for religious intolerance and royal despotism. Such harshness was bound to produce unrest, and much energy was consumed in suppressing revolts in Granada and Aragon. Upon Castile fell the great financial burdens of Philip's many enterprises at home and abroad. Huge taxes paralyzed commerce and industry. At the close of Philip's reign, Spain was on the verge of bankruptcy.

The same politics of absolutism, the Inquisition, and oppressive taxation were applied to the Netherlands, with the added grievance that Philip sought to subordinate the Netherlands to Spain. Spanish garrisons were stationed in the cities, Spaniards appointed to all lucrative and honorable public offices, Dutch commerce restricted in the interest of Spain's. When disorder ensued, a military despotism under the Duke of Alva was set up and maintained for six years. Ultimately force proved ineffectual, but shrewd diplomacy succeeded in dividing the South, which was Flemish, Catholic, and industrial, from the North, which was Dutch, Calvinist, and commercial. The ten southern provinces (Belgium) were persuaded to accept the Treaty of Arras (1579), which linked them to the Hapsburgs (Spanish and Austrian) for two hundred years. The northern provinces (Holland) united about the same time, and in 1581 issued a formal declaration of independence. This they effectually maintained, though their freedom was not acknowledged by Spain until the peace of Westphalia in 1648.

When Elizabeth came to the throne in England in 1558, Philip sought her hand in marriage, and when she refused him and espoused Protestantism, he continued for thirty years to plot against her. At length, all other means failing, he sent forth his famous Invincible Armada. This and its equally hapless sequels destroyed not only the navy but the commerce of Spain. It also marks the beginning of England's commercial supremacy. His meddling in France was quite as fruitless, though less disastrous. His only signal achievement was the defeat, in 1571, of the Turkish fleet at Lepanto. It checked the Moslem advance, which was threatening Rome itself, and it forever ended Turkish sea power in the Mediterranean.

6. The political theory of transition.

* *Randall*, 181–188.

J. W. Allen, *A history of political thought in the sixteenth century;* Preserved Smith, *A history of modern culture*, I, ch. VIII.

A. Monarchs claim absolute sovereignty over their states.
  (*a*) A feudal idea.
  (*b*) Personal and dynastic interest of rulers.
  (*c*) Political organization follows expanding commerce.
  (*d*) National languages, national cultures, and historical traditions help to condition political organization and allegiance.
  (*e*) Christendom's political predominance lost.

B. The appearance of national states and strong monarchies.

C. Theories formulating and justifying sovereign claims.
  (*a*) Divine right monarchy.
  (*b*) Naturalistic theories and governmental ideas of Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes.
    i. Strong government.
    ii. The social contract.

QUESTIONS

1. What was the connection between the rule of Austria, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Holy Roman Empire?

2. Under what handicaps did Philip II labor? What goals did he set himself? How did he fail and why?

3. To what changing ideals is the rise of European nationalism due? What advantages did this shift bring to the serf? the capitalist? the aristocrat?

4. Draw an analogy between the cult of nationalism and the cult of religion as to dogma or creed, ritual, slogans, methods of control, and purpose.

5. Distinguish between the theory of the divine right of kings and the theory of the absolute sovereignty of the monarch. What needs were supplied by the two theories?

6. How did literature respond to the growth of nationalistic sentiment? Name some modern examples of this sort of writing.

7. What was Hobbes' conception of the origin and the organization of the state?

8. What arguments in logic and tradition could an absolute monarch advance? What would be the modern rebuttal to such arguments?

9. What practical utility did an absolute monarch have at this time?

10. How did monarchy advance nationalism?

11. Why do we speak of political duplicity as Machiavellian?

12. What is Hobbes' theory of social contract?

7. The intellectual development in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Assignment twenty-two: The emergence of natural science

* John Herman Randall, Jr., "Note in the science of the Renaissance," *Syllabus*, 120–128; * *Randall*, 203–224.

NOTE ON THE SCIENCE OF THE RENAISSANCE

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Although natural science, as a method of investigating nature and a systematic interpretation of the world, did not become an important factor in western civilization until the seventeenth century, there had been a continuous line of thinkers with such interests since the eleventh century. It is not possible to understand the epoch-making intellectual changes associated with the names of Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes in the seventeenth century without knowing why men had come to take more and more interest in astronomy and mathematical physics, and less and less in the ideas of Thomas Aquinas.

The Greeks developed two separate kinds of science. The first was that of Aristotle. That great Athenian was primarily interested in understanding living beings, and particularly the life of men as it was led in the rich civilization of Athens. He was impressed by the fact that all living beings grow and develop into certain characteristic forms, and that they all have certain characteristic activities when fully mature.

Man in particular lives in an organized society; his distinguishing activity is the employment of intelligence to achieve a harmonious, rich, and balanced group life. It is the task of knowledge, thought Aristotle, to criticize, systematize, and understand the various pursuits that make up the best group life. Knowledge should explore the possibilities in these pursuits; it should seek to discover the meaning and significance of all the materials that can be worked into a good life. Above all, it should consider human life itself, and work out such an organization of activities that both a society and its individual members could consciously strive to realize all their capacities for rich and complete living. The sciences of ethics and politics were naturally for Aristotle the most important branches of knowledge. He also laid great emphasis on logic, as the science of arriving by discussion at definite decisions about the good life, and on what he called "first philosophy," which after his day received the name of "metaphysics," as the science that should interpret the meaning and significance for man of the world in which he finds himself.

Aristotle lived in Athens in the fourth century B.C. During the third, second, and first centuries B.C., chiefly in the commercial center of Alexandria, other Greeks worked out quite different notions of science. They were impressed by the beauty and simplicity of mathematics, which seemed to them the very ideal of organized knowledge. They found that mathematics could be employed to erect a system of astronomy that possessed much of the same beauty of consistency and certainty in its predictions; and some of them, like Archimedes, discovered that physical objects in their actions displayed simple mathematical relations. These Alexandrian scientists developed the science of mechanics, which they found was useful in building machines and contrivances. But slave labor was so cheap that there was little incentive for much practical application of these principles, and most of the Alexandrian scientists felt that the chief value of their discovery was to show that the whole world is really a beautiful mathematical structure.

The men of western Europe discovered both Aristotelian and Alexandrian science when in the late eleventh century increasing economic prosperity and better communications gave a scholar class the chance to inquire into the ideas of their Moslem neighbors. The Arabs had long before appropriated both of these bodies of Greek science, and learned men both in the Near East and in Spain had for centuries pored over and added to what they had taken. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries a considerable number of Christians and Jews made translations and compilations from this Arabic version of Greek science. In the newly founded schools and universities of Christendom these translations, though at first regarded with suspicion by the Church authorities, were enthusiastically studied, and men naturally turned also to the Latin or Greek manuscripts preserved in Christian libraries but hitherto left to gather dust.

The Christians were profoundly influenced by both bodies of Greek science which they thus became acquainted with. But they found Aristotle much more congenial to their own religious and moral interests than the Alexandrians, and it was Aristotelianism that came by the middle of the thirteenth century to dominate the intellectual life of the European schools. This study and assimilation of Aristotle was the first great intellectual revolution in European life. Aristotelian science was worked over and harmonized with Christian theology and the actual conditions of medieval social organization; it became the scientific foundation of the great syntheses of Thomas Aquinas and Dante, as well as of the slightly different systems of many other teachers.

The mathematical and mechanical science of the Alexandrians from its first discovery in the eleventh century awakened the enthusiasm of a certain number of scholars. But it was not till the late sixteenth century that it came to be widely popular even among scholars. When it finally did, and began to inspire the great scientific geniuses of the seventeenth century, it effected a second intellectual revolution that caused a far more radical break with the older Christian ideas of man and the world than had the coming of Aristotle in the twelfth century. This newer science found its first great popularizer in Descartes, who wrote between 1637 and 1650. When Isaac Newton finally fitted its various parts together in one system of the *Mathematical principles of natural philosophy*, in 1687, the ideas of this Alexandrian science began to enjoy an immense prestige. The intellectual life of the eighteenth century is largely the story of the spread of these conceptions to every field of human interest.

During the five hundred years when the mathematical astronomy and mechanics of the Greeks were slowly making their way in a world largely dominated by the Aristotelian interests in science, social and economic conditions were gradually changing. The men in the rising towns were beginning to desire a kind of science that would be more practically useful in commercial and manufacturing pursuits than the wisdom of Aristotle. They became more and more dissatisfied with the ideas of Thomas Aquinas. They did not know of the other kind of science that learned men in the universities were keeping alive, and they went down many blind alleys in their search for a more useful kind of knowledge. Indeed, even in the early seventeenth century as great a genius as Francis Bacon could criticize acutely the shortcomings of Thomas and Aristotle without realizing that just the kind of fruits he was most interested in had already been gained by men working in the Alexandrian tradition of the Middle Ages. The story of what we call the "birth of modern natural science" is the story of the gradual development of certain ideas by scholars in the universities, and of the increasing desire for a practical and useful knowledge of nature by men alive to the needs of the newer commercial life.

The first organized center of mathematical and natural science in medieval Europe was at the School of Chartres, in France, in the first half of the twelfth century. Here the natural science of the Arabs was eagerly welcomed; and from Chartres the interest in mathematical physics and the experimental investigation of nature spread to other parts of Europe, especially to Germany and to Oxford. While the University of Paris was in the thirteenth century becoming the official intellectual center of Christendom, and while at Paris Thomas and his colleagues were building on the basis of Aristotelian science, at the University of Oxford much more attention was being paid to the mathematical and experimental investigation of nature. The most famous among these Oxford natural scientists was Roger Bacon, but he was by no means an isolated figure. In the early fourteenth century this Oxford school produced very keen critics of the intellectual synthesis of Thomas — men who at the same time were trying to build up a positive natural science. In its youth, hoary and respectable Oxford was the leader in the breaking up of the intellectual synthesis of the thirteenth century.

It was at the University of Paris, however, that these "modernists," as they called themselves, made their most important discoveries. Around 1350 a group of extraordinary scientific thinkers at Paris worked out many of the main notions upon which the natural science of the seventeenth century was later founded. They were especially concerned with the problems of motion and its mathematical formulation; they were the real pathfinders in the development of the science of dynamics. John Buridan worked out a conception of inertia and of mass; he also discovered that falling bodies are an instance of uniformly accelerated motion. Albert of Saxony formulated somewhat more precisely the laws of falling bodies and the notion of a center of gravity. Nicholas of Oresme made three outstanding discoveries. He invented a system of analytic geometry, thus anticipating the mathematical conceptions of the seventeenth century. He took the widely known hypothesis that the earth rotates on its axis daily, and gave far better arguments in its support than Copernicus was able to find later. He discovered the exact mathematical law of uniformly accelerated motion, and thus made the central discovery in dynamics which Galileo later elaborated.

For a century and a half these notions in mechanics were taught, both in the University of Paris and in the University of Padua in Italy, the two main centers of natural science during the later Middle Ages, without much further advance. This was the period during which the interest in humanism and ancient Latin literature and the social and artistic life of men in the new commercial towns was rapidly becoming ascendant. Men were much more concerned to work out new moral, artistic, and religious conceptions suited to the richer life called forth by the growth of trade and manufacturing than with the problems of natural science. Indeed, one result of the humanists' reverence for the Greeks was to revive for a time ideas of Aristotle that had been superseded by better natural science in the thirteenth century. There was, however, a marked revival of interest in the ideas of the fourteenth century mathematicians and physicists about the year 1500. A group was teaching them then at Paris, and the works of Buridan, Albert of Saxony, and Nicholas of Oresme were several times printed on the new presses. It is interesting to note that two of the most famous humanists — Erasmus and Luis Vives — studied under these scientists and later satirized the "silly discussions" of falling bodies, uniformly accelerated motion, and infinitesimals!

In the midst of the enthusiasm for the non-scientific concerns of the humanists, however, there were many men, especially at the University of Padua, who busied themselves with mechanics during the sixteenth century. Leonardo da Vinci pored over the writings of Albert of Saxony, and in his notebooks are to be found all the essentials of the mathematical interpretation of nature and of dynamics. A number of other Italian scientists studied and taught the Paris physics. It is significant that all the great pioneers of natural science from Copernicus to Galileo, except Kepler, were at one time or another associated with these Padua physicists. Galileo studied carefully the works of Buridan and Albert of Saxony; Descartes's first written work was modeled on Albert. There was thus a continuous intellectual development from the first acquaintance of Christians with Alexandrian science in the early twelfth century at the School of Chartres to the great discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes.

In the meanwhile, however, before these ideas could win wide acceptance, men's minds had to be prepared for a conception of science so different from the more popular Aristotelianism of the universities. They had to develop an interest in nature for its own sake, quite irrespective of its meaning for man's moral and religious life. They had also to come to feel the need for a practical knowledge that would give man control over nature and help him manipulate and use it. This change of intellectual attitude toward nature took place during the Renaissance period and was felt by men some time before they realized that at Oxford, Paris, and Padua there had been developed just the kind of science they wanted. The new attitude was primarily the product of the novel conditions in flourishing commercial and manufacturing towns, and was one phase of the general change produced in men's minds by the outgrowing of medieval interests and ideals.

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the great geographical discoveries awakened a keen interest in the natural scene of human life on our globe. The artistic interest, so strong during the Renaissance period, turned away from painting and chiseling religious symbols and began to portray both men and landscapes for their intrinsic beauty.

The tools and instruments required for carrying on the new trades built up a wealth of experience and knowledge, like the astronomical tables necessary for navigating the oceans, quite independent of the approved Aristotelian science. Men came to feel increasingly dissatisfied with a body of knowledge irrelevant to their fundamental interests, and to look about for something more suited to their needs.

During the late Renaissance a number of "nature enthusiasts" were teaching and writing — men who, like the German physician Paracelsus, were fascinated by nature and hoped by a kind of "natural magic" to be able to turn it to human account. They were not acquainted with the exact physics whose development we have just sketched, and their inspiration was not Alexandrian mathematics and mechanics, but rather the astrological and alchemical tradition of the Middle Ages. They conceived of nature as one great system, one self-contained whole, a play of forces and powers whose secrets man might learn. But, unlike the mathematical physicists, they tried to interpret nature as a great living organism, like man, with a soul and mind of its own. They thought natural phenomena were controlled by "elemental spirits" and "sylphs," whose wills might be bent to human bidding by suitable magic formulae. Though they did not discover how to control nature, they succeeded in popularizing an interest in natural phenomena and in means for controlling them.

Their very lack of practical success created an intense interest in the discovery of a method that would give man control over nature. The sixteenth century saw many attempted formulations of such a method. In view of the popularity of humanistic interests, quite naturally most of these methods were founded on classical literature and rhetoric. Some of them, however, like those of Vives and Francis Bacon, emphasized observation and experiment. It was, however, neither from the literary humanists nor the experimentalists that the fruitful method, and with it the actual development of natural science, were to come. The successful method of dealing with nature, in fact, turned out not to be new at all, but the traditional method of Alexandrian astronomy and mechanics. It was first explicitly formulated at Padua in the late sixteenth century, and was used for epoch-making discoveries by Galileo. It depended on the faith that nature is an all-embracing natural order whose relations are mathematical throughout. In the words of Galileo, "Nature can only be understood by him who has learned the speech and symbols in which she speaks to us. This speech is mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other mathematical figures." In such a world, the task of the scientist is to analyze a few instances of natural phenomena in order to discover the mathematical relations involved, and then build up an ordered and systematic body of propositions that follow logically from these first principles.

Although most of those who during the sixteenth century raised their voices in criticism of Thomas and Aristotle did not arrive at this conception, they did play an important part in preparing men's minds to accept it during the next hundred years. They were fundamentally humanists rather than scientists. As against the major body of humanists, who felt that moral and artistic problems should be man's chief concerns, they insisted that a knowledge of nature and of the means for controlling it was of primary importance in human life. They were prophets of the fundamental position that science was later to occupy in western civilization. Francis Bacon was the prophet who best expressed the importance of such practical knowledge in human life, and this kind of interest in nature and science has accordingly come to be known as the "Baconian spirit." The development of such an attitude was an indispensable condition of the wide acceptance of natural science that has marked our civilization ever since.

Thus the actual rise of natural science turns out to have been not so much a series of spectacular original discoveries made during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a slow and continuous process that began for western Europeans in the eleventh century. These Christians themselves derived their ideas from a flourishing scientific tradition that stretched back through the Arabs and the Syrians to the scientists of ancient Alexandria, and back of them to still earlier Greek mathematicians like the Pythagoreans. The appearance of novelty that marks the scientific teachings of the geniuses of the seventeenth century is largely due to the fact that the medieval tradition of natural science, which had made such important advances at the University of Paris in the fourteenth century, had been for several centuries obscured for the majority of scholars by the enthusiasm for the literary and non-scientific writings of the ancients. Men like Kepler, Galileo, and Descartes made important discoveries, but they were definitely working in scientific traditions that had been fruitfully followed for centuries. Their greatest achievements were consciously founded on the work of medieval predecessors, and they inevitably carried over into the natural science of the seventeenth century many of the ideas and methods of those same predecessors that have only gradually been criticized and removed from our own science. Even in science, no sharp breaks with the past occur. What was most novel in the intellectual life of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not so much new scientific notions and methods as a readiness on the part of many members of the educated class to turn definitely from the medieval tradition of Aristotelian science to the medieval tradition of Alexandrian mathematical and mechanical science.

A. The slow emergence of natural science.

* *Randall*, 203–224.

F. S. Marvin, *Science and civilization*, ch. 5 — the best brief account in English, of the emergence of natural science; John Dewey, *Reconstruction in philosophy*, ch. 2 — the best account of the social factors that made men turn to the Baconian conception of the aim of science.

(*a*) The growth of towns and the expansion of Europe as causes of a new attitude toward nature.
(*b*) Medieval interest in Alexandrian natural science — Roger Bacon.
(*c*) Effects of the humanistic movement on scientific interests.
  i. Diverted attention from mathematics and mechanics.
  ii. Attacked scholasticism as barren and irrelevant.
  iii. Led many into an enthusiastic and uncritical interest in nature and natural magic.
  iv. Led a few to study directly the works of the Alexandrian scientists.
(*d*) The search for a method that would give practical knowledge.
(*e*) The Baconian aim of the new science — "to extend the bounds of human empire over nature to the effecting of all things possible."

QUESTIONS

1. What were Aristotle's great contributions to science?

2. What was Alexandrian science?

3. How did Greek science come to the West?

4. Who were some of the early half-magical seekers for control over nature? What did they contribute? What did they teach?

5. What economic factors aided the rise of natural science? In what ways has the product of this science, the machine, affected the economic situation in our own day?

6. Describe the beginnings of interest in science during the Middle Ages. State the humanists' opinion of this sort of wisdom. Who are the modern humanists and what is their complaint?

7. State the Baconian ideal of scientific knowledge. What, according to Bacon, are the defects of the scholastic ideal? How do the thirteenth century and the sixteenth reflect these varying ideals?

8. What is an experiment? What part does it play in the acquisition of scientific knowledge? In what fields is experiment difficult or impossible?

9. Why have men always been awed by mathematical demonstration? Why did the coming of science increase this interest in the subject?

IV. WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

1. The social-economic scene.

Assignment twenty-three: The political and economic scene in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

* *Hayes*, I, 209–230.

A. Agriculture.

B. Industry.

C. Commerce.

2. Political development — General introduction.

As we have noticed earlier, the monarchs of the sixteenth century, in reward, as it were, for their victories over the old feudal separatism within their domains, were able to direct national policies pretty much at will. Yet even then, the new fields of economic enterprise and the services which a state could render to its nationals who were adventuring in those fields were making it necessary for political leaders to mold national policy to economic ends. Governments were beginning the process which was to end by their becoming businesses themselves, or the servants of business. Thus it comes about that in the seventeenth century two processes are clearly in motion: the actual assumption of varying degrees of political power by the representatives of the commercial classes; and the creation of a new department of state in many European countries, whose sole concern it was to serve and regulate trade. Unfortunately the dynastic idea continued to have living force as well, and a good deal of the political confusion of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is owing to the fact that dynastic designs and ambitions and national economic interests could and did conflict. We shall see that geographical insulation saved the English a great deal of interruption in their progress to economic strength, but that they had to spend most of the seventeenth century in converting their monarchy from an irresponsible despotism into the executive arm of an oligarchical parliamentary system. During the same period in France, the Bourbons and their able servants — Sully, Richelieu, and Mazarin — created a despotism so efficient that it lasted two centuries and set up a standard for all Europe. Meanwhile Spain steadfastly refused to conform to the modern European pattern and steadily dropped behind in the race for strength and wealth. In her devotion to the Church of Rome and her preoccupation with Mediterranean and Italian affairs, Spain, as it were, turned her back even on her own western colonies and failed both to find the atmosphere of the new Europe congenial and to develop an aptitude in its affairs. Her geographical isolation and this backward-looking characteristic tended for centuries to make of Spain a medieval anachronism in a rapidly changing Europe.

Using their hereditary territories in central Europe as a base, the Hapsburgs made another of those attempts to establish German hegemony which mark European history from the tenth century to the nineteenth, and, as always, they failed. This attempt failed in part because of the keen insight of political leaders from the region of the Baltic. That area had somewhat dwindled in European importance when the Hanseatic League lost its cohesiveness in the sixteenth century and when the schools of herring moved out to the banks of the North Sea. Yet the shores of the Baltic were wooded with magnificent timber, and into it flowed the rivers which drained the northern European plain and brought Polish and Russian grain and furs and other articles of trade to the old Baltic ports. The seventeenth century was characterized by an enormous increase in shipbuilding, and the western states viewed with alarm their dwindling resources in timber and their inability to cope with the demands for other marine supplies. The English turned to their American colonies, but the supply industries could only be built up slowly, and therefore they were vitally interested, along with the Swedes, the Russians, the Poles, the Danes, the Dutch, the French, and the Spaniards, in the products of the Baltic and the command of its entrance which nature and conquest had given to the kings of Denmark. The Austrian Hapsburgs, too, looked longingly on the wealth and commerce of German towns on the Baltic. This interest in northern Europe on the part of the western states was reciprocated by dynasts in the north, and about the middle of the seventeenth century the Hohenzollern family began that consolidation of its estates which was to end in the creation of modern Prussia. At the same time Russia, a part of Europe neglected by the West, medieval in its basic civilization, eastern and Byzantine in its upper social levels, and only slightly affected by the changes which had taken place in the West, began to stir toward modernity. These two states, Prussia and Russia, were speedily to challenge the Baltic hegemony of Sweden, to squeeze between them boundaryless and medieval Poland, and to bargain with the Austrian Hapsburgs as equals; and Russia was to take over the task of driving the decadent Turk from Europe.

3. Political development of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

* *Hayes*, I, 209–230.

A. The ascendancy of France.
- (*a*) Sorry condition of France after the War of the Three Henries.
- (*b*) France under Henry IV and Sully, 1589–1610.
  - i. Agricultural and commercial development.
  - ii. Edict of Nantes, 1598.
- (*c*) Regency of Marie de Medici.
  - i. Lapse of Estates-General.
- (*d*) Rule of Cardinal Richelieu, 1624–1642.
  - i. Richelieu's policies —
    - (*i*) Make royal power supreme in France.
    - (*ii*) Make France predominant in Europe.
  - ii. Making the royal power supreme in France.
    - (*i*) Exaltation of royal council at expense of Estates-General.
    - (*ii*) Decrease of power of provincial estates.
    - (*iii*) Organization of royal army.
    - (*iv*) Removal of political privileges of Huguenots.
      - *a*. Siege of La Rochelle, 1625.
      - *b*. Edict of Alais, 1629.
    - (*v*) Repression of nobles.
      - *a*. Destruction of private fortifications.
    - (*vi*) Centralization.
      - *a*. Intendants.
- (*e*) Cardinal Mazarin, 1642–1661.
  - i. Continuation of policies of Richelieu.
  - ii. Interference with the *parlements*.
  - iii. Suppression of the Fronde.
  - iv. Triumph of absolutism in France with assumption of power by Louis XIV, 1661.
- (*f*) Bourbons *vs*. Hapsburgs: The Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648.
  - i. Conflicting ambitions of the rival monarchs.
  - ii. The Thirty Years' War.
    - (*i*) Ecclesiastical causes.
      - *a*. Weaknesses of Peace of Augsburg of 1555.
      - *b*. Enmity between emperor and German Protestants.
    - (*ii*) Political causes.
      - *a*. Political ambitions of German princes.
      - *b*. Attitude of Denmark, Sweden, and France.


Central EUROPE after the Peace of Westphalia, 1648.
NORTH SEA
DENMARK
SWEDEN
BALTIC
DY. OF PRUSSIA
Danzig
Lübeck
Hamburg
Stettin
Bremen
Elbe
BRANDENBURG
Berlin
Hanover
Vistula
Warsaw
POLAND
REPUBLIC OF HOLLAND
Dortmund
SAXONY
Dresden
SILESIA
Oder
Antwerp
SPANISH NETHERLANDS
Arras
Aix
Cologne
Rhine
Cracow
Frankfort
PALATINATE
BOHEMIA
Reims
Worms
Nuremberg
Paris
Metz
Rothenburg
FRANCE
Strassburg
Danube
HUNGARY
Ulm
Augsburg
AUSTRIA
Vienna
Colmar
BAVARIA
Salzburg
Buda
Pest
FRANCHE COMTÉ
SWISS REPUBLIC
TYROL
STYRIA
KM. OF HUNGARY
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Lyons
Savoy
MILAN
REP. OF VENICE
Venice
Rhone
Po
GENOA
Danube
J.F.H.
Boundary of the Empire
Free Towns, thus: •Cologne
Swedish territory....
French "
Austrian Habsburgs
Spanish Habsburgs
Brandenburg (Prussia)....

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- (*iii*) Course of the war.
  - *a.* The Bohemian Revolt, 1618–1620.
  - *b.* The Danish intervention, 1620–1630.
    1. Christian IV *vs.* Wallenstein.
    2. The Edict of Restitution, 1629.
  - *c.* Swedish intervention, 1630–1635.
    1. Gustavus Adolphus.
    2. Battle of Lützen, 1632.
    3. Peace of Prague, 1635.
  - *d.* French intervention, 1635–1648.
    1. Richelieu's policy.
    2. Victories of Condé and Turenne.
  - *e.* The Peace of Westphalia, 1648.
  - *f.* Evil effects of the war on the Germanies.

Assignment twenty-four: Louis XIV, undisputed monarchy, nationalism, and international law

* *Hayes*, I, 235–257; * *Randall*, 194–201.

- iii. Continuation of the war between Bourbons and Spanish Hapsburgs, 1648–1659.
  - (*i*) Peace of Pyrenees, 1659.
  - (*ii*) Triumph of policies of Richelieu and Mazarin.

QUESTIONS

1. Give the extent of the power of France, and her sources of strength, political and economic, in the days of Richelieu.

2. What weaknesses were present in France, social, religious, economic, and political, in the days of Richelieu? of Mazarin?

3. Sketch the causes and the course of the struggle for power waged by the Bourbons and Hapsburgs.

4. What did the Thirty Years' War do for central Europe economically? What for France? What for England? What for Holland?

- (*g*) The Age of Louis XIV.
  - i. Louis XIV as the "Grand Monarch."
  - ii. Ministry of Colbert.
    - (*i*) "Rule of the Robe."
    - (*ii*) Attempted financial reform.
    - (*iii*) Colbertism, or French mercantilism.
    - (*iv*) Colbert's "World Policy."
    - (*v*) Militarism in the reign of Louis XIV.
  - iii. Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 1685.
  - iv. The wars of Louis XIV.
    - (*i*) Traditional foreign policy of France.
    - (*ii*) Doctrine of "national boundaries."
    - (*iii*) The War of Devolution against Spain, 1667–1668.
      - *a*. The doctrine of balance of power and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1668.
    - (*iv*) The Dutch War, 1672–1678.
      - *a*. Franco-Dutch rivalry.
      - *b*. Civil strife in Holland.
      - *c*. Treaty of Nijmwegen, 1678.
    - (*v*) War of the League of Augsburg or the Palatinate, 1688–1697.
      - *a*. Effects of Dutch War on France: extension of frontiers, but threatened economic ruin of country.
      - *b*. The "Chambers of Reunion" and further French annexations.
      - *c*. Entry of England and Holland into the war: beginning of Second Hundred Years' War, 1689–1815.
      - *d*. Treaty of Ryswick, 1697.
    - (*vi*) The War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–1713.
      - *a*. Austro-French rivalry for the Spanish throne.
      - *b*. Commercial and colonial complaints.
      - *c*. The Grand Alliance *vs.* the Bourbons.
      - *d*. The Peace of Utrecht, 1713.

            - (*vii*) Significance of the Peace of Utrecht.
                - *a.* Establishment of Bourbon control in Spain.
                - *b.* Hapsburg control in central Europe.
                - *c.* Further rise of English sea-power. Gibralter
                - *d.* Establishment of kingdoms of Prussia and Savoy.
        - v. Death of Louis XIV, 1715, and decline of French glory.
        - vi. France under the Regency.
            - (*i*) Misgovernment of the Duke of Orleans and of Cardinal Fleury, 1715–1743.
            - (*ii*) John Law and the Mississippi Bubble.
            - (*iii*) Bad effects of the War of the Polish Election, 1733–1738.

B. Irresponsible national sovereignty and the restraining influence of international law.

- (*a*) Individualism of the state in the seventeenth century.
    - i. Individual states pursue their development and expansion in disregard of rights of competing states.
    - ii. Glorification of war as a national policy.
    - iii. Machiavelli's theory that "the state is an end in itself and owes allegiance to no law other than that of its own interests."
        - (*i*) *The prince.*
        - (*ii*) Hero worship of Ferdinand of Aragon and Cesare Borgia.
- (*b*) Rise of international law.
    - i. Disastrous effects of Thirty Years' War.
    - ii. Hugo Grotius' *On the law of war and peace*, 1625.
        - (*i*) Tries to regulate, not stop, competition of sovereign states.
        - (*ii*) International law as a code of honor between nations.
        - (*iii*) International law as the law of nature.
        - (*iv*) Treatment of sovereign powers as individuals in a larger social whole.
        - (*v*) International law as a combined statement of —
            - *a.* An ideal of national conduct.
            - *b.* How nations actually treated each other.
            - *c.* What was necessary if European society was to endure.
        - (*vi*) International law not altogether popular with rising middle class, which frequently found national freedom quite profitable.

QUESTIONS

1. Give an account of France's treatment of Protestants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. What were her losses, thereby, what her possible gains?
2. What were the terms and the significance of the Peace of Utrecht?
3. What conditions led to the rise of the theory of international law?
4. What did Grotiers consider the utility of international law?

4. The emergence of new powers — Holland, the Baltic States, and Russia.

Assignment twenty-five: The emergence of new powers

* John H. Wuorinen, "The emergence of new powers in seventeenth century Europe," *Syllabus*, 136–157.

R. N. Bain, *Scandinavia;* K. Waliszewski, *Peter the Great* (trans. by Mary Loyd); James Mavor, *Economic history of Russia*, Vol. I, Book I, chs. 4–7; G. Edmundson *History of Holland*, chs. 6, 11.

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW POWERS IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE — HOLLAND, THE BALTIC STATES, AND RUSSIA

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Holland

It seems hard to imagine that peaceful Holland, now so conspicuously one of the minor states in Europe, was once a leading commercial nation with a vast colonial empire and a volume of trade and industry that was the envy of all Europe. Several factors contributed to this preëminence. The geographical position of the Netherlands was particularly favorable to commerce. Situated midway between the expansive Baltic Sea and western and southern Europe, with excellent natural harbors and an extensive hinterland to which waterways provided an easy access, it was destined to a commercial future. The earliest Dutch fortunes were founded on the North Sea, which the persevering Netherlanders compelled to yield riches to the fishermen and land to the farmer. The herring meant as much to the Netherlands as wool meant to England, and even in our day the sturdy Dutch farmers cultivate soil partly wrested from the sea by means of dykes.

Fishing naturally led to maritime enterprise. By the opening of the seventeenth century, the Netherlands had become the outstanding cargo carriers of the western world. By the time their independence was recognized (1648), the Dutch had won an expansive colonial empire at the expense of Portugal and Spain, and a large part of the valuable trade between Europe and the East had fallen under their complete control. They were the commercial and shipping agents of Europe: they exchanged the products of the North — timber, corn, hemp, furs, and iron — for the wine, spirits, and other commodities of more southerly climes. "Norway is their forest; Prussia and Poland their granaries; the Rhine, the Garonne, and the Dordogne their vineyards; Germany, Spain, and Ireland their sheepfold." To this expansion the ascendancy of the Dutch as the finest sailors in Europe contributed a great deal. Because of the efficiency of their shipping, their freights remained well into the eighteenth century the cheapest in Europe. No less important were the sound business methods evolved by them. By the middle of the seventeenth century, Amsterdam, formerly a fishing port, had become the chief commercial center of the world, with vast docks, spacious quays, and a population of some three hundred thousand persons.

Capital accumulated in the coffers of the enterprising merchants of the diminutive republic. Banks for deposit and securities, like those established at Amsterdam in 1609 and at Rotterdam in 1635, were organized to facilitate the movements of capital and international exchange. The former city rapidly became the financial center of Europe, and it enjoyed for long the reputation of being the wealthiest city in the West.

Not the least important factor in the amazing progress of the country was its policy of religious toleration. Foreigners as well as natives enjoyed complete freedom throughout the land — a blessing to many a refugee from other countries where religious freedom was limited or nonexistent. These refugees were as a rule thrifty, hard-working folk who brought many industries with them. The cloth mills of Leyden, the linen works at Haarlem, the manufacture of silks, and the famous Utrecht velvet stand out as examples of the economic consequences of this enlightened religious liberalism. Industrial growth followed closely on the heels of commercial expansion and power in the realm of finance. Toward the middle of the seventeenth century Holland had approximately six hundred thousand workmen. The progress of manufacture entailed a growth of towns, and the urban element soon amounted to two-thirds of the total population. This represented a striking proportion at a time when European urbanization in a modern sense had hardly begun.

With growing economic progress came intellectual activity of a high order. The printing and book trade flourished. The Dutch freedom of the press caused many of the English and French rationalists to publish in the Netherlands. The literacy of the Dutch was exceptionally high; their country became the home of the newspaper. Higher academic pursuits flourished also: the University of Leyden was an intellectual center for all Europe. The names of Erasmus (1466–1536), the greatest scholar of the Renaissance; Rembrandt (1607–1669) and Frans Hals

(1581–1666), the artists whose magnificent reproductions of the grave manner and noble presence of their contemporaries enable us to catch a glimpse of these bygone days; Grotius (1583–1645), the "Father of International Law"; Spinoza (1632–1677), the philosopher; and Huygens (1629–1695), the scientist, mark a great epoch in the cultural advance of the world.

Much of the great prosperity of Holland was fundamentally adventitious, however. The country in truth had but limited natural resources. It had been able to profit by a policy of peace and the advantages created by the constant wars of its neighbors. It could not expect to enjoy permanently its commercial hegemony. Its rivals — especially England — had greater basic resources. They learned in time to equal and exceed the Dutch accomplishments in shipping and began to develop industries to compete with those of Holland. When colonial and commercial rivalry led to armed conflict, the Dutch found themselves unable to maintain their position. Many of their overseas holdings were snatched away. Their command of the seas was challenged, and they were gradually elbowed out of the carrying trade by their neighbors. Mercantilistic policies, domestic and colonial, added to the difficulties. Possibly also the governmental structure was none too effective. In 1694 the Dutch East India Company failed, with assets of 15,287,000 florins and liabilities of 127,550,000. The Bank of Amsterdam, which was heavily involved in the company's affairs, followed it to ruin. In the course of the eighteenth century, Holland was compelled to give up the unequal struggle. Having occupied for a hundred years a place in the world analogous in the main to that held by England in the next hundred years, Holland receded increasingly into the background. Its later history, less spectacular, shows a steady growth based on the advantages of geographic position, sound industry and banking, and an efficient colonial administration of overseas possessions whose area today is nearly sixty times that of the Netherlands and whose population is seven times that of the mother country.

The Baltic States

In our day the northern states of Europe are Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. During the greater part of the two centuries here surveyed, however, they comprised but two kingdoms (Sweden and Denmark). Norway became independent as late as 1905, and Finland twelve years later. As in the case of Holland, the Scandinavian states now occupy a wholly secondary place among the powers of the world, but in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they gave substance and direction to European politics and were a factor in the economic life of the period as well.

The details of Denmark's political fortunes need not concern us here. It will suffice to say that in earlier times Danish policy and statesmanship controlled the destinies of the North, and that in the course of the Thirty Years' War, Denmark made its last conspicuous attempt to rise to a position of preëminence in continental affairs. The attempt failed and, during the century and a half that followed, Denmark was one of the minor cogs in the European political mechanism.

Denmark was essentially an agricultural country. The condition of the downtrodden peasantry from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth, however, was such as to make agricultural prosperity difficult. The bulk of the tillers of the soil had been reduced to serfdom in the course of the fifteenth century. Because of the growing power of the nobility during the following century and a half, the lot of the common man grew worse rather than better, and agricultural progress became increasingly impossible. Productivity was lowered, and the area under cultivation decreased. An indication of the low ebb to which farming was brought by these adverse conditions is suggested by the fact that from 1670 to 1700 the Danes were compelled to purchase the butter and cheese for their army from Holland. The import of foreign grain was forbidden. The result was an increased cost of living for the lower classes and a tendency to follow the traditional agricultural routine. The levy of the tithe in kind discouraged the clearing of any but the most fertile land, much of which was in the hands of the wealthy aristocracy. The introduction of the potato in 1759 brought some relief, but the recovery of agriculture became a real possibility only after serfdom was abolished in 1780 and a population of free peasants came into being.

Although Denmark's strategic geographical position gave her the control of the Straits leading from the North Sea into the Baltic, this natural advantage failed to spell conspicuous commercial gain. The trade of the Baltic region was for long the monopoly of the Hanseatic League. In the sixteenth century, Denmark had successfully competed with the Hansa merchants, but their domination was shaken off only by throwing the Sound open to the rivals of the League, the Dutch. Thus one master was changed for another, and in the course of time the new domination was shared by England. In spite of valiant efforts, the Danes were unsuccessful in their efforts to develop a mercantile navy. Even Copenhagen relied for its revenue on the tolls collected from ships passing through the Straits rather than on the commercial activity of its port. It was not until the middle decades of the eighteenth century that Denmark began to recover her maritime power. Additions were made to the Danish holdings in the West Indies. A profitable carrying trade was developed. This enterprise was very successful, and the appearance of the thirteen colonies as the United States of America opened a new and wider field to it.

Industry, as well as agriculture, suffered from the ascendancy of the aristocracy: while the peasants lost their personal freedom, the artisans and craftsmen were despoiled of their economic privileges and political rights. Members of the privileged classes of German immigrants monopolized the more lucrative crafts, which became, one might say, industrial fiefs in their hands. Native industry was thus despoiled by arbitrary dispossession and ruinous competition. As a consequence, Danish industry began to assume respectable proportions only after 1700, when it was accorded governmental aid. The textile industry made its appearance about the middle of the eighteenth century; and from then on, an increasing number of new enterprises added wholesome diversity to the economic life of the country.

Excepting the latter half of the eighteenth century, the social as well as economic development of the country was characterized by stagnation, traceable in large measure to the aristocratic texture of the social and political fabric. This stagnation was all the more notable because both in geographical situation and natural resources the kingdom may be classed with Holland. But while Holland rose to conspicuous commercial eminence some three hundred years ago, Denmark succeeded in attaining substantial economic progress only during the latter part of the last century. Perhaps the main reason for the difference in the accomplishments of the two countries is to be found in the growth of an enterprising bourgeoisie in Holland and the absence of a vigorous middle class in Denmark. In the former, the bourgeoisie became the agents of progress along every line and raised their country to the forefront of European states; in the latter, absolutism in government and a rigidly aristocratic social order retarded advance and in large measure nullified the advantages offered by favorable geographic conditions.

The Danish dependency, Norway, represented in many respects a situation markedly different from that which obtained in Denmark. The Norwegian peasant had never known serfdom. Complete personal freedom prevailed even during the generations which witnessed the bondage of the Danish peasant. A considerable part of the soil of Norway was unsuitable for agriculture. Hence timber represented the most valuable natural wealth of the country. From the sixteenth century onward the forests were actively exploited and millions of pines, firs, and oaks found their way to the markets of England and the Continent. The sea was an important supplement to the resources of soil and forest. The coast was rich both in breeding-grounds for fish and excellent harbors. Thus with a good coast line, plenty of timber, and a population of hardy fishermen, Norway became, especially in the course of the eighteenth century, the center of an impressive export trade and the possessor of a sizable merchant marine. This position as the chief shipping nation of the North, Norway has been able to retain down to our day.

From the first quarter of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth century, Sweden's history is the record of the establishment and the collapse of a large Baltic empire. During the stormy years of the Thirty Years' War and the decades that followed, the Baltic Sea became almost literally a Swedish lake. To the kingdom proper, of which Finland had been an integral part for centuries, was added by conquest most of the southeastern and southern littoral of the "Mediterranean of the North." For many years after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), Sweden was the recognized leader of continental Protestantism, exercised considerable influence in German affairs, and, because of her control of most of the important Baltic ports, virtually monopolized the trade of this important region. Moreover, at that time Sweden was not only a military power of first magnitude but also one of the largest states in Europe. Stockholm, the capital, lay in the very center of the large kingdom whose second greatest city was Riga, on the other side of the sea.

The chief natural wealth of Sweden, where the soil is relatively poor and the climate severe, lay in forests and mines. The former furnished naval stores and building material not only for domestic needs but for foreign markets as well. England, for example, was dependent upon the North for naval stores, for her attempts to free herself from dependence upon the Baltic basin by exploiting the American colonies were never wholly successful. The exports were almost exclusively raw materials. Iron ore, pig iron, copper, and the products of the fisheries, in addition to naval stores, furnished the most important items on the list of exported goods. Imports consisted of manufactured articles and a variety of agricultural produce. As regards the exploitation of the mineral resources of the country, the iron, copper, and silver mines had been brought to new levels of productivity already in the course of the sixteenth century. In the seventeenth, the annual output of the foundries reached ten thousand tons. Nor were industrial arts wanting. Manufactures were founded, much of the capital and most of the skilled labor and management being contributed by foreigners. The Dutch in particular were active in setting up cloth manufactures, glass works, tobacco factories, breweries, and the like.

It may be said with much truth, however, that down to 1721 war was the chief industry of the kingdom. Certain it is that only after the collapse of the Swedish Baltic empire did the country really begin to make headway toward lasting national prosperity.

There were several elements of weakness in Sweden's position as master of the Baltic and arbiter of European politics. Her dependencies were in many ways a liability rather than an asset. Excepting Finland, which had become a part of Sweden long before the various provinces of the kingdom were united to form a centralized monarchy, they were difficult to hold. They were peopled by Esthonians, Poles, Germans, and Danes. These foreign elements, together with the size of the sprawling monarchy, imposed on Sweden the task of remaining a military state. This in turn involved burdens which the kingdom could shoulder only with great difficulty. Thousands upon thousands of lives were sacrificed in meaningless enterprises, and commerce was seriously impaired. Taxes were heavy and badly apportioned; in general, the government was neglectful of home interests and the works of peace. Lack of varied natural resources, inefficiency and chaos in domestic affairs, a small population and a poor peasantry, the envy and jealousy of Denmark, the rise of Prussia and Russia — these were among the factors that contributed to the lowering of Sweden to the position of a third-rate power.

The collapse of Sweden's hegemony (1721) found the country in dire straits. Industry had suffered great losses during the many long years of war. Shipping had been swept from the seas. Agriculture had suffered probably no less from the unwisdom of man than from the ravages of war and nature. The policy of internal reconstruction, to which the energies of the country were directed during the decades that followed, wrought a marked change along all lines and brought the kingdom to the devious path leading to economic progress. The first real textile factories were founded. Before long, cotton and woolen mills, tanneries, metal works, and factories for lace, ribbons, and dyes were flourishing. Government bounties were liberally bestowed upon the energetic men of business responsible for these and other gains in the work of rehabilitation. English and French experience and methods were freely utilized: looms, dyes, and skilled workers were smuggled from abroad to give the new enterprises the benefit of tested accomplishment. English improvements in the metal trade, for example, were responsible for the fame which Swedish refined iron now began to enjoy.

A fresh stimulus was likewise given to commercial development. A mercantilist policy, modeled on the familiar pattern, was instituted. England's famous Navigation Acts were copied to the letter in an effort to assist native shipowners, and native sailors were exempted from personal taxation. Nor was agriculture forgotten. An important agrarian reform was completed in 1762, whereby some of the worst features of the prevailing strip system of landholding were eliminated. Fresh sources of wealth were drawn from the soil by the introduction of new crops. The most important was the potato, brought from Germany in the seventeen-sixties. Tobacco was another permanent acquisition, while many other less conspicuous plants were also imported and the agricultural resources of the country thereby enriched. The soil of Sweden-Finland thus began to repay more abundantly the peasants' labor, which had never been shackled by serfdom and which now became increasingly methodical and efficient.

The political institutions under which the inhabitants of Sweden-Finland lived through the "Age of Greatness" and the less brilliant period that followed, underwent a number of changes. During the seventeenth century and the first quarter of the eighteenth, the power of the king grew at the expense of the classes represented in the national parliament. The events which culminated in the deflation of Sweden's Baltic bubble, thoroughly discredited the royal power and enabled the Riksdag to assert itself. The result was some fifty years of parliamentary control. While representation rested upon a basis sufficiently broad to be called democratic, the ascendancy of the Riksdag did not, however, mark the advent of democratic government. On the contrary, the national legislature fell under the influence of the nobility, who saw to it that the rigid framework of a narrow aristocracy was not unduly disturbed. The common citizen was almost completely excluded from giving point and direction to national policy, and the king was permitted neither to rule nor to reign. In 1772 a *coup d'état* ushered in a strong monarchy; another in 1789 brought it very close to the kind of government which the French were beginning to discard at the very time when the king of Sweden was embarking upon the unchartered sea of royal absolutism. By the time the ship of state was brought back to its former constitutional moorings, Napoleon had upset the political equilibrium of Europe, and Sweden had lost the eastern part of the kingdom — Finland — to the growing Russian colossus.

RUSSIA

The transformation of the backward, oriental tsardom of Muscovy into the huge Russian Empire which, before the World War, comprised about one-sixth of the land surface and one-twelfth of the population of the earth, represents one of the most significant developments in modern history. This transformation was largely wrought during the period 1500–1700, although many of its important phases fall within the last two hundred years. One of the basic factors in Russia's greatness was the remarkable eastward expansion which continued throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By the seventeenth century the Muscovite domain extended from the frontiers of Poland to the farthest extremities of northern Asia on the Pacific Ocean. But during this period of empire-building, Russia played little part in the concert of conflicts of Europe. Figuratively speaking, her face was turned to the East. While her form of religion placed Russia among the European states, this great empire remained, down to the seventeenth century, fundamentally oriental in customs and interests. The people were too backward in the scale of wealth or knowledge or civilization to enable them to exercise marked influence even on their neighbors. Potentially a formidable force, they were in fact forgotten or unknown.

There were several reasons for this relative backwardness and isolation. In the first place, the long and close contact with the conquering Mongols and Tartars of Asia had saturated the people of Russia with eastern habits and customs. Secondly, the religion of the country was a direct heritage of the expiring Eastern Empire and was different both from the Catholicism and the Protestantism of western Europe. Thirdly, so long as the neighboring states of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey remained powerful and controlled the coasts of the Baltic and Black seas, Russia remained a landlocked empire. Deprived of seaports she was unable to engage in traffic with western Europe and thus to partake of the common culture of western Christendom. Finally, the nature of the country placed a premium upon agriculture, tended to discourage industry, and was at least partly responsible for the turning of Russia's expansion eastward rather than westward.

From her obscurity and isolation, Russia rose to a conspicuous position among the nations in the course of a single reign, by the efforts and action of one man. The man was Peter the Great (b. 1672 — d. 1725) who succeeded in establishing intercourse with the world — intercourse of trade for Russia's material progress, intercourse of ideas for Russia's civilization. He may rightfully be called the father of modern Russia.

Peter was uneducated, unmannerly, and uncouth, but he had a clear notion of the needs of his country and had the energy and force of character to meet them. The program which he set out to realize was twofold: foreign aggrandizement in order that Russia might be brought into ever closer contact with the socially and intellectually more advanced states of Europe, and ambitious internal reforms designed to westernize the country and its people. These two objectives were inextricably connected. For our purposes, however, it will be advisable to treat them separately; but let us not forget that while Peter was busily engaged in acquiring new territories which brought him closer to the leading nations of the West, he was also revolutionizing Russian manners and customs, was effecting important ecclesiastical reforms, and was giving variety and stimulus to Russia's economic life.

During his youth, Peter was associated with his brothers in the government of Russia. In 1696, he became sole tsar at the age of twenty-four. Already by that time, he had come to the conclusion that his people were badly in need of the civilizing influences of the more progressive nations. In 1697 he accompanied a Russian commission on a tour to western Europe. There he personally studied shipbuilding, the organization of industry, commerce, and military establishments and became familiar with a great variety of subjects and accomplishments, ranging all the way from anatomy and engraving to the use of the napkin, the art of tooth-pulling, and carpentry. He set about recruiting a numerous staff of sailors, physicians, cooks, and artisans, whom he sent back to Russia to help in the task of modernizing the country. Upon returning to Moscow, Peter began his work of reconstruction in earnest.

One of his first concerns was the army. The old royal bodyguard and other badly organized forces were abolished, and an army on the Prussian model was organized to take their place. Officered and disciplined by foreigners wholly dependent upon the tsar, the new military machine soon proved an important factor in the furthering of the domestic and foreign policies of Peter. Among the latter, the prolonged war with Sweden played a most important part. Because of its consequences for Russia, its causes and general results must be briefly noted.

If the Russians were to be raised, in the arts of peace and war, to the level of the western nations, goods, men, and ways of doing things had to be imported from the West. The route for this necessary commerce in tangible goods as well as ideas was by the sea. But Russia touched the sea only in the north, where it is closed by ice during a considerable part of the year. The way to France, England, and Holland was by the Baltic Sea. There the Swedes blocked the way. All the way from Poland to Finland the coast was inaccessible to the interior of Russia. Resolved as he was to make the cultural and economic connection between Russia and Europe strong and intimate, Peter embarked upon a a war which, for some twenty years, furnished the somber accompaniment to the internal revolution by which the energetic tsar was trying to westernize his country and its people.

The treaty of Nystad (1721), which closed this long international conflict, marked a significant turning point for Russia. The Swedish Baltic empire dwindled, and most of its fragments fell to Peter. The southeastern littoral of the Baltic became a part of Russia, and Peter thus realized his ambition of affording his country an important "window to the west." On the waste marshes of the Neva River, he built a great city at enormous sacrifice of life and treasure, to serve as a center of commerce and an avenue of contact between Russia and Europe. The city was named St. Petersburg, and to it was transferred the government from Moscow. Free from the traditions of the old Capital, the new, looking only to the future, was to serve as a gate for the inflow of the forces by which its founder would transform the nation. As a part of the transformation which had already taken place, the Tsar of Muscovy became the Emperor of All the Russias. Russia supplanted Sweden in the leadership of the Baltic and assumed a place among the powers of Europe.

During the two decades of the Northern War, many and important things occurred in Russia. Having reorganized the Russian army, Peter turned his attention to the customs of his people, which he would change from oriental to occidental. Peter had a special hatred for all beards: to him they typified the unprogressive ideas, traditions, and prejudices which he was trying to erase. Hence beards were forbidden in spite of their traditional importance in the East, and heavy penalties were imposed upon those unwilling to part with them. Later in his reign, hirsute decorations were permitted upon the payment of a heavy yearly tax; the privilege also entailed the wearing of a medal with the inscription, "A beard is a useless inconvenience." French and German clothes were substituted for the traditional costume. But Russia shaved and dressed in European styles was not enough. Peter's next attempt was to put a pipe into everyone's mouth. The sale of tobacco, previously prohibited, was made free. New court officials, created after European patterns, were appointed. The great man's civilizing work also included a change in the position of women. Their semi-exclusion was ended. Both sexes were compelled to mingle freely at the court, where French dances, heavy eating, and noisy drinking gave somewhat unconvincing evidence of the success of the innovations. The national calendar was reformed. The Russian calendar was the outcome of Byzantine tradition, and the year began on September 1, the supposed date of Creation, 5508 B.C. It was to open, in the future, like the European year, on January 1. Many of these reforms were superficial: they partially permeated the nobility and the clergy, but left the mass of the people untouched. They were, however, heralds of a new age which the resolute ruler was sternly imposing upon his subjects.

Peter's personal views on education were far-reaching and included a system of free, compulsory instruction. This principle was embodied in an edict in 1714. Its application was too limited, because of lack of pupils, to mark the beginning of an important educational reform. More successful than this attempt to teach the Russians to read was Peter's contribution to the development of the Russian language. He gave the country practically a new language. In 1721, Peter desired the Holy Synod to undertake the translation of one of Pufendorf's works. The question arose, Should the contemplated translation appear in the ancient Slavonic language of the Orthodox church, or should it be printed in the current, popular form, which had undergone great changes in the course of time? The tsar decreed the employment of a special language which was in use in the Russian Diplomatic Chancery and which was full of foreign words. This tongue of marked cosmopolitan origin was to be the official language in the future. Today it is written and spoken by well over one hundred million persons.

In addition to increasing military efficiency, the army reform of Peter was an important step in the direction of unlimited autocracy. Another reform which likewise increased the power of the tsar was the subordination of the church to the state. Peter appreciated the very great influence which the Orthodox church exerted over the Russian people and the danger to his policies that ecclesiastical opposition might create. He was naturally anxious that the church should become the ally, not the enemy of the state he was remodeling. Indifferent as he was to the wills of other men, he at first shrank from offending their consciences, but when the patriarch of the Holy Orthodox church died in 1700, he began to curtail the powers of the church. All the powers of ecclesiastical government were vested in a body called the Holy Synod. Its members were bishops, but its chief was a layman appointed by the tsar. No appointment to ecclesiastical office could henceforth be made without the approval of the Holy Synod; no sermon could be published and no book printed without its sanction and authorization. The control which the tsar thereby obtained over the Russian church was complete. From Peter's time down to the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the church in Russia remained one of the most important supports of the absolutism which came to an end as a result of the World War.

Another significant achievement was the remodeling of the secular government. During Peter's reign, the monarchy became absolute as never before: the tsar, as the head of the state, possessed absolute powers. An ancient assembly of nobles which had formerly exercised vague legislative functions had disappeared by the time Peter embarked upon the policies outlined. In its place was created a Senate or Council of State. Its members were chosen by the emperor. Its powers were sufficiently vague to prevent the Senate from becoming anything but a subservient body. Also, new provincial administrative units were established, in close conformity with European models. Recourse was not had to them, however, because of an intelligent appreciation of the advantages of efficient local self-government. The advantages of greater centralization, especially in the collection of taxes, furnished the main motive for the adoption of these administrative bodies. Their ultimate effect was to sweep away all traces of local self-government, and the country was henceforth administrated by the tsar's personal agents. To enforce his autocratic will, a system of police was organized on a militia basis. In these, as in all his other reforms, Peter encountered a good deal of opposition. Because his schemes of change were so tremendous and because the persuasion by which he bent the country to his will was often atrocious and at times base, many Russians recoiled and wished them no success. Peter's own family opposed him and became the center of plots directed against the new order. But Peter overcame all obstacles. His ruthless severity carried him from one innovation to another, and Russia was literally driven with the lash along the road to westernization.

Considerable attention was also given to the economic condition of the monarchy. Attempts were made, though often in a bungling manner, to promote agriculture. Peter knew well that Russia grievously lacked a numerous and prosperous middle class, and he aimed to create one by encouraging trade and industries. His constant wars, however, prevented him from bringing many of his economic plans to fruition. When he died in 1725, he left the empire a large, compact state, well organized, westernized at least superficially, and ready to play an important rôle in the international politics of Europe. By indiscriminately discarding nearly everything indigenous, and by forcibly imposing upon his country siftings brought together from all the corners of Europe — fragments of European speech, rags of European clothing, adaptations of European institutions, scraps of European customs — Peter was able to create an inheritance upon which several of his incompetent successors lived for forty years. Catherine the Great found means, out of the residue, to make a figure in Europe which was not the least imposing among the many that crowded the stage of the eighteenth century.

For four decades after Peter's death, his successors were mostly women with loose morals and ugly manners. The policies of Peter were left intact, on the whole, by the rulers who occupied the throne from 1725 to 1762. Especially in matters of internal government, Peter had blazed a trail so clear and unmistakable that it would have been difficult to lose it. But in the field of foreign politics, it was only in the reign of Catherine II, usually called Catherine the Great (b. 1729 — d. 1796), that Peter's ambitious objectives were fully realized.

Catherine was a Protestant German princess by birth. Dynastic considerations had made her the wife of the heir to the Russian crown. Her husband was half insane. In 1762, he ascended the throne as Peter III. By that time, Catherine had met with considerable success in her efforts to ingratiate herself with the Russians. She had learned the Russian language, had become, at least outwardly, Orthodox in religion, and had acquired a reputation of quick and lofty patriotism. In less than a year from her husband's crowning as tsar, Catherine managed to make away with him and became the real sovereign of the country. For thirty-four years she was the tsarina of Russia. Passionate, untroubled by conscience or scruples, she ruled with a firm hand and consummated the work of Peter the Great. Her reign was a great epoch in Russian history.

It has been said that Catherine was the first ruler of Russia who read and wrote and thought. In the first few years of her reign especially, she made a great display of liberal and even revolutionary views. She corresponded with Voltaire and other philosophers and learned men of the time. She pensioned Diderot, and invited scholars to her court. Perhaps the most notable result of her liberal tendencies was the great Legislative Commission summoned to Moscow in 1766. It was to undertake a new and sorely needed codification of the laws. It was, in effect, a representative assembly of classes and nationalities in the polyglot Russian Empire and numbered 658 deputies. For its guidance Catherine herself compiled a weighty "Instruction," founded on the works of Montesquieu and Beccaria. This Instruction was so radical that it alarmed her ministers. The commission was heralded as the harbinger of great things, but it ended in nothing at all. Dissension soon appeared among its members, and the outbreak of war with Turkey in 1768 facilitated the disappearance of this picturesque but unimportant attempt to effect a thoroughgoing legal reform. As a result, the improvements actually achieved while Catherine occupied the throne fell far short of the ambitious projects of the Legislative Commission.

In the administrative system Catherine increased the number of "governments" and "districts," divisions and subdivisions of the empire. Over them were placed respectively governors and vice governors, all appointed by the central government. The unwieldy administrative units established by Peter were thus replaced by a more efficient system of control. To the ecclesiastical alterations of Peter, she added the secularization of the vast monastic properties, and the monasteries were made dependent on the state. As a result, the clergy was made for the first time, distinctly dependent on the bounty of the secular government. Many schools, orphanages, and hospitals were established. The colonization of the immense, empty lands of southeastern Russia was another notable accomplishment of the energetic tsarina.

It was in the field of foreign conquest that Catherine was most successful. In the eighteenth century, three countries blocked the western expansion of Russia. One of them, Sweden, had been humbled by Peter, who had pushed Russia's boundaries to the shores of the Baltic. Peter had also attempted to register similar gains against the other two — Poland and Turkey — but had met with but inconspicuous success. It was the partition of Poland and Catherine's contest with the Ottoman Empire that created the impression of greatness and accomplishment which posterity has come to associate with her reign. As a result of these successes in the realm of external politics, it may be said that the chief aims and ambitions of Russian foreign policy, especially since the days of Peter, were at length triumphantly accomplished.

Poland in the first half of the eighteenth century was a large state, but a variety of circumstances rendered her weak and unstable. In the first place, no natural boundaries gave her adequate security. Secondly, the wide but indefensible territory was not peopled by a homogeneous nation. The Poles constituted the majority, but Lithuanians, a related Slavic folk, as well as Russians and Germans, constituted notable minorities. Thirdly, religion added to the internal disunion caused by language. The Poles and most of the Lithuanians were staunch Roman Catholics. The Russians and some of the Lithuanians adhered to the Greek Orthodox faith, while the Lutheran persuasion was represented by the German elements. Fourthly, the social conditions were bad. The great nobles owned the land, lived in luxury, and subordinated the interests of the country to their personal aims. The mass of the people lived in a state of serfdom and wretchedness. No numerous and wealthy bourgeoisie existed. With a grasping nobility on the one hand and an oppressed peasantry on the other, social solidarity was wholly lacking. Fifthly, the government was most ineffective. The kingship was elective. Foreign intrigues, domestic squabbles, bribes, all manner of concessions wrung by selfish magnates from the candidate to the throne, served to reduce the kingship to an ornamental figurehead. Furthermore, the Polish constitution was rendered absurd and impotent by the *liberum veto*, a sort of gentlemen's agreement among the nobles whereby any legislation by the Polish Diet could be rendered null and void if a single member objected to it. In practice, this quaint custom had been so far extended as to recognize the right of any one of the thousands of noblemen to refuse to obey a law he had not approved. The result was anarchy and hopeless inefficiency which was not lessened by the fact that the country was divided within itself by two powerful parties. One looked to Russia for aid, and the other counted on French and Austrian support.

While the Ottoman Empire did not suffer from all the maladies which rendered Poland too weak to withstand her greedy neighbors, the power of the Turk was also on the decline. It will be recalled that in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Turks captured Constantinople, overran the Balkan peninsula, and extended their conquests across the Danube into the very heart of Hungary. During the seventeenth century, they came to be considered a formidable menace to western Christendom. They captured the territories immediately north of the Black Sea, exacted tribute from Rumania, annexed all of Hungary, received tribute from Poland, and in 1683 laid siege to Vienna — the high-water mark of the Muhammadan advance in Europe. Thenceforth the Turkish boundaries gradually receded. By the year 1700, the whole of Hungary had been freed, and important trading centers on the Greek and Dalmatian coasts had been recovered from Turkish dominion.

Domestic rather than foreign difficulties prepared the way for this decline. The Turks never constituted a majority of the population in their European possessions. They were a group of conquerors whose military prowess and religious ardor had enabled them to plant over wide areas the crescent in the place of the cross. They oppressed the conquered peoples and crushed them under the might of burdensome taxes. They were an exacting office-holding class, dependent on the continued efficiency of their military organization. In the course of time, however, corruption began to corrode the whole office-holding element in the Ottoman state, and the army commenced to reflect the demoralized condition of the government. While new military powers were making their appearance in Europe, the Ottoman army steadily declined.

It was the good fortune of Catherine the Great to appreciate the weakness of both Poland and Turkey. She turned her neighbors' distress to the profit of her own country. The tsarina looked upon war against Turkey as her historic mission. But in the end it was Poland that was forced to pay the main part of the bill for Catherine's foreign successes.

Catherine's first opportunity to interfere in Polish affairs came during the early years of her reign. In 1764, she was able to persuade the Polish nobles to elect one of her courtiers and intimate friends, Stanislaus Poniatowsky, king of Poland. Russian predominance in the country thus having been assured, the empress made agreements with Prussia and Austria to uphold the inefficient constitution of Poland. A few years later, other steps leading to the spoliation of Poland were taken. Catherine's first war against Turkey (1768–1774) and the first partition of Poland, in 1772, were in reality two parts of a single operation. When the Russo-Turkish war broke out, efforts were made to localize the conflict. Frederick the Great of Prussia, in particular, dreaded another general European war after his narrow escape in the Seven Years' War. Austria feared that a Russian triumph over Turkey, with consequent large annexations, would destroy the balance of power. Catherine was uneasy because the suppression of the Polish civil war, which was then raging, and the conquest of the Turks might prove too difficult a task. It was under these circumstances that Frederick conceived the dismemberment of Poland as the best way out of all the difficulties and as a means of reconciling the conflicting jealousies of the three autocracies. In 1772 they joined hands in making the first partition. Poland was deprived of approximately one-fourth of her territory: Russia took all the country east of the Düna and Dnieper rivers; Prussia appropriated West Prussia, except the city of Danzig; and Austria laid hands on Galicia and the town of Cracow.

In the meantime, the war with Turkey was increasingly demonstrating the inability of Turkey to resist the military prowess of Russia. When the war was brought to a close in 1774, the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji marked an important southern extension of Russia. By its provisions, Turkey ceded Azov and adjacent territory to the victor and renounced all sovereignty over the lands north of the Black Sea. Russia obtained the right of free navigation for her merchant ships in Turkish waters. Russia also gained a foothold in the internal affairs of Turkey, in that she was recognized as the protector of certain churches in Constantinople.

Russia likewise acquired potential interests in the Turkish parts of the Balkans.

The partition of 1772 was executed at a moment when Poland was exhausted by four years of civil war. The spoliation of the country sobered the leaders of the Polish people and brought them to an understanding of the necessity of thoroughgoing reforms. During the ensuing twenty years, real attempts were made to set the Polish house in order. A notable economic revival took place. In the field of education, new and sustained activity manifested itself. A serious attempt was also made at political reform, in order to strengthen inwardly and outwardly what remained of the Polish state. But the grasping, selfish attitude of the sovereigns who had already benefited by Poland's weakness prevented this progressive spirit from bringing forth a new, reconstructed Poland. In 1793 Russia and Prussia effected a second partition, and two years later the original triumvirate erased Poland from the political map of Europe by dividing the rest. By these partitions, Russia obtained the major share, Prussia the lower Vistula valley, including the city of Warsaw, while the upper Vistula region went to Austria. Thus Russia was brought into immediate geographical contact with central Europe and became, in the full sense of the word, a vital member of the European family of nations.

When Catherine died, in 1796, the marvelous eighteenth century growth of Russia in Europe may be said to have been completed. Extensive territory and a capital on the Baltic, impressive domains and valuable ports on the Black Sea, a western boundary that had been pushed to the very center of the European continent — these, as well as the exalted position of the autocrat, the westernization of the administration and of customs and ways of doing things were some of the conspicuous outward signs of the gains that had been made. But how had this progress affected the bulk of the Russian nation? How did the Russian people live and labor during this notable century in the history of the gigantic empire?

Russia had always been what it was to remain down to our day, an empire of peasants. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, it became an empire of serfs. For a long time those who cultivated the land had been able to consider themselves as its real owners, in return for paying taxes to the tsar and for performing the customary feudal labor — usually three days a week — for the noble lord. The community or *mir*, governed by the *starost* and the elders, was responsible for these dues. The individuals who composed the *mir* enjoyed personal liberty, and as late as the close of the fifteenth century serfdom existed only here and there. The peasant could not be made to give up the land he cultivated, unless he was indebted to the lord for certain advances. In the course of the sixteenth century, however, the condition of the peasants became progressively worse. Not only did they become serfs bound to the soil; the majority sank to the level of slaves bought in the market. They were sold apart from the land, as ordinary movable property. Despite the attempts by Peter the Great to improve the position of the serfs, the eighteenth century brought no relief. On the contrary, the situation grew worse. The trade in serfs became an important branch of commerce, was taxed by the government, and was officially recognized in 1741. When in 1762 military service ceased to be obligatory for the nobility, the peasants were enrolled in their stead, and many landlords opened what were practically markets for recruits. As among primitive people wealth is reckoned by heads of cattle or sheep, so here wealth was reckoned by the heads of serfs.

This profound degradation of the peasantry made agricultural progress well-nigh impossible. Yet some material advance was made, primarily at the instance of the energetic sovereigns. Peter the Great tried to acclimatize the Hungarian vine on the banks of the Don, and the Persian vine on the shores of the Caspian. In the lower valley of the Volga he planted the mulberry. Tobacco and potatoes were successfully introduced. The priests were forced to instruct the people in gardening, and efforts were made to improve the cattle and sheep by means of intelligent breeding. It was by Peter's orders that the peasants were first taught how to use manure and select seeds. Attempts were also made to improve agriculture by stimulating the immigration of German settlers, who were offered substantial inducements in the form of exemption from taxes, military service, and the like. But progress was slow at best, and Russian agriculture remained on a uniformly low level well into the closing decades of the last century.

The development of trade was no more rapid. Before Peter's time, internal trade hardly extended farther than the district around each town. Barter prevailed, and roads were poor and often blocked by tolls and infested with robbers. The extensive commercial monopolies of the Crown, which were jealously guarded, constituted another obstacle. Even Peter was compelled, for financial reasons, not only to retain but to extend this system. When these survivals of an earlier age were abolished in 1719, and trade in nearly all commodities was made free, commerce began to flow more freely. To be sure, foreign trade remained for long chiefly in the hands of foreigners. But a native commercial class was beginning to make its appearance, and Catherine the Great was able to draw upon the rich merchant class for many an able administrator for the growing cities of the empire.

Russian industry developed as slowly as agriculture. The manorial workshop, which western Europe had known several centuries earlier, was still one of the basic agencies of industrial production. The noble's household included the workmen who were needed to supply the wants of the family. Each village, if not each peasant household, made everything necessary for its modest needs. Prior to the seventeen-hundreds, urban labor was wholly of secondary importance. It was in the reign of Peter that significant changes in the industrial life of the country began to appear. He was responsible for the founding of some two hundred factories of various kinds. Subsidies were granted, the use of native cloth was made obligatory for all liveries, the export of wool was prohibited, foundries and forges were established, mineral deposits were exploited — in short, innumerable measures were taken in the familiar mercantilist spirit in the hopes that many-sided national prosperity in industry would be thereby attained. Craftsmen were imported from abroad, and a class of factory workers began to make its appearance. The latter were purchased or hired by the manufacturers and became, in effect, serfs of the factory as they had been serfs of the land. But in spite of the attempts made to infuse agriculture, commerce, and industry with new life, Russia remained essentially backward and slow in her economic development. The inertia of so vast a mass could not be overcome by even the most strenuous efforts of a few enlightened despots.

QUESTIONS

1. What circumstances contributed to the rise of Holland as an important power in Europe? To her decline?

2. How do you explain the growth of Sweden's Baltic empire? What were some of the differences between the economic and social conditions in Denmark-Norway on the one hand and in Sweden-Finland on the other?

3. Why did territorial aggrandizement seem to be an inescapable concomitant of Peter's program of westernization? What was the significance of the "windows to the west"?

4. In what respects did the work of Peter the Great enhance the power of the monarch? How did it affect the lot of the common man?

5. If it is true that Catherine II carried Peter's work to its conclusion, what part of his undertakings in particular did the tsarina complete? With what results for Poland?

5. The struggle for constitutional government in England.

Assignment twenty-six: The struggle for constitutional government in England

* *Hayes*, I, 261–293.

By the opening of the sixteenth century, England had definitely emerged as a national state. From the accession of Henry VII, the first of the Tudors, in 1485, to the death of his granddaughter Elizabeth in 1603, it was ruled in absolutistic fashion. Not only were the nobility humbled and the church subordinated to the Crown, but industry and commerce were brought under royal control and the strong hand of the monarch laid upon justice.

Several reasons help to explain why the Tudors were able to exercise such despotic authority. First of all, England was at that stage in her development when unlimited royal power was possible. Torn by the feudal Wars of the Roses she needed a strong executive who would put an end to internal dissension, restore law and order, and protect and promote her expanding commerce and industry. By pursuing just such a policy the Tudors won the loyal support of the wealthy and influential growing middle class of the nation. Secondly, the personal ambitions of the Tudors, with the exception of Mary, coincided in large measure with popular interests. They gave the English nation what it most desired. Parliament was usually amenable, because the Tudors manifestly ruled in the interests of the middle class, which constituted the backbone of the House of Commons. Even though Henry VII and his successors ruled despotically, they ruled wisely and displayed real solicitude for the welfare of their people. Moreover, their selfish and high-handed acts were often cloaked with the guise of legality, and they possessed the wisdom of knowing when to yield either partially or completely to popular demands.

Despite the popularity of the Tudors, it was evident before the close of Elizabeth's reign that in the opinion of many Englishmen absolute monarchy, like feudalism, had served its day and was already becoming a worn-out and detrimental form of government. This notion was expecially widespread among the bourgeoisie, the very class which at the beginning of the Tudor régime had been among its staunchest supporters. No longer, it reasoned, was there need for absolute power. The feudalistic nobility had been suppressed, the Reformation was securely settled, the defeat of the Armada had ended the danger of foreign invasion, the nation was peaceful and prosperous. Most important of all, many Englishmen began to realize that their interests, as well as those of the nation, were no longer best promoted by absolute royal government. For this reason, Parliament toward the close of Elizabeth's reign displayed a growing disposition to oppose the royal will. And Elizabeth's cousin, James I, who succeeded her to the throne, failed to inherit any part of the old loyalty which the nation for a hundred years had bestowed on the Tudors.

James, though a person of no mean ability, was an untactful, conceited, opinionated theorist, who paid little attention to public opinion and was apparently ignorant or indifferent to those great social, economic, and intellectual forces which were transforming England as well as all western Europe. Instead of making himself popular with his subjects as did the Tudors, he ignored their wishes and advice and endeavored to compel them to adhere to his absolute notions. In his estimation, subjects had no rights; they might have privileges granted by royal favor; otherwise they had only duties. To him monarchy was a divinely ordained institution. According to this theory a king is accountable only to God; he is not responsible to Parliament or to the nation. Indeed Parliament and all other forms of government derive their power from the king. Subjects owe the king obedience; resistance is sin. It is the king's duty to rule for the welfare of his subjects, but, as

God's appointed, he is the only judge of what constitutes their welfare. If he fails in his duty, his subjects have no redress except to ask God to give him light. Even against a tyrant, they have no right of rebellion. As God's ordained, he stands above the law, the Parliament, and the nation. James not only acted upon this theory but he flaunted it before the nation. But a nation already chafing under the restraints of the Tudors and becoming daily more convinced that absolute monarchy had served its purpose and should be superseded by constitutional parliamentary government, at once took issue with James. Contest after contest of quarrelsome nature ensued between those who upheld the principle of unlimited royal power and those who championed limited monarchy, and these contests eventually led to the Civil War and to the triumph of those who fought for the principle of parliamentary government.

This bitter conflict between absolutism and parliamentarianism has for us a double significance. In the first place, it absorbed the energies of the English nation throughout the greater part of the seventeenth century. Secondly, and vastly more important, it marked the beginning of the end of absolutist divine-right monarchy in the modern world, for during the next four centuries similar social-economic-political upheavals occurred in France, Spain, Germany, Austria, and Russia, as well as in other parts of the globe. In surveying these revolutions, we should endeavor to ascertain, in so far as possible, the forces responsible for each of them, to what extent they differ from each other, and what effect, if any, each has had in shaping present-day civilization.

* *Hayes*, I, 261–293.

G. M. Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts* — a scholarly account of the years 1603–1714, written with real literary charm. The first two chapters provide an excellent picture of Shaksperean England.

A. Attempts to limit the power of absolute monarchs.
- (*a*) Development of autocracy under the Tudors.
    - i. Foundation of Tudor absolutism in the promotion of material prosperity and national patriotism.
    - ii. Marked ability of the Tudor monarchs and their willingness to compromise.
    - iii. Beginning of parliamentary opposition during the later part of Elizabeth's reign.
- (*b*) Forces opposed to absolutism.
    - i. Tradition of popular rights.
        - (*i*) Constitutional and individual rights guaranteed by charters.
        - (*ii*) Parliamentary rights in matters of taxation, legislation, and protection of the people.

(*iii*) Supremacy of the common law.
(*iv*) Popular support of the evolutionary character of the constitution; strength of precedent and custom.
ii. Opposition of the growing middle class when their interests came in conflict with those of the monarch.
iii. Attitude of the radical Protestants toward the dominant position of the established church.
(*c*) Parliamentary opposition aroused by the Stuarts.
i. Lack of tact and ability of the early Stuarts.
ii. Devotion of the Stuarts to absolute divine-right monarchy.
iii. Royal extravagance and resort to "illegal" taxation.
iv. Extension and arbitrary jurisdiction of extraordinary courts.
v. Arbitrary control of appointments.
vi. Dictation of an unpopular foreign policy.
vii. Religious feelings of the Puritans outraged; scandalous condition of the royal court; favorable attitude toward Catholicism.
viii. Policy of censoring the press and imprisoning opponents.
(*d*) Beginning of the conflict between Parliament and the early Stuarts.
i. Inconclusive nature of the struggle during the reign of James I.
ii. Parliament forces Charles I to compromise; Petition of Right, 1628.
iii. "Personal rule" of Charles I, 1629–1640, temporarily defeats Parliament.
iv. War in Scotland forces Charles I to reconvene Parliament.

B. The middle-class Puritan Revolution.
(*a*) Reforms of the Long Parliament.
i. Right of impeachment reasserted.
ii. Abolition of special tribunals.
iii. Necessity of parliamentary consent for the adoption of financial measures.
iv. Dissolution of Parliament forbidden: Triennial Act.
(*b*) Outbreak of civil war.
i. Opposing parties in the struggle.
(*i*) Royalists: monarch; landed aristocracy; ecclesiastical nobility; higher gentry; and Roman Catholics.
(*ii*) Parliamentarians: commercial nobility; lesser gentry; middle class, composed of merchants, manufacturers, and shopkeepers; professional men; and seamen.
ii. Violation of parliamentary privilege by the attempt of Charles I to seize members of Parliament.
iii. Attempt of Parliament to govern with the king's consent.
iv. Resort to arms to settle the issue.
(*c*) Establishment of the Commonwealth.
i. Government by a radical minority, 1649–1653; execution of Charles I.
ii. Protectorate and dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell, 1653–1658.
iii. Disorganization following the death of Oliver Cromwell.

C. The Stuarts' second chance.
W. T. Laprade, *British history for American students*, 346–363, 370–373, 375–379, 425–430.

(*a*) The restored state and church.
i. Personal character of Charles II.

    - ii. Wide desire for peace and stability.
    - iii. Parliament directs work of restoration.
    - iv. Financial control of Parliament.
    - v. Rise of the Cabinet.
    - vi. Severity of religious settlement.
- (*b*) The failure and success of Charles II.
    - i. Effect of Louis XIV ideals and policies on Charles II.
    - ii. Religious and foreign complications.
    - iii. Cultural achievements.
- (*c*) The failure of the second James.
    - i. Personal character of James II.
    - ii. Suppression of Monmouth rebellion.
    - iii. Quarrels with Parliament.
    - iv. Religious policy.
    - v. Problem of succession at birth of Catholic heir.
    - vi. Intervention of William of Orange.
- (*d*) The Revolution of Settlement.
    - i. Attitude of William of Orange toward England.
    - ii. English settlement prior to foreign war.
    - iii. The Bill of Rights.
    - iv. The Act of Settlement.
    - v. Supremacy of Parliament.
    - vi. Religious measures.
    - vii. Increasing influences of monied classes.
- (*e*) The Cabinet takes form.
    - i. Function of the Cabinet.
    - ii. Early history under Stuarts, William and Mary, Anne, and the Hanoverians.
    - iii. Increase of power.

QUESTIONS

1. What conditions aided the Tudors in an absolutistic rule? What conditions caused the rule to be questioned?

2. How did Parliament assert its rights as over against the kingly rule?

3. What forces made the Puritan Revolution powerful? What inherent lacks did it exhibit?

4. What did the glorious revolution of 1688 settle for England, and how did it influence the Continent and the colonies?

6. Colonial empires and the American Revolution.

Assignment twenty-seven: Colonies and empires

A. The overseas empires and the struggle for colonial mastery.

In a previous section we noted that Portugal and Spain were the first of Europe's national states to establish overseas empires. For half a century or more these two states continued to have the field of empire-building to themselves. But their monopoly was soon cut short by their



Britain, France & Spain in America: 1750

Hudson's Bay
HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY
NEWFOUNDLAND
NOVA SCOTIA
NEW FRANCE
Quebec
St Lawrence
Montreal
NEW ENGLAND
Boston
New York
VIRGINIA
CAROLINA
GEORGIA
Savannah
Missouri
Mississippi
Ohio
Arkansas
LOUISIANA
Red R.
New Orleans
FLORIDA
BAHAMAS (British)
Rio Grande
NEW SPAIN
Gulf of Mexico
Mexico
CUBA
HAITI
JAMAICA (British)
S. AMERICA
British
French
Spanish
J.F.H.

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powerful west European neighbors — England, France, and the Netherlands. Why these states entered the race for empire, what success each achieved, and how one — England — made herself supreme in the struggle for colonial mastery, provides an interesting and important chapter in the story of the background of our present-day civilization.

* *Carman*, I, 17–41; * *Randall*, 192–194.

(*a*) Motives for empire-building.
(*b*) The colonial empires.
(*c*) The struggle for colonial mastery.
(*d*) The English triumph over France and Spain, 1754–1763.

B. The American revolt.

Assignment twenty-eight: Conflicts of interest

* *Carman*, I, 193–227.

(*a*) General introduction.

As the discovery of America was an incident in the quest for a new route to the Indies, so may the American Revolution be regarded as merely a phase in the long struggle of man to adjust himself harmoniously to a discordant environment. European nations, galvanized into action by the expanding tendencies of the age, struggled for control of the New World. Stirring military engagements and grand schemes of world empire obscured the less spectacular essays of men and women to wrest a livelihood from what had been a wilderness. The distance from Europe, the conditioning influences of geographic environment, and the exigencies of new living conditions gradually evolved in America a civilization different from that of Europe, accompanied by new points of view. The settlers in America, partly hidden by the dazzling panoply of European clashes sometimes enacted in the New World, were more concerned with their own immediate problem of making a living than with the vast impressive needs of the whole nation as articulated by mercantilism. Long periods of "salutary neglect" of the colonies by the mother country accentuated the propensity of the colonials to manage their own affairs. Sporadic ill-planned attempts to uniformize the administrative systems and to reconcile the consistently diverging interests of the old and new parts of England stirred the muddied waters of misunderstanding without achieving their end. The close of the French and Indian War, with the consequent removal of a troublesome France from the borders of the English colonies, revealed, in addition to the geographical separation of the two sections of England (European and American), incompatible political theories, incongruent economic needs, and administrative loose ends. Behind these larger generalized dissatisfactions lay many particular grievances about trade laws, currency, quitrents, land policies, local governmental squabbles and religious disputes. No one of these in itself was sufficient to cause a detachment of the colonies from England, but they were all bits in the patchwork of the American Revolution. With England's insistent efforts, springing from a huge national debt and a feeling that the colonies should bear a fair share of the burden, to fit the square peg of mercantilism into the round hole of colonial desires, during the decade after 1763, the disconnected causes of irritation began to unite into a conglomerate mass of opposition which culminated in rebellion. Energetic, determined leaders, proceeding with a cautious deference to the dangers of unsupported treason, crystallized the amorphism of discontent into a conviction among a sufficiently powerful portion of the colonists that the elimination of English control would concomitantly eradicate their individual difficulties. Afterward they were to discover that the grievances had not been obliterated. Factious quarrels emanating from various maladjustments marred their anticipated Utopia, and they fumbled for new methods to harmonize the discords of a harsh world. Even England's removal from political control in some respects increased rather than decreased the problems of the former colonies. Political independence had not brought economic independence. The United States had to readjust its relations with an older world, which viewed the Revolution with mingled emotions, mostly of disapproval. The revolting colonies advanced in defense of their action a political philosophy borrowed from France and England, and tempered to suit their needs. Many of the tenets returned to France, where they seeped into another great revolutionary movement. The two momentous experiments in democracy extolled by philosophers, welcomed by the masses, deplored by aristocracy, and characterized by bitter class struggles for control, were to begin almost simultaneously in Europe and America.

(*b*) The conflict of interests.

* *Carman*, I, 193–227.

Beard, I, ch. 5; C. M. Andrews, *Colonial background of the American Revolution;* V. L. Parrington, *Main currents of American thought*, I, 179–193.

- i. Nature of the American Revolution.
- ii. The economic friction of mercantilism, 1650–1750.
  - (*i*) Application of the doctrine by England to its colonies.
    - *a.* Trade regulations.
      - 1. Navigation Acts of 1650 and 1651.
      - 2. Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663.
      - 3. The Trade Act of 1696.
      - 4. The Molasses Act of 1733.
    - *b.* Attempted restrictions of colonial manufacturing.
    - *c.* Restrictions on lumber industry.
    - *d.* Land titles and quitrents.
    - *e.* Parliamentary regulation of colonial currency and credit.
  - (*ii*) Restrictive legislation partly balanced by advantageous measures.
    - *a.* Preferential tariff rates.
    - *b.* Bounties and drawbacks.
    - *c.* Monopoly of home market.
    - *d.* Military and naval protection.
    - *e.* Benefits from commercial treaties.
  - (*iii*) British mercantilism clashes with colonial self-interest.
- iii. Diverging interests and darkening skies.
  - (*i*) The colonies under the old colonial system.
  - (*ii*) Proposed changes in colonial policy, 1750.
    - *a.* Centralized control of West.
    - *b.* Closer association of colonies for administrative purposes.
    - *c.* Imperial defense and the burden of taxation.
    - *d.* Stricter enforcement of mercantilistic system.
  - (*iii*) Seven Years' (French and Indian) War emphasizes need for new colonial policy.
    - *a.* Lack of colonial unity and inadequate defense.
    - *b.* Colonial war-time trade with enemy and inadequate enforcement of mercantilistic system.
    - *c.* Problem of West.
    - *d.* Increased expense and need for increased revenue.

QUESTIONS

1. Is the doctrine of mercantilism observed by nations at present?

2. Prior to 1760 did any one of the acts regulating colonial affairs evoke widespread protest throughout all of the mainland colonies?

3. Did England, before 1760, realize and endeavor to slacken the increasing tension between the colonies and the mother country?

4. How did the Seven Years' War affect the interrelations of the colonies and the mother country?

5. Does the United States colonial policy at present differ drastically from that of England during the eighteenth century?

Assignment twenty-nine: The alienation of the colonies

* *Carman*, I, 227–263.

- (*iv*) British political situation, 1763.
- (*v*) The Grenville Ministry and its work.
    - *a*. The Proclamation of 1763.
    - *b*. Efforts to enforce trade laws and raise revenue.
        - 1. Sugar Act, 1764.
        - 2. Currency Act, 1764.
        - 3. Stamp Act, 1765.
        - 4. Quartering Act, 1765.
- (*vi*) Colonial reaction to Grenville legislation.
    - *a*. Legislation launched in a period of economic depression.
    - *b*. Resistance.
        - 1. Boycott.
        - 2. Violence.
- (*vii*) The Grenville legislation modified — repeal of the Stamp Act, 1766.
- (*viii*) The Townshend Acts and colonial opposition.
- (*ix*) The repeal of Townshend Acts.
    - *a*. Growing strength of colonial radicals.
- (*x*) England attempts to aid East India Company.
    - *a*. Colonial reaction — Boston Tea Party.
    - *b*. The Intolerable Acts.

iv. Other institutional differences generate friction.

- (*i*) Differing social ideals and estimates.
- (*ii*) The intellectual gulf.
- (*iii*) Religion and sectarian animosities.
- (*iv*) Political differences.

QUESTIONS

1. What would have been the effect of the Grenville legislation, considered as a mass, upon the colonies?

2. Do you believe that the colonial manner of protesting against the Grenville legislation resulted in modification of the mother country's colonial policy?

3. Did the policy adopted by the American colonies to combat the Townshend legislation increase the possibilities of a revolution?

4. Was the Boston Tea Party the cause of the American Revolution?

5. What is your analysis of the maladjustment of the colonies to the mother country prior to the American Revolution, and what plan for the harmonization of discordant interests would you have offered?

Assignment thirty: Revolution and independence

(*c*) Revolution and independence.

* *Carman*, I, 265–305.

Beard, I, ch. 7. An excellent brief analysis of the social changes attending the Revolution is J. F. Jameson, *The American Revolution considered as a social movement*.

- i. Two social and economic classes developed in colonial America.
  - (*i*) The conservatives.
  - (*ii*) The radicals.
- ii. The radicals triumph.
  - (*i*) Radicals and conservatives disagree on policy toward Great Britain.
  - (*ii*) The First Continental Congress.
    - *a.* Controlled by radicals.
    - *b.* Radical victories in Congress.
    - *c.* Conservative proposals rejected.
    - *d.* The Declaration of Rights.
    - *e.* Adoption of coercive measures: the Association.
      - 1. Condemned by conservatives.
      - 2. Its effect.
  - (*iii*) The extremists come to blows: Lexington and Concord.
  - (*iv*) The Second Continental Congress.
    - *a.* Controlled by radicals.
    - *b.* Idea of complete independence gathers momentum.
    - *c.* Radical propaganda: Thomas Paine's *Common sense.*
    - *d.* Congress votes separation: the Declaration of Independence marks triumph of the radicals.
- iii. Civil war.
  - (*i*) Supporters of the Revolution.
    - *a.* In commercial North.
      - 1. Shopkeepers, mechanics, and yeoman farmers.
      - 2. Merchants.
    - *b.* In Tidewater Region.
      - 1. Majority of planters.
      - 2. Majority of merchants in Tidewater Region oppose Revolution.
    - *c.* Frontiersmen.
  - (*ii*) Opponents of Revolution.
    - *a.* The loyalists.
      - 1. Many great landholders.
      - 2. Many wealthy merchants.
      - 3. Many professional men.
      - 4. Many prosperous farmers.
      - 5. Majority of crown officials.
      - 6. Many Anglicans — both clergy and laity.
      - 7. Some from lower ranks of society who depended on landowner or merchant for a livelihood.
    - *b.* Service of loyalists to Great Britain.
    - *c.* Patriot treatment of loyalists.
      - 1. Intimidation.
      - 2. Banishment.
      - 3. Confiscation of property.
  - (*iii*) Revolution the work of a well organized energetic minority.
  - (*iv*) Financing the Revolution.
    - *a.* Paper money.
    - *b.* Requisitions.
    - *c.* Loans.
      - 1. Domestic.
      - 2. Foreign.

- (*v*) Shortcomings and handicaps of Continental Congress.
- (*vi*) Military plans of Great Britain.
- (*vii*) Inadequacy of the Continental Army.
- (*viii*) The gloomy years, 1776–1777.
- (*ix*) Foreign aid.
- (*x*) The tide turns in favor of the patriots.
  - *a.* Lafayette secures added assistance.
  - *b.* The triumph at Yorktown.
  - *c.* Privateering supplements work of the Navy.

QUESTIONS

1. Would you characterize the attitude of the radicals in the two Continental Congresses as more or less unreasonable than that of the conservatives?

2. Was there a patent social and economic class alignment of the opponents and proponents of the Revolution?

3. What is your opinion of the treatment of dissenting elements by the Revolutionaries? Has the attitude toward war-time dissenters since changed?

4. Have the devices for the financing of wars changed sharply since the American Revolution?

5. What were the motives for the entry of European countries into the Revolutionary War? Were they compensated for the effort?

Assignment thirty-one: Peace after revolution

* *Carman*, I, 305–330.

- iv. Peace.
  - (*i*) Treaty of 1783.
  - (*ii*) Social and economic conditions in war-time.
    - *a.* Majority of people self-sustaining during Revolution.
      - 1. Scarcity of food.
      - 2. Enhancement of prices.
      - 3. Luxury and extravagance.
      - 4. Profiteering and the new rich.
    - *b.* The war and agriculture.
    - *c.* Revolution stimulates manufactures.
    - *d.* Internal and coastwise trade.
  - (*iii*) The aftermath of war.
    - *a.* Transformation in landholding.
    - *b.* Abolition of entail and primogeniture.
    - *c.* Effect on industry and commerce.
    - *d.* Changes in religion.
    - *e.* Humanitarian reform.
    - *f.* The Revolution and education.
    - *g.* Influence upon fine arts.
    - *h.* The Revolution and morals.
    - *i.* Revolution strengthens independence, liberalism, and nationalism.

- *C.* "The Remnant of Empire."
  - (*a*) The decline of mercantilism.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century the mercantile theory received a severe setback. As early as the sixteen-sixties such men as Sir Josiah Child and Nicholas Barbon had attacked the idea that money was the measure of a nation's wealth. They pointed out that gold and silver themselves were only commodities used as measures of value, and not at all true measures of wealth. But it remained for Adam Smith to formulate the classic indictment of the whole system. Smith had come under the influence of a group of French economists known as Physiocrats, who believed, among other things, that commerce and industry would prosper much more if the government refrained from all regulatory interference. *Laissez faire* was their watchword — "Hands off!" France's colonial misadventures, culminating in the fateful Paris Treaties of 1763 and 1783, furnished a sad commentary on the efficiency of the old paternalism. It is therefore small wonder that the new theory of freedom from governmental control should have had some of its most ardent proponents in France.

But it remained for Adam Smith to popularize the new conception. In his *Wealth of nations*, the so-called economic declaration of independence, published in 1776, he argued that a system of free trade permitting specialization of industry would be far more profitable than mercantilist regulation. The latter was economically unsound. Economics should be divorced from politics. And so far as colonies were concerned, the attempts to monopolize colonial trade caused "mere loss instead of profit" to the "body of the people." The mercantilist doctrine lost sight of the interests of the consumers. Moreover, the undue expansion of colonial trade deflected capital from more vital developments and caused stagnation in the general foreign trade. Furthermore, colonies were ungrateful progeny. They were a burden on the treasury and were ever ready to break away at the first opportunity.

Two factors tended to give added weight to Smith's arguments. First, England's early start in the industrial revolution and the simultaneous world-wide demand for English manufactured goods removed the necessity for monopolizing certain definite colonial markets. Secondly, the break-up of the French Empire and the American revolt served as outstanding examples of Turgot's famous remark: "Colonies are like fruits which cling to the tree only till they ripen."

For a time the influence of these new ideas was such as to lead many people to believe that the British Empire was coming to an end — that "the sun of England's glory was set." But matters had not yet come to such a pass. England still had Ireland and Canada and India. She soon manifested a renewed interest in Australia and New Zealand. But the old colonial policy was doomed. A new colonial policy gradually began to be formed.

QUESTIONS

1. Did the Revolutionary War create prosperity within the rebellious colonies?
2. With the advent of independence were the colonies immune to the operations of the Navigation Acts? Did independence aid or injure American commerce?
3. What justification is there for considering the American Revolution a social movement?
4. Did the economic conflicts within the former colonies disappear with the gaining of independence?
5. Was there an intellectual and cultural change in the North American colonies which may be attributed to the impact of the Revolution?

7. Intellectual life: Newton to the French Revolution.

Assignment thirty-two: The new intellectual world

A. The intellectual changes involved in the new natural science.

* *Randall*, 226–248.

F. S. Marvin, *Science and civilization*, ch. 6 — an appraisal of the achievement of the "century of genius," by A. N. Whitehead; Smith, *History of modern culture*, I, 17–172; John Dewey, *Reconstruction in philosophy*, ch. 3 — the best account of the significance of the revolution in science for human life.

(*a*) The Copernican revolution in astronomy: Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo.

Copernicus placed the sun in the center of the solar system and sketched mathematically the resulting orbits of the planets; relying on Brahe's observations, Kepler discovered the laws of planetary motion; Galileo used his telescope to make observations that confirmed the Copernican theory. This change in astronomical theory had several momentous consequences:

- i. It discredited the accepted authorities, Ptolemy and Aristotle.
- ii. It led men to distrust common sense and superficial observation and to rely on mathematical reasoning to correct observation.
- iii. It emphasized the uniformity of nature as against the Aristotelian notion of a hierarchy of more and more perfect realms.
- iv. By placing the earth "in the heavens," it raised terrestrial science to the dignity of theology and made the earth the proper scene of scientific investigation.

(*b*) The Cartesian revolution in physics: Galileo and Descartes.

Galileo furnished the science of dynamics or moving bodies; he insisted that the true aim of science is not to seek for purposes and the reasons why events occur, as had Aristotle and the scholastics, but to describe mathematically the uniform and unchanging ways in which they actually take place. Descartes generalized this ideal of science into a complete mechanical interpretation of nature; he maintained that nature is nothing but a great harmonious and mathematically ordered machine. This conception of the world became immensely popular, especially in France, Holland, and England.

(*c*) The new place of man in the universe.
  i. Giordano Bruno and the idea of infinite worlds.

Bruno developed the notion that the universe is infinite and that man is not the hero of a cosmic drama of salvation, but an insignificant figure on a minor planet in an endless universe.

  ii. Spinoza and the reign of immutable law.

Spinoza consistently and rigorously worked out the idea of an all-embracing mechanical order of nature of which man was a part and which was itself God.

QUESTIONS

1. What was the Copernican revolution? What attitude toward it was taken by the Aristotelian scientists? By the church?

2. Which had the greater effect on the everyday practical life of Europeans, the Copernican or the Cartesian revolution?

3. What part was played in these two revolutions by the invention of new instruments, both ideological and material?

4. What connection is there between Copernicus's faith in the simplicity of nature and the reliance of modern science upon the law of parsimony?

5. What is meant by saying that the Thomistic-Aristotelian science was concerned with the *why* of things, but the new science with the *how?*

6. In what ways does the Cartesian investigation of nature differ from the Aristotelian? Can you suggest inadequacies in the former?

7. Descartes formulated our coördinate or analytic geometry. Why is it of such great importance in the kind of science he advocated?

8. We are very careless in our use of words. What do the words "infinite" and "infinity" mean? What do we mean when we talk of infinite worlds and infinite space?

9. What were the religious and ethical results of the Cartesian revolution? In this connection, tell something of the life and work of Benedict Spinoza.

10. What considerations, if any, are able to offset the feeling of man's cosmic unimportance engendered by the infinite space and worlds of the new astronomy?

B. The systematic formulation and popularization of the new scientific viewpoint — Isaac Newton and the world-machine.

Assignment thirty-three: Sir Isaac Newton

* *Randall*, 253–266, 273–279.
W. Marvin, *History of European philosophy*, ch. 23 — the best brief account of the influence during the Age of Reason of the Newtonian conception of science; H. Höffding, *History of modern philosophy*, I, 212–235 — a short account of Newtonian science; A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the modern world*, ch. 3 — an account of Newtonian science from the critical point of view of present-day physics.

The thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries possessed a successful scientific method, the mathematical interpretation of nature. Isaac Newton discovered the mathematical instrument for dealing with motion, and employed it to piece together the discoveries of his predecessors into one simple and all-embracing system of natural science. He presented the picture of a world order that was rational and not magical or supernatural, and that could be investigated, understood by reason, and formulated in mathematical terms. His synthesis was so successful that he stamped the rational and mathematical ideal of science upon the whole field of thought. The "rational" method of Newtonian science was applied to every field of knowledge and for decades formed the unifying element in thought. At the same time, following certain suggestions in Newton himself, there appeared an interest in the observation and classification of many facts about the world, and an emphasis upon experimental analysis and investigation.

It must not, of course, be supposed that these intellectual changes were welcomed immediately even by scholars and the educated classes as a whole. The universities in particular remained strongholds of the older medieval Aristotelianism, and the new natural science gained little foothold in these official seats of learning until the early nineteenth century. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the majority of learned books published by university teachers continued with surprisingly little change the scholastic tradition. The new science was forced to make its way largely in independence of the official organizations for conserving and teaching knowledge; like most of the new forces of the modern world, it grew up outside the institutions built up during the Middle Ages. When scientists felt the need of coöperative endeavor, they could not turn to the universities; they had to build up entirely new organizations, the scientific societies and academies that played so important a part during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But this academic inertia and traditionalism kept the universities from playing any large part in the intellectual life of early modern times. During the Middle Ages they were the seat of practically all scientific investigation and teaching. From the sixteenth century to the nineteenth they sank into insignificance so far as any vital influence on the development of thought is concerned, with a few exceptions like the Dutch University of Leyden. The great movement of popular education which during the eighteenth century carried the scientific ideal to the middle class was carried on largely apart from schools and universities, and with little support from the older learned class, the clergy, and the official teachers. It was only in Germany that the universities were in the eighteenth century at all touched by the new currents of rationalism and scientific thought. The educational movement of the Enlightenment was not a product of the schools; it was a movement in adult education, and it was largely carried on by popular writers who would today be classed as journalists. It is this fact that gives much of the distinctive character of the intellectual life of the Age of Reason. With all its popularity, the Enlightenment left most men in ignorance of science and its bearings on human life. Even at the present day it is almost literally true that the great majority of Europeans and Americans have never heard of science or scientific conceptions save in their fruits in industrial invention.

- (*a*) The success of the mathematical interpretation of nature.
- (*b*) Newton's mathematical system of nature — "physico-mathematical experimental learning."
    - i. The calculus as the means for describing motion in exact terms.
    - ii. The world as made of "solid, massy, impenetrable particles," to which the laws of motion apply.
    - iii. The wide popularization of these ideas during the eighteenth century.
- (*c*) The emergence of the method of observation and experimentation in science

Newton himself believed that, though the aim of science was to achieve a deductive system of knowledge on the model of geometry, its first principles should be reached by analyzing observations, and its conclusions should always be tested by their conformity to observed phenomena. Many of his followers and critics laid even greater emphasis on the notion that science cannot prove what must take place in nature, but can only formulate in exact terms the observed succession of phenomena. At the same time, the desire to extend science beyond the field of physics led to many detailed observations of animals, plants, and geological phenomena, which were carefully classified; this mass of observations was used in the early nineteenth century as the material for new generalizations in biology and geology.

(*d*) The scientific ideals of the eighteenth century rationalists.

  i. Nature is a fixed, geometrical structure, a machine whose movements recur with uniform regularity.
  ii. Natural law is immutable, eternal, and universal.
  iii. Reason is a systematic, uniform principle and ideal.
  iv. The tests of truth are rationality, reasonableness, universality, deducibility from general principles observed in experience.
  v. The rational is to be identified with the natural; since nature is a rational order, whatever appears reasonable must be natural.

QUESTIONS

1. In what ways are Newton and Locke the end of the old order and the beginning of the new?
2. In what way, if any, did the method of Newtonian science differ from the method of modern science today?
3. Describe the part played by each of the following in the Newtonian method: observation, hypothesis, mathematical statement, experiment, induction, law.
4. Why was the invention of the calculus so necessary in carrying out the new scientific method? Give some examples of its use in physics.
5. Is mathematical or logical deduction a necessary part of an adequate scientific method?
6. Was time or space and matter more emphasized in the Newtonian system of the universe?
7. What relation seemed to be implied between God and Nature in the Newtonian system? Between the natural and the rational?
8. Explain the eighteenth century idea of God as the natural outcome of Newtonian science. What changes did nineteenth century science demand in this matter?
9. Why did eighteenth century science lead to dissatisfaction with the social order existing at the time? What connection can be traced between this unrest and the rise of interest in the primitive and savage?
10. What was the attitude of the universities toward the new scientific ideas? Of the educated classes? Of the Christian church?

C. The creation of a rational science of human nature and society — The Age of Enlightenment and Reason.

Assignment thirty-four: The science of society

* *Randall*, 308–321.

Under the inspiration of Newtonian natural science, the attempt was made during the eighteenth century to discover and formulate a science of human nature and human society and to criticize existing religious, social, and moral traditions in the light of what seemed rational and reasonable. Man and his institutions were included in the order of nature and the scope of the recognized method of Newtonian science. There grew up the ideal of a simple and all-embracing social order in which, without arbitrary human interference, the activities of every man would, in accordance with the natural laws of human society, work together to secure general prosperity and happiness. This ideal of leaving every man to his own enlightened self-interest, without any arbitrary social control, was taken to be the rational, natural, and scientific conception of society. It admirably expressed the desire of the middle classes for free play and *laissez faire;* it seemed to be reconstructing society on the analogy of the harmonious and orderly motions of the solar system. Thus the demands of the middle class for freedom from traditional political and economic restrictions were read into nature as the immutable laws of "social physics." In this way a powerful leverage was secured to pry loose the remnants of medieval social control. But the fact that, to ensure social changes necessary enough in that day, the demands of a particular situation were made the unchanging laws of nature, operated, so soon as the novel conditions produced by the industrial revolution had radically altered social needs, to prevent any effective dealing with the new problems. In the eighteenth century a social science was created to effect and justify radical changes in social organization; because of its inflexibility, these same principles became in the nineteenth century the bulwark of conservative opposition to further change.

John Locke was regarded during the eighteenth century as the chief inspiration of this attempt to carry the principles and methods of Newtonian science into politics and economics. As Newton stood for natural science, he stood for the notion of a social science. His analysis of human nature was made the source of the principles from which economics and politics were to be deduced. Though the natural scientists were developing a conception of experimental science, it was not till the late nineteenth century that experimental methods were applied to the social sciences. In them the accepted method remained, with few exceptions, rational deduction from first principles established by an arbitrary analysis of human nature.

(*a*) The science of human nature — Hobbes, Locke, Hartley, Condillac.

* *Randall*, 308–321.

Since nature was taken to be a system of particles in motion, whose actions were described by the Newtonian laws of motion, human nature, as a part of the natural order, was conceived on the same mechanical model. Man was molded by mechanical contacts from outside, which reached his mind as sensations. These sensations were united by the laws of association, the mental counterpart of the laws of physical motion, and the principle of gravitation in mental life. The elements of human nature were held to be sensations, as contrasted with the view of present-day psychologists that they are bodily activities, simple forms of human behavior.

- i. Mechanistic analysis applied to man's mental life.
  - (*i*) The ultimate elements found in sensations.
  - (*ii*) Sensations combined in accordance with the laws of association.
- ii. The consequences for social science — Hartley, Helvetius, Bentham.
  - (*i*) Men are at birth blank tablets to be written on by the environment — "All men are created equal."
  - (*ii*) Human nature is created by education and social institutions — a great incentive to social, political, and educational reform.
  - (*iii*) The springs of human action are the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain — men are rational beings who calculate the consequences of their actions in rational terms. Hence the aim of the legislator is to provide suitable rewards and penalties for socially desirable and undesirable actions.

(*b*) The science of society.

- i. The influence of the model and method of Newtonian science — the ideal of a "social physics."
- ii. The idea of a social science founded on observation and classification — Montesquieu.

QUESTIONS

1. What part of the Newtonian method did the social sciences of the Enlightenment chiefly employ?

2. In what spirit and with what measure of success did the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries study the problem of human nature and its activity?

3. "The mind at birth is a *tabula rasa*."
"There is nothing in the mind which has not first been in the senses."
"All men are created free and equal."
Explain these sentences in terms of the psychology of John Locke.

4. What can a competent twentieth century psychologist accept as true in the associationist psychology?

5. What criticism have you to make of Helvetius's solution of the environment *versus* the heredity argument?

6. Why is it said that the theory that men act only and always from self-interest implies an unbelievable amount of human intelligence?

7. Explain the confidence of such a thinker as Helvetius in the virtues of education. How far do we follow him in this view?

8. In what ways does Montesquieu stand apart from his contemporaries? What later developments in the social sciences does he foreshadow?

9. To what sort of society were the political and economic systems of the early eighteenth century fitted? Why are they more or less inapplicable to present conditions?

(*c*) The science of business — "political economy."

Assignment thirty-five: The science of business

* *Randall*, 321–332.
R. G. Tugwell, *The trend of economics*, 4–14 — a critical account by W. C. Mitchell of the foundations of political economy; Gide and Rist, *History of economic doctrines*, Book I — a detailed account of the founders of political economy.

In their desire to secure support for their opposition to the mercantilistic regulation of trade and manufacturing, the early political economists attempted to establish their demands for *laissez faire*, free competition, and the absolute right of private property as the natural laws of society. They built up a deductive science of "social physics" which proclaimed the necessity of allowing the natural order of society to operate without interference by governments, except to guarantee private property. In the late eighteenth century, political economy was a creed of promise for the agricultural and commercial interests. It professed to contain the rules for securing the wealth of nations. When the evil effects of the early industrial revolution were felt, however, political economy became the dismal science that proved these evils to be the outcome of the inevitable laws of economics. From the time of Malthus and Ricardo on, economics ceased to be a program of radical social reform and became the justification of unrestrained profit-seeking and the inability of men to solve the new problems of the factory system.

i. The science of trade and agriculture — optimistic social physics.
  (*i*) The contrast between the harmonious order of nature and the confusion and stupidity of human regulation.
  (*ii*) The actual need of commerce for freedom from antiquated mercantilistic restrictions.
  (*iii*) The laws of political economy — the Physiocrats and Adam Smith.
    a. The natural right of liberty — free competition and *laissez faire*.

    - *b.* The natural right of property — governmental guarantee of legal ownership.
    - *c.* The functions of government — to be a "passive policeman," to promote universal education, particularly in the laws of economics, and to build public works.
- ii. The science of industry — the dismal science.
  - (*i*) The disastrous effects of *laissez faire* in the early factory system.
  - (*ii*) Malthus and the laws of population — a protest against optimism.
  - (*iii*) Ricardo and the laws of the distribution of wealth in post-Napoleonic England.
    - *a.* The Iron Law of wages.
    - *b.* The inevitability of class conflicts.
    - *c.* The labor theory of value.
  - (*iv*) Arguments borrowed from biological evolution — Herbert Spencer.

QUESTIONS

1. What sort of governmental protection did the eighteenth century merchant and manufacturer desire? Why did other forms of regulation become increasingly unpopular?

2. What were the underlying "rationalizations" of eighteenth century political economy?

3. Discuss the *laissez faire* policy and show its relation to the general attitude of the Newtonian physicist toward Nature.

4. Which of Adam Smith's views show his grasp of the economic situation to be firmer than that of his French associates?

5. What was the relation of Adam Smith to the Physiocrats?

6. What were the good and bad effects social, economic, and political, of the doctrine of *laissez faire?*

7. How did Malthus and Ricardo "justify" the atrocious condition of the labor class in the early days of the industrial revolution?

8. What kind of protection extended to the serf and apprentice by the medieval system was denied to the factory worker in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries?

9. Why was economics called "the dismal science"?

10. How did the coming of the Machine Age make inapplicable or irrelevant most of the economic "laws" of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries?

(*d*) The science of government.

Assignment thirty-six: The science of government

* *Randall*, 334–364.

- i. The theory of benevolent despotism, as developed on the European continent.
  - (*i*) A rationalization of the Renaissance theory of absolute monarchy — Newtonian science applied to the notion of strong centralized government in the interests of the middle class.
  - (*ii*) The monarch as an expert scientific administrator, applying the natural laws of human society.
  - (*iii*) Liberty conceived as obedience to natural laws and freedom from capricious tyranny — Voltaire, Diderot.

    - (*iv*) The achievements of the enlightened despots and the ultimate failure of irresponsible expert administration — Joseph II, the Bourbons.

- ii. The theory of constitutional government in Holland, England, and America.
    - (*i*) An outcome of the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century for the legal recognition of rights that governments must not infringe.
    - (*ii*) Liberty conceived as the guarantee of the exercise of natural rights, especially that of private property.
    - (*iii*) The political theory of John Locke — an apologetic for the Whig revolution of 1688.
        - *a.* The state of nature; natural rights; the social contract.
        - *b.* The defense and interpretation of natural rights the proper function of government.
        - *c.* The right of revolution and the conditions of its exercise.
    - (*iv*) The theory of the American Constitution — *The Federalist papers.*
        - *a.* The purpose of government: the defense of the rights of the individual or minority against the majority.
        - *b.* The "natural aristocracy" theories of John Adams and Madison.
- iii. The theory of democracy on the basis of natural rights, as developed in France and America.
    - (*i*) Liberty conceived as obedience to self-made laws, involving popular participation in government.
    - (*ii*) Rousseau's theory of popular sovereignty.
        - *a.* The deification of majority rule.
        - *b.* The importance of education.
    - (*iii*) Jeffersonian democracy — the theory of "elective aristocracy"; the supremacy of the legislature.
    - (*iv*) Jacksonian democracy.
        - *a.* Its background in pioneering conditions.
        - *b.* A strong popular executive; rotation in office.
- iv. The Utilitarian method and the science of legislation — Helvetius and Bentham.
    - (*i*) Liberty as the exercise of socially useful rights.
    - (*ii*) The criterion of legislation and private rights to be sought in the usefulness of the consequences, rather than in traditional legal rights.
    - (*iii*) Bentham's critique of the theory of natural rights as both meaningless and socially harmful because of its inflexibility.
    - (*iv*) Critique of the institutions of the old régime in the light of their social consequences rather than their discrepancy with an assumed natural order of society.
    - (*v*) Emphasis on individualism, *laissez faire,* and education.

QUESTIONS

1. What difference may exist between constitutional government and a complete democracy?

2. What weaknesses attach to the theory of government by benevolent and enlightened despots?

3. Granting that the theory of enlightened despotism is in accord with the outlook of Newtonian science, why did it fail to hold the allegiance of political thinkers?

4. How does Locke's theory of the origin and purpose of government limit the powers of the state? What more fundamental notions are governments bound to respect?

5. How was the "social contract" myth able to wield such tremendous influence?

6. In what ways did the framers of the American Constitution guard against overdoses of democracy in the form of tyrannical and ignorant majorities?

7. Show how the theory underlying the Declaration of Independence is more democratic than the spirit of the Constitution of the United States.

8. Trace the development of political theory in the United States during the first third of the nineteenth century. Justify Jacksonian democracy in the light of Rousseau's doctrines.

9. What do you think of the claim that Utilitarianism and Rousseau's democracy, both originally individualistic, logically and in practice lead to collectivism?

10. What relation exists between the calculus of pleasures and pains and the theory of government advocated by the Utilitarians? How did they regard the fundamentals of Locke's political system?

D. The ultimate social and moral ideals of the Age of Reason.

Assignment thirty-seven: The ideals of the Age of Reason

* *Randall*, 365–385.
J. B. Bury, *History of the freedom of thought* — an excellent brief account of the growth of the ideals of the Enlightenment; J. B. Bury, *The idea of progress* — an account of the optimistic hopes of eighteenth century rationalists; Voltaire, *Candide* — a classic tale embodying a rationalist critique of traditional moral conventions and practices.

During the eighteenth century, thinkers tried to work out a rational science of morality which should, like Newtonian mechanics, discover an order of natural law in the moral realm. Some men, like Samuel Clarke and Joseph Butler, tried to elaborate a moral mathematics or mechanics. Others founded their moral principles more closely on an analysis of human nature, as eighteenth century psychology conceived it, and sought to make the production of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, conceived as a balance of pleasures over pains, the criterion of right action. In both cases the actual content of their moral science, its practical precepts, turned out to be a rationalized and generalized statement of the bare core of the traditional Christian morality — benevolence, sympathy, justice, the Golden Rule. Certain broad and universal humanitarian ideals, like toleration, cosmopolitanism, pacifism, and progress, gained great popularity as reasonable and enlightened moral ideals. In many respects the Age of Reason attained a greater freedom from fanaticism, irrational traditional taboos, and useless asceticism than has been enjoyed since. But appealing as are these eighteenth century ideals, they were so broad and general as to lose most of their meaning, and much of the richness of life. It was possible to love humanity in the abstract and be callous to individual suffering, to tolerate religious opinions that no longer seemed important and persecute political opinions that did, to cultivate a rational cosmopolitanism that lost all sense of the values of particular national traditions, to grow complacent in the conviction that progress had raised the Age of Reason above all previous ages, to send men to the guillotine in the name of the Rights of Man. In seeking a richer conception of the good life, the men of the nineteenth century often descended to barbarities that would have shocked Voltaire; but at the same time they disclosed the barrenness and inadequacy of the Enlightenment ideals. Only the ideal of a democratic society, as the rationalized version of traditional Hebrew and Christian moral notions, gained steadily in popularity during the nineteenth century.

- (*a*) The rational science of morality.
  - i. The standards of rationality and naturalness applied to the moral tradition.
  - ii. The influence of the conceptions and methods of Newtonian natural science on moral conceptions.
  - iii. Benevolence, justice, the Golden Rule, and reasonable moral standards — Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Shaftesbury.
  - iv. The Utilitarian ethics — Helvetius, Bentham.
- (*b*) Humanitarian sympathy and feeling — humanitarian reforms in penology, the treatment of the insane, abolition of slavery.
- (*c*) The argument for toleration in religious matters.
- (*d*) Cosmopolitanism and pacificism — Voltaire, Goethe.
- (*e*) The idea of progress — Fontenelle, Condorcet.

QUESTIONS

1. Compare and contrast the moral ideals of the Age of Reason with the traditional Christian ethics.

2. How was it that both atheists and believers during this period could agree on the main principles of morality?

3. How far were the most liberal thinkers of the Enlightenment willing to carry the principle of toleration?

4. What distinction is to be made between the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century and the internationalism of the twentieth?

5. Do you think that the failures of the Age of Reason were due to too much use of reason or too little?

E. The religion of reason — the criticism of the religious tradition in the interests of eighteenth century standards of reasonableness and social usefulness.

Assignment thirty-eight: The religion of reason

* *Randall*, 282–306.

A. C. McGiffert, *The rise of modern religious ideas*, Part I — the best account of the eighteenth century criticism of religion; A. C. McGiffert, *Protestant thought before Kant*, ch. 10 — an illuminating survey of the arguments and tendencies of rational religion.

During the period when the scientific ideal was dominant, the attempt was made to harmonize the religious tradition with the new ideas and standards. The interest in science led to an emphasis on the intellectual or theological element in religion. Both scientists and theologians tried to fit the traditional ideas about God and the creation into the framework of the Newtonian mechanics. What was irrational or irrelevant to intellectual interests in Christianity was pushed into the background, and religion became primarily a set of beliefs providing an incentive for socially useful action. This was a sharp break with the Christian tradition, in which religion had been hitherto primarily a way of life rather than a set of beliefs; its influence has been felt to the present day. The attempt to identify religion with such a set of rational beliefs failed; it was the greatest failure of the Age of Reason. In the first place, keen critics, especially men working out a more experimental conception of science, called into serious question the scientific validity of the tenets of natural religion; in the second, the identification of religion with rational beliefs obscured most of the values that had traditionally been satisfied by Christianity. Beginning about the middle of the century, a great religious revival, both Protestant and Catholic, swept over Europe and America. Its leaders maintained that religion is not science or philosophy, not the mere sanction of a moral code, but a rich way of life, and that it has as little need to be rational as life itself.

(*a*) The rise of the religion of reason or nature.
  i. Humanistic criticism of the Christian tradition — the Renaissance "philosophy of Christ" — Erasmus, the Socinians.
  ii. The effect of seventeenth century rational science on religious ideas.
  iii. The tenets of rational religion: God the Creator, future rewards and punishments, the moral law.
  iv. The new purpose of religion: to provide a rational incentive to socially useful morality.
(*b*) The issue and the debate between the rational supernaturalists and the Deists.
  i. Is revelation necessary in addition to natural religion?
  ii. The validity of miracles and prophecies as proofs of revelation.
(*c*) The critique of the tenets of rational religion — Hume, Holbach, Kant.
(*d*) The emergence of atheism and materialism as substitutes for religious beliefs.

QUESTIONS

1. What place do you think doctrinal beliefs should have in religion?
2. What place did the eighteenth century religion of reason assign to such beliefs?
3. How successful was the Age of Reason in reconciling religion with science?
4. Were the concepts of God and immortality less or more important in the Age of Reason than those of the Golden Rule and universal justice?
5. Do you agree with Holbach, Hume, and Kant that there can be no purely rational proof of the existence of God?

F. The Romantic protest against the Age of Reason.

Assignment thirty-nine: The Romantic protest

* *Randall*, 389–421.
W. T. Marvin, *History of European philosophy*, ch. 26 — a general account with especial emphasis on the more conservative tendency in the Romantic movement; A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the modern world*, ch. 5 — an account of the value of the Romantic criticism of eighteenth century science; G. Santayana, *Three philosophical poets*, ch. 3, "Goethe" — an appraisal of the Romantic ideal of life.

The aim of the Age of Reason to reconstruct every human enterprise on a rational basis, to introduce scientific ideas and methods everywhere, met drastic criticism toward the end of the eighteenth century, when men had recovered from their first enthusiasm for Newtonian science. A revolt against this scientific ideal of life swept across Europe, manifesting itself in such different forms as a great religious revival, a great wave of artistic and literary activity, a protest by the more conservative landed classes against the fruits of middle-class social science in the French Revolution, and a nationalistic protest, particularly in Germany, against the domination of France and French enlightenment under Napoleon. For the mass of men this Romantic movement was a conservative reaction against too sharp a break with the non-scientific past. For them it was felt primarily as a reaction against the liberalism of the French Revolution, and a revival of traditional religious life in the face of the failure of the religion of reason. For the intellectual leaders of the movement, however, it was a serious attempt to criticize the inadequacy of eighteenth century scientific ideas and methods. In Germany in particular, many thinkers not only called attention to parts of human experience that Newtonian science had neglected, but added to the stock of scientific ideas the characteristic new notions, like that of evolution, that distinguish nineteenth century natural science from that of Newton.

The great danger of the scientific enterprise of the eighteenth century was its narrowness and complacency. In attempting to put all life on a completely rational basis, men minimized what was not scientific, like religion and art. Their conception of science itself was narrow and rigid, and had no place for change or growth, no place for life and living beings, no place for the characteristic activities of man. It even proved impossible, in the world as Newton described it, to understand how there could be such a thing as scientific investigation and knowledge. Moreover, important as was the notion of a social science, the actual social sciences developed were narrow crystallizations of the demands of the business classes in the eighteenth century situation.

In view of these inadequacies of the scientific ideas of the Age of Reason, it was very necessary to broaden men's intellectual horizons, to enlarge the scope of science itself, to appeal from the narrow systems of Newtonian science to the much richer field of living human experience. At its best the Romantic movement was just such an appeal to experience as against a tight little system. It is true that for most men its immediate effect was reaction and obscurantism, an unhappy turning from all science to the inertia of older institutions. For most men the appeal to experience means the appeal to tradition, so completely are they molded by the world in which they are born. Yet the acute criticisms of Newtonian science at the hands of the outstanding leaders did prevent stagnation. They broadened the scope of science itself, and confronted it with a rich variety of materials which in the nineteenth century it was able to order and understand. They destroyed the dogmatism of Newtonian science, and much of the open-minded, experimental attitude, the deep respect for facts and investigation, that has marked scientific thinkers in the nineteenth century is the product of this Romantic criticism. The Romantic philosophers made an open-minded acceptance of all the facts their cardinal principle. At the same time, they added a whole new dimension to science by insisting on the importance of growth and development and continuous change. The idea of evolution was emphasized by the Romantic thinkers, and it was from them that biologists and natural scientists learned it. Just as the humanistic movement of the Renaissance was deeply critical of medieval science, but ultimately proved a liberating influence that prepared the ground for the growth of natural science in the seventeenth century, so the Romantic movement was a liberation from scientific dogmatism and a potent factor in the emergence of the broad and rich science of the present day.

The Romantic movement was primarily a protest against rationalism, and it naturally assumed many different forms. There were so many other things to which to turn! Consequently it appears confused and contradictory, both reactionary and progressive, a religious revival, an artistic rebirth, a plea for the counter-revolution, a wave of nationalism. All these tendencies are united by a common turning from a narrow system of science to a much broader human experience. Almost all types of experience had their protagonists. The task of nineteenth century science remained that of understanding and adjusting these various forms of experience.

- (*a*) Dissatisfaction with the scientific ideal.
  - i. Felt by poets and artists who emphasized the lyrical and the imaginative rather than the rational — the English Romantic poets.
  - ii. Felt by religious men aware of the failure of the religion of reason.
- (*b*) Emphasis on the less rational sides of human nature.
  - i. The "natural man" no longer equivalent to the rational man — Rousseau.
  - ii. Emphasis on the importance and naturalness of tradition.
- (*c*) The appeal to faith.
  - i. In the interests of the religious tradition.
    - (*i*) The German pietistic movement.
    - (*ii*) Wesleyan evangelicalism and Methodism.
    - (*iii*) The Catholic revival and the Oxford movement.
  - ii. In the interests of the revolutionary ideals.
- (*d*) The rational justification of faith — Immanuel Kant.

Science was interpreted by Kant as a human way of organizing and systematizing observations, which is valid as a description of human experience because it does bring consistency into our views. There are other experiences, however — that of the moral life and that of beauty — which are irrelevant to science and at times conflict with the principles the scientist employs in his interpretation of experience. Since we know science to be limited and incomplete, we are justified in believing that the whole story about the world would have a place in it for moral freedom, art, and religious faith. Starting from this position, a number of "idealistic" philosophers tried to interpret the world in the light of their non-scientific experiences. These men —

i. Emphasized the individual personality and its full development and expression, thus giving an ideal expression to the individualism of the middle class.
ii. Interpreted nature in personal terms.
iii. Emphasized the importance of social groups and institutions as the means of developing individuality and a rich life.
iv. Emphasized the importance of national traditions and the cultural heritage and their continuous change and evolution.
v. Thus laid the foundations for the social science of the nineteenth century.

QUESTIONS

1. Did the Romantic reliance on feeling and faith, as opposed to reason, lead to conservativism or radicalism?

2. How did the Romantic understanding of the "natural man" differ from that of the Age of Reason?

3. What does Dr. Randall mean by saying that the philosophy of Idealism "is poetry, not science"?

4. In what manner did the Romantic movement give impetus to the idea of evolution?

5. With the lessons of the Enlightenment and the Romantic protest in mind, what part do you think reason should play in religion and what part feeling and faith?

V. WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND THE NINETEENTH

1. The French Revolution and the early industrial revolution.

A. General introduction.

Assignment forty: The French Revolution, the first stage

* *Syllabus*, 188–193; D. M. Ketelbey, *A history of modern times*, 46–79.

We have noted previously that the people of Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were divided into two fairly distinct classes — privileged and unprivileged. The privileged class, which formed a very small minority of the population — about one out of every hundred — was composed for the most part of the wealthier nobility and the higher clergy. It would be most erroneous for anyone to assume that the eighteenth century nobility of Europe could in all cases trace its ancestry back to the old military and administrative nobility of the Middle Ages. On the contrary, the old nobility had been in large measure replaced by a new nobility which rose from the ranks of the common people. Voltaire, for example, tells us in his *Essay on manners* that in France "a huge number of citizens, bankers, surgeons, merchants, servants of princes, and clerks obtained patents of nobility" and laid the foundations for noble families. And what was true of France was true of almost every country in western Europe. But irrespective of origin, the members of the higher nobility, both lay and ecclesiastical, in addition to possessing magnificent estates, esteemed themselves inherently superior to the rank and file. They wore better clothes, lived in finer homes, set luxurious tables, performed no menial tasks, expected and received deference and dues from the common people, monopolized the higher offices in the state, army, and church, enjoyed exemption from taxation, and frequently were pensioned.

All these advantages, privileges, and immunities, it will be remembered, were merely part of the medieval heritage. With the disruption of the old Roman Empire and the feudalization of Europe, the common people turned to the nobility, both lay and ecclesiastical, for protection and assistance, giving in return loyalty and service. Long before the eighteenth century, however, these protective functions of the nobility had been transferred in large measure to the new royal governments which had gradually emerged from the chaos of feudalism. But transference of functions was not accompanied by a corresponding relinquishment of rewards, and consequently the higher nobility, though no longer performing any real service to the lower classes, continued in true parasitic fashion to enjoy itself at the expense of the rest of society. Many of its members idled away their lives in the cities or at the royal court while their flint-hearted agents, in accordance with their instructions, squeezed money from the less fortunate rank and file that the absentee lords might have a larger revenue. A few, it is true, were interested in business and in promoting art and learning, but they were the exception.

In sharp contrast to the privileged class was the unprivileged, which included within its ranks the bourgeoisie, the country gentry, the artisans and laborers, the peasantry, and the lesser clergy. Upon the shoulders of the members of this class fell the chief burdens of the day. They tilled the soil, carried on the manufacturing, did the merchandising, performed all sorts of manual work, and paid most of the taxes. With few exceptions, they were of ignoble birth. They bore no high-sounding titles; high social and official distinctions were not heaped upon them, and the rich sinecures of church and state were generally closed to them. In the eyes of the privileged aristocracy, their principal function was to make the then existing state of the higher aristocracy more easy and secure.

But all those who expected that European society as it existed in the eighteenth century would long continue unchanged were destined to be disillusioned. With the discovery of the New World and the subsequent expansion of commerce and industry, the middle class or bourgeoisie — merchants, bankers, wholesalers, and shopkeepers — increased rapidly in both strength and numbers. Recruiting its membership from peasants and petty townsmen and to some extent from the subsidiary branches of the nobility, it became constantly more powerful not only in the realm of business but in other fields as well. From its ranks came most of the lawyers, financiers, physicians, lesser officials, the learned and cultured, and the patrons of art. Naturally the bourgeoisie, quite irrespective of birth, felt themselves the equals if not the betters of foppish spendthrift nobles whose only claim to greatness rested on ownership of a moldy castle, a worm-eaten patent of nobility, a family tradition, or perhaps the knowledge that they were favorites of a royal household.

Even more important than aspiration for social equality on the part of the bourgeoisie was their desire for greater participation in governmental affairs. In England, it is true, sons of rich merchants were frequently admitted to the nobility, and the commercial interests, thanks to the seventeenth century revolutions, enjoyed a share in the control of the government. But on the Continent, with the possible exception of the Netherlands, the bourgeoisie had little or no direct say in politics. Government, centered in the hands of absolute monarchs and the privileged class, was conducted in the supposed interest of the rulers, the nobility, and the clergy. Parliamentary bodies representative of bourgeoisie, artisans, and peasants either did not exist or, if in existence, were either strangled or ruthlessly disregarded. Royal funds obtained by taking from the unprivileged were wasted on extravagant enterprises or often handed over outright to the nobility in the form of gifts or pensions. Actuated by dynastic motives, kings embarked on wars which exhausted national treasuries. Legislation which in the opinion of every good business man ought to be enacted was seldom passed, and such legislation as was passed was usually badly administered. And what was true of legislation was equally true, with some exceptions, of the courts and every other phase of government — inefficiency, corruption, and abuse — a condition, the bourgeoisie argued, that could only be remedied by bourgeois participation in the affairs of government. Even in those states which were ruled by benevolent despots like Frederick II of Prussia and Joseph II of Austria, the bourgeoisie were not entirely happy with their lot.

Those who believed that society was static and fixed, and who consequently opposed the social and political aspirations of the bourgeoisie, either failed to realize that the human world is dynamic and progressive or else, realizing this fact, thought it possible to maintain the old régime. In other words, they were either not cognizant of those far-reaching intellectual and material changes which occurred during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, or else believed that despite these changes the old order, with its classes and class distinctions, might somehow be retained.

The hundred years from 1750 to 1850 witnessed a titanic struggle between those who wanted to keep the old social order as it had come down from the Middle Ages and those who believed that the old social and political institutions had served their day and should be replaced by a new order which should be in harmony with changed conditions. Roughly, it was a contest between the privileged and the unprivileged classes in which the bourgeoisie, backed by discontented artisans and downtrodden peasantry, took the offensive. The commercial, agricultural, and industrial revolutions gave the bourgeoisie economic power; the French Revolution and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 gave them social and political power. During the first half of the contest, the bourgeoisie steadily drove deep wedges into exclusive privilege, whether in church or state; during the last half, the privileged classes clung desperately but unsuccessfully to the image and form of a power which had already actually passed from them. During this half, however, and the later years of the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie were forced to share their power with the new classes to which the industrial revolution gave rise. In a word, the bourgeoisie knocked at the door of the privileged classes, and the peasantry and the industrial workers in turn knocked at the door of the bourgeoisie.

In a very true sense the beginning of this struggle long antedated 1750. The rise of the Italian bourgeoisie and their struggle for the domination of the Italian city-states in the late medieval and early modern period, the similar struggle of the rising German middle class at about the same time in such towns as Hamburg, and the subsequent contests in England and Holland on the part of the commercial element, were merely forerunners of this later struggle. Nor should we draw the erroneous conclusion that the revolutionary movement terminated in 1850, for it is still going on in Russia, Turkey, China, and other parts of the world.

B. The French Revolution.

(*a*) The classes in France on the eve of the Revolution.

Between 1789 and 1815, forces originally released in France by the destruction of the remains of the old feudal order dominated the political and social life of western Europe. It is to these forces, wherever and however expressed, that we now wish to direct attention, rather than merely to insurrectionary acts against the established order within France itself. The French Revolution is more than a series of incidents in the history of France; it is one of the foundation stones of the modern order. Though its specific origins were of course largely local, the social background of the movement was by no means peculiar to France. Questions of the destiny and relations of social classes, for example, were raised and had to be answered, in the light of the French reply, in every western country.

France in the seventeenth century had already become a national state ruled by an absolute, divine-right monarch. The leading social class was the privileged landed aristocracy. But the conditions that sustained the existing order were productive of widespread disaffection. The small peasant proprietors, numbering perhaps 450,000, struggled beneath an ever increasing burden of taxation. They paid their own share and the shares of the landed nobles and clergy as well. The growing commercial class, whose foreign trade had increased fivefold in the sixty years preceding 1787, felt severely the political and social neglect visited upon them by the groups in power. They were becoming conscious of their numbers and strength, and felt that they had a right to participate in the processes of political control. Many of the lesser clergy found their interests and outlook at cross-purposes with those of the religious hierarchy. They were really bourgeois at heart. In the larger cities, and especially in Paris, the massed proletariat seethed with discontent. They were a vulgar rabble with nothing to hope for from things as they were. And among the intelligentsia there circulated a ferment of subversive ideas, mixed with an enervating political cynicism as to the existing system, that fed these various forms of discontent. The very court itself had lost its morale and could only hope that no upheaval might occur in its time. These groups and forces existed at least potentially outside of France, but were not so filled with menace, because in no other country was the absolutistic political system, to which they were naturally opposed, in such complete and complacent control.

The specific occasion of the Revolution was the threatened bankruptcy of France, due to a profligate court, an expensive foreign policy, and the nonpayment of taxes on the part of the clergy and nobles. The Estates General, an ancient body composed of members of the three Estates —

he clergy, the nobles, and the commoners — which had not met since 614, was called to meet in May, 1789, in order to deal with the situation.

(*b*) The National Assembly (June, 1789–October, 1791).

* *Syllabus*, 188–193; * Ketelbey, 46–79.

- i. The Estates-General convenes (May 5, 1789).
  - (*i*) Composition.
    - *a.* Clergy — two-thirds of them parish priests.
    - *b.* Nobility.
    - *c.* Third Estate — equal in number to the other two Estates and chosen by all taxpayers over twenty-five.
  - (*ii*) The Cahiers — lists of grievances and suggested reforms, quite non-revolutionary in character.
  - (*iii*) The split over the question of voting.
    - *a.* One house or three — by head or by Estate?
    - *b.* Third Estate waits five weeks for others to join it.
- ii. The Third Estate constitutes itself the National Assembly (June 17).
  - (*i*) The Clergy joins the Commons (June 19).
  - (*ii*) The Tennis Court Oath, never to disperse until France has been given a constitution (June 20).
  - (*iii*) The king recognizes the National Assembly (June 27).
- iii. July disturbances in Paris.
  - (*i*) Lafayette and the National Guard.
  - (*ii*) Bread riots; the taking of the Bastille (July 14).
- iv. Revolt in the provinces.
  - (*i*) Burning of the châteaux and the feudal records.
  - (*ii*) Seizure of the land by the peasants.
  - (*iii*) Formation of local "communes."
- v. Surrender of feudal privileges by the Nobles and the Clergy (the night of August 4–5).
- vi. The Declaration of the Rights of Man (August 12).
- vii. The royal family brought to Paris by the mob — "The March of the Women" (October).
- viii. Reforms of the Assembly.
  - (*i*) Finances.
    - *a.* Confiscation of church lands.
    - *b.* Issuance of "assignats" based on these lands.
  - (*ii*) Substitution of "departments" for the old provinces.
  - (*iii*) Ecclesiastical reforms.
    - *a.* Abolition of the dioceses.
    - *b.* The civil constitution of the Clergy.
      - 1. The non-juring clergy.
    - *c.* The church becomes the enemy of the Revolution.
  - (*iv*) The new constitution.
    - *a.* The king has merely suspensive veto and power to choose and dismiss ministers.
    - *b.* Chief authority vested in a unicameral Legislative Assembly.
- ix. The death of Mirabeau (April, 1791).
  - (*i*) The champion of constitutional monarchy and dominating figure of the Assembly.

    - (*ii*) The way cleared for the activities of the extremists.
    - (*iii*) The royal family, no longer well advised, and frightened, attempts unsuccessfully to flee from France (June, 1791).
- (*c*) The Legislative Assembly (October, 1791–September, 1792).
  - i. Inexperience of members — "self-denying ordinance" of the National Assembly.
  - ii. Groups in the Legislative Assembly.
    - (*i*) Feuillants or Constitutionalists.
    - (*ii*) Girondists — Brissot, Condorcet, Pétion, Vergniaud.
      - *a.* Theoretical radicals, eloquent, humane.
      - *b.* Policy — to overthrow the monarchy by involving France in foreign war.
  - iii. Foreign intrigue.
    - (*i*) Activities of the émigrés.
    - (*ii*) Efforts of the royal family to secure Austrian aid.
    - (*iii*) Declaration of Pillnitz (August, 1791). The emperor and the king of Prussia would invade France if the other powers should join them.
  - iv. France declares war on Austria (April, 1792).
  - v. Triumph of the Jacobins and the people.
    - (*i*) Failure of the Girondists to prosecute the war successfully.
    - (*ii*) Danton, Marat, and Robespierre represent the radicals in act as well as in theory — called "Jacobins."
    - (*iii*) Proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick (July).
    - (*iv*) Attack on the Tuilleries and the suspension of the king (August).
    - (*v*) Republic proclaimed (September 22, 1792).
      - *a.* Convention summoned to frame a republican constitution.
- (*d*) The Convention (September, 1792–October, 1795).

Assignment forty-one: The French Revolution, the second stage

* *Ketelbey*, 79–111.

- i. Problems confronting the National Convention.
  - (*i*) Deposition of the king.
  - (*ii*) Organization of the national defense; repelling of invasion.
  - (*iii*) Suppression of domestic revolt.
  - (*iv*) Provision of a strong government for the country.
  - (*v*) Consolidation of earlier reforms of the Revolution.
- ii. The tide of war turns.
  - (*i*) Invasion checked at Valmy (September).
  - (*ii*) Two months of victory — Dumouriez occupies Austrian Netherlands.
- iii. Execution of the king (January, 1793).
  - (*i*) Formation of the First Coalition against France.
- iv. Jacobin rule of force.
  - (*i*) Insurrection in La Vendée (led by priests and nobles) put down with great cruelty.
  - (*ii*) Suppression of the Girondist Revolt in the cities — Lyon, Toulon, etc.
  - (*iii*) Arrest and execution of the Girondist leaders (June).
  - (*iv*) Carnot reorganizes the armies. Conscription introduced.


The EMPIRE of NAPOLEON about 1810
GT BRITAIN & IRELAND
NORTH SEA
SWEDEN
DENMARK
BALTIC
RUSSIA
London
Boulogne
Antwerp
Paris
SWEDISH POMERANIA
Tilsit
PRUSSIA
Duchy of WARSAW
Confederation of the RHINE
EMPIRE of FRANCE
SWITZD
AUSTRIAN EMPIRE
Hungary
Illyrian Provinces
Milan
ITALY
Venice
ADRIATIC
Danube
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Constantinople
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Wellington's Army
CORSICA
Rome
K. of SARDINIA
K. of NAPLES
Corfu
C. Trafalgar
K. of SICILY
Direct rule
Subject States
J. F. H.

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(*v*) Maximum price of bread set by law.
(*vi*) The Committee of Public Safety formed, with supreme power.
  a. Dominated first by Danton, then by Robespierre.

v. "The Terror" (July, 1793–July, 1794).
  (*i*) Instrument of domestic policy to insure authority of the Committee of Public Safety.
  (*ii*) Estimated that 2500 persons were killed in Paris alone — Girondists exterminated.
  (*iii*) "Terror" spreads to the provinces.
  (*iv*) Robespierre's execution (July, 1794) brings Moderates into power.

vi. Reforms of the Convention.
  (*i*) Land of émigrés confiscated.
  (*ii*) Land rents abolished without compensation.
  (*iii*) New calendar — 12 months, 36 weeks, 360 days, plus 5 national holidays.
  (*iv*) Metric system of weights and measures.
  (*v*) Project for universal free education (Condorcet).
  (*vi*) Separation of church and state, 1794.
  (*vii*) Project for comprehensive code of law (completed by Napoleon).
  (*viii*) Abolition of negro slavery and imprisonment for debt.

- (*ix*) Constitution of the Year III — the Directory, 1795.
  - *a.* Executive — Directory of five members.
  - *b.* Legislature — bicameral, indirectly elected by taxpayers.

C. The era of Napoleon.

- (*a*) Early career.
  - i. Born in Corsica, August 15, 1769.
  - ii. Military education at Brienne.
    - (*i*) Poverty.
    - (*ii*) Dreams of liberating Corsica.
  - iii. Drives English from Toulon, 1793.
  - iv. Defends Convention from the mob (October, 1795).
  - v. Placed in command of Army of Italy.
  - vi. Marriage to Josephine.
- (*b*) First Italian Campaign (1796–1797).
  - i. Demonstrates ability as a military commander.
  - ii. Treaty with the pope — Tolentino (1797).
  - iii. Treaty with Austria — Campo Formio (1797).
    - (*i*) End of Girondist war of 1792 against the empire.
    - (*ii*) France acquires the Rhine boundary.
    - (*iii*) Austria receives Venice for Lombardy.
  - iv. The Cisalpine Republic.
    - (*i*) Model of the dependent moderate democracies which France built up as buffers along her borders.
    - (*ii*) Napoleon demonstrates his powers of civic organization.
- (*c*) The Eygyptian expedition (1798–1799).
  - i. The Directors' anxiety to keep Napoleon away from Paris.
  - ii. Napoleon's dreams of oriental empire and a blow at the English in India.
  - iii. The scientific aspects of the expedition.
    - (*i*) Archeological discoveries — the Rosetta Stone.
    - (*ii*) Astronomical, geological, and medical surveys.
  - iv. Defeat of the Mamelukes — Battle of the Pryamids.
  - v. Nelson severs Napoleon's communications — Battle of the Nile (August 1, 1798).
  - vi. Sortie into Syria fails.
  - vii. On receiving news of French reverses at home, Napoleon slips away from army and returns to Paris (October, 1799).
- (*d*) The coup d'état of Brumaire, year VIII.
  - i. The bribery of the Directors.
  - ii. Soldiers clear the hall of the Five Hundred — Lucien's coolness.
  - iii. Napoleon made First Consul under new constitution.
- (*e*) First Consul of France (1799–1804).
  - i. Consulate a disguised despotism based on the desire of the French for a strong and efficient government after the indecision and corruption of the Directory (1800).
  - ii. Second Italian Campaign — recovers losses of 1799.
  - iii. Peace of Amiens (1802).
    - (*i*) Dissolution of the Second Coalition.
    - (*ii*) Only truce for France during the era of Napoleon.
  - iv. Internal reforms.
    - (*i*) Centralization of local government.
    - (*ii*) Checking of inefficiency and graft.

        - (*iii*) Founding of the Bank of France.
        - (*iv*) National system of public education.
        - (*v*) Peasants allowed to retain possession of land.
        - (*vi*) The Code Napoléon (1804).
            - *a.* Collection of legal principles based on experience rather than theory.
            - *b.* Basis of present-day French law.
        - (*vii*) Concordat with the pope (1801).
            - *a.* Pope to invest bishops, canon law reëstablished, priests to be paid by the state.
            - *b.* Confiscation of church property accepted.
        - (*viii*) Legion of Honor — "men are led by baubles."
        - (*ix*) Beautification of Paris.
        - (*x*) Patronage of science and art.
    - v. Plots against Napoleon — execution of the duc d'Enghien.
    - vi. Napoleon crowns himself Emperor of the French (1804).

While to us Napoleon's far-sighted internal reforms constitute his chief benefaction to France, he himself felt that his "destiny" impelled him rather along the paths of war. The Treaty of Amiens was to him, as to England, merely a truce to be disregarded when opportunity for advantage offered to either party. Hardly more than a year passed, in fact, before hostilities recommenced on the flimsiest of excuses, and from 1803 until 1812 Napoleon ranged across Europe practically at will, routing armies, deposing kings, and humbling emperors. He terminated the long history of the moribund Holy Roman Empire, and surrounded France with a congeries of dependent kingdoms and confederations from which to draw men and supplies to feed his restless craving for fresh conquests and greater glories.

Against England alone, Napoleon's genius could make no headway. The sea had always baffled him, and England was mistress of the seas. To bring the Island Kingdom to her knees he issued a series of decrees, known collectively as the "Continental System," for the purpose of cutting off her markets on the Continent. In actuality, these decrees hurt Napoleon and the peoples subject to him more than they did the English. The Continent was deprived of goods necessary to a satisfactory life, which were then being produced by the rising English industrial system. There was some stringency in England, but a lack of markets is a less serious evil than a lack of goods. Napoleon was himself obliged to ignore his decrees and purchase overcoats in England in order to carry on a campaign against Russia. On the other hand the English, thanks to their navy, were able to comb the seas entirely free of enemy merchantmen, while the markets of the non-European world remained open to their own traders. Even neutral commerce almost disappeared from everything except coastwise trade, so that England flourished commercially and industrially. Further, attempts at a rigid application of the Continental System seriously increased the disaffection of the peoples under his control, especially in Spain, and were the immediate cause of the ill-fated invasion of Russia in 1812.

But far more important in its bearing on our western civilization of today than his brilliant feats of arms and statesmanship, was Napoleon's service in spreading the doctrines of the French Revolution throughout central Europe and Italy, and even into England, where his armies never penetrated. For, while he deprived Frenchmen of the "Liberty" of 1792, which he was persuaded they didn't want anyhow, he guaranteed "Equality" and encouraged "Fraternity." Both at home and abroad they proved shibboleths of the highest efficacy. To the lowliest private he offered the "career of merit" and a personal share in the national glory. Wherever his standards were borne, the gospel of equal opportunity and fellowship was carried, to take root and bear in time a rich harvest of liberalism, democracy, and nationalism. Under the inspiration of these new enthusiasms, defeated peoples became "nations in arms," with national banners, national songs, and national destinies. Hard upon the disastrous retreat from Moscow in the winter of 1812 came the "Battle of the Nations" near Leipzig, and the iron grip of the tyrant on Europe faltered. In 1814 Napoleon abdicated and was exiled to St. Helena, from which he returned to rouse France and shake Europe for a brief "Hundred Days" until his career was terminated on the battlefield of Waterloo.

Napoleon was confined to Elba. But Pandora's box was open. Repression of the doctrines he had spread broadcast was but temporary and superficial. The substance of the old order crumbled from within. The principles of the First Republic — national self-determination, separation of church and state, political and social equality of opportunity, and public education came to be the principles of the rising class of bourgeoisie, and it was left for these men of energy and affairs to put into practical operation during the latter part of the nineteenth century the revolutionary ideas of Marat, Robespierre, Condorcet, and Helvetius.

QUESTIONS

1. How do you account for the fact that the Revolution of 1789 broke out in France even though the French people were in a less downtrodden state than were the inhabitants of the other continental countries?
2. Why did the parish priests sympathize with the Third Estate in the early months of the Revolution? Why did the peasants of La Vendée fight the Republic?
3. What various motives inspired the French to attempt to spread the gospel of liberty, equality, and fraternity throughout Europe?
4. What factors would you adduce in support of the statement that Napoleon's true greatness rests upon his achievements during the years from 1802 to 1804?
5. Why did the French people tolerate the establishment of an autocratic empire in 1804?

2. After the Revolution: Reaction and liberalism.

Assignment forty-two: The aftermath of the Revolution

A. The Congress of Vienna and its aftermath.

* *Hayes*, II, 1–14, 28–41; * *Hayes*, I, 517–519.

- (*a*) Reconstruction of Europe.
  A. W. Ward, *The period of the congresses* — a short but satisfactory analysis of the major European congresses.
    - i. Work of the diplomats under leadership of Metternich at the Congress of Vienna.
        - (*i*) Guiding principles.
            - *a*. Legitimacy.
            - *b*. Compensation.
        - (*ii*) Application of these principles.
            - *a*. Restoration of boundaries and rulers.
            - *b*. Lenient treatment of France.
            - *c*. Renewal of neutrality of Swiss Confederation.
            - *d*. Partition of Poland approved.
            - *e*. Territorial readjustments due to necessity for compensation.
            - *f*. Reconstruction of the Germanies an exception to legitimacy.
        - (*iii*) Disregard for nationalism, liberty, and democracy in the settlement of Vienna.
    - ii. Measures taken by diplomats to insure the permanence of the Vienna settlement and to preserve the future peace of Europe.
        - (*i*) Coöperative enterprises of reactionary monarchs.
            - *a*. Formation of alliances.
                - 1. The Quadruple Alliance.
                - 2. The Holy Alliance.
            - *b*. Holding of European congresses.
        - (*ii*) Program of the reactionaries.
            - *a*. Local measures to repress liberalism — Carlsbad Decrees.
            - *b*. Armed international intervention to suppress liberalism.

(*b*) The Tory reaction in Great Britain.
    i. Promotion of policies favorable to landed aristocracy.
    ii. Repressive measures to suppress liberalism: six acts of Parliament.
(*c*) Abandonment of liberalism in Russia.

B. The liberalizing effects of the Revolution.

* *Hayes*, I, 517–519.
See also J. H. Clapham, *Economic development of France and Germany, 1815–1914*, 1–28; 37–52.

(*a*) General.
    i. Abolition of privileges of tradition and rank.
    ii. More general participation in government by the people.
    iii. Beginning of universal education.
    iv. Religious freedom.
    v. National patriotism.
    vi. Impetus to colonial revolt and independence.
    vii. Creation of a new tradition.
(*b*) Effect of revolutionary movement on various social classes.
    i. In France.
        (*i*) Privileged classes.
        (*ii*) Bourgeoisie.
        (*iii*) Peasantry.
            a. Changes in land ownership and land tenure.
            b. Changes in agricultural methods.
    ii. In Germany.
        (*i*) Changed framework of rural life.
        (*ii*) The emancipation of the peasantry.
        (*iii*) New methods in agriculture.

QUESTIONS

1. What interests did England, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and France have to conserve at Vienna?

2. Why did Austria win her way at the congress?

3. What important forces were disregarded at the congress? Why?

4. For what future troubles did the congress set the stage?

5. What machinery was set up after the congress for maintaining the peace of Europe? How does the League of Nations compare with this post-congress solution?

6. What forces were contending in England after the Revolution? Why could the Tories win their point? When did they lose?

7. What led to the abandonment of liberalism in Russia?

8. How did the liberalizing tendencies of the Revolution in France find their way into the rest of Europe?

9. In what particular ways were the effects of French liberalism and reforms manifested outside of France?

3. The industrial and agricultural revolutions.

Assignment forty-three: The commercial and industrial contest between England and the Continent

* Hammond, *The rise of modern industry*, 38–65.

A. The effects of the European wars.
  (*a*) Wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries aided British development and retarded European.
    i. Commercial and naval struggle with the Dutch resulted in England's favor after the Dutch were weakened by their wars with France.
    ii. In the struggle between England and France, the continental character of France prevented her from developing as a commercial nation.
    iii. The Napoleonic era resulted in further development of English trade and decline of French trade.
      (*i*) Early French industrial development was *greater* than that of England.
      (*ii*) The drain of the wars on France left British industry in the lead.
      (*iii*) After the wars the inadequate coal supply of France made itself felt, since steam power was becoming important.
    iv. Development of British financial and credit institutions aided industrial growth.

B. Natural advantages of England.
  (*a*) Geographic position relative to the Atlantic.
  (*b*) Coal and iron deposits.
  (*c*) Climate suited to cotton spinning.

C. British advantages of social organization.
  (*a*) Governmental unity — internal free trade.
  (*b*) Commercial stock companies.
  (*c*) Banking facilities (learned from the Dutch).
  (*d*) Prosperous textile industry — expulsion of workmen from France (1685).

QUESTIONS

1. What is meant by the contrast between "the wars of religion" and the "wars of economic nationalism"?

2. What was the effect on the Dutch Empire of the struggles with England and France?

3. What were the effects of the Navigation Acts on British trade?

4. From the standpoint of the French commercial development, discuss the change in governmental policy during the reign of Louis XIV.

5. To what extent did the continental wars of the Napoleonic era disturb British commercial activity?

6. It is customary to allot credit to the inventors of the improved textile machinery for the development of the industrial revolution in England. If these were the cause, why did France not grow as fast as England?

7. Why did Belgium vie with England in rapidity of industrial development? How does she compare today?

8. "A new power . . . that was a rival to the Holy See and the Holy Roman Em-

pire, to the king of Spain and to the king of France." What was the nature of the economic strength of these "powers"?

9. What were the institutions which characterized "European civilization" from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century?

10. What were the new financial and business "arts" which were developed during the commercial revolution?

11. Why is internal free trade so important for commercial development?

12. Why were the Stuarts so much interested in the development of commercial monopolies and privileged companies?

13. What was the "change in atmosphere" which made the mechanical invention "at home" in the eighteenth century?

Assignment forty-four: Changes in agriculture and in the old industrial system

D. Agricultural changes.

* *Hammond*, 81–109.

(*a*) The revival of enclosures.
    i. Earlier period.
    ii. Later period.
(*b*) Technical advances — the influence of French agriculture.
    i. Plant breeding.
    ii. Scientific cultivation.
    iii. Cattle and sheep herding.
(*c*) Growth of capitalist farming.
    i. The small landowner remains in Europe — France, Denmark, Rhine, and South Germany.
    ii. Growth of a landless proletariat in England.
    iii. The wealthy landlord with his surplus available for investment in industrial undertakings as well as farming.

E. Changes in the old industrial system.
(*a*) Decline of the guilds.
(*b*) The demand of the workers for protection.
    i. The Yorkshire workers in the woolen industry.
    ii. Nottingham frame-work knitters attempt forcible protest.
    iii. Lancashire cotton weavers' riotous protests against the masters' refusal to obey Parliamentary regulations.

QUESTIONS

1. Why did the Plague and the growth of the cloth industry weaken the manorial system in England?

2. What difference was there in the motive for enclosure of the common lands (in England) during the sixteenth century and that during the eighteenth.

3. How did the medieval village hamper the development of agriculture?

4. What were the Enclosure Acts, and why were landlords so much interested in them?

5. What difference was there in the status of the peasants of England and those of France at the time of the break-up of the medieval agricultural system?

6. What difference was there in the change which came over the status of the English peasant and that of the Danish peasant?

7. Did the old English laws regulating wages prove effective in the crisis caused by the high prices prevailing for foodstuffs (at the end of the eighteenth century)?

8. What was the allotment movement?

9. Why were the peasants of England in a state of poverty while the agricultural industry was profitable (early nineteenth century)?

10. What was the "Poor Law" and what were its results?

11. Describe the effects of the agricultural revolution on the English peasants; the landlords.

12. Contrast the character of the guilds of England in the fifteenth century and the sixteenth.

13. How did royal governments attempt to make use of the guilds in the sixteenth century?

14. How did changing commercial tasks alter the character of the guilds?

15. What was the attitude of the industrial employer of England (early nineteenth century) toward governmental regulation of industry?

16. What caused the Luddite riots?

17. What governmental actions were taken as a result of industrial disturbances similar to the Luddite riots?

18. Were the statesmen of the early nineteenth century consistent and logical in their attitude toward the "sanctity of property rights"?

F. Mechanical inventions.

Assignment forty-five: Mechanical control and social irresponsibility

* *Hayes*, II, 69–79; * *Hammond*, 190–209.

(*a*) Machinery for spinning and weaving.
(*b*) Water and steam power.
(*c*) The iron industry.
  i. Transportation.
  ii. Improved machines.
(*d*) Expansion of industry.
(*e*) Increase in commerce, population, urbanization, wealth.
(*f*) New classes in society — capitalists and wage earners.

G. The wage earners' problems.

* *Hammond*, 190–209.

(*a*) The status of employers and that of wage earners further modify the relationships of the handicraft system.
(*b*) The growth of child labor, with repressive consequences, intellectual and physical, to the children concerned.
(*c*) The rise of vested interests among industrial employers.
(*d*) The long hours and low wages of factory workers.
(*e*) The ineffectual attempts at social control.

QUESTIONS

1. Why do men make faster progress in control over machinery and power than in control over conditions affecting human beings? Is this "social lag" constant? What tendencies to lessen the lag are apparent today?

2. Argue that steam, iron, commerce, and textile machine invention are each in itself the cause of the industrial revolution.

3. What were the steps in textile manufacture to which machinery was progressively adapted?

4. What problems confronted the wage earner in the early days of the industrial revolution? Have any of these problems found solutions? Have any of them been rendered less acute? How?

4. Reaction and reform, 1815–1850.

Assignment forty-six: Europe from the Revolution to 1848

* *Ketelbey*, 156–178, omitting 165–166.

A. General characteristics of the period.
  - (*a*) Age of science and letters rather than of political achievement.
  - (*b*) Rising voice of the people.
    - i. Nationalist aspirations.
    - ii. Democratic aspirations.
  - (*c*) Development in England in advance of that on Continent.

B. France.
  - (*a*) Moderate character and policies of Louis XVIII (1814–1824).
    - i. Guarantee of liberties in Charter of 1814.
  - (*b*) Opposition to Louis of the Ultra-Royalists.
    - i. The White Terror.
    - ii. Cause of Ultras strengthened by murder of duc de Berri.
    - iii. The Congregation.
  - (*c*) Rule of Charles X (1824–1830).
    - i. Divine right once more.
    - ii. Rule of the nobility and clergy.
    - iii. Appointment of reactionary Polignac Ministry.
    - iv. Issue of July Ordinances.
      - (*i*) Restrictions on press.
      - (*ii*) Dissolution of newly-elected Chamber.
      - (*iii*) New and very restrictive electoral law.
      - (*iv*) Ordering of new elections.
    - v. July Revolution, 1830.
      - (*i*) Flight of Charles and accession of Louis Philippe.
  - (*d*) Louis Philippe, the Citizen-King (1830–1848).
    - i. A rule based on disorganized opposition rather than inherent strength.
    - ii. Elements of weakness.
      - (*i*) Opposition of Legitimists and Clericals.
      - (*ii*) Opposition of Republicans.
      - (*iii*) Economic discontent and rise of Socialism.
        - *a*. Louis Blanc.
      - (*iv*) *La France s'enuie.*
    - iii. Signs of discontent in spite of a material prosperity.
      - (*i*) Insurrections of Legitimists and Louis Napoleon.
      - (*ii*) Plots, riots, and conspiracies, especially in towns.
      - (*iii*) "Down with Guizot!"
    - iv. The Revolution of 1848.

      - (*i*) Republican phase.
      - (*ii*) Conflict between Republicans and Socialists.
      - (*iii*) Triumph of Republicans through Louis Napoleon.
- (*e*) President Bonaparte, 1848–1852.
  - i. Antecedents and character of Louis Napoleon.
  - ii. Heir to the Napoleonic Legend.
  - iii. Place of the Napoleonic Legend in French hearts.
  - iv. Premature attempts at greatness in 1836 and 1840.
  - v. The seizure of an opportunity, 1848.
    - (*i*) Election to National Assembly.
    - (*ii*) Election to presidency.

C. Spain.
- (*a*) Democratic constitution of 1812.
- (*b*) Return of Ferdinand in 1813, and acceptance of constitution.
- (*c*) Grievances against Ferdinand.
  - i. Revival of Inquisition.
  - ii. Persecution of Liberals.
  - iii. Loss of colonies in America.
- (*d*) Revolution of 1820.
  - i. Intervention of French, 1823.
  - ii. England, the United States, and the Monroe Doctrine, 1823.
- (*e*) The Carlist Wars, 1833–1840.
  - i. Reactionary "Carlists" *vs.* Liberal "Christinos."
  - ii. Triumph of Christina and Isabella.
- (*f*) Rule of Isabella II (1843–1868).
  - i. Despotism, immorality, extravagance of the queen.
  - ii. Revolution of 1868.
  - iii. Constitution of 1869.

D. The Italian peninsula.
- (*a*) Redivision of Italy in 1815.
  - i. Kingdom of Sardinia; Austrian-owned Lombardo-Venetia; independent duchies of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, Lucca; Papal States; Kingdom of Two Sicilies.
- (*b*) Restoration of absolutism throughout the peninsula.
- (*c*) Chief features of Italian situation from 1815 to 1848: absolutism, provincialism, Austrian domination.
- (*d*) Crystallization of discontent: the Carbonari.
- (*e*) Revolutions of 1820–1821.
  - i. Influence of Spanish Revolution of 1820.
  - ii. Revolt in Naples; crushed by Austrian troops.
  - iii. Revolt in Piedmont; similarly crushed.
- (*f*) Revolutions of 1830–1831.
  - i. Influence of July Revolution in France, 1830.
  - ii. Revolt in Papal States and adoption of red, white, and green tricolor.
  - iii. Outbreaks in Parma and Modena, ruled by Austrian protégés.
  - iv. Metternich dispatches Austrian troops to crush the revolts.
- (*g*) Mazzini and the Young Italy Society, 1831.
  - i. Mazzini's dreams of a regenerated, united Italy.
  - ii. His appeal to the youth of Italy.
  - iii. Spread of revolutionary propaganda in favor of a republic.

- (*h*) Growth of sentiment in favor of an Italian federation under the pope or else a constitutional monarchy.
    - i. Early liberalism of Pope Pius IX, 1846.
    - ii. His example followed by rulers of Piedmont and Tuscany.
    - iii. Nationalist aspirations added to democratic ones.
- (*i*) Revolutions of 1848–1849.
    - i. Ferdinand of Naples forced to grant a constitution.
    - ii. Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Papal States receive constitutions.
    - iii. News of flight of Metternich from Vienna precipitates revolt in Lombardy, Venetia, Modena, and Parma.
    - iv. Piedmont declares war on Austria, but fails to receive adequate support from Papal States and Naples.
    - v. Defeat of Piedmont and restoration of Austrian domination and reaction throughout Italy, except Piedmont.

E. The Germanies.

- (*a*) Characteristics of German Confederation, 1815–1866.
    - i. Loose organization.
    - ii. Rivalry of Austria and Prussia.
    - iii. Possessions of Denmark, Holland, and England in the Confederation.
    - iv. Lack of any executive power.
- (*b*) Control of Metternich.
    - i. His opposition to democracy and to nationalist aspirations.
    - ii. Liberalism of German students.
        - (*i*) Wartburg Festival, 1817.
        - (*ii*) Murder of Kotzebue, 1819.
        - (*iii*) The *Burschenschaften*.
    - iii. Carlsbad Decrees, 1819.
        - (*i*) Aimed chiefly at press and universities.
        - (*ii*) Apparent triumph of reaction.
- (*c*) Tendencies to German unification.
    - i. Economic benefits of union.
        - (*i*) Development of the *Zollverein*, 1819–1834.
        - (*ii*) Economic union as a prelude to political union.
    - ii. Rise of German nationalism.
        - (*i*) Nationalism stimulated by French and Napoleonic Wars.
        - (*ii*) Growth of cultural nationalism: activities of patriotic poets, philosophers, and historians and of universities.
        - (*iii*) Cultural nationalism as a step toward political nationalism.
- (*d*) Revolutions of 1848–1849.
    - i. Influence of French Revolution.
    - ii. Widespread nature of the revolutions in 1848.
    - iii. Temporary success of revolution in Prussia.
    - iv. Frankfurt Parliament, 1848–1849.
        - (*i*) Meets to draw up constitution for united Germany.
        - (*ii*) Opposition of Austria.
        - (*iii*) Conflicting opinions of members of the Parliament.
        - (*iv*) Conflicting opinions caused by national sentiments.
        - (*v*) Rejection of crown by king of Prussia.
        - (*vi*) Prussia again bows to Austrian leadership.

QUESTIONS

1. What different interests or parties were operative in France under Louis Philippe?

2. What situation and personal qualities put Louis Napoleon on the throne, and what situations, conflicting interests, and personal qualities proved his ruin?

3. What discontents and what hopes did Mazzini capitalize?

4. Describe the Italian revolutions of 1848.

5. What tendencies to unification did Germany show before 1848? What checked these tendencies?

6. Describe the German revolutions of 1848.

F. The Hapsburg dominions.

Assignment forty-seven: Europe from the Revolution to 1848 — Continued

* *Ketelbey*, 178–190, omitting 184–185.

(*a*) Nationalist problems.
(*b*) *Divide et impera.*
(*c*) Economic backwardness.
(*d*) Power of Metternich: no revolution in Austria in 1830.
(*e*) Revolutions of 1848–1849.
  i. Demands for nationalist and constitutionalist concessions by German Austrians, Italians, Czechs, Hungarians, and Croats.
  ii. Temporary success of revolts and threatened disintegration of Austro-Hungarian Empire.
  iii. Nationalism defeats democracy, though Ferdinand abdicates and Russian assistance is required to reconquer the short-lived Hungarian Republic of Louis Kossuth.
  iv. Accession of Francis Joseph (1848–1916).

G. Poland.
(*a*) Liberalism of Tsar Alexander I.
(*b*) Reactionary influence of Metternich on the tsar.
(*c*) Polish discontent.
  i. Evasions of the constitution.
  ii. Activities of autocratic Russian officials.
  iii. Nationalist hopes for a greater Poland.
  iv. Oppressiveness of Nicholas I.
(*d*) Revolution of 1831: a failure.
(*e*) Revocation of Polish constitution.
(*f*) Russification measures.
(*g*) Weak uprising in 1846.

H. Greece.
(*a*) Privileged position of Greeks in Ottoman Empire.
(*b*) Religious and intellectual unity of Greeks.
  i. Hellenistic revival about 1800.
  ii. The *Philike Hetairia.*
  iii. Foreign Philhellenism.
  iv. Hopes of Russian support.
(*c*) War for Greek Independence, 1821–1829.
  i. Defeat of Greeks by Mehemet Ali.

    - ii. Intervention of Russia, England, and Prussia for political or sentimental motives.
    - iii. Naval Battle of Navarino, 1827.
    - iv. Peace of Adrianople (1829) and Greek Independence.

I. Belgium.
- (*a*) Assigned to Holland in 1815.
- (*b*) Grievances against Holland.
    - i. Religious differences: Protestantism *vs.* Catholicism.
    - ii. Economic differences: commercial Holland and agrarian and industrial Belgium.
    - iii. Dutch officials.
    - iv. Example of French Revolution, 1830.
- (*c*) Revolution of 1830.
    - i. Belgian independence declared.
    - ii. Recognition by foreign powers.
    - iii. Neutrality guaranteed, 1839.

J. Switzerland.
- (*a*) The Swiss Confederation of 1815–1848.
    - i. Movement for greater democracy.
    - ii. Movement for closer unity.
        - *a*. Protestant *vs.* Catholic cantons.
        - *b*. Catholicism *vs.* Liberalism.
    - iii. The Sonderbund War, 1847.
        - *a*. Defeat of Catholic Sonderbund and triumph of nationalism.
    - iv. Democratic and national revision of Swiss constitution in 1848.

QUESTIONS

1. How did nationalism defeat democracy in Austria prior to 1848?
2. For what did Greece fight and what did she gain?
3. Outline the development of liberalism in Belgium.
4. Describe the growth of nationalism in Switzerland.

5. The philosophies of conservatism and liberalism: The conflict of social ideals.

Assignment forty-eight: Philosophy supports conservatism and liberalism

A. The philosophy of conservatism.

* *Randall*, 423–444.

- (*a*) Developed largely to justify the position of the privileged classes — court, church, and landholders.
- (*b*) Acceptance of certain middle-class ideals.
    - i. Right of private property, especially in land.
    - ii. Benevolent despotism in the economic sphere, save for agricultural privileges — Metternich, Tory reformers.
    - iii. Nationalism in western Europe.

- (*c*) Acceptance of romantic protest against rationalism.
    - i. Faith as a binding force, reason anarchic.
        - (*i*) Need of a strong spiritual power within and over nations, *i. e.*, the church.
        - (*ii*) Organic view of society — fusion of old régime and nationalism.
    - ii. Importance of conserving tradition and continuing historical development of the national genius.
        - (*i*) Emphasis on the historical attitude.
        - (*ii*) The aesthetic appeal of the past.
- (*d*) Idealization of feudalism.
    - i. Conception of expert governing class.
    - ii. Conception of functional rights and the protection of minorities.
    - iii. Religious and spiritual ideal for society.

B. The philosophy of liberalism and individualism.
- (*a*) The revolutionary heritage.
    - i. Liberty — economic liberalism and individualism, and self-government for the middle class.
    - ii. Equality of opportunity to rise.
    - iii. Nationalism first, then peace and prosperity.
    - iv. Faith in progress through science and industry.
- (*b*) Utilitarianism — the continuance of eighteenth century reasonableness.
    - i. Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill — the social basis for individualism.
    - ii. Cobden and Manchester School cosmopolitanism.
- (*c*) The new naturalism — the finding of the ideal in an advancing nature.
    - i. Spencerian and Tennysonian faith in progress.
    - ii. The liberal romanticists — Young Germany, Young Italy.
- (*d*) The liberal nationalism and internationalism of 1848 — Mazzini and the German forty-eighters.

QUESTIONS

1. Why does the far away and long ago hold such a tremendous appeal for mankind? Give some nineteenth and twentieth century examples of the working of this principle.

2. What attitude, according to such conservatives as De Maistre and Burke, should the citizen take toward the state? What position does the church hold in the thought of the former?

3. Discuss the political theory of John Stuart Mill as representative of Individualistic Liberalism in the nineteenth century.

4. Why did the notion of progress gain so many adherents during the nineteenth century? Who were its most famous protagonists? What American institutions still spread this gospel?

5. How did the political situation in Germany and Italy give rise to the ideal of Liberal Nationalism? In what way does the history of this ideal illustrate the saying "The corruption of the best is the worst"?

6. Unification and consolidation, 1850–1871.

Assignment forty-nine: The unification of Italy

A. The unification of Italy, 1850–1870.

* *Ketelbey*, 211–231.

- (*a*) Apparent weakness of Italian nationalist cause in 1849.
- (*b*) Piedmont as Italy's one hope.
  - i. Victor Emmanuel II, *il re galantuomo*.
  - ii. Count Camillo Cavour becomes Prime Minister, 1852.
    - (*i*) Diplomatic abilities.
    - (*ii*) Constitutionalism.
    - (*iii*) Economic rehabilitation of Piedmont.
    - (*iv*) Reorganization of army.
    - (*v*) Reduction of clerical power.
    - (*vi*) Cavour as the brain, Mazzini the prophet, and Garibaldi the sword of Italian unification.
    - (*vii*) Realization that only with the aid of some other European country could Italy be united and freed from Austrian domination.
- (*c*) Cavour's Italian policy.
  - i. Literary propaganda in France and England to bring the cause before the consciousness of Europe.
  - ii. Participation in the Crimean War to secure representation as an equal at a European Peace Congress, 1856.
  - iii. Napoleon III becomes interested in the Italian cause: the Orsini plot.
  - iv. The Pact of Plombières, 1858.
    - (*i*) Napoleon consents to an independent but disunited Italy in return for the promise of Nice and Savoy, and a marriage alliance.
    - (*ii*) Cavour accepts the arrangement in order to get France's help in a war with Austria.
    - (*iii*) Making an aggressor of Austria.
  - v. The Austro-Franco-Sardinian War of 1859.
    - (*i*) Defeat of Austrians at Magenta and Solferino.
    - (*ii*) Napoleon calls a halt.
      - *a*. Napoleon's fear of Prussia.
      - *b*. Great French losses.
      - *c*. Napoleon's unwillingness to create a strong, united, ambitious neighbor.
    - (*iii*) Armistice of Villafranca and Treaty of Zurich, 1859.
      - *a*. Piedmont receives Lombardy.
      - *b*. Austria retains Venetia.
      - *c*. Princes who meanwhile had been deposed in the duchies, to be restored.
      - *d*. Pope to become president of an Italian federation.
    - (*iv*) Resignation of Cavour and his return in 1860.
    - (*v*) Treaty of Turin (1860) between Cavour and Napoleon.
      - *a*. Nice and Savoy to France.
      - *b*. Permission to Sardinia to annex Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and Romagna after plebiscites.
      - *c*. No papal federation.

(*d*) Unification by "revolution from the south."
  - i. Dissatisfaction in Naples and Sicily with "Bomba's" policies.
  - ii. Discontent increased by activities of Mazzini, Cavour, Garibaldi, La Farina.
  - iii. Guiseppe Garibaldi, sailor, soldier, patriot, republican.
  - iv. Garibaldi and the Sicilian Revolution of 1860.
    - (*i*) Garibaldi and the Thousand.
    - (*ii*) Garibaldi dictator of Sicily and then of Naples.
  - v. Cavour invades the Papal States to prevent Garibaldi from so doing.
  - vi. Surrender of Garibaldi to Victor Emmanuel.
  - vii. Plebiscites in Sicily, Naples, the Marches, and Umbria favor union with Piedmont.
  - viii. Proclamation of Italian Kingdom, 1861.
    - (*i*) Venetia and Rome still outside the kingdom.
    - (*ii*) Death of Cavour, 1861.

(*e*) Annexation of Venetia (1866) after Seven Weeks' War of Prussia and Italy *vs.* Austria.

(*f*) Annexation of Rome (1870) upon withdrawal of French troops during Franco-Prussian War.

(*g*) The Law of Papal Guarantees, 1871.

QUESTIONS

1. Show how Cavour, Victor Emmanuel II, and Garibaldi each contributed to the unification of Italy.
2. What part did the Papacy play in the unification of Italy, and why?

Assignment fifty: The unification of Germany

B. The Unification of Germany, 1850–1871.

* *Ketelbey*, 231–243; * *Hayes*, II, 186–204.

(*a*) Germanies in 1850.
  - i. Austria still dominant power.
  - ii. Nationalism and democracy defeated.
  - iii. Growing recognition that salvation lay in Prussia.
    - (*i*) Natural guardian against France.
    - (*ii*) Economic leadership: *Zollverein.*
    - (*iii*) Military power.

(*b*) William I, king of Prussia (from 1861) "brave, honest, pious, and practical."

(*c*) Otto von Bismarck, 1815–1898.
  - i. The Bismarcks as Junkers.
  - ii. The landed proprietor.
  - iii. Lutheran and conservative.
  - iv. A "royalist Hotspur" in the Prussian Diet.
  - v. Growing hatred of democracy, and growing pride in Prussia.
  - vi. Prussian Minister at Frankfurt Diet of Confederation, 1851–1859.
    - (*i*) Growing *German* outlook.
    - (*ii*) Dislike of Austria.
    - (*iii*) An opportunist in politics.
  - vii. Minister to St. Petersburg, 1859.
    - (*i*) Friendship with tsar useful in future.

- viii. Minister to Paris, 1862.
  - (*i*) Studied character of Napoleon for future use.
- ix. Prussian Minister-President, 1862.
  - (*i*) New vigor in Prussian policies, domestic and foreign.
  - (*ii*) "Blood and iron."
  - (*iii*) Quarrel with Diet over army appropriations.
  - (*iv*) Building up of army under Roon and Moltke.
  - (*v*) Friendship with Russia during Polish Revolt, 1863.
  - (*vi*) Refusal to attend Congress of Princes in 1863, called by Austria to strengthen Confederation.

(*d*) The process of unification, 1863–1871.

- i. The question of Schleswig-Holstein.
  - (*i*) A conflict between Danish and German nationalism.
  - (*ii*) The Danish War of 1864.
  - (*iii*) Dispute between Prussia and Austria over disposition of the two duchies: Bismarck objects to giving the Diet any say in the matter.
  - (*iv*) Convention of Gastein (1865), a compromise.
    - *a.* Prussia occupies Schleswig, and Austria occupies Holstein.
  - (*v*) The diplomatic situation.
    - *a.* England friendly to Prussia for economic and sentimental reasons.
    - *b.* Russia favorable to Prussia for aid in Polish Revolt of 1863.
    - *c.* France favorable to Prussia for promise of compensations.
    - *d.* Italy favorable to Prussia for Venetia.
    - *e.* Lesser German states favorable to Austria out of fear of Prussian power.
    - *f.* Prussia picks a quarrel in Holstein.
- ii. The Seven Weeks' War, 1866: Prussia and Italy *vs.* Austria and lesser states.
  - (*i*) Battle of Sadowa, 1866.
  - (*ii*) Treaty of Prague, 1866.
    - *a.* Dissolution of Germanic Confederation.
    - *b.* Prussia leader in Germanies.
    - *c.* Venetia to Italy.
  - (*iii*) Annexation of lesser German states to Prussia, 1866.
  - (*iv*) Formation of North German Confederation under Prussia's presidency, 1867–1871.
    - *a.* Independent position of four south German states of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt.
- iii. Bismarck makes a compromise with the Liberals in Prussia.
  - (*i*) Restoration of Constitution.
  - (*ii*) Bill of indemnity.
  - (*iii*) Universal manhood suffrage.
  - (*iv*) Rise of National Liberal Party with principles of German nationalism and support of Bismarck.
- iv. Effect of the war on Austria.
  - (*i*) Out of German and Italian affairs.
  - (*ii*) Establishment of Dual Monarchy through *Ausgleich* of 1867 with Hungary.
- v. Effect of the war on France.
  - (*i*) Napoleon fails to secure compensations.
  - (*ii*) Fear of growing Prussian power.

- (*iii*) International isolation of France.
- (*iv*) French *vs*. German nationalism.
- (*v*) Pretext for war: The Hohenzollern candidacy in Spain; the Ems Dispatch — waving the "red rag before the Gallic bull."

vi. The Franco-Prussian War, 1870–1871.
  - (*i*) Excellent preparation of Prussia and poor preparation of France.
  - (*ii*) Battle of Sedan, September, 1870.
  - (*iii*) Abdication of Napoleon and establishment of "Government of National Defense," or Third Republic.
  - (*iv*) Continuation of war with Third Republic.
    - *a*. Surrender of Paris, 1871.
  - (*v*) Treaty of Frankfurt, 1871.
    - *a*. Alsace and Lorraine to Germany.
    - *b*. Billion-dollar indemnity.
    - *c*. Occupation of northern France.
  - (*vi*) Union of four south German states with North German Confederation, 1870.
  - (*vii*) Proclamation of German Empire at Versailles, 1871: Emperor William I (d. 1888).

QUESTIONS

1. From what disabilities did Prussia suffer in the eyes of other German states in her efforts to promote German unity?

2. What plans, military and diplomatic, did Bismarck lay to lead up to unity?

3. What was the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War for Prussia, other German states, France, the peace of Europe?

VI. GROWING AMERICA

1. The struggle for control.

Assignment fifty-one: The struggle for control

* *Carman,* I, 330–361.
C. A. Beard, *Economic interpretation of the Constitution;* V. L. Parrington, *Main currents of American thought,* I, 267–291; *Beard and Beard,* I, 297–335.

A. Hard times and unrest.
- (*a*) Situation of American manufacturer, 1783–1789.
- (*b*) Plight of American shippers.
- (*c*) American merchant suffers.
- (*d*) Welfare of propertied-business class under Articles of Confederation.
  - i. Propertied-business class dislike radical-controlled governments.
  - ii. Heavy taxes and scarcity of money.
  - iii. Pleas of debtors for relief unheeded.
  - iv. Shays' Rebellion.
  - v. Propertied-business class aspires to political as well as social and economic control.

B. Beginnings of movement for stronger government.
- (*a*) The Annapolis Convention.
- (*b*) The Philadelphia Convention.
  - i. Dominated by propertied-business interests.
- (*c*) Convention drafts new Federal Constitution.
  - i. Little disagreement on great economic questions.
  - ii. Lack of unanimity on structure of government.
- (*d*) Framework of new government.
  - i. System of checks and balances devised as barrier to political domination by common people.
- (*e*) The hostile groups: Federalists and Anti-Federalists.
  - i. Economic foundation of government according to *The Federalist.*
  - ii. Principal Anti-Federalist objections to the Constitution.
- (*f*) Vote on ratification of Constitution followed economic lines.

QUESTIONS

1. Were the American shippers helped or harmed by the attainment of American independence?

2. What were the social-economic groups which were satisfied or dissatisfied with the government under the Articles of Confederation?

3. Show how the economic grievances of the propertied-business class were corrected by the Constitution?

4. What were the arguments advanced in favor of the Constituion and what reasons were offered for its rejection?

5. Did the vote on the Constitution indicate a close conformity between material welfare and acceptance or rejection of the Constitution? Analyze the vote throughout the thirteen states.

* *Carman*, I, 361–400.

C. The new government controlled by propertied-business men.
- (*a*) Propertied-business men realize necessity of controlling new government.
- (*b*) Anti-Federalists fear Constitution as instrument of class control.
- (*c*) Personnel of first government overwhelmingly Federal.
- (*d*) Constitution floated in on wave of prosperity.

D. The Hamiltonian program.
- (*a*) First Report on the Public Credit.
- (*b*) Report on National Bank.
  - i. Opposition to Hamilton's funding scheme.
  - ii. Opposition to assumption of state debts.
- (*c*) Establishment of National Bank and mint.
- (*d*) Agrarian opposition.
  - i. The Whisky Rebellion.
  - ii. Opposition to protective tariff.
- (*e*) Adoption of Hamiltonian program climax to aspirations of propertied-business class.

E. The agrarian challenge.
- (*a*) Agrarian complaints.
- (*b*) Influence of the French Revolution.
  - i. Rank and file of America enthusiastic over French Revolution.
  - ii. Hatred of Hamiltonians for French Revolution.

F. Foreign affairs.
- (*a*) French activities.
- (*b*) The Jay Treaty.
- (*c*) Further difficulties with France.

G. Alien and Sedition Acts.

H. Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.

I. Thomas Jefferson and his philosophy.

J. Agrarian victory of 1800.
- (*a*) Agrarians thwarted by John Marshall.
- (*b*) Jeffersonians unable to uproot capitalism.

QUESTIONS

1. Why should the friends of the Constitution desire to control the new government?

2. Did the Hamiltonian program fully protect the interests of the propertied-business class?

3. What is your explanation of the stout agrarian opposition to the measures of the new government?

4. Do you approve of the attitude of the United States government toward France in 1793?

5. Were the differences of the United States with England corrected by the Jay Treaty?

6. What is your opinion of the logic of the Alien and Sedition Acts?

2. The turn of the century.

Assignment fifty-three: Social and cultural life about 1800

* *Carman*, I, 401–440.

A. The social order.
  - (*a*) Character of population.
    - i. Population overwhelmingly rural.
  - (*b*) Poor communications.
    - i. Postal service hampered by poor transportation.
  - (*c*) Unchanged character of towns.
    - i. Occupations of townsmen.
  - (*d*) Social classes.
    - i. Place of woman in the social structure.
    - ii. Social life of higher classes.
    - iii. Amusements of lower classes.

B. Religion and humanitarianism.
  - (*a*) Outwardly religious scene in America unchanged.
    - i. Denominations decidedly unorthodox.
    - ii. Religious groups makers and conservers of morals.
    - iii. Religion and the state.
  - (*b*) Old World intellectual currents undermining religious orthodoxy.
    - i. Deism and its spread to America.
    - ii. The Unitarian revolt.
    - iii. Methodism.
  - (*c*) The clergy and humanitarianism.
    - i. Prison reform.
    - ii. The poor and unfortunate.
    - iii. The blind and the deaf and dumb.
    - iv. Treatment of the insane.

C. Science and invention.
  - (*a*) The new science.
    - i. America aware of Old World scientific movement.
  - (*b*) Philadelphia America's scientific center.
  - (*c*) Scientific workers outside of Philadelphia.
  - (*d*) Science and agriculture.
  - (*e*) Invention and engineering.

D. The professions.
  - (*a*) Backwardness of medical science in 1800.
    - i. Ignorance of cause and cure of disease.
    - ii. Credulity and superstition.
    - iii. Patent medicines.
    - iv. Epidemics.
  - (*b*) Efforts to improve medical profession.
  - (*c*) Surgery and dentistry.
  - (*d*) Pharmacies.
  - (*e*) Hospitals and dispensaries.
  - (*f*) The legal profession in America.
    - i. Its status prior to Revolution.
    - ii. Subsequent unpopularity.

        iii. Early legal training.
        iv. Law schools.
        v. Bar associations and legal periodicals.

QUESTIONS

1. Contrast the society of the United States in 1800 with what it had been prior to the Revolution.
2. Did America feel the impact of European religious changes?
3. Was the science of America more or less advanced than that of Europe?
4. Of what importance were the professions of America at the turn of the century?

E. Literature and journalism.

Assignment fifty-four: Social and cultural life about 1800 — Continued

* *Carman*, I, 440–497.

- (*a*) Literary atmosphere in America in 1800.
- (*b*) Dramatic satire during Revolution.
- (*c*) Opposition to theater at close of Revolution.
- (*d*) Dramas and dramatists at the turn of the century.
    - i. Royall Tyler.
    - ii. William Dunlap.
    - iii. James N. Barker.
    - iv. Mordecai M. Noah.
    - v. John Howard Payne.
- (*e*) The novel and its pioneers.
    - i. Royall Tyler.
    - ii. Hugh H. Brackenridge.
    - iii. Charles Brockden Brown.
- (*f*) Poetry of early Republic.
    - i. The Hartford wits.
    - ii. Anti-Jeffersonian poetasters.
    - iii. Philip Freneau.
    - iv. Joel Barlow.
    - v. William Cullen Bryant.
- (*g*) Newspapers.
- (*h*) Magazines and their character.

F. The arts.

- (*a*) Noted painters of aristocratic leanings: West, Copley, Stuart.
- (*b*) Charles Wilson Peale.
- (*c*) The Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts.
- (*d*) John Trumbull.
- (*e*) Washington Allston and John Vanderlyn.
- (*f*) Architecture.
    - i. Classical influence.
- (*g*) Town and city planning.
- (*h*) Early Republic without sculpture of its own.
- (*i*) American music foreign in origin.
    - i. Patriotic songs.
    - ii. Concerts increase in numbers.

- (*j*) Etching and engraving.
- (*k*) The industrial arts.

G. Education.

- (*a*) Benjamin Rush's proposal.
- (*b*) Efforts fail to establish a system of national education.
- (*c*) Character of institutions of higher learning in 1800.
  - i. The typical college curriculum.
  - ii. Jefferson's educational scheme.
  - iii. Other colleges where liberalism gained foothold.
- (*d*) Secondary and elementary education influenced by Old World.
  - i. The academies.
  - ii. Lack of universal elementary education.
  - iii. The Sunday school.
  - iv. The monitorial school.
  - v. The infant school.
  - vi. The district school.
- (*e*) Textbooks.
- (*f*) New concept of women's education.
- (*g*) Libraries.

QUESTIONS

1. Do you consider the dramas of the early Republic manifestations of the American milieu or borrowings from Europe?
2. What is your evaluation of their poetry?
3. What was the nature chiefly of painting? How meritorious was it?
4. Did the education of the period conform with the ideals of a democracy?

3. Two generations of western frontiersmen.

Assignment fifty-five: Two generations of western frontiersmen

* *Carman*, I, 499–539.

F. J. Turner, *The frontier in American history;* Paxson, *History of the American frontier*, chs. 1–48; V. L. Parrington, *Main currents of American thought*, I, 391–542.

A. Character and importance of West.

B. Beginning of westward movement.

- (*a*) Motives.

C. Settlement of the "Old West" and the conquest of the "New."

- (*a*) The coming of the Germans.
- (*b*) The Scotch-Irish.
- (*c*) Peopling the Shenandoah valley.
- (*d*) The Revolution and the Trans-Allegheny country.
- (*e*) George Rogers Clark and the conquest of the Northwest.

D. The migration to the Trans-Allegheny.

- (*a*) Migration westward governed by economic conditions.
- (*b*) Four great waves of migration westward before 1840.
  - i. Post-Revolutionary years.
  - ii. Opening years of nineteenth century.

        - iii. War of 1812 and Panic of 1819.
        - iv. Years following Panic of 1837.
    - (*c*) Sources of population of western settlements.
    - (*d*) Methods of getting west.
    - (*e*) Routes of migration.
    - (*f*) Cost of reaching the West.
    - (*g*) Three classes of frontiersmen.
        - i. The genuine pioneer.
        - ii. The pioneer farmer.
        - iii. The permanent settler.

E. Frontier problems.
- (*a*) Indian relations.
- (*b*) Land titles.
- (*c*) Currency and credit.
- (*d*) Adequate markets.
- (*e*) Purchase of Louisiana an outgrowth of frontier difficulties.

QUESTIONS

1. Were the motives which carried the settlers to the lands west of the Alleghenies different from those which induced migrants to leave the Old World for the New during the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries?

2. Did eastern conditions regulate the rate of speed of western settlement?

3. What were the manifestations of western problems in national politics?

4. Do you believe that the importance of the frontier in the evolution of the United States has been exaggerated?

5. Explain the Louisiana Purchase as a result of the expansion policies of the United States, France, and Spain.

Assignment fifty-six: Two generations of western frontiersmen — Continued

* *Carman*, I, 539–573.

F. Frontier imperialism. West Florida claimed by United States as a part of Louisiana Purchase.
- (*a*) The United States takes possession of the Floridas.
- (*b*) Frontier imperialism in the North.
- (*c*) War of 1812 outgrowth of Napoleonic Wars.
    - i. British Orders in Council and French retaliatory decrees.
    - ii. Effect of strangulation policies on American commerce.
    - iii. The British practice of impressment.
    - iv. The Chesapeake-Leopard affair.
    - v. Peaceable coercion.
        - (*i*) The Embargo Act of 1807.
        - (*ii*) Embargo gives way to non-intercourse.
    - vi. Frontier West and planting South demand war.
        - (*i*) War party controlling Twelfth Congress a frontier party.
        - (*ii*) Reasons of frontier desire for war.

- vii. War declared against Great Britain.
  - (*i*) The war.
    - *a.* War party divided as to aims and methods.
    - *b.* Sectional opposition to war.
    - *c.* The Hartford Convention, 1814.
  - (*ii*) The Treaty of Ghent.
- viii. The acquisition of Florida.

G. Western ideals and western culture.
- (*a*) Western temperament and ideals.
- (*b*) Western social life.
- (*c*) Western political ideas.
- (*d*) Western education.
- (*e*) Literature of the West.
- (*f*) Songs and verse.
- (*g*) Religion in the West.
  - i. Roman Catholicism in West.
  - ii. Protestant sects most active in West.

H. Influence of West on East.
- (*a*) Economic influence.
- (*b*) Political influence.
- (*c*) Effect of finer and nobler aspects of western life upon the East.

QUESTIONS

1. In which direction or directions pointed the imperialistic aims of the United States?
2. Were the European wars a benefit or a detriment to United States commerce?
3. How would you distinguish between the occasion and the cause of the War of 1812?
4. Was the war heartily supported by all sections of the country? Can you connect their economic welfare with their conduct?
5. Did western life modify the society of the East?

4. The rise of the industrial revolution.

Assignment fifty-seven: The rise of the industrial revolution

Carman, II (pages to be assigned).

Assignment fifty-eight: The rise of the industrial revolution — Continued

* *Carman*, II (pages to be assigned).
Victor Selden Clark, *History of manufacturers in the United States, 1607–1860*, chs. 11–20; *Beard*, I, 628–649; Channing, *History of the United States*, V, chs. 1–4.

A. The manufacturers of the United States in 1790.
- (*a*) Hamilton's report.
- (*b*) Manufacturing methods.
- (*c*) Raw materials and markets.

B. The industrial revolution in Britain.

C. Transference of the factory system to America.
  - (*a*) Efforts of Britain to monopolize new inventions.
  - (*b*) Organization of societies in America for promoting manufactures.
  - (*c*) Early pioneers.
    - i. Samuel Slater and others.
  - (*d*) Stimulation of American manufactures by War of 1812.

D. The development of the factory system, 1820–1840.
  - (*a*) Reasons.
  - (*b*) Evidence.

E. Effect of industrial revolution on society.
  - (*a*) The rise of the factory owner.
    - i. Profits — protective tariff.
    - ii. Position in community.
  - (*b*) The factory worker.
    - i. Source.
    - ii. Disadvantageous position.
  - (*c*) Inception of labor movement.
    - i. Labor organization.
    - ii. Labor in politics.
    - iii. Accomplishments.
  - (*d*) Industrial revolution and sectionalism.

QUESTIONS

1. What forces operated to develop factories in the United States during the Revolution?

2. What was the history of trade and industry immediately after the Revolution?

3. Discuss tariff and industry in the early history of the United States. Compare the present situation with the earlier times.

4. What status did the worker have in the early factory development in the United States? Compare this with the status in England. Account for the differences.

5. Give a sketch of the early labor movement.

5. Merchants and shippers.

Assignment fifty-nine: Merchants and shippers

Carman, II (pages to be assigned).

Assignment sixty: Merchants and shippers — Continued

* *Carman*, II (pages to be assigned).
S. E. Morrison, *Maritime history of Massachusetts;* Faulkner, *American economic history*, chs. 11, 13, 14.

A. Domestic commerce, 1790–1860.
  - (*a*) Centers.
  - (*b*) Transportation agencies and their effect.
    - i. Roads and turnpikes.
    - ii. Canals, rivers, and seaboard.
    - iii. Railroads.
    - iv. Express.

- (*c*) Financial and monetary situation.
    - i. Financial laws of new government.
    - ii. Currency and banking.
    - iii. Panics: 1819, 1837, 1857.
- (*d*) Effect of westward expansion and growth in population.

B. Foreign commerce, 1790–1860.
- (*a*) Rapid growth, 1789–1810.
- (*b*) Unfavorable effects of War of 1812.
- (*c*) Second period of rapid growth and prosperity, 1820–1860.
- (*d*) Period of overproduction in shipbuilding and gradual decline, 1830–1860.
- (*e*) Extent and character of foreign commerce, 1860.

C. Relation of government to merchant and shipper.
- (*a*) Extent of subsidization.

QUESTIONS

1. What were the early centers of trade in the United States? Why were there centers?
2. Give an account of the development of transportation by water in the United States.
3. What has been the history of our foreign commerce? What factors increased it, and when, and what factors decreased it, and when?
4. How did the government aid commerce and transportation?

6. Pioneers and the Trans-Mississippi.

Assignment sixty-one: Pioneers and the Trans-Mississippi

Carman, II (pages to be assigned).

Assignment sixty-two: Pioneers and the Trans-Mississippi — Continued

* *Carman*, II (pages to be assigned).
Alan Nevins, *Frémont; Beard*, I, 581–627; M. L. Werner, *Brigham Young*.

A. The vanguard.
- (*a*) Early settlers in lower Louisiana.
- (*b*) Acquisition of Louisiana.
    - i. Lewis and Clark Expedition.
    - ii. Other explorations.

B. The fur trade.
- (*a*) Its importance.
- (*b*) The fur companies.
    - i. British.
    - ii. American.
        - (*i*) John Jacob Astor.
    - iii. Social aspects of fur industry.

C. The Middle Border moves westward.
- (*a*) Louisiana.
- (*b*) Missouri.

- (*c*) Arkansas.
- (*d*) Michigan.
- (*e*) Wisconsin.
- (*f*) Iowa.
- (*g*) Minnesota.

D. Texas and the Southwest.
- (*a*) Americans penetrate Texas.
- (*b*) Texas revolts and establishes independence.
- (*c*) Annexation of Texas.
- (*d*) Spanish mercantilism and American interest in New Mexico and California.
  - i. Santa Fe trade.
  - ii. American traders in California.
- (*e*) The Mexican War and the acquisition of the Southwest.
- (*f*) The Gadsden Purchase.
- (*g*) The migration to California.

E. Oregon and the Northwest.
- (*a*) Early claims to Oregon.
- (*b*) Basis of American claims.
- (*c*) Joint occupation.
- (*d*) Settlement of Oregon.

F. The Mormons and the State of Deseret.

G. The significance of the Trans-Mississippi.

QUESTIONS

1. Why was the Lewis and Clark Expedition important?
2. What service did the fur trade perform in the development of the nation?
3. What is meant by the "Middle Border"? When and how did it move?
4. What was the history of Spanish development of the Southwest?
5. Give an account of the American penetration and annexation of Texas.
6. What is the Mormon faith? What was the course of the Mormons to Utah? What was their economic success? To what due?
7. What is the significance of "free land and open country" for the United States? What is the status of these elements now?

7. Democratic vistas.

Assignment sixty-three: Democratic vistas

Carman, II (pages to be assigned).

Assignment sixty-four: Democratic vistas — Continued

* *Carman*, II (pages to be assigned).
Outline and questions to be provided by instructor.

8. The growth of sectional rivalry.

Assignment sixty-five: The growth of sectional rivalry

Carman, II (pages to be assigned).

Assignment sixty-six: The growth of sectional rivalry — Continued

* *Carman*, II (pages to be assigned).
Channing, *History of the United States*, VI, 1–227; Allen Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas;* W. E. Barton, *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, I; Parrington, *Main currents of American thought*, II, 350–378.

A. America — a federation of sections.
  (*a*) Basis of sectionalism.

B. Economic basis of sectionalism.
  (*a*) The diversified industrial North.
    i. The growth of manufactures.
    ii. Patents an index to industrial growth.
    iii. The distribution of manufactures.
    iv. Leading manufactures of Atlantic coast mill belt.
    v. Capital invested in manufactures.
    vi. Manufacturing products.
  (*b*) Other sources of northern wealth.
    i. Mining.
    ii. Commerce.
    iii. Banking.
    iv. Agriculture.
    v. Population.
  (*c*) The planting kingdom.
    i. The cotton kingdom.
    ii. The sugar industry.
    iii. Tobacco.
    iv. Hemp.
    v. Rice.
    vi. Other southern products.
  (*d*) Economic dependence of the South.
    i. A cause of sectional rivalry.
  (*e*) Causes of southern dependence.
    i. Unequal operation of Federal legislation.
    ii. Undiversified agriculture.

C. Program of advocates of southern industrialism.
  (*a*) Manufactures.
  (*b*) Direct trade.
  (*c*) Railroads to link the West and the South.
  (*d*) Establishment of better banking and credit facilities.
  (*e*) Diversified agriculture.
  (*f*) Meager results of industrial diversification.
  (*g*) Slavery principal cause for non-diversification of industry.

D. Slavery and sectional rivalry.
  (*a*) Importance of slavery in colonial America.
    i. Attitude of colonists toward slavery.

- (*b*) Reaction against slavery during Revolutionary period.
    - i. Contrary to Revolutionary doctrines.
    - ii. Growing unprofitableness in sections.
    - iii. Comparative industrial unimportance in North.
    - iv. Opposition of white labor.
    - v. Oppostion on moral grounds.
- (*c*) Early manifestations of sectionalism caused by slavery.
    - i. Draft of Declaration of Independence.
    - ii. The vote on Jefferson's Ordinance in 1784.
    - iii. Debates in the Constitutional Convention.
    - iv. The Constitutional compromise.
    - v. The struggle for ratification of the Constitution.
    - vi. Antislavery petitions in early sessions of Congress.
- (*d*) Slavery declines in the North.
- (*e*) Conditions undermining slavery in the South, 1780–1790.
- (*f*) Invention of cotton gin and introduction of short staple cotton revolutionizes slave system.
- (*g*) South defends slavery as a positive good.
    - i. On historical grounds.
    - ii. Scriptural authority.
    - iii. On basis of natural order.
    - iv. Economically profitable.
    - v. Socially beneficial to whites.
    - vi. Beneficial to negroes.
    - vii. On national grounds.
- (*h*) Certain northern business interests defend slavery.
- (*i*) Antislavery sentiment increases.
    - i. Early church action.
    - ii. Abolition societies organized.
    - iii. Colonization schemes.
    - iv. William Lloyd Garrison and uncompromising abolition.
        - (*i*) Northern opposition to Garrisonian abolitionism.
        - (*ii*) Southern opposition to Garrisonian abolitionism.
    - v. Abolition gains ground.
- (*j*) Effect of the antislavery movement on sectionalism.

E. The sectional struggle for territory.

- (*a*) The South and territorial expansion.
- (*b*) The two frontiers: free and slave.
- (*c*) The struggle for control of Missouri.
    - i. The sectional debate.
    - ii. The Missouri Compromise.
- (*d*) Annexation of Texas, the Mexican cession, and slavery.
- (*e*) The Wilmot Proviso.
    - i. Effect of Proviso on sectionalism.
- (*f*) The sectional struggle precipitates a national crisis.
- (*g*) Proposed solutions.
- (*h*) The Compromise of 1850.
    - i. The great debate.
        - (*i*) Clay.
        - (*ii*) Calhoun.
        - (*iii*) Webster.
        - (*iv*) Seward and Chase.

        - ii. Compromise adopted.
    - (*i*) Its acceptance by the country.
        - i. The Fugitive Slave Act and renewal of sectional strife.
        - ii. Efforts of Slavocracy to expand southward.
            - (*i*) Cuba and the Ostend Manifesto.
            - (*ii*) Buchanan and tropical expansion.
    - (*j*) Kansas-Nebraska Act.
        - i. Motives for Kansas-Nebraska Act.
            - (*i*) Project for transcontinental railway and sectional rivalry.
        - ii. Effect of the act.
    - (*k*) The Dred Scott Case.
        - i. The decision of the Supreme Court.
        - ii. Its effect on sectionalism.
    - (*l*) John Brown's raid.
        - i. Attack on Harper's Ferry.
        - ii. The sectional aftermath.
    - (*m*) Sectional propaganda.
        - i. *Uncle Tom's cabin.*
        - ii. Helper's *Impending crisis.*
        - iii. Southern propaganda.

QUESTIONS

1. How integrated is the United States in type of economic activity, soil, climate, speech, customs? Show how these factors play a part in the development of sectionalism, and show in particular how they functioned in the period leading up to the Civil War.
2. Sketch the pre-Civil War industrial development of the South. What is the status of the South in industry now?
3. What caused slavery to decline in the North?
4. Was slavery an economic good in the South?
5. Give the steps in the history of the sectional struggle for territory.

VII. THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

1. Political, social, and economic history since 1871.

Second Semester

Assignment one: Great Britain, political development

* *Hayes*, II, 277–307.
Cambridge modern history, XII, ch. 22. (Contains an excellent summary of the social movements of this period by Sidney Webb.)

We come now to what may quite accurately be termed the modern phase of European history. Although all attempts to divide history into distinct periods must be more or less arbitrary, there is considerable justification for the choice of the year 1871 as marking the genesis of a new era. In the first place, most of the nations of Europe, with the exception of those in the Balkan peninsula, had by that date assumed the geographical and political forms which were to be maintained practically unaltered until the outbreak of the World War in 1914. Thus, we see that in 1867 the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary was created; in the same year, Great Britain took an important step in the direction of political democracy with the extension of the franchise to workingmen; in 1870, the unification of the Italian Kingdom was completed; in 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed, and the Third Republic of France was established. Turning to the United States, we find that, with the close of the Civil War in 1865, the supremacy of the Federal Union was definitely established and a new consciousness of national unity emerged. Side by side with nationalism went the doctrine of popular control. Everywhere, even in distant Japan, written constitutions were secured and popularly chosen legislative bodies came to exercise a large share in the control of governments.

In the second place, the United States and most of western Europe had by 1871 felt the impact of the industrial revolution and seen the rise of the social problems which inevitably follow in its wake.

This was the period in which the bourgeoisie came into its own. The industrial revolution had now touched, to a greater or less degree, every country of the West. With it there emerged a group of wealthy and powerful business men. Men in a single lifetime rose from poverty to fabulous riches. Vast businesses, with interests ramifying to the remotest corners of the world, came into being in a decade. The oil, the automobile, the rubber, the motion picture industries, are all quite new in this period. Older industries, such as iron and steel, railroads, or meat packing, went through transformations as amazing as they were rapid. The leaders of these great enterprises could not be denied political and social recognition. The bulk of the legislation of the period was in the interest of the middle class — the merchants, the traders, the "captains of industry." The paltry wealth of the older landed aristocracy looked like poverty itself by comparison. The existing titled aristocrats were eclipsed or absorbed by the new meat and soap barons. In the early days of the commercial and industrial revolutions, the nobility had been jealous and contemptuous of the upstarts. During this period the two became one. The peasants tended to sink to a state of tenancy and dependency. The artisans, though in part encouraged by the occasional rise of an individual from their midst to become an industrial magnate, began more and more to feel a consciousness of social solidarity among themselves. But both peasants and artisans shared the current philosophy that it was the chief aim of national patriotism to promote business prosperity. True, in the first instance, this meant the enrichment of the bourgeois capitalist. But it was confidently assumed that his prosperity would radiate to all other classes in society.

In the third place, the nations of Europe, having achieved a degree of domestic stability, began to turn their attention outward, and we see during the decade 1870–1880 the initiation of a new imperialistic expansion fraught with grave consequences for the peace of the world.

Other significant characteristics of the period were: (1) legislation directed to the promotion of trade and industry — a kind of "neo-mercantilism"; (2) the rise of militarism; (3) the development of free, public, secular education; (4) the rapid advance of the physical sciences.

Two protests against bourgeois ascendancy need also to be recorded. The first came from the Catholic church in those countries where it had been the state church and where for many reasons it was in process of being disestablished. The church became the vigorous opponent of nationalism and constitutionalism, as well as of the materialistic and free-thinking tendencies of the age. It was met by an equally vigorous anticlerical movement throughout western Europe, with the forces of democracy and nationalism generally arrayed against the church. The second challenge to bourgeois ascendancy took the form of opposition to *laissez faire* and a demand for either socialism or social control. The growth of socialist parties throughout Europe during this period was rapid and significant and, though international socialism was badly disrupted by the World War, it found itself thereafter stronger than ever. Scarcely a country in Europe has not had at least one socialist ministry since the war.

A. Domestic problems and external influences.

In this section we take up in some detail the domestic history of the leading European nations and the United States. Because of the limitations of time, it is impossible to attempt a survey of the entire western world for this period. Thus, we are forced to ignore the developments taking place in many of the lesser European countries and in those of Central and South America. With the mental reservation that our survey emphasizes what seems essential and attempts a selection of events, we turn now to the study of those nations which seem most important for our purposes. In this study our attention will be focused chiefly upon the social factors enumerated in the preceding introductory section.

(*a*) Great Britain.

* *Hayes*, II, 277-307.

So much of the history of the period since 1871 is a history of things British that it may seem strange to allot so small a section to the domestic problems of the United Kingdom. In our earlier readings, however, we have examined in some detail the story of the industrial revolution in England and seen the consequences of this economic phenomenon. For this reason it is unnecessary to emphasize again this aspect of the English domestic scene. The history of the industrial revolution there after 1871 is largely the following out of tendencies already well established, with perhaps special emphasis on integration of industry and concentration of wealth. The social responsibilities of the new economic order had already been acknowledged in part; the remainder of the century merely sought out further implications. The expansion of the suffrage by the Acts of 1867 and 1884 was destined to have a profound influence on the social politics of the country in ways not always immediately perceptible and in some cases not apparent to this day. It is a period not of revolution but of maturation of the results of the earlier revolution. It was this process — by no means complete — which the World War interrupted.

- i. Changes in political structure.
  - (*i*) Enfranchisement of middle class: Reform Bill of 1832.
  - (*ii*) Enfranchisement of town dwellers: Reform Act of 1867.
  - (*iii*) Liberation of the voter: Ballot Act of 1872.
  - (*iv*) Enfranchisement of rural workers: Representation of the People Act of 1884.
  - (*v*) Equal electoral districts: Acts of 1885 and 1918.
  - (*vi*) Removal of effective veto of House of Lords: Parliament Act of 1911.
  - (*vii*) Enfranchisement of women: Acts of 1918 and 1928.
- ii. Peculiarities of English Constitution.
  - (*i*) Absence of a written constitution.
    - *a*. Omnicompetence of Parliament.
    - *b*. English courts only administer laws, and are not concerned with their validity.
  - (*ii*) Responsibility of the Cabinet to Parliament.
    - *a*. Permanency of the Civil Service.
    - *b*. Parliamentary heads of the various departments alone retire when cabinet changes.
  - (*iii*) Little local autonomy.
- iii. Party organization.
  - (*i*) Conservatives: favor tariff, vigorous foreign policy.
  - (*ii*) Liberals: favor free trade, *laissez faire* — recently modified by program of social reform.
  - (*iii*) Labor Party: favors nationalization of certain key industries and steeply graduated income tax, and leans somewhat toward protection.
    - *a*. Strength of trade unions.
    - *b*. Breakdown of *laissez faire* and increased social consciousness.

QUESTIONS

1. To what extent was the growth of democracy in Great Britain due to changes in economic structure?

2. Consider what advantages in the sphere of social legislation England possesses, in contrast with the United States, through the absence of a written constitution and the omnicompetence of Parliament.

3. Discuss the merits and demerits of a permanent Civil Service such as England possesses, making comparisons with the United States where possible.

4. Do you think that the emergence of a third party, strongly antagonistic to the present social scheme, is a grave threat to English constitutionalism?

5. Consider how far English local government is a wise settlement of the problem of diversity in unity. Is English experience here relevant to the problems of the United States?

Assignment two: Great Britain, economic development

* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel,* 499–524, or Ogg and Sharp, *Economic development of modern Europe,* revised edition, 1926, pages 146–149, 152–176.

- iv. Industrial growth.
  - (*i*) Industrial supremacy.
    - *a.* Early industrial revolution.
    - *b.* Geographical and climatic advantages.
  - (*ii*) The growth of competition.
    - *a.* Lack of adaptability.
    - *b.* Costs of production.
    - *c.* Foreign tariffs.
  - (*iii*) Dependence on staple industries.
    - *a.* Cotton.
    - *b.* Wool.
    - *c.* Extractive industries.
  - (*iv*) The development of means of communication
    - *a.* Increase and improvement of roads.
    - *b.* Rapid development of railways.
    - *c.* Iron and steel ships.
  - (*v*) Industrial crises.
    - *a.* Misdirected production.
    - *b.* Conditions abroad.
  - (*vi*) The worker and social legislation.
    - *a.* Legal rights of worker.
    - *b.* Industrial unionism.
    - *c.* Labor in politics.
    - *d.* Old-age pensions.
    - *e.* Unemployment insurance.
  - (*vii*) Contemporary difficulties.
    - *a.* Unemployment.
    - *b.* Strikes.
      - 1. Industrial.
      - 2. The general strike.
    - *c.* Population problems.
    - *d.* The need for rationalization.
    - *e.* New theories of the state and industry.
  - (*viii*) Industry and empire.
    - *a.* The character of present trade.
    - *b.* Excess of imports over exports.
    - *c.* The export of capital.
    - *d.* The growth of native industries.
    - *e.* Possibilities of European trade.

QUESTIONS

1. Do you consider that in the long run England's early, undisputed industrial supremacy has proved advantageous to her?

2. Taking England as an example, do you find that reliance by a nation on a few

staple industries and a vast carrying trade is dangerous to its own well-being? Compare and contrast with the United States today.

3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the entry of organized labor into the political sphere, as shown in modern British experience? Do you think that some form of socialism would provide a solution for the present-day difficulties of England?

4. Explain how the growth of British dominions and colonies has aggravated England's economic problems at home. Are there any analogies in recent experiences of the United States?

5. To what extent could England solve her economic problems by adopting American methods of production and distribution? What factors work against the adoption of such a course?

v. Agricultural development.

Assignment three: Great Britain, economic development, agriculture

* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel*, 439–456.

(*i*) Science in agriculture.
  a. Fertilizers.
  b. Farm machinery.
(*ii*) The agricultural depression.
  a. Crop failures.
  b. Diseases of live stock.
  c. Foreign competition.
  d. Decline in acreage.
(*iii*) Rural depopulation.
  a. Extent.
  b. Proposed remedies.
(*iv*) Size of holdings.
  a. The large estate.
  b. Allotments.
  c. The small holdings movement.
(*v*) The possibilities of betterment.
  a. Agricultural education.
  b. Organization of workers.
  c. Agricultural coöperation.
  d. Protection.
  e. Land nationalization.

QUESTIONS

1. Do you think that a strong agriculture is desirable, necessary, or possible for England? In the light of your answer estimate the gravity of rural depopulation and the value of schemes of land settlement.

2. In the light of foreign competition, what form and scale do you think English agriculture should take? Would protection be a valuable asset to the British farmer?

3. Would either agricultural coöperation or land nationalization help to improve the position of the farmer or farming in England? Would either of these solutions be applicable to the farm problem in this country?

4. Compare the size and type of farms in England and the United States. How do such differences as you find affect the problem of applying science to agriculture?

5. Why is organized labor so much weaker in farming than in industry in England? Consider what would be the results, economic, social, and political, of a strongly developed trades union system in agriculture.

(*b*) France.

Assignment four: France, political development

* *Hayes*, II, 331–367.

A. L. Guirard, *French civilization in the nineteenth century*, especially the later chapters giving an account of life in France during this period.

We take up the thread of French history in this section at the close of the disastrous Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, which brought about the downfall of Napoleon III. The Second Empire, which had started off so brilliantly in 1852, ended abruptly after the Battle of Sedan with the abdication of Napoleon III. For several months thereafter the French people strove valiantly to carry on the war against Prussia, but, after the fall of Paris in 1871, they were forced to accept humiliating terms of peace. Besides a huge war indemnity, these terms included the cession to the newly created German Empire of the valuable provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

As a result of this defeat France lost her commanding position among the nations of Europe. In fact, it appeared for a time as though she would be reduced permanently to the status of a second or third rate power. The rapid economic recovery of the nation after the close of the war, however, surprised the whole world, and within two decades France was recognized once more as a power of first rank in European affairs.

i. Political history, 1871–1914.

* *Hayes*, II, 331–367.

(*i*) The formation of the Third Republic.
  a. Monarchical character of National Assembly, 1871–1875.
  b. Suppression of the Paris Commune.
  c. "Constitutional Laws" of 1875; triumph of republicanism.
(*ii*) French government and political parties.
  a. Supremacy of the Parliament.
  b. Subordinate position of President.
  c. Highly centralized internal administration.
  d. Absence of strong political parties; bloc system; continuity of policy maintained despite constant change of ministries.
(*iii*) Rise of anticlericalism.
  a. Republican hostility to church because clerical party supported the monarchists.

    - *b*. State education provided to offset influence of church schools; Ferry laws.
    - *c*. Republican and anticlerical sentiment, increased as a result of Boulanger episode, 1887, and Dreyfus case, 1897–1905.
    - *d*. Laws against religious propaganda orders; Associations Act, 1901.
    - *e*. Separation of church and state, 1905.
- (*iv*) Labor legislation.
    - *a*. Recognition of unions, 1884.
    - *b*. Code of protective labor laws, 1892–1893.
    - *c*. Workmen's compensation, 1898.
    - *d*. Old-age pensions, 1911.
- (*v*) Growth of imperialism and militarism.
    - *a*. Reorganization of army after Franco-Prussian War; universal military service.
    - *b*. Fortifications of eastern frontier; building up of navy.
    - *c*. Vigorous expansionist policy in Africa and Indo-China.
    - *d*. Desire for ***revanche*** against Germany and recovery of Alsace-Lorraine.

QUESTIONS

1. Judging from the history of the Third Republic, do you think that the accurate representation of varying opinions in the country through many parties is adequate compensation for the instability of governments?

2. Does French experience in the latter part of the nineteenth century teach us anything as to the best relations of church and state? Compare the political influence of religious bodies in France with that in the United States.

3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of having a weak president, as in France, against a powerful one, as in the United States? What services does such a president perform, and would they not be carried out more usefully by an hereditary monarch, as in England?

4. Estimate the results of governmental centralization in France on the life of the people, socially and economically? Do you think that the reverse tendency, at present at work, would bring any significant gains?

5. What causes and influences lay behind French imperialism and militarism between the Franco-Prussian and the World War? Do you think such developments were necessary or profitable?

(*b*) France — *Continued.*

Assignment five: France, economic development

* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel*, 579–594.

The industrial revolution took place in France much later than in England, and the process of transition was much more gradual throughout. There were many factors tending to retard France's industrial development. French production of coal was inadequate for the development of iron and steel industries. During the first half of the nineteenth century the entire French output of coal was considerably smaller than that of Belgium. France also lacked a landless urban proletariat from which industrial wage workers might be recruited. The total population grew slowly, and the shift of population from country to town was very gradual. In 1801, 6.75 per cent of the total population lived in towns of twenty thousand inhabitants or more. In 1851 the corresponding figure was just over 10.5 per cent. The tendency for the population to remain predominantly agricultural and rural was strengthened by the emancipation of the peasants as a result of the Revolution, as well as by the French laws of inheritance, which provided for the equal division of property amongst all the direct heirs. Consequently, France remained a country of small peasant proprietorships, and the small agriculturalists were not driven from the soil as they were in England by the process of enclosures and the growth of large estates. France was also economically demoralized by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, from which she did not recover fully until the second quarter of the nineteenth century.



Data from Statesman's Yearbook.

Rural and urban population in France.

The French industrial centers were less advantageously situated in relation to the seaboard than those of England. As a result, the industrialization of France had to wait upon the development of an adequate system of railroad transportation, which did not appear until after the middle of the nineteenth century. The introduction of machinery from England was retarded by the British prohibitions against the exportation of machines, which remained in effect until 1825. Furthermore, England, with high-priced labor and cheap fuel, had a much greater incentive for the introduction of machinery than did France, with her cheap labor and dear fuel. Consequently the use of machines developed slowly in France, despite Napoleon's efforts to subsidize inventors.

As a result of these conditions, France was still predominantly an agricultural nation at the end of the first half of the nineteenth century. Some industrialization had taken place in the iron and textile industries, but even in these industries small-sized establishments were still the rule, while independent hand-loom weavers were still holding their ground in the manufacture of textiles against the encroachments of machinery. Independent artisans and proprietors of small-sized establishments comprised the great bulk of the manufacturing population, and the industrial proletariat of factory wage workers still formed a relatively unimportant minority.

- ii. French industry since the Revolution.
  - (*i*) Slow growth.
    - *a.* Late start.
      - 1. Eighteenth century wars.
      - 2. The effects of the Revolution.
    - *b.* Agricultural foundation.
    - *c.* Lack of basic raw materials.
    - *d.* Centralization and the guilds.
  - (*ii*) The use of power-driven machinery.
    - *a.* Practical difficulties in first half of century.
    - *b.* Vast growth subsequently.
  - (*iii*) The development of textile industries.
    - *a.* The continuance of handwork.
    - *b.* Artistic ideals.
    - *c.* The spread of machinery.
      - 1. Foreign competition.
      - 2. The Jacquard loan.
    - *d.* The silk industry.
      - 1. Tariffs.
      - 2. Artificial silk.
    - *e.* Rapid development of cotton industry after 1871.
  - (*iv*) Coal mining.
    - *a.* Need of imports.
    - *b.* Destruction of World War.
    - *c.* Subsequent recovery — The Gaar.
    - *d.* Hydroelectric power.
  - (*v*) Iron and steel.
    - *a.* Scarcity of iron ore and coke.
    - *b.* Expansion with the railway age.
    - *c.* Loss of Alsace-Lorraine.
    - *d.* The effects of the World War and the peace settlement.
    - *e.* Foreign competition.
    - *f.* Overequipment and the growth of combines.

Assignment six: France, economic development — Continued

* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel*, 594–608.

- (*vi*) Machinery.
  - *a.* Its extent.
  - *b.* Modern production methods: Citroën.
  - *c.* French disadvantages.
- (*vii*) Shipbuilding.
  - *a.* Bounties and tariffs.

- *b.* The merchant marine at end of century.
- *c.* War losses.

(*viii*) Communications.
- *a.* The Napoleonic roads.
- *b.* Canals.
- *c.* The late growth of railways.
- *d.* Government policy and railways.
- *e.* Paris as a center.
- *f.* Canalization of rivers.

(*ix*) Urban growth.
- *a.* Concentration of heavy industries.
- *b.* The size of the population.
- *c.* The continued importance of the land.

(*x*) The importance of minor industries.
- *a.* Wines and liqueurs.
- *b.* Chemicals.
- *c.* Pharmaceutical chemistry.

(*xi*) Colonial policy.
- *a.* From autonomy to tariff assimilation.
- *b.* The importance of North Africa.
- *c.* Non-commercial value of colonies.
- *d.* Colonial dissatisfaction.

QUESTIONS

(For assignments five and six)

1. What advantages in her general life has France gained by remaining attached to the soil? Would industrialization have given her people a better life or her a [illegible] greater strength?

2. Do you think, judging from France, that artistic products must necessarily depend on the continuance of handwork and inevitably disappear with industrialization? Are the gains in beauty an adequate compensation for a less rich material civilization?

3. How far do you think that France's economic and industrial losses during the war were compensated for by her gains under the peace treaties?

4. Estimate the advantages and disadvantages accruing to France in her economic life through centralization at Paris. Contrast with Germany.

5. Illustrate from French economic history the value to a country of important minor industries, from both a social and an economic point of view. Compare with England and the United States.

6. How has the French conception of colonies influenced the treatment of colored people, both in the colonies and in France? Do you think that the policy of France is wise, and would it justify a claim that France is basically more democratic than the United States?

7. Estimate the influence on French economic development of the Revolution and of Napoleon. Which was the more important? Would your answer warrant any conclusions as to the economic value to a country of an autocratic government?

8. Do you think that the French workmen have done more to improve their condition by economic or by political action? How would your answer affect your attitude toward the labor movement in the United States?

(*c*) The German Empire.

Assignment seven: Germany, political development, 1871–1914

* *Hayes*, II, 397–426.
Emil Ludwig, *Bismarck, the story of a fighter* — an absorbing account of the struggle for German unity, and the part played by Bismarck; W. H. Dawson, *The German Empire, 1871–1914*, 2 vols. — an excellent, though lengthy, history of pre-war Germany.

The proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles in 1871 at the close of the Franco-Prussian War marked the culminating triumph of Bismarck's struggle for unification of the German states under the hegemony of Prussia. The hope of German unification, first awakened during the Napoleonic Wars, was only realized after more than half a century of effort and controversy. In our earlier assignments we have traced the successive steps in this gradual advance toward unity: the creation of the Imperial *Zollverein* in 1834, the Frankfurt Parliament and the abortive attempt at unification in 1848, the struggle between Austria and Prussia for leadership of the German states and the final triumph of Prussia as a result of the Seven Weeks' War in 1867, the creation of the North German Confederation under the aegis of Prussia in the same year, and finally the victory over France in 1871, which enabled Bismarck to draw the south German states into his imperial scheme. From a group of petty, backward states at the opening of the century, Germany became in 1870 the outstanding power on the continent of Europe. In this transition no factor was so important as the phenomenal industrialization of the country, which began about 1850 and which hastened the process of unification. In fact, it might almost be said that the German Empire itself was fundamentally a product of the industrial revolution. This economic transformation continued even more rapidly after 1870 and was the outstanding phenomenon of



Data from Statistical abstract of United Kingdom and World almanac.

Population and birth rates of German and British Empires.

the period now under consideration. So rapidly did this development take place that by the close of the century Germany was able to challenge the industrial supremacy of Great Britain.

i. Political history, 1871–1914.

* *Hayes*, II, 397–426.

- (*i*) The German Constitution of 1871.
  - *a.* Permanent treaty between North German Confederation and the four south German states.
  - *b.* Federal character of government; the Bundesrat and Reichstag.
  - *c.* Supremacy of Prussia; position of emperor and of his imperial chancellor.
  - *d.* Undemocratic character of government; Prussian military tradition.
- (*ii*) The empire under Bismarck, 1871–1890.
  - *a.* Unification of empire by standardization of legal, financial, and military practice.
  - *b.* Political parties under Bismarck: the National Liberals, the Conservatives, the Progressives, the Catholic Center Party.
  - *c.* Failure of Bismarck's policy of nationalization in struggle with Catholic Center Party; the *Kulturkampf*.
  - *d.* Bismarck's attempts to crush socialism.
  - *e.* Bismarck's abandonment of *laissez faire* policy and program of protective tariffs and social legislation.
  - *f.* Growth of interest in imperialistic expansion.
- (*iii*) The empire under William II, 1890–1914.
  - *a.* Personal influence of the emperor after dismissal of Bismarck.
  - *b.* Vigorous imperialistic policies.
  - *c.* Strengthening of army and navy.
  - *d.* Growth in numerical strength of socialists; impotence of socialists in imperial government.

QUESTIONS

1. Compare German Federalism under the Constitution of 1871 with the Federal system of the United States, considering critically the advantages of each.

2. Compare the value of German unification by legal, financial, and military methods. Do you think that Bismarck's policy of blood and iron was the best method of promoting unity, or was thoroughness sacrificed for speed? Can you find any analogies in the history of the United States?

3. Do you think that Bismarck's attacks on socialism compensated for the destruction of liberty by their conscious policy of social improvement through government? In view of your answer, how do you think the United States might improve its social policy?

4. Estimate critically the value and methods of imperialism by considering Germany's attitude under Bismarck and subsequently. Do you think that later German troubles were due to the absence of a strong leader or were inherent in the policy adopted?

5. Comparing France with Germany, what further light is thrown on the relations of church and state by the *Kulturkampf?* Do continental religious troubles in the last

century give any justification for the fears of Roman Catholicism felt in certain sections of this country, or are the conditions too dissimilar?

(*c*) The German Empire — *Continued: Economic development*

Assignment eight: Germany, economic development

* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel,* 526–545.

ii. German industry since 1800.
  (*i*) Retarded development in early part of century.
    a. Continued guild control.
    b. Lack of economic unity till 1833.
    c. Lack of political unity before 1871.
    d. Beginnings of factory system.
    e. The *Gewerbe Institut.*
  (*ii*) Rapid growth after 1871.
    a. Increase in town population.
    b. German powers of adaptation.
    c. Government paternalism.
  (*iii*) Textiles.
    a. Continuance of peasant industry.
    b. Machine production late in all branches.
    c. Importance of woolen industry before the World War.
    d. Rapid development of cotton and silk industries.
      1. Acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine.
      2. German science and finishing processes.
  (*iv*) Coal.
    a. Small developments before 1845.
    b. Stimulus through industry and trade.
    c. Swift development after 1900.
    d. Lignite.
    e. Distribution and output of coal fields.
    f. The effects of the peace settlement.
  (*v*) Iron and steel.
    a. The effects of the *Zollverein.*
    b. Phosphorous iron ore in Alsace-Lorraine.
    c. Advantages of a late start: Siemens-Martin process.
    d. The use of tariffs.
    e. Germany leading producer in Europe: import of ores.
    f. Post-war losses and disorganization.
    g. Gradual recovery: the International Steel Cartel.
  (*vi*) Other metals and machinery.
    a. Abundance of zinc and lead.
    b. Want of copper and petroleum.
    c. War difficulties.
    d. The organization of the cutlery industry.
    e. Electricity and hydroelectric power.
  (*vii*) Chemical industries.

Assignment nine: Germany, economic development — Continued

* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel,* 546–563.

a. The reasons for German preëminence.

- *b.* The dye industry.
- *c.* Post-war attacks on Germany's position.

(*viii*) Distribution of population and industrial concentration.
- *a.* Decline of dependence on agriculture.
- *b.* Growth of industrial and trading population.
- *c.* Concentration in large cities.
- *d.* The growth of large enterprises toward end of century.
- *e.* Pre-war decentralization.
- *f.* The continuance of small firms.
- *g.* Financial organization and commercial credit.

(*ix*) Transport.
- *a.* Canal development under the empire.
- *b.* Railway growth.
- *c.* The problem of ownership of railways.
- *d.* Inflation and railway rates.
- *e.* Post-war arrangements.

(*x*) The labor movement.
- *a.* Labor and socialism: Anti-Socialist Law of 1879.
- *b.* Rapid development after 1890.
- *c.* Types of union.
- *d.* The opposition of industrialists.
- *e.* Post-war growth.

(*xi*) Social insurance.
- *a.* German initiative: Bismarck.
- *b.* Types of legislation.
- *c.* Codification in 1911 and administrative machinery.
- *d.* Localization.

QUESTIONS

(For assignments eight and nine)

1. Estimate the value to Germany in economic matters of the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian War. Do you consider that your answer is a justification for wars of aggrandizement?

2. Does the lack of economic development in Germany before the *Zollverein* throw any light on the question of free trade *versus* tariff protection? How would later German success under a tariff régime modify the answer you have given?

3. Judging from German economic expansion, do you think that the advantages of a late start in this sphere compensate for the want of training and experience? Compare Germany's position here with that of the United States, and contrast with England.

4. What light is thrown on the problem of national self-sufficiency by the experiences of industrial Germany? Compare this with agricultural France. In the light of your answer examine critically American policy and development.

5. To what extent do you think that Germany's industrial growth was due to the character and training of her people? Do you think her brilliant recovery after the war has been due to the same characteristics or to new ones emerging in and after the struggle? What light does your answer throw on the general problem of rational character and business success? In the light of this answer estimate the contribution of our national character toward our economic preëminence.

6. In the light of German experience consider the limitations of large concerns and the value of small enterprises. What reflections does this suggest on the present developments of trade and industry in the United States?

7. What principles of state control and state ownership are brought out by German railway experience? Are they applicable, are they or could they be applied, to the transport system of New York City?

8. What reflections on the problem of labor are suggested by the evolution of trades unions and socialism in Germany? What lessons could our own business men and labor movement learn from recent German experience in this respect?

9. Do you think that the amazing success of German social legislation justifies an attitude of paternalism on the part of the state? What advantages does German experience suggest may arise from devolution and local control in these matters?

(*d*) Russia.

Assignment ten: Russia, 1801–1914

* *Hayes*, II, 37–41, 452–487.

The greater part of Europe has never had much contact with what we call European civilization. Most of the so-called "European ideas" have had their source in the nations of western Europe — France, Spain, Italy, Germany — which together form an area smaller in extent than Russia in Europe. In fact, once might almost say that western Europe is a series of peninsulas and islands off the mainland of Russia. The vastness of the Russian domain, besides isolating the country from the influence of western culture, has proved an insurmountable obstacle to all attempts at military invasion from the time of Napoleon to the present day.

Such a geographic situation explains why Russia maintained her own culture patterns during the greater part of the nineteenth century — the varieties of village organization, the Russian manor, the institution of serfdom, the Russian Orthodox church, distinctive architecture, wide varieties of racial strains scattered over a huge area but within the same political organization.

From the time of Peter the Great, in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, constant efforts were made to introduce western ideas and institutions into Russia, but prior to the latter half of the nineteenth century these attempts had succeeded only in imposing a thin veneer over the national cultural base. The Russian court and nobility had family connections with the other European aristocracies. European administrative machinery was firmly intrenched. Early in the nineteenth century the universities of western Europe became the favorite places for completing the education of well-to-do Russians. Political exiles, in their wanderings back and forth between western Europe and Russia, gradually introduced the cultural ideas of the outside world. The science of warfare, which was highly developed in western Europe, found little difficulty in being adopted by Russia. Western philosophy was a pleasant diversion for Russian intellectuals.

The introduction of western industrial technique came only late in the century. Even more so than in the case of Germany, the industrial development of Russia had to wait upon the coming of the steam railway. Introduced shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century for military purposes, the railways soon caused sweeping changes in the economic and social life of the nation. But even today the railway must be regarded as having fulfilled only a small part of its possible rôle in transforming Russian society. Much may yet be done.

The period when Russia may definitely be regarded as facing west is the decade between the close of the Crimean War and 1865. During these years three great reforms were instituted, all of which bear the stamp of western influence: (1) In 1861 the legal emancipation of the serfs was decreed. (2) In 1862 a court system with public trials under a law code was established. This system was modified in practice by the continued use of "administrative process" in political cases, and others in which officials had special interests. (3) In 1864 a system of provincial and country assemblies was set up. These were known as "Zemstvos." They consisted of representatives of the well-to-do classes, and were supposed to carry on a number of activities, such as local (largely agricultural) education, poor relief, and public health. During the half century following these reforms a number of basic social changes took place which we consider in some detail in the reading outlined below.

i. Trial and abandonment of liberal administration in Russia.

  * *Hayes*, II, 37–41.

    (*i*) Alexander I, 1801–1825.
    (*ii*) Alexander and Metternich.
    (*iii*) The Decembrist revolt, 1825.
    (*iv*) Reaction under Nicholas I, 1825–1855.

ii. The Russian Empire, 1801–1914.
  * *Hayes*, II, 452–487.
    (*i*) Autocracy restored under Alexander I and upheld by Nicholas I.
    (*ii*) Alexander II, 1855–1881.

- *a.* Liberal reforms.
  - 1. Emancipation of the serfs.
  - 2. Establishment of the Zemstvos for local self-government.
  - 3. Setting up of a judiciary for civil and criminal cases.
- *b.* Polish Insurrection of 1863.
- *c.* Reactionary policies. Persecution of political offenders.
- *d.* Growth of liberal opposition.
  - 1. Nihilists.
  - 2. Anarchistic Socialists.
  - 3. Terrorists.

(*iii*) Alexander III, 1881–1894.
- *a.* Maintenance of autocracy. Repression of local autonomy. Corruption of imperial administration. Upheld by —
  - 1. Loyalty of governing classes.
  - 2. Support of Orthodox church.
  - 3. Lack of popular education.
  - 4. Severity of repressive measures.
  - 5. Filial attitude implanted in peasants toward tsar.
  - 6. Predominance of agriculture and accompanying conservatism.
  - 7. Tradition of autocracy.
  - 8. Ideal of Pan-Slavism, or "Russification."
- *b.* "Russification" of the empire. Suppression of subordinate nationalities; persecution of the Jews.
- *c.* Beginning of the industrial revolution in Russia.

(*iv*) Nicholas II, 1894–1917.
- *a.* Progress of industrial revolution in Russia. Industry and social legislation encouraged by the government under Witte.
- *b.* Opposition to the autocracy.
  - 1. Landed classes envious of industrial.
  - 2. Socialism.
  - 3. Middle-class and intellectual liberalism.
  - 4. Smaller nationalities.
- *c.* Revolutionary movement of 1905, following Russo-Japanese War.
  - 1. Guarantee of individual liberties by the tsar.
  - 2. Establishment of the Duma.
  - 3. Finnish "national strike" and restoration of Constitution.
- *d.* Reactionary compromise. The Duma made merely consultative.

QUESTIONS

1. Do you think that the policy of repression in Russia during a large part of the nineteenth century shows by its results the value of toleration? How would the results of the liberal policy of Alexander II modify your answer?

2. Judging from the case of Russia would you conclude that an agricultural country must necessarily be conservative? Does Russian experience show that the growth of industry is necessarily liberalizing? Is such liberal growth necessarily advantageous to a country?

3. To what extent do you think the emergence of Soviet Russia is due to reaction against tsarist policy? Do you think that by revolution a country can really escape from the results of its earlier history?

4. What powers would you conclude from a study of Russia may be exercised by

an enlightened minority? Can such a minority really change conditions? In the light of your answer estimate the value of the modern intelligentsia in America, and criticize their methods.

5. Was the idea of Pan-Slavism a genuine nationalist ideal, or was it solely a means to imperialism in the interests of a few? In the light of your answer consider the value and dangers of the conception of nationality.

6. How far were political conditions in Russia in the nineteenth century an obstacle to its economic development? Does your answer suggest any connection between the type of government of a country and its material development or offer the basis for any philosophy of the relationship of politics and economics?

7. Which do you think was the greater bar to the development of Russian industry, the legal status of the worker or the conditions under which he lived? How are the two connected?

8. How far were the varying interests of the different bodies of workers a hindrance to the general improvement of their conditions? Compare with the labor movement, in America today and in the past.

9. What characteristics of the Russian people, both peasant and intelligentsia, militated against the achievement of their own ideals? Were these characteristics an inherent bar to development, or did they only become so through long-continued custom and experience?

10. What made the Russian administration inefficient, while the German was efficient, since both were based on the same model? What reflections on the general theory of administration does your answer suggest?

(*e*) Austria-Hungary.

Assignment eleven: Austria-Hungary, Italy

* *Hayes*, II, 426–435, 163–175, 367–378.

Austria-Hungary is no longer a member of the family of nations. The bones of its curious dualism — neither federal nor unitary — gather dust in the museum of political curiosities, but the problems that troubled its half century of hectic existence are still with us. The most striking feature of the old Hapsburg empire was its polyglot character. It included 12,000,000 Germans, 10,000,000 Magyars, 4,000,000 Latins, 8,500,000 Czechs and Slovaks, 5,000,000 Poles, and 12,000,000 others. The political life of the nation, the emergence of other social consciousness, was frequently obscured in the rivalries and jealousies of racial, national, and linguistic groups. The centrifugal forces of nationalism have burst the motley company into its elements, but the problem of promoting the interests growing out of economic interdependence, without sacrifice of cultural autonomy, remains.

* *Hayes*, II, 426–435.

Cambridge modern history, XII, ch. 7.

i. National diversities.
    (*i*) Racial and linguistic groups.
        a. Problem of language in public affairs, courts, and schools.

- ii. Government.
  - (*i*) The *Ausgleich* of 1867.
    - *a.* Common monarch, common flag, common citizenship, common action through joint delegations.
    - *b.* Joint ministries of foreign affairs, war, and imperial finance.
  - (*ii*) Austrian Empire.
    - *a.* Austrian Constitution, 1867.
      - 1. Lack of ministerial responsibility and parliamentary control of the executive.
      - 2. Five-class (property) system of voting; displaced by equal and direct manhood suffrage, 1907.
  - (*iii*) Kingdom of Hungary.
    - *a.* Greater measure of popular government.
      - 1. Ministry responsible to Parliament.
      - 2. Small tax-paying qualification for Parliament.
- iii. Political parties.
  - (*i*) Emphasis on national and racial cleavages.
  - (*ii*) Groups with non-racial appeal.
    - *a.* Liberals.
    - *b.* Christian Socialists (Catholic).
    - *c.* Social Democrats (Marxian).
- iv. Social legislation.
  - (*i*) Mines and factories acts; national factory inspection, 1883–1885.
  - (*ii*) Woman and child labor laws, 1893.
  - (*iii*) Compulsory accident and sickness insurance for workingmen, 1887–1888.
  - (*iv*) The Industrial Code, 1907.

(*f*) Italy.

The Franco-Prussian War, causing the withdrawal of French military protection from the Papal States, removed the last obstacle to Italian geographical unification. Aside from certain thwarted ambitions in Trieste, all of the Italian people were under one government. The church, however, never admitted the legal existence of the new order and scarcely yielded any recognition at all. With the great majority of the Italian people Catholics, this lack of accord presented a serious obstacle to national solidarity. It was only when the church realized that the new order was destined to have some permanence and that the aloofness of Catholics from politics was playing into the hands of the church's enemies that this policy was modified. But the Roman question was not solved by this grudging abatement of hostility; it persists to this day as a major problem of the Italian state. Most of the rest of the nation's problems flow from the rather limited natural resources of the country and its proportionately large population. This is basic in any discussion of the problems of poverty, tax burdens, or emigration.

Vast numbers of Italians during this period left their native land for the Americas. This has been deemed an important domestic problem. It has had an influence on the efforts to rehabilitate Italian agriculture and prompted much of the social legislation of the period. It has also colored Italian efforts to secure colonial possessions.

* *Hayes*, II, 163–175, 367–378.
King and Okey, *Italy today* (especially ch. 6 on poverty, ch. 11 on social legislation, and ch. 13 on church and state).

- i. National unity.
  - (*i*) Achievement of unification, 1871.
  - (*ii*) Constitutional government.
    - *a.* Expansion of Sardinian *Statuto* of 1848.
    - *b.* Supremacy of Parliament to Constitution; no judicial review.
    - *c.* Limited monarchy — centralized state.
    - *d.* Extension of franchise, 1882, 1912.
  - (*iii*) Nationalism — *irredentism.*
- ii. Social problems.
  - (*i*) Social legislation.
    - *a.* Sickness, old age, and accident insurance through mutual societies, 1886.
    - *b.* Workingmen's compensation (one of best systems in Europe), 1914.
    - *c.* National invalidity and old-age insurance, 1898.
  - (*ii*) Burdens of taxation.
  - (*iii*) Emigration.
    - *a.* Conflicting views of economists.
    - *b.* Attempts to guide and control.
  - (*iv*) Rehabilitation of Italian agriculture.
- iii. Church and state.
  - (*i*) The Roman question — temporal power of the church.
  - (*ii*) Law of Papal Guarantees, 1871.
  - (*iii*) *Non expedit* and *Non licet*, 1895.
  - (*iv*) Participation of Catholics in elections after 1905.
- iv. Socialism and syndicalism.
  - (*i*) Gains under manhood suffrage.
    - *a.* Conflicts with anarchists, 1885–1895.
    - *b.* Marxian (revolutionary) leadership, 1904–1908.
    - *c.* Reformists in ascendance, 1908–1913.
    - *d.* Revolutionist dominance after 1913.

QUESTIONS

1. Compare the Austrian method of dealing with racial minorities with the American treatment of alien immigrants. How far was the long-term failure of the former due to the use of force, how far to the lack of economic opportunity?

2. Do you think that it was possible for Austria to adopt a humane and liberal policy toward its racial minorities and keep its empire intact? How far were its later reforms and the granting of various privileges the inevitable prelude of dissolution? Would the latter have come without the World War?

3. Do you consider that the later developments of Italian nationalism were either a justifiable or an inevitable development of the ideas of Mazzini? In view of your answer, criticize the value of nationalism as an ideal.

4. Do you think, in view of Italian experience, that population problems are a legitimate reason for imperialism, or that emigration forms a satisfactory solution? Compare Italian policy before the war with that of Mussolini. Do you think the American quota has been a genuine cause of Italian troubles in this matter?

5. Discuss the value and legitimacy of syndicalism, as shown in Italy, as a means of improving labor and industrial conditions. Was Fascism its natural and inevitable consequence?

(*g*) The United States.

Assignment twelve: The United States, the triumph of business enterprise

* Beard, *Rise of American civilization*, II, 191–198, 204–210.

The Civil War, as portrayed in conventional treatments, breaks the history of the United States, as if the normal activities of life ceased with its beginning and recommenced with its ending. Actually, the story of mankind flowed along in accustomed channels in many respects during the Civil War. Settlers, stimulated by the Homestead Act, rushed to occupy uninhabited, fertile regions. Business, which already gave evidence of future bigness, accelerated the speed of its growth with the impetus of war-time conditions.

As a result of the Northern victory, three definite results emerged from the Civil War. States' rights faded as a vital political doctrine, and supremacy was definitely vested in the hands of the central government. Slavery was abolished, and, finally, the semi-feudal character of Southern society, centering in the great estates, disappeared with their partition. In addition, the currency system and the high tariff, created for the purpose of financing the war, remained afterwards with the approval of the dominant faction, because they were found useful for other purposes in peace time.

For fifty years after the close of the Civil War many important aspects of the United States — manufacturing, extractive industries, farming, finance, and population — increased to previously unimagined magnitudes until the World War contributed a great forward push. The United States, during the period from the Civil War to the World War, experienced all the distressing pains of a hectic growth. Clearly, old standards and philosophies were no longer suited to the new industrialized world. The half century seemingly produced endless movements of protest among those injured by untrammeled big industries. Quarrels about currency, the tariff, the plight of impoverished farming districts, and the evils of unregulated business interests featured the period. Fortunes were amassed and caused the appearance of a haughty monied aristocracy. For the most part it was an age when all the energies of the nation were absorbed in the great game of exploiting the unrivaled resources of a new continent, and the people as a whole were little aware of the outside world. By the close of the century, however, this game,



Data from U. S. Census for 1920.

The Shift from "Old" to "New" Immigration.

The percentages from the various countries in the two groups may be read from left to right, *e.g.*, United Kingdom in 1880 furnished about 42%, Germany about 30%, Scandinavia about 4%, France, Belgium, Holland, etc., about 3%.

to a large extent, had been played out, and the nation, turning its attention outward, splashed over the sides of an insufficient mainland and acquired the ownership of distant lands in which American economic interests had obtained a foothold. It was an age of vigorous, undisciplined youth, at the end of which the nation showed signs of arriving at national maturity.

i. Triumph of business enterprise.

* Beard, *Rise of American civilization,* II, 191–198, 204–210.

(*i*) The land of opportunity.

a. Lack of tradition and social inertia.

- *b.* Half the area of the country open to individual acquisition and exploration in 1860.
- *c.* Abundant labor supply — immigration.
- *d.* Wealth and variety of raw material.
- *e.* Rivers and harbors.
- *f.* Enterprise protected and fostered by government.

(*ii*) The "Industrial Buccaneer."

- *a.* Social and national background of industrial leaders.
- *b.* Group characteristics.
  - 1. Few served in Civil War.
  - 2. Organizers of men and material.
  - 3. Imagination and daring — pride of creation.
  - 4. Lack of scruple.



Data from U. S. Census for 1920.

Growth of total immigration.

(*iii*) Fields of enterprise.

- *a.* Manufacturing.
- *b.* Extractive industries.
- *c.* Transportation.
- *d.* Finance.

(*iv*) Rise of big business.

- *a.* Corporation form of organization.
- *b.* Tendency toward monopoly in industry — oil, steel, sugar, whisky.
- *c.* Corruption in business methods.
- *d.* Inevitable connection with politics.
- *e.* Career of the Standard Oil Company.

(*v*) Railroad consolidation.

- *a.* Civil War followed by increased railroad construction.
- *b.* Lavish public and private support for railroad projects.

- *c.* Evils of competition — rebates, rate wars, etc.
- *d.* Trend toward combination.
- *e.* The empire builders.
  - 1. Vanderbilt and the New York Central.
  - 2. Fiske, Gould, Drew, and the Erie.
  - 3. The Morgan lines.
  - 4. Hill and the Northern Securities Company.
  - 5. The Harriman combine.

(*vi*) Political corruption and regulation.
- *a.* Credit Mobilier scandal.
- *b.* "Judicious distribution" of passes and shares.
- *c.* Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and later strengthening acts.
- *d.* Anti-Trust Act, 1890.
- *e.* Clayton Act, 1914.
- *f.* Railroad Act, 1920.



Railroad mileage in the United States. Miles of line in operation.

From Statistical abstracts of the United States.

(*vii*) Rise of the financier.
- *a.* Trend of authority in industry from promoter to financier.
  - 1. Impetus of Civil War to financiering.
  - 2. Increase in capital for investment.
  - 3. Lessened harmony of interest between owners and executives in industry — profits *vs.* production.
- *b.* Morgan the master trust-builder.
  - 1. Banking power of a billion.
  - 2. Railroad control of ten billion.

(*viii*) The new America.
- *a.* Increase in population from thirty-one million in 1860 to seventy-six million in 1900.
- *b.* Huge domestic market guarded by tariffs.
- *c.* Phenomenal growth in national wealth.
- *d.* Increasing inequality in distribution of wealth.
- *e.* America becomes urban.
  - 1. Shift from country — 1860, one-sixth of population in towns over 8,000; 1900, one-third in towns over 8,000.
  - 2. Growth of metropolises.
  - 3. Growth of proletariat.
- *f.* Industry invades the South.
- *g.* Slow increase in social discontent.

QUESTIONS

1. Do you consider that the lack of social tradition was an unmixed blessing in the economic development of the United States? Compare with England, where tradition has always been strong.

2. Consider how far the sufferings of the weak through the unscrupulousness and corruption of early industry and industrial magnates were inevitable. Looking at the situation today, economic, social, and political, do you think the price was worth paying?

3. Do you think that the stimulus of industry as the result of the Civil War was adequate compensation for the sectional disharmonies and the impoverishment of the South which followed it? Explain the various influences of the Civil War on economic development.

4. How far do you think the government proved itself adequate in dealing with the varying forces making for industrial expansion and social change? Would a more positive policy have prevented the growth of present-day problems without hindering the enterprise that has produced present standards of living.

5. Estimate the value to the country in the last century of unchecked immigration. Do you think a more regulated policy, with greater assimilation, would have lessened materially the growth of social discontent and have resulted in adequate assimilation?

ii. Rise of the labor movement.

Assignment thirteen: Rise of the labor movement

* *Beard*, II, 211–248.

- (*i*) Labor and the Civil War.
  - *a.* Lack of sympathy with abolitionists.
  - *b.* Interest in free land.
  - *c.* Loyal support of North after Sumter.
  - *d.* Rise of prices and lagging of wages.
  - *e.* Increase in local organization.
  - *f.* Lack of national federation.
- (*ii*) Problems of post-war organization.
  - *a.* Lack of funds in seventies and eighties.
  - *b.* Lack of legal and newspaper support.
  - *c.* Lack of experience.
  - *d.* Lack of education among workers.
  - *e.* Strong differences in tongue, race, and opinion.
  - *f.* Theories on social reorganization complicate unified organization.
  - *g.* Problems of women, aliens, and negroes.
- (*iii*) The National Labor Union.
  - *a.* Founded under leadership of W. H. Sylvis, 1866.
  - *b.* Included many varieties of labor associations.
  - *c.* Weakened by dissension of idealistic and revolutionary elements.
  - *d.* Fostering of coöperatives. Their failure.
  - *e.* Disappeared in 1872.
- (*iv*) The Knights of Labor.
  - *a.* Founded, 1869; secret society until 1875.
  - *b.* Membership open to skilled and unskilled and to all in sympathy with labor.
  - *c.* All labor to be placed in single consolidated group.

d. Resort to economic pressure and to political action.
e. Opposition from capitalists and craft unions.
(*v*) The American Federation of Labor, 1881.
a. Difficulties and near failure under Gompers and Strasser.
b. Reorganization in 1886.
1. Organization.
(1) Unit — the national craft union.
(2) Federation a super-government for common purposes.
(3) Local power largely in hands of craft unions.
2. Large treasury.
3. Attraction of large craft unions into Federation.
4. Policy.


Membership American Federation of Labor Fiscal Year 1927 2,812,526
365 Local Trade and Federal Labor Unions
4 Departments
106 National and International Unions
49 State Federations
794 City Central Bodies
742 Local Department Councils
29,394 Local Unions

Organization of the American Federation of Labor.

Adapted from Report of the Proceedings of the 47th Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, 1927.

(1) Opportunistic; practical and immediate; non-utopian; accepts capitalism.
(2) Refusal to participate directly in politics; active pressure upon legislation.
(3) Direct economic pressure.
(4) Hostility to extreme socialism and communism.
c. Conflict with Knights of Labor and final victory.
d. Failure to include Railroad Brotherhoods.
e. Increase in membership.
1. 150,000 in 1886.
2. 23,000,000 during World War.

- (*vi*) Industrial warfare.
    - *a.* The Molly Maguires, 1874–1875.
    - *b.* Railroad strike of 1877.
    - *c.* Haymarket Riot, 1886.
    - *d.* Homestead strike, 1892.
    - *e.* Pullman strike, 1894.
- (*vii*) Gradual legal recognition of rights of labor to organize and assert pressure for its welfare.
    - *a.* Labor organizations at first regarded as conspiracies in restraint of trade.
    - *b.* By 1865, right to organize for mutual benefit generally recognized by courts.
    - *c.* Right to strike, boycott, picket, etc., determined by states; vagueness of labor statutes.
    - *d.* Sherman Anti-Trust Act invoked against unions until Clayton Act of 1914.
    - *e.* Use of injunction by courts prior to Clayton Act and since Pullman strike.
- (*viii*) Positive legislative program of labor.
    - *a.* Education.
    - *b.* Employer's Liability Act, 1908.
    - *c.* Factory inspection.
    - *d.* Immigration control.
- (*ix*) Rise of socialism.

QUESTIONS

1. Consider critically the difficulties that stood in the way of organizing labor in the latter part of the last century and the equipment existing to solve them. How far would the experience of other countries have helped, and how far was the problem unique?

2. How far was geography a bar to the organization of labor? Do you consider this more important than the variety of groups and interests?

3. Do you think that the policy of the American Federation of Labor was wise in view of the forces opposed to them? How far has their lack of ideals militated against success and led to the growth of more extremist groups?

4. Do you think that, in view of the growth of inequalities, the law in respect to labor unions before 1914 was wise or showed an adequate appreciation of social change on the part of either government or capitalists?

5. Do you think that immigration control will in the long run make possible an effective and united organization of labor? Or is the spirit of the people, developed during a pioneer age, likely to be too strong and antipathetic?

iii. Triple revolution in agriculture.

Assignment fourteen: The revolution in agriculture

* *Beard*, II, 254–284.

- (*i*) Expansion of agriculture since 1850.
    - *a.* 1850, total population of the United States less than thirty million; 1910, agrarian population fifty million.
    - *b.* 1860, two million farms; 1910, six million.

- *c.* 1860, wheat output 173,000,000 bushels; 1910, 700,000,000 bushels (one-sixth of world's crop).
- *d.* Advance much slower relatively than that of industry.

(*ii*) The revolution in southern agriculture.

- *a.* Old régime in the South.
    1. Slaveholders, dominant socially and politically — 360,000.
    2. Slave class — 4,000,000.
    3. Freeholders (yeomen and "poor whites") — two-thirds of white population.
- *b.* Post-war agriculture in the South.
    1. Many plantations broken up.
    2. Hiring of negroes as farm hands.



Data from Statistical abstract, 1926.

Increase in American farm tenancy.

3. Tenant system.
4. "Cropping system": land and capital supplied by planter; labor, by tenant; crop shared.
5. Lack of capital.
6. War and emancipation lower southern agricultural productivity for a generation.

- *c.* Position of Negro.
    1. Lack of property; laziness.
    2. Negro as a farmer.
        - (1) Ignorance of scientific methods.
        - (2) Competition with Mexican labor in Texas.
    3. Ineptitude as mechanic.
    4. Loss of political rights by 1880 in spite of Republican legislation.
    5. Trend to northern cities, particularly since World War.

- *d.* White freeholder.
    - 1. Gained more by the war than any other class in South.
    - 2. Social equality.
    - 3. Economic opportunity.
    - 4. Political power.
- *(iii)* End of free land.
    - *a.* Tradition of inexhaustibility of free land.
    - *b.* Homestead Act, 1862.
    - *c.* Morrill Act, 1863.
    - *d.* Railroad grants after the war.
    - *e.* End of frontier, 1890; choice arable land taken up.



Data from U. S. Census for 1920.

The southern Negro as a farmer.

- *f.* Beginning of irrigation and dry farming.
- *g.* Significance of closed frontier.
    - 1. No longer an outlet for social malcontents.
    - 2. Economic opportunity for immigrants considerably lessened.
    - 3. Organization among workers made necessary to maintain standard of living; immigration limitation proposed.
    - 4. Development of scientific farming.
    - 5. Capital looks abroad for further enterprises.
- *(iv)* Farming turns capitalistic.
    - *a.* Movement accelerated by end of slave plantation and of free land; rise in land values.
    - *b.* Breakdown of agrarian self-sufficiency.
    - *c.* Introduction of machinery and specialization — McCormick reaper, chilled plow, seeder, binder, tractor.
    - *d.* Growing dependence on banker.
    - *e.* Increase in tenant farming.
    - *f.* Increase in agrarian debt.
    - *g.* Farmer, individualist by nature, slow to adopt capitalistic methods.
    - *h.* Gradual spread of scientific technique in agriculture.
- *(v)* Organization among farmers.
    - *a.* Grange founded, 1867.
    - *b.* Producers' associations — California Fruit Growers and Cotton Growers Association.

        c. Temporary character of political organizations.
            1. Farmers' Alliance.
            2. Populist movement in the nineties.
            3. Farmer-Labor Party of 1924.
                (1) Lack of common interests between groups.
            4. Return of good times fatal to agrarian political combination.
    (*vi*) Congressional aid.
        a. Interstate Commerce Act, 1887.
        b. Irrigation Act, 1917.
        c. Farm Loan Act, 1916.
        d. Proposals for socialistic aid defeated — McNary-Haugen Bill, 1925–1928.
    (*vii*) Demand for "cheap money," 1870, 1896, 1912, 1920.

QUESTIONS

1. How far did the Civil War change the type and methods of southern farming? Do you think that the Negro or the white gained more by the change?

2. Consider critically the results of the end of free land on the methods of farming and the different social classes concerned? Were the injustices done and the hardships suffered in the course of expansion justified by the economic results? Could they have been avoided?

3. Do you consider that the efforts of Congress to aid farmers showed a statesmanlike policy and considered adequately the interests of the country as a whole? What residues has its policy left for present-day legislators to deal with?

4. Why were there continual demands on the part of farmers for cheap money? Why were they economically unsound, and what was the correct method for dealing with the difficulties of which they were a sign?

5. Why were the farmers at this time unable to form a permanent political party? Do you think that labor and farmers have sufficient common interests to make political coöperation among them practical or successful?

iv. Expansion.

Assignment fifteen: Expansion

* *Beard*, II, 350–362, 365–376, 379–382.

(*i*) Alaska acquired, 1867.
(*ii*) Seward's attempts at Caribbean expansion.
(*iii*) Samoa.
    a. Tripartite agreement, 1889.
    b. Division between the United States and Germany, 1900.
    c. New Zealand takes mandate over German share, 1919.
(*iv*) Hawaii.
    a. Early American penetration.
    b. Economic significance.
    c. American revolution of 1892.
    d. Cleveland refuses to annex islands.
    e. Islands annexed by Congress, 1898.
(*v*) Relations with Great Britain.
    a. Geneva Tribunal, 1872.

b. Venezuela dispute of 1895; Monroe Doctrine tacitly recognized by Great Britain.

(*vi*) Cuba.
  a. American interests in islands.
  b. Spanish oppression.
  c. Revolt of 1895.
  d. "Yellow journalism" prepares America for war.
  e. De Lome letter and sinking of the *Maine*.
  f. War declared, despite Spanish compliance with American demands.
  g. Speedy American triumph.



Data from Report of the Proceedings of the 47th Annual Convention, American Federation of Labor, 1927.

Growth of membership of American Federation of Labor.

  h. Peace with Spain.
    1. Cuba to be freed from Spanish rule and Spaniards to assume her debt.

(*vii*) Philippine Islands ceded to the United States by Spain for twenty million dollars.
  a. Economic and strategic importance.
  b. Opposition in the United States.
  c. "White man's burden."

(*viii*) Porto Rico and Guam ceded to the United States.

QUESTIONS

1. Do you think that American expansion in the Pacific compensated for the difficult international problems it created by forcing the United States to take a world view?

2. Estimate the relative importance of economic and political considerations in connection with the United States expansion in Samoa and Hawaii.

3. Do you think that humanitarian sentiments or the needs of the American business man played a greater part in the war with Spain and the resultant domination of Cuba? Was the native's position greatly improved by the change from Spanish rule to American influence?

4. Do you think that, in view of subsequent troubles and expenses, the Philippines have really been as valuable to the United States as was expected when they were obtained? Under modern conditions do they retain their strategic value?

v. The Gilded Age.

Assignment sixteen: The Gilded Age

* *Beard*, II, 383–416, 426–429.

(*i*) Rising influence of the *nouveaux riches*.
  a. One-tenth of people owned nine-tenths of wealth in 1900.
  b. Plutocrats gained riches through industry, not agriculture.
  c. "Society."
    1. Influence of Europe.
    2. Rich homes and lavish display.
    3. Development of exclusiveness. "The Four Hundred."
(*ii*) The working people.
  a. Poor living conditions in cities.
  b. Ambition to rise; general acceptance of social order.
  c. Party machines responded to will of masses rather than classes; services to the poor.
  d. Amusements of the masses.
(*iii*) The middle class.
  a. Protestant respectability.
  b. "Nordic" stock.
  c. Low standard of taste in art and letters.
(*iv*) No distinct agrarian cultural type.
(*v*) Rise of women's economic status.
  a. Entrance into industry.
  b. Feminist movement — Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony.
  c. Rise of women's clubs.
(*vi*) Cultural influence of Europe.
  a. Darwinism.
  b. Herbert Spencer.
  c. Work of Pasteur, Lister, Curie, etc.
  d. Hegel.
  e. Influence of German method of research.
  f. The "grand tour" becomes popular.
(*vii*) Religion.
  a. Christian Science.
  b. Spread of Catholicism.
  c. Development of Protestant Fundamentalism.

- (*viii*) Scientific advance.
  - *a.* Inventions in field of applied science — electric light, air brake, phonograph, automobile, chilled plow, airplane, printing, linotype, typewriter, telephone, camera, motion picture, Hoe printing press.
  - *b.* Advance of technology and research.
  - *c.* Pure science. Biology, astronomy, chemistry, physics, botany, and geology make rapid strides.
- (*ix*) Criticism of the Gilded Age.
  - *a.* Failure of Marxian socialism to gain in America.
  - *b.* Henry George's *Progress and poverty*, 1879.
    1. "Single Tax" as remedy.
    2. Influence abroad.
  - *c.* James Bryce's *American commonwealth*, 1888.
    1. Attack on corrupt municipal government.
    2. Awoke Americans to critical attitudes.
  - *d.* H. D. Lloyd's *Wealth against commonwealth*, 1897.
    1. Attack on methods of big business.
    2. Social democracy as remedy.
- (*x*) Progress in arts and letters.
  Beard, II, 428–460.
- (*xi*) Journalism.
  - *a.* Technical revolution in printing.
  - *b.* Decline of editor-owner papers. Dana, Greeley, Raymond.
  - *c.* Rise of sensationalism.
    1. "Yellow journalism."
    2. Joseph Pulitzer and the *World*.
    3. William Randolph Hearst.
    4. Attacks on corruption in politics and industry.
    5. Fostering of patriotism; "jingoism."
  - *d.* Muck-raking.
    1. Ida M. Tarbell's *History of the Standard Oil trust*.
    2. Upton Sinclair's *The jungle*.
    3. S. S. McClure.
    4. Effect on legislation.
  - *e.* Popularity of comic strip and "column."
- (*xii*) Education after the Civil War.
  - *a.* Success in wealth devoted to education.
  - *b.* Improvement in common schools.
  - *c.* Additional high and trade schools supported by taxation.
  - *d.* Growth of state universities.
  - *e.* Emancipation of colleges from clerical dominance.
  - *f.* Expansion of universities into "faculties" and "schools."
  - *g.* Changes in curriculum.
    1. Classics decline in favor.
    2. Social sciences gain prominence.
    3. Professional courses introduced.
  - *h.* Women's colleges prosper — Barnard, Radcliffe, Vassar, Bryn Mawr, and Smith.

QUESTIONS

1. How far do you think that the rise of "society" in America is culturally useful? Does it involve the negation of democracy?

2. Do you think that the acceptance of the social order by the masses, once an acknowledgment of individuality and the power to rise, has tended to become a sign of standardization? Is this attitude morally or politically dangerous?

3. Do you consider that the cult of respectability by the middle classes is a sign of conscious pride and independence? Or is it the result of intellectual timidity and an undue absorption in practical affairs?

4. Has the growing independence of women proved valuable in the cultural, social, and political spheres? Do you think any gains here compensate for the growing gulf between man and woman and possible dangers to family life?

5. Do you think that the increasing interest of American people in travel has really proved culturally broadening? Or has it delayed the development of a truly American culture?

6. Do you think that Fundamentalism has seriously hindered social development or prevented an easy solution of modern problems? Is Modernism a legitimate answer to it, and does it provide an adequate foundation for those who need religion?

7. Do you think that the advantages America has derived from applied science have given her a proper respect for the value of pure science, or have they led to the perversion of the latter?

8. Do you think that the criticisms of the Gilded Age have provided the basis for a constructive philosophy, or has their result been purely destructive and negative? In the latter case, have they opened the path for more constructive thought by clearing the ground, or have they merely created a dangerous habit of mind?

9. To what extent were the foundations of a native, as distinct from a borrowed, culture laid toward the end of the nineteenth century? Estimate their importance and value.

10. Estimate the growth of the influence of the Press on public opinion in the last half of the century. By what methods was it attained, and was the growth in quantity offset by a decline in quality?

11. Do you consider that the changes in the curriculum of universities in the last half century have tended more to develop an interest in present-day social problems or to turn men's minds away from things of mind and spirit to purely material success?

vi. Toward social democracy.

Assignment seventeen: Increasing social control

* *Beard*, II, 538–545, 550–577.

(*i*) The age of acquisition and enjoyment.
  a. The cult of individualism in business and politics.
  b. Parties controlled for individual and group interest.
  c. Abuse of national domain.
  d. Employer's industrial irresponsibility.

Assignment eighteen: Increasing social control — Continued

* *Beard*, II, 578–587, 593–608.

  e. Wealth not heavily taxed.
  f. Judicial support of individualism and *laissez faire* theory of government and business.

(*ii*) *Laissez faire* calls forth antithesis.
    - *a.* Forces making for social control subtle and not in hands of any one group.
    - *b.* Growth of labor organization.
        - 1. Increased political effectiveness of labor.
        - 2. Emphasis on pressure rather than participation in politics.
    - *c.* Control of party activity.
        - 1. Civil service reform, 1883.
            - (1) Godkin, Curtis, Schurz *vs.* Platt, Conkling, and the Stalwarts.
            - (2) Gradual extension of merit system.
        - 2. Australian ballot replaces open voting.
        - 3. Demand for direct primaries — La Follette.

QUESTIONS

(For assignments seventeen and eighteen)

1. Do you think that the creed of individualism has helped to stabilize American life? Or has it led to the growth of restlessness and social discontent?

2. Estimate the extent to which the evils of individualism in the sphere of business are offset by the growth of a spirit of service. Do you think that this is more effective or more valuable than the idea of social control?

3. Do you think that the growth of the merit system in the Civil Service provides an adequate solution of the technical problem of administration? Compare the Civil Service of the United States with that of Great Britain with this in mind.

4. How far does a diversity of groups aiming at social control of government and business make up in virility for what it loses in lack of unity? Compare private associations in the United States with those in other countries in this respect.

5. Is the growth of a strong labor organization dangerous or useful to the community? Is it better that labor should bring pressure to bear on politicians than that it should itself take a part in politics?

6. Criticize the policy of light taxation of the wealthy from the point of view of national prosperity and social well-being? Do you think the state could use the surplus income of the very rich to better ends and with greater success than they can or do themselves?

Assignment nineteen: Modern imperialism

B. The growth of modern imperialism.

* Harry Elmer Barnes, *World politics in modern civilization*, 187–211.

One of the most significant developments of the nineteenth century was the rise of a new imperialism, aggressive, and based on exploitation. It was caused on the one hand by the changes produced by the industrial revolution, creating surplus populations which needed outlets, surplus products to market, and surplus capital to invest; while at the same time crying always for more and more raw materials for its factories, whose appetite was never appeased. On the other hand, it was a result of the development of nationalism, once the crusading creed of the weak against the strong, but now became vainglorious and lusting for power. It resulted in the suppression and brutal exploitation of native peoples and cruel contacts with the races of the East, showing an utter disregard for ancient cultures. By way of protest the oriental races were compelled to adopt western institutions and to develop a nationalism of their own, while the very vigor of the exploitation of Africa proved ruinous and has gradually forced the owners to call a halt. At the same time the energy of the process brought the western powers themselves into conflict and created much of the underlying bitterness which produced the World War, but failed to terminate the policy. Imperialism, too, had its reaction on domestic affairs, creating difficult economic and political problems, for which the cultural gains were a dubious compensation. Yet, the policy still goes on, though constantly changing its forms.

(a) The nature and background of contemporary imperialism.
  i. Nationalism and imperialism.
    (i) Overseas ambitions and foreign policy.
    (ii) Reaction on domestic issues.
  ii. Precursors of imperialism.
  iii. The evolution of imperialism.
    (i) Expansion of Europe, 1500–1800.
      (1) Great effect on Europe.
      (2) Slight penetration of overseas countries.
    (ii) Rapid extension of Europe overseas after 1870.
  iv. Economic factors.
    (i) Raw materials.
    (ii) Overseas markets.
    (iii) Investments.
  v. Social motives.
    (i) The growth of population.
    (ii) The desire to control emigrating nationals.
  vi. Religious drives.
  vii. Psychological motives.
    (i) Love of adventure.
    (ii) Scientific curiosity.
    (iii) Prestige of colonial empire.
    (iv) The psychology of imperialism.
  viii. Nature of the expansion movement.
    (i) Forcible colonization — Africa, Oceania, Australasia.
    (ii) Exploitation — Asia, Latin America.
  ix. Distribution of colonial territory.
  x. Moral progress. — "The white man's burden."
(b) The rediscovery and partition of Africa.
  i. Early explorations.
    (i) Islam and the slave trade.
    (ii) Trading ports and coastal settlements.


AFRICA
1914
1924
ABYSSINIA
LIBERIA
BR MANDATE
S.A. MANDATE
UNION OF S.AFRICA
GREAT BRITAIN
GERMANY
FRANCE
ITALY
BELGIUM
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Protectorate or Mandate

- ii. The great explorations of the seventies.
    - (*i*) The motives of the explorers.
    - (*ii*) The territory covered.
- iii. The Berlin Conference, 1884–1885.
    - (*i*) Continent opened up and partitioned.
    - (*ii*) No systematic moral or cultural provisions.
- iv. The Congo Free State.
    - (*i*) Private possession of Leopold II.
    - (*ii*) Abuses and protests.
    - (*iii*) Surrender to Belgian government.
    - (*iv*) The rubber industry.
- v. German imperialism.
    - (*i*) Private enterprise.
    - (*ii*) Bismarck and government annexation.
    - (*iii*) The development of colonial administration.
- vi. The Boers in South Africa.
    - (*i*) Early Boer settlements and the "Great Trek."
    - (*ii*) The First Boer War, 1881.
        - *a.* Disraeli's imperialism.
        - *b.* Defeat of British.
    - (*iii*) Causes of friction.
    - (*iv*) The Jameson Raid.
    - (*v*) The Second Boer War, 1899–1902.
- vii. The Union of South Africa, 1909.
    - (*i*) Boer loyalty.
    - (*ii*) Economic development.
        - *a.* Main products.
        - *b.* Native labor.
- viii. Egypt and the Sudan.
    - (*i*) The Suez Canal.
    - (*ii*) Dual control.
    - (*iii*) British control.
        - *a.* Treatment of native institutions.
        - *b.* Economic and financial improvements.
    - (*iv*) Gordon and the Mahdi.
    - (*v*) The Fashoda Incident.
    - (*vi*) The World War and the British Protectorate.
- ix. The French in Africa.
    - (*i*) Extent of possessions.
    - (*ii*) Morocco.
        - *a.* Crises in European politics.
        - *b.* The French protectorate.
        - *c.* Economic value.
- x. Italy and Africa.
    - (*i*) Defeat by Abyssinia.
    - (*ii*) The control of Tripolitania.
- xi. Liberia and the United States.
- xii. Post-war developments.
    - (*i*) Annexations of German possessions.
    - (*ii*) Moroccan troubles.
    - (*iii*) Franco-Italian rivalry.

- xiii. Economic and social problems.
    - (*i*) The costs of Africa.
    - (*ii*) The wealth of Africa.
        - *a*. Valuable resources to exploit.
        - *b*. Exhaustion of important raw materials.
        - *c*. Decline of native population.
    - (*iii*) Racial problems.
    - (*iv*) The need and value of European control.
    - (*v*) The possibilities of better methods.
        - *a*. The example of Nigeria.
        - *b*. The Hilton Young Report.

QUESTIONS

1. Estimate the importance of the various factors making for imperialism. Would you agree that the economic factor is basic?

2. How far do you think that the proclamation of "the white man's burden" has been sincere? What has been done to carry it out in practice?

3. Estimate the effects of African imperialism on the native races. Would you agree that the total withdrawal of the white is necessary for the preservation and development of the Negro? If so, would it be a moral obligation or a practical possibility?

4. Consider critically the reactions of African imperialism on European politics and the balance of power. To what extent, if any, was it responsible for the outbreak of the World War.

5. Compare the policies of England in South Africa and Egypt in their effects on native nationalist feeling. How far are the situations sufficiently similar to warrant similar treatment? What would be the results and the value of Egyptian independence?

(*c*) The penetration of Asia and Oceania.

Assignment twenty: Modern imperialism — Continued

* *Barnes*, 212–224.

- i. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the *Drang nach Osten*.
    - (*i*) German motives.
    - (*ii*) Relations with Turkey.
        - *a*. The Congress of Berlin.
        - *b*. Von Bieberstein at Constantinople.
        - *c*. German professions of friendship with Turkey.
    - (*iii*) Diplomatic problems.
        - *a*. Russian opposition.
        - *b*. France and her Syrian interests.
        - *c*. English fears for India and Egypt.
    - (*iv*) The construction of the railway.
    - (*v*) The results of the World War.
        - *a*. Germany ousted from Near East.
        - *b*. Quarrels over the spoils.
        - *c*. American oil interests.
    - (*vi*) The making of a new Turkey.
    - (*vii*) The Near East mandates.

        - *a.* Allocation.
        - *b.* Disturbances.
- ii. Persia and Afghanistan as a scene of Anglo-Russian rivalry.
    - (*i*) Persian misrule.
    - (*ii*) Anglo-Russian rivalry.
        - *a.* Era of struggle.
        - *b.* The partition of Persia, 1907.
        - *c.* Persian finances — Shuster.
    - (*iii*) English post-war policy.
    - (*iv*) American interest.
    - (*v*) Conflict in Afghanistan.
        - *a.* British control of foreign affairs.
        - *b.* Boundary settlement with Russia.
        - *c.* Anglo-Russian economic equality.
        - *d.* Growth of independence since war.
- iii. The Indian Empire.
    - (*i*) Early development.
    - (*ii*) Consolidation of British power.
        - *a.* Government control of Civil Service.
        - *b.* The Sepoy Mutiny, 1857.
        - *c.* Government reorganization.
    - (*iii*) Indian nationalism.
        - *a.* Native representation.
        - *b.* The problem of diversity.
        - *c.* The reward of war services.
        - *d.* The Amritsar massacres.
    - (*iv*) The economic wealth of India.
        - *a.* Importance of exports to England.
        - *b.* India as a market for manufactures.
        - *c.* Development of own resources.
    - (*v*) The aims of Gandhi.
        - *a.* Political.
        - *b.* Economic.
- iv. China and the powers.
    - (*i*) Early Chinese contacts with the West.
    - (*ii*) Modern intervention in China.
        - *a.* The Opium War, 1840–1842.
        - *b.* The War of 1856–1858 and the Treaty of Tientsin.
        - *c.* The Tai-Ping Rebellion.
        - *d.* The Chino-Japanese War, 1894–1895.
        - *e.* The Boxer rising, 1900.
    - (*iii*) The "open door" policy in China — John Hay.
    - (*iv*) Annexations of Chinese outposts.
    - (*v*) Chinese nationalism and the reform movement.
    - (*vi*) Recent Chinese developments.
        - *a.* The disruption of civil war.
        - *b.* The rule of Chiang Kai-Shek.
        - *c.* The Shanghai massacres.
    - (*vii*) Chinese grievances.
        - *a.* Customs control.
        - *b.* Extraterritoriality.
    - (*viii*) The aims of China.

        - *a*. Political freedom.
        - *b*. Better economic position of worker.
        - *c*. Equal international rights.
    - (*ix*) Economic position.
        - *a*. Nature and extent of trade.
        - *b*. The decline in exports.
        - *c*. The industrial revolution.
- v. The awakening of Japan.
    - (*i*) Western entry into Japan.
        - *a*. The exploit of Commodore Perry.
        - *b*. Japanese anti-foreign policy.
        - *c*. The bombardment of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki.
    - (*ii*) The westernization of Japan.
        - *a*. Removal of feudalism.
        - *b*. Industrialization.
        - *c*. Imperialism.
    - (*iii*) The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902.
    - (*iv*) The development of a Japanese "Monroe Doctrine."
    - (*v*) Japan as a world power.
        - *a*. Naval strength.
        - *b*. Japanese interests in China.
        - *c*. Relations with the United States.
        - *d*. The growth of Japanese trade.
- vi. American interests in the Far East.
    - (*i*) The cession of the Philippines, 1898.
    - (*ii*) The policy of civilizing the Philippines.
        - *a*. The commissions of Schurman and Taft.
        - *b*. The establishment of civil government.
        - *c*. The Jones Act.
    - (*iii*) The demand for Filipino independence.
    - (*iv*) The material benefits of American rule.
    - (*v*) The economic value of the Philippines.
    - (*vi*) Other American possessions in the Pacific.
- vii. Imperialism in Oceania.
    - (*i*) The division of the territory.
    - (*ii*) The economic value of the Dutch East Indies.
    - (*iii*) The strategic importance of island groups.
    - (*iv*) Imperialist collisions: Samoa.
- viii. The Development of Australasia.
    - (*i*) Penal settlements in Australia.
    - (*ii*) The economic motive for settlement.
        - *a*. Sheep-farming.
        - *b*. Gold.
    - (*iii*) Australian federation.
    - (*iv*) The development of New Zealand.
        - *a*. British claim and subsequent settlement.
        - *b*. Self-government, 1853.
        - *c*. Dominion status, 1907.
    - (*v*) Social democracy and labor legislation in Australasia.
    - (*vi*) The growth of industry and commerce.
    - (*vii*) The policy of a "White Australia."
- ix. The future of the Far East.

QUESTIONS

1. To what extent has the creation of mandates settled the old problems of the Near East? Has it created any new ones, and how do they differ from the old?

2. Compare the growth of nationalism in India and China? From the point of view of ultimate independence and stable self-government, has foreign government proved more or less valuable than economic penetration backed by force of arms?

3. Compare the results of United States policy toward China and toward Japan. Has the United States in fact proved a friend to China? Compare her policy here with that of the other powers, and consider which is more helpful to the native and to the exploiting country.

4. Estimate the extent to which western civilization has spread to Japan and to China. Consider the gains and losses involved in its substitution for their former civilizations. Compare with the results of British rule in India.

5. Consider critically the policies of the various Pacific powers. How far are they morally justified? Do they give rise to legitimate fears for the future peace of the world?

6. How far has American rule been beneficial to the Filipinos? Is its continuance justified against their expressed desire? Is it necessary for the United States, economically or strategically?

(*d*) The British Empire and world politics.

Assignment twenty-one: The British Empire and Latin America

* *Barnes*, 245–272.

i. The historical background.
  (*i*) Early developments.
  (*ii*) Parties and the philosophy of colonies.
    a. The "Little Englanders."
    b. The Tories.
    c. The Liberals: Durham, Buller, Gibbon Wakefield.
ii. The extent of the Empire.
iii. The reasons for British primacy.
  (*i*) Early attraction of overseas enterprise.
  (*ii*) The capacity for calculating self-interest.
  (*iii*) The spirit and training of the colonial service.
iv. The types of British possessions.
  (*i*) The self-governing colonies.
  (*ii*) The crown colonies.
  (*iii*) Protectorates.
  (*iv*) India.
  (*v*) Mandates.
v. Imperial union and imperial preference.
  (*i*) The Imperial Conferences.
  (*ii*) The policy of Chamberlain.
vi. The distribution of British commerce.
vii. The effects of the World War.
  (*i*) Imperial defense.
  (*ii*) Dominion nationalism.
viii. The future of the British Empire.
  (*i*) The weakening of rivals.

        - (*ii*) Methods of coöperation.
        - (*iii*) The weight of vested interests.
- (*e*) Modern imperialism and Latin America.
    - i. The United States as an imperialist power.
        - (*i*) The conquest of the continent.
        - (*ii*) The entry into Latin America.
        - (*iii*) Financial imperialism.
    - ii. The growth of Latin America.
        - (*i*) Spanish rule.
        - (*ii*) The revolutions.
        - (*iii*) The origins and meaning of the Monroe Doctrine.
        - (*iv*) The growth of independence.
        - (*v*) The "A.B.C. Powers."
    - iii. Developments of the Monroe Doctrine.
        - (*i*) The interpretation of Polk.
        - (*ii*) The isthmian canal project.
        - (*iii*) The Anglo-American dispute over Venezuela.
        - (*iv*) The doctrines of Roosevelt.
            - *a.* Repudiation of the "Drago Doctrine."
            - *b.* The right to maintain order.
        - (*v*) Wilson and the policy of non-aggrandizement.
        - (*vi*) The World War and the moral basis of the doctrine.
        - (*vii*) Aggressive post-war interpretation of the doctrine.
            - *a.* The theory of moral responsibility.
            - *b.* Intervention in Nicaragua.
            - *c.* Liberal opposition.
    - iv. The United States and Mexico.
        - (*i*) The rule of Diaz.
        - (*ii*) Wilson and "watchful waiting."
        - (*iii*) The failure of Pershing.
        - (*iv*) The call for intervention on behalf of property.
        - (*v*) Opposition by Borah and the advocates of peace.
        - (*vi*) The achievement of Morrow.
    - v. Control of the Caribbean by the United States.
        - (*i*) Lack of internal stability.
        - (*ii*) Increase of trade.
        - (*iii*) The protection of the Panama Canal.
        - (*iv*) The area controlled.
    - vi. The United States south of the Equator.
        - (*i*) Lack of control.
            - *a.* European economic domination.
            - *b.* Resentment of intrusion by the United States.
        - (*ii*) The policy of "Pan-Americanism."
            - *a.* Disproportionate power of United States.
            - *b.* Commercial interest in Monroe Doctrine.
            - *c.* Cultural differences.
    - vii. The economic value of Latin America.
        - (*i*) The extent of United States trade.
        - (*ii*) Investments in Latin America.
    - viii. The future of Latin American relations.
        - (*i*) The growing power of South America.
        - (*ii*) The possibilities of foreign interference

    - (*iii*) The need for a policy of good-will.
- (*f*) The effects of imperialism on overseas areas.

Assignment twenty-two: The effects of imperialism

* *Barnes*, 273–289.

- i. The spread of material culture.
    - (*i*) The factory system.
    - (*ii*) Ruthless foreign exploitation.
    - (*iii*) The growth of urban life.
    - (*iv*) The growth of population.
    - (*v*) Emigration.
    - (*vi*) The protest of the proletariat.
- ii. Political institutions.
    - (*i*) Autocratic white bureaucracy.
    - (*ii*) Western political ideals — Japan and China.
    - (*iii*) Autonomy — The British Dominions.
    - (*iv*) Assimilation — Algeria.
    - (*v*) Association — Morocco, Egypt.
    - (*vi*) The rise of nationalism.
        - *a.* Direct imitation of Europe.
        - *b.* Resentment of insults.
- iii. Social customs.
    - (*i*) General non-interference with native customs.
    - (*ii*) The suppression of cruelty.
    - (*iii*) Changes in sex mores.
- iv. Friction between westerners and orientals.
    - (*i*) The lack of contacts.
    - (*ii*) The assumption of superiority.
    - (*iii*) Interference with caste.
- v. The work of missions.
    - (*i*) The value of medical work.
    - (*ii*) The "part-time missionary."
    - (*iii*) Opposition to Christianity.
- vi. The "white man's burden."
    - (*i*) The prevalence of illiteracy.
    - (*ii*) Education and contempt for the westerner.
    - (*iii*) Native labor.
    - (*iv*) Cruelty and debauchery.
    - (*v*) Alcohol and drugs.
    - (*vi*) Famine and native material losses.

- (*g*) The reaction of imperialism on Europe and America.
    - i. Economic results.
        - (*i*) New commodities.
        - (*ii*) The development of credit institutions.
        - (*iii*) The mechanism of international trade.
        - (*iv*) The volume of money and price levels.
        - (*v*) Trading policies.
        - (*vi*) The profit and loss of imperialism.
            - *a.* The volume of trade added by control.
            - *b.* The difficulty of monopoly.
            - *c.* The costs of administration and protection.

ii. Political influences.
    - (*i*) The weakening of democracy.
    - (*ii*) The lessening of funds for social improvement.
    - (*iii*) The burden of armaments.
    - (*iv*) Administrative training.

iii. Scientific and cultural progress.
    - (*i*) The physical and natural sciences.
    - (*ii*) Medicine.
    - (*iii*) The social sciences.
    - (*iv*) Philosophy and literature.
    - (*v*) The arts.
    - (*vi*) Psychological influences.
        - *a.* The spirit of sacrifice.
        - *b.* The assumption of superiority.

iv. The future of imperialism.

QUESTIONS

1. Consider the evolution of the British philosophy of colonies in relation to internal developments in England and the changes of foreign policy and relations. Which of the views taken seems to you the sanest and the most likely to promote the good of civilization?

2. How far has the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine been a necessary result of its first premises? Is it justified by current conceptions of international morality? Has its existence forced on the United States a policy of control in Central America and the Caribbean as part of its obligations to other powers?

3. Do you think that the humanitarian ideals of the American people have on the whole made more for or against a policy of imperialism? Do you believe that our interventions have generally been more beneficial and constructive than the imperialism of other nations? If so, how far is this due to better business methods?

4. Consider the reasons for the failure of the imperialist aims of the United States south of the Equator. Do you think it has been a good thing for ourselves? How serious are the dangers to the United States in that area, and how may they be avoided? Is Pan-Americanism a possible policy for the future, and on what basis could it be established?

5. Do you believe that the favorable reactions of imperialism on America and Europe have outweighed or compensated for the unfavorable? How far does the contribution of imperialism to science and art justify any sufferings of native peoples or excuse those who have caused them? Have the natives themselves profited from such gains?

C. The war and the return of peace.

Assignment twenty-three: The war complex

* *Barnes*, 293–305.

(*a*) The war complex.
- i. Biological causes of war.
    - (*i*) The pressure of population.
    - (*ii*) The desire of nations not to lose their citizens.
        - *a.* The appropriation of colonies.
        - *b.* The struggle of the excluded powers.

    - (*iii*) Man as a fighting animal.
    - (*iv*) The fallacy of "Social Darwinism."
        - *a.* The falseness of the analogy.
        - *b.* The counter-selective tendency of war.
- ii. Psychological causes of war.
    - (*i*) War as a noble occupation.
        - *a.* Unselfishness.
        - *b.* Group devotion.
    - (*ii*) Territorial aggression.
        - *a.* Alarmist threats.
        - *b.* The need of preparedness.
    - (*iii*) The cult of patriotism.
        - *a.* The ideal of devotion to one's community.
        - *b.* "Hundred-percentism."
    - (*iv*) Nationalistic history.
        - *a.* History as a record of military achievement.
        - *b.* The distortions of school textbooks.
- iii. Sociological causes of war.
    - (*i*) Group struggle.
        - *a.* Conflict of interests as incentive to war.
        - *b.* Struggle as a social discipline and source of culture.
    - (*ii*) The struggle for habitats (*vide supra*, *i*).
- iv. Economic origins of war.
    - (*i*) The struggle for markets and raw materials.
    - (*ii*) The search for investments.
    - (*iii*) Intervention by governments to protect interests of nationals.
    - (*iv*) Tariff wars and international friction.
    - (*v*) The propaganda of armament manufacturers.
- v. Political causes of war.
    - (*i*) The concept of nationality.
    - (*ii*) The dogma of absolute sovereignty.
        - *a.* A stumbling-block to international organization.
        - *b.* The pluralist attack.
- vi. The possibilities of creating peace.
    - (*i*) The danger of panaceas.
    - (*ii*) The need of understanding.
    - (*iii*) The requirement of a complex policy.

QUESTIONS

1. How far has the pressure of population or the fear thereof been a genuine cause of international friction, and how far has it been the means for alarmist propaganda? If it is a danger, how far have nations taken, or are they taking, all the means within their control to prevent it?

2. How far do you think it is true that it is man's nature to struggle? To what extent can this instinct be sublimated or transferred to a struggle with the forces of nature? Would such a transfer itself increase the degree of international coöperation? What can education do to bring it about?

3. Examine the general relation of education and the war complex. Consider the importance of education in early years in removing this complex. How far are educators aware of this need, and what steps are they taking to meet it? What should be the program of teaching on nationalism? Or should that force be ignored?

4. How far is the dogma of international sovereignty a cause of international strife and a hindrance to international coöperation? How far has its theoretical basis been destroyed? Are there any practical signs of its abandonment or limitation with a view to world peace? How far does it correspond to the facts of the present-day world?

5. What, in your opinion, should be the attitude of friends of peace toward the present world situation? What subjects should they study, and how? What philosophy of life would they formulate? How would they try to further their aims in practical life? Should they have a definite program? Would it be rigid or flexible?

(*b*) The World War in the making.

Assignment twenty-four: The diplomatic background of the war

* *Barnes*, 306–327.

- i. The causes of war in general.
  - (*i*) "The international anarchy."
  - (*ii*) Degree of German responsibility.
    - *a.* Amount of preparedness.
    - *b.* The myth of Nietzschean influence.
    - *c.* General Bernhardi and public opinion.
    - *d.* The Pan-German League.
  - (*iii*) Divided guilt.
    - *a.* Urges to war in every country.
    - *b.* Analogies with Germany.
      - 1. Preparedness.
      - 2. Jingoism.
- ii. European diplomacy, 1870–1912.
  - (*i*) The great alliances.
    - *a.* The preservation of the balance of power.
    - *b.* The genesis of the Triple Alliance, 1879–1882.
      - 1. The prevention of French revenge.
      - 2. Friendship with Russia.
      - 3. Abandonment of Russia and cultivation of England.
    - *c.* The formation of the Triple Entente, 1893–1904.
      - 1. The French alliance with Russia.
      - 2. The French bid for English friendship.
    - *d.* The politics of prestige.
      - 1. The weakening of the Triple Alliance.
      - 2. The aggressiveness of the Triple Entente.
  - (*ii*) Alsace-Lorraine.
    - *a.* French hopes for recovery.
    - *b.* The psychology of *revanche*.
  - (*iii*) The Near East.
    - *a.* Russian desire for access to the Straits.
    - *b.* The opposition of England.
    - *c.* The politics of Isvolski.
    - *d.* Balkan developments.
  - (*iv*) Diplomacy in Morocco.
    - *a.* Germany and the Pact of Algeciras.
    - *b.* The growth of French bellicosity.
  - (*v*) The Hague Conferences, 1899 and 1907.
    - *a.* Poor German diplomacy.
    - *b.* Russian bad faith.



EUROPE in 1914

RUSSIA
SWEDEN
NORWAY
DENMARK
GERMANY
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
ENGLAND
SCOTLAND
WALES
IRELAND
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
RUMANIA
BULGARIA
TURKEY
SERBIA
ALBANIA
GREECE
ITALY
SPAIN
PORTUGAL

- (*vi*) Anglo-German naval rivalry.
- (*vii*) The allocation of responsibility.
  - *a.* Least guilt of England and Germany.
  - *b.* English fears of Germany.
  - *c.* The diffusion of responsibility.

iii. The diplomatic revolution, 1912–1914.

- (*i*) Paris intrigue.
  - *a.* Isvolski at Paris.
  - *b.* The accession of Poincaré.
  - *c.* The Straits and Alsace-Lorraine.
  - *d.* Franco-Russian military alliance.
  - *e.* Russian bribery.
  - *f.* The conversion of Sazonov.
  - *g.* War preparations.
  - *h.* Fear of Anglo-German rapprochement.
- (*ii*) The attitude of England.
  - *a.* The Mansion House speech.
  - *b.* Grey and the British navy.
  - *c.* England committed to aid France and Russia.
  - *d.* The attitude of the British Press.
- (*iii*) The German side.
  - *a.* Italy's secret agreement with France.
  - *b.* Friction between Germany and Austria over Serbia.
  - *c.* The Schmitt-Kanner myth.
- (*iv*) The eve of the war.
  - *a.* Favorable conditions for war in 1914.
  - *b.* The erroneous conception of Russian drifting.
  - *c.* The assassination plot.
- (*v*) The murder of the archduke and its predisposing conditions.
  - *a.* The Austro-Serbian impasse.
  - *b.* Russian alarm at German influence in Turkey.
  - *c.* The Serbian government aware of the murder plot.
  - *d.* Austrian suspicions of government complicity.
- (*vi*) General diplomatic guilt.
  - *a.* The innocence of Germany.
  - *b.* The guilt of France and Russia.

QUESTIONS

1. Consider the effects of secret diplomacy on pre-war Europe? To what extent do you think it was responsible for the war? Do you think that open diplomacy and the democratic control of foreign affairs might have prevented its outbreak?

2. Examine the relative importance of the proximate and more distant causes of the war. In the light of your conclusion, how would you apportion the blame for the catastrophe? Where would you say the emphasis must be laid if we are to prevent future outbreaks of a similar nature?

3. Estimate the part played by the Press in the various countries in creating the spirit which made the war possible. Does this suggest any reflections as to the value or reality of the freedom of the Press? Can you suggest any reform or method of control that would prevent such occurrences in the future?

4. Compare the parts played by governments and by different vested interests in producing the conditions for a world conflict. How far was the war the result of

popular opinion and desire in the various countries? Does this suggest any reflections on the efficacy of democracy? If so, what reforms or changes would you suggest?

5. How far were governments forewarned of the coming of the war? Did they take any steps to prevent it? If so, why did they fail, and to whom can one attribute the resultant blame? Or were they all at the mercy of forces they did not know how to control?


The BREAK-UP of AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Former Austro-Hungarian territory shaded

The frontiers in various cases have yet to be precisely defined.

GERMANY
Prague
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
Silesia
POLAND
UKRAINE
Lemberg
Cracow
Galicia
Teschen
?
Munich
Danube
Vienna
Pressburg
AUSTRIA
SWITZER?
Trentino
Buda Pest
HUNGARY
Theiss
Bukowina
Transylvania
RUMANIA
Maros
Drave
Zagreb (Agram)
Trieste
Fiume
Venice
ITALY
SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE KD
Save
Danube
Banat
Belgrade
Bucharest
Danube
Bosnia
Dalmatia
Zara
Spalato
ADRIATIC
SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
ALBANIA
BULGARIA
J.F.H.

(*c*) Major effects of the war on Europe.

Assignment twenty-five: Major effects of the war on Europe

* *Hayes*, II, 765–779; * Buell, *Europe, a history of ten years*, 1–18.

i. The national revolution in southeastern Europe and the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.
  (*i*) The revolution in Bulgaria.
  (*ii*) The revolution in Turkey.
  (*iii*) The revolution in Austria-Hungary.
  (*iv*) Czechoslovakia.
  (*v*) Jugoslavia.
  (*vi*) Separation of Transylvania, Bukowina, and Galicia from Austria.
  (*vii*) Separation of Hungary from Austria.
  (*viii*) The revolution at Vienna, 1918.

ii. The democratic revolution in Germany.
  (*i*) Popular opposition rises and grows, 1916, 1917.
  (*ii*) Political reform fails, 1917–1918.

        (*iii*) Revolution in Germany, 1918.
        (*iv*) Partisan strife — reactionaries and communists.
        (*v*) The Weimar Assembly, 1919.
    iii. The resurrection of Poland.
        (*i*) Poland in the World War.
        (*ii*) Pilsudski.
        (*iii*) Polish Republic, 1918.

QUESTIONS

1. Why did Austria-Hungary so long hold together? What trends for reunion are visible today?

2. What is the present economic, social, and cultural status of Czechoslovakia?

3. Characterize the constitution of the Weimar Assembly.

4. What are the difficulties inherent in the integrating of Poland?

5. What grounds may be found for the assertion that the World War damaged the supremacy of European civilization?

6. Compare post-war European and American standards of living, using bathtubs and Ford cars as an index. Make the same comparison, using universities and opera houses as an index.

7. Show how the political problems of Russia and Austria-Hungary before the war were due to an outmoded theory of the state. What solution of these difficulties did the Versailles treaty propose?

8. Why were England, France, and Russia each opposed to the political and economic expansion of Germany? Discuss the alliances arising from this rivalry.

9. Show, by referring to the events of the summer of 1914, the difficulties inherent in determining which nation or nations were responsible for the war.

(*d*) The Treaty of Versailles.

Assignment twenty-six: The treaty and the league

* *Buell*, 18–39 ("The Treaty of Versailles"); * *Barnes*, 511–533.

- i. Background of the treaty.
    - (*i*) Effects of the war on Europe.
    - (*ii*) Decline of Allied idealism.
        - *a*. Conflict between the "fourteen points" and secret treaties among the Allies.
        - *b*. Post-war hysteria.
            - 1. Desire of vengeance against Germany.
            - 2. Fear of Germany — especially on part of France.
            - 3. British "khaki" elections of 1918.
- ii. The Peace Conference.
    - (*i*) Exclusion of defeated Central Powers.
    - (*ii*) Clash between American aims as represented by President Wilson and aims of the other victorious nations.
    - (*iii*) Wilson compromises in order to obtain acceptance of the League of Nations.
    - (*iv*) Final signing and ratification of treaty by Germany under protest.
- iii. Provisions of the treaty.
    - (*i*) Complexity of the settlement.
    - (*ii*) Losses of Germany in territory and population.


EUROPE
in 1920
NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
RUSSIA
ESTHONIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
DANZIG
E PRUSSIA
White Russia
DENMARK
IRISH FREE STATE
SCOTLAND
WALES
ENGLAND
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
GERMANY
POLAND
Ukrania
CZECKOSLOVAKIA
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
RUMANIA
Georgia
JUGOSLAVIA
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
GREECE
TURKEY
ITALY
SPAIN
PORTUGAL

        - *a.* In Europe: new states.
        - *b.* Colonies: the mandate system.
    - (*iii*) Economic and commercial losses of Germany.
    - (*iv*) The burden of reparations.
    - (*v*) Disarmament terms.
    - (*vi*) The "war guilt" clause.
    - (*vii*) Inclusion of League of Nations Covenant.

QUESTIONS

1. Which phases of the Paris Peace Conference showed the lack of progress in international relations? Which phases give most hope for the future?

2. Discuss the Treaty of Versailles, treating of (1) territorial changes, (2) reparations, (3) economic changes, (4) disarmament, (5) war guilt, (6) the League of Nations.

3. What judgment will future historians pass upon Woodrow Wilson as a world statesman?

(*e*) The League of Nations and world peace.

* *Barnes*, 511–533.

- i. The history of plans for international organization.
    - (*i*) Early writers.
        - *a.* The desire for a united Christendom.
        - *b.* Bentham on armament limitation and arbitration.
        - *c.* Kant's detailed plans and studies.
    - (*ii*) Alexander I and the Holy Alliance.
        - *a.* Christian mysticism.
        - *b.* The plan not taken seriously.
    - (*iii*) The Concert of Europe.
        - *a.* The periodical assembly of the powers.
        - *b.* Protection against revolution.
    - (*iv*) Later theorists.
        - *a.* The desire for general peace.
        - *b.* Coudenhove-Kalergi and Pan-Europe.
- ii. The creation of the league.
    - (*i*) American initiative.
        - *a.* The League to Enforce Peace.
        - *b.* The interest of Wilson.
    - (*ii*) The Paris Peace Conference.
        - *a.* The drafting of the covenant.
        - *b.* Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles.
    - (*iii*) The failure of America to join.
    - (*iv*) The league opens, 1920.
- iii. The structure of the league.
    - (*i*) The purpose of the league.
        - *a.* International peace and security.
        - *b.* Justice between nations.
        - *c.* The rule of international law.
    - (*ii*) The Assembly of the league.
        - *a.* Representation and voting.
        - *b.* General control of policy.

ORGANISATION CHART OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS


The Assembly
The Permanent Court of International Justice
The Council
The International Labour Organisation
The Permanent Secretariat
Technical Organisations
The Organisation for Communications and Transit
Economic and Financial Organisation
Health Organisation
Permanent Advisory Commissions
Committee on Intellectual Cooperation
Permanent Mandates Commission
Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions
Committee for the Suppression of the Traffic in Opium and Dangerous Drugs
Committee for the Protection of Children and Young Persons
Temporary Advisory Commissions
Preparatory Commission for the International Economic Conference
High Commissariat for Refugees
Committee for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference
Administrative Organisations
Governing Commission of the Saar Basin
High Commissioner for the Free City of Danzig.
Greek Refugees Settlement Commission (Athens).
Commissioner for the Settlement of Bulgarian Refugees (Sofia)

Courtesy of the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association.

    (*iii*) The Council.
        a. Composition.
        b. Powers.
            1. To deal with emergencies.
            2. To form a general executive.
    (*iv*) The Secretariat.
        a. A permanent civil service.
        b. The Secretary General as acting president.
        c. The preparation of material for Assembly and Council.
    (*v*) The World Court.
        a. Composition.
        b. Competence.
        c. Permanently in session.
iv. The league and the nations.
    (*i*) An aid to independent development.
        a. Practical benefits.
        b. Psychological effects.
    (*ii*) The problem of equality.
        a. Predominance of large powers in Council.
        b. Equality in Assembly.
    (*iii*) The question of boundaries.
        a. The preservation of small states.
        b. The power to change boundaries.
    (*iv*) The prevention of war.

    - *a.* Provisions for arbitration and enquiry.
    - *b.* The achievements of the league in settling disputes.
  - (*v*) The conflict of nationality.
    - *a.* Economic problems and the Economic and Finance Committee.
    - *b.* Communications and the Committee on Communications and Transit.
  - (*vi*) The protection of minorities.
  - (*vii*) The achievements of the league.
    - *a.* The neglect of petitions.
    - *b.* The treatment of big states.
    - *c.* The discouragement of minorities.
    - *d.* The failure to undo the iniquities of Versailles.
- v. The league and the capitalist system.
  - (*i*) The support of capitalist policies.
  - (*ii*) The International Labor Organization.
    - *a.* Creation.
    - *b.* Meetings and representation.
    - *c.* Conventions.
  - (*iii*) The International Labor Office.
    - *a.* The governing body.
    - *b.* The technical staff.
      - 1. Publications.
      - 2. Drafting conventions.
- vi. The league and imperialism.
  - (*i*) Failure to check international economic strife.
  - (*ii*) The mandates.
    - *a.* Constitution.
    - *b.* The Mandates Commission.
    - *c.* The division of the mandates.
    - *d.* Degree of success in controlling mandatory powers.
  - (*iii*) The German desire for former colonies.
- vii. The league and disarmament.
  - (*i*) The statement of the Covenant, Article VIII.
  - (*ii*) The Permanent Advisory Commission.
  - (*iii*) The Temporary Mixed Commission.
  - (*iv*) The continuance of armament growth.
  - (*v*) Provisions to delay war.
- viii. Miscellaneous activities of the league.
  - (*i*) Public health.
  - (*ii*) Protection of women and children.
  - (*iii*) Intellectual coöperation.
- ix. The expenses of the league.

QUESTIONS

1. Consider the value of early proposals for international organization. What forces caused them to remain essentially ineffective and theoretical? Why and how had conditions changed after the World War?

2. What were the inherent defects of Wilson's conception of a League of Nations as finally embodied in the Treaty of Versailles? What outside forces militated against its performing effectively the work he had hoped from it?

3. Estimate how far the league has been successful in overcoming local and national particularisms. Can its failures be attributed to its own structure or to the apathy of public opinion? To what extent is it capable of creating opinion, and what are the results on the policy of its individual members?

4. How far is it true to say that the league is a bulwark for capitalist powers? Examine in this connection the composition and work of the International Labor Organization. How far does it further, and how far does it control, working class aspirations?

5. Do you think that the league is more valuable for its direct attack on war or for its oblique offensive in the creation of peace? Examine in this connection the value of its social work in creating international ties. Is this any justification for the view that the practical interconnections of the modern world will make war impossible?

6. Consider the value of the mandates, both in conception and practice, as a means of checking the imperialist spirit. What is their value to the mandatory and to the native? How far are they successful in setting a standard for the government of backward peoples? Would it be desirable or possible to extend the system to all such peoples?

(*f*) The peace movement.

Assignment twenty-seven: The peace movement

* *Barnes*, 534–554.

- i. Development before the war.
  - (*i*) The attitude of the Quakers.
  - (*ii*) American initiative.
    - *a*. Early workers.
    - *b*. The Lake Mohonk Conferences.
    - *c*. The World Peace Foundation.
    - *d*. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  - (*iii*) The movement in Europe.
    - *a*. The Interparliamentary Union.
    - *b*. The Nobel Peace Prize.
  - (*iv*) The Hague Conferences — *vide supra C* (*b*) ii (*v*).
    - *a*. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1899.
    - *b*. The failure of the Conference of 1907.
  - (*v*) The Bryan arbitration treaties.
  - (*vi*) The strength of the movement before the war.
- ii. The Washington Conference on Disarmament, 1921–1922.
  - (*i*) The maintenance of the status quo.
  - (*ii*) The naval ratio.
  - (*iii*) Failure to limit essential armament.
  - (*iv*) Oriental adjustments.
    - *a*. The Nine Power Pact.
    - *b*. The Four Power Pact.
- iii. The failure of the Geneva Conference, 1927.
  - (*i*) Conflict of United States and Britain.
  - (*ii*) Secret Anglo-French agreement.
- iv. Locarno.
  - (*i*) The failure of the Geneva Protocol, 1925.
  - (*ii*) The need for European security.
  - (*iii*) The Locarno Conventions.

        - *a.* Boundary guarantees.
        - *b.* The Permanent Conciliation Commission.
    - (*iv*) The admission of Germany to the league.
    - (*v*) Locarno as a new method.
    - (*vi*) The defects of Locarno.
        - *a.* Issues not settled.
        - *b.* Rhineland not at once evacuated.
- v. The Kellogg Pact.
    - (*i*) The movement for the outlawry of war.
    - (*ii*) The Briand proposal.
        - *a.* Motives.
        - *b.* American reactions.
    - (*iii*) The counter-proposals of Kellogg.
    - (*iv*) The compromise.
    - (*v*) The acceptance of the pact.
        - *a.* The signatories.
        - *b.* The text.
    - (*vi*) The limitations of the pact.
        - *a.* Interpretations and the exchange of notes.
        - *b.* British reservations.
        - *c.* Loopholes for diplomacy.
        - *d.* No provision to revise treaties.
        - *e.* Failure to provide for disarmament.
        - *f.* No attack on real causes of war.
        - *g.* Failure to deal with European realities.
    - (*vii*) Criticisms of the pact.
        - *a.* Soviet Russia.
        - *b.* Academic criticism.
    - (*viii*) The bad faith of the signatories.
        - *a.* French fortification plans.
        - *b.* The British and Singapore.
        - *c.* The United States.
            - 1. Nicaragua.
            - 2. The Big Navy Bill.
    - (*ix*) The value of the pact.
        - *a.* The importance of the gesture.
        - *b.* The basis for future developments.

QUESTIONS

1. What have been the obstacles to general disarmament since the World War? Do you think such a condition is desirable in view of the present state of the world? Estimate the value of what has already been accomplished.

2. What was the value of Locarno to world peace? Do you think that, in view of European conditions at the time, more could have been accomplished? Was the publicity given to its results in any way a danger for the future?

3. In the light of the Kellogg Pact, is one justified in claiming that the old-time diplomacy is at an end? Or is it truer to say that new methods have been superimposed on, and added to, the old?

4. Consider the extent of the insincerity of the signatories of the Kellogg Pact. Is it correct to assume that their attitude reflected correctly the views of their peoples? If not, do you consider this a bad or a good sign?

5. In what way does the post-war differ from the pre-war peace movement? How deep-seated is the change, and what has caused it? What, in your opinion, does it betoken for the future of the world?

D. The nations after the War.

(*a*) Germany and France.

Assignment twenty-eight: Germany and France after the war

* *Buell*, 40–59, 61–77.

- i. Germany defaults.
  - (*i*) Early difficulties with treaty.
    - *a.* Disorganized supervision by Allies.
    - *b.* Failure of punitive clauses.
    - *c.* German resentment of Rhineland occupation and unwillingness to disarm.
  - (*ii*) Reparations.
    - *a.* Spa percentages, 1920.
    - *b.* Germany contests payments and Allies tighten grip on Rhineland, 1921.
    - *c.* Total amount fixed at thirty-one billion dollars.
    - *d.* Bond issues.
    - *e.* Difficulties in meeting payment arouse French fears of default.
    - *f.* Progress of inflation.
    - *g.* French occupation of Ruhr valley, 1923.
      - 1. England dissents.
      - 2. Crisis in Germany.
      - 3. Failure of occupation.
- ii. The security of France.
  - (*i*) France and security.
    - *a.* Military alliances with Belgium and Poland.
    - *b.* Weakening of tie with England.
    - *c.* Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Roumania.
      - 1. Moderate character of agreements.
    - *d.* Free-zones controversy triumph of international law.

QUESTIONS

1. In what ways did the course of internal events in Germany hinder the application of the disarmament clause of the treaty? What troubles did the Allies encounter in the occupied territory?

2. Trace the status of the reparations problem from 1919 till the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. Contrast the French with the British attitude on this question.

3. Why was the occupation of the Ruhr, ostensibly a French victory, in reality a hindrance to the settlement of the reparations problem?

4. With which nations and for what purposes did France contract alliances after the war? How do the later alliances show a change in the spirit and aim of French diplomacy?

5. Why is French diplomacy motivated by considerations of security rather than those of economic advantage?

(*b*) Reparations.

Assignment twenty-nine: Reparations

* *Buell*, 78–97, 431–438.

- i. The Experts' Plan.
  - (*i*) The Experts' or "Dawes" Plan.
    - *a.* Necessity of fixing reasonable reparations payments.
    - *b.* Idea of expert study of Germany's "capacity."
  - (*ii*) American share — Owen D. Young.
  - (*iii*) Provisions.
    - *a.* Loan to restore German finances and currency.
    - *b.* Rising schedule of payments, derived from earmarked taxes and bonds covering railroads and important industries.
    - *c.* Bank of Issue to prevent inflation and handle payments.
    - *d.* Supervision by commissions.
  - (*iv*) French acceptance of plan as new guarantee.
  - (*v*) Arbitration of any future defaults.
  - (*vi*) Transfer Committee under Allied control.
  - (*vii*) Plan aids in restoring German industry.
    - *a.* Rationalization.
    - *b.* Interrelation of reparations, loans.
    - *c.* Allied war debts and German exports.
  - (*viii*) Temporary character of plan.
- ii. The Young Plan, 1929.
  - (*i*) Payment to be completed by fifty-eight reduced annuities.
  - (*ii*) Total value of reparations, $8,879,040,000.
  - (*iii*) Flexibility provisions.
  - (*iv*) Bank of International Settlements.
  - (*v*) Departure from Spa percentages.
    - *a.* Mr. Snowden at The Hague.
    - *b.* Further linkage of reparations and Allied debts to the United States.

QUESTIONS

1. What new ways of looking at the problem of reparations did the so-called "Dawes" plan inaugurate?

2. How did the Experts' Commission provide for the raising of the money for the annual reparations payments? What problem did the Transfer Plan attempt to solve?

3. By what means did the Dawes Plan insure the Allies against trickery in the matter of reparations? Why did Germany accept these ignominious provisions?

4. How does the Young Plan of 1929 apparently meet the need for a final settlement of the reparations question? Which objectionable features of the Dawes Plan does it eliminate?

5. Discuss the American and European views on the debt owed to the United States by the Allies. What provisions for liquidation are incorporated in the Young Plan?

(*c*) France and England.

Assignment thirty: France and England

* *Buell*, 119–133, 134–156.

- i. The reconstruction of France.
  - (*i*) Devastation of France.
  - (*ii*) Financial difficulties.
    - *a.* Cost of reconstruction.
    - *b.* Unbalanced budget.
    - *c.* Increasing national debt.
    - *d.* Depreciated currency.
  - (*iii*) Failure of successive ministries to solve problems.
  - (*iv*) Poincaré Ministry, 1926–1929.
    - *a.* Taxes increased.
    - *b.* Debt funded.
    - *c.* Budget balanced.
  - (*v*) Reasons for financial troubles.
    - *a.* Idea that Germany would pay French debts.
    - *b.* Government by groups of parties.
    - *c.* Self-sufficiency.
  - (*vi*) The problem of Alsace-Lorraine.
    - *a.* School problem.
      - 1. Concordat of Alsace-Lorraine with pope.
      - 2. Attempt by Herriot ministry to introduce French educational system.
      - 3. Formation of *Heimatbund* — for autonomy.
      - 4. Criticism of French overcentralization.
  - (*vii*) Reopening of church and state question.
    - *a.* Appointment of Minister to the Vatican, 1921.
  - (*viii*) The decline of population.
  - (*ix*) Connection with military security.
    - *a.* Search for alliances.
    - *b.* Encouragement of large families.
  - (*x*) Labor shortage.
    - *a.* Immigration of Poles and Italians.
- ii. The status of England.
  - (*i*) Problem of food supply for England.
  - (*ii*) Cost of maintaining the empire.
  - (*iii*) Economic losses resulting from the war.
  - (*iv*) Unemployment.
    - *a.* Dole, unemployment insurance.
  - (*v*) Free trade *vs.* imperial preference.
    - *a.* Support of protection by the Conservatives.
    - *b.* Repudiation of protection by the people, 1923.
  - (*vi*) The Labor government in power, 1924.
    - *a.* Ramsay MacDonald.
    - *b.* Zinovieff letter.
  - (*vii*) Mildly protective legislation by the Conservatives, 1925.
  - (*viii*) The coal crisis.
    - *a.* Importance of coal to English industry.
    - *b.* Post-war decline in exports.

c. Consequent reduction of wages.
d. Subsidies to producers, 1925.
e. Royal Commission Report, 1926.
f. General strike, 1926.
g. Trade Disputes Act, 1927.
h. Failure to solve problems.

QUESTIONS

1. What were the causes for the decline in value of the franc? How was the crisis met in 1926?

2. What feature of French government lies at the root of the trouble in Alsace-Lorraine? How has the annexation of this territory affected the relations of church and state?

3. How does England feed her population? What were the effects of the war on British economic life?

4. What is the present status of free trade and protection in England? What is the outlook for the future?

5. Why is the matter of Prayer Book revision a concern of the British Parliament? What solution of the church-state question has been proposed by the High Church party?

6. The dissolution of the British Empire has been called the most important historical event of our generation. Justify this statement.

(*d*) The British Commonwealth since the war.

Assignment thirty-one: The British Commonwealth

* *Hayes*, II, 640–657; * *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (pamphlet, World Peace Foundation), 273–288.

Great Britain came through the World War with much less serious derangement in her fiscal and economic existence than did her neighbors on the Continent. Nevertheless, the war-time dislocation not only dislodged Great Britain perhaps permanently from her place as economic mistress of the world, but, in addition, many serious British publicists question their country's capacity to maintain the proud position which she still holds. The post-war unemployment problem has stubbornly resisted solution. A million wage earners have been maintained in whole or in part for now ten years by a system of doles that obviously cannot be permanent.

An equally important discovery from the war was that Britain's self-governing dominions had almost outgrown imperial tutelage. This necessitated a reinterpretation of the nature and organization of the empire. Instead of being the mother of a group of immature nations, Great Britain found herself merely a leader among her adult daughters.

The British Empire passed away into the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The new British Commonwealth is represented in four continents. If India receives dominion status, as seems likely, the number will be five. The future alone can tell whether sentiment, a common cultural heritage, and certain mutual advantages can keep its components together, or whether these ties will be progressively relaxed and the dominions emerge completely independent.



The British Commonwealth, including imperial areas.

- i. The British Commonwealth.
  - (*i*) The dominions.
    - *a*. Canada.
      - 1. Lord Durham's recommendations, 1837.
        - (1) Self-government.
        - (2) Federation.
      - 2. British North America Act, 1867.
        - (1) Federation with residuary powers vested in dominion government.
        - (2) Ministerial responsibility.
    - *b*. Australia and New Zealand.
      - 1. Commonwealth Act, 1900.
        - (1) Federation with residuary powers noted in state governments.
      - 2. Difficult labor situation.
      - 3. Advanced program of social legislation.

- *c.* South Africa.
  - 1. Boer War, 1899–1902.
  - 2. Union of South Africa, 1909.
    - (1) Strongly centralized government.
  - 3. Racial difficulties between whites, natives, and orientals.
- *d.* Irish Free State.
  - 1. Home Rule agitation, 1848–1914.
  - 2. Irish Republic — De Valera, 1919.
    - (1) Failure of Home Rule Act, 1920.
  - 3. Ulster accepts Act of 1920.
  - 4. Irish Free State Treaty, 1921.
  - 5. Constitution of 1922.
    - (1) Full dominion status.
    - (2) Ulster refuses to join; remains aloof.

(*ii*) Development of dominion self-government.

* *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (pamphlet, World Peace Foundation), 273–288.
W. P. Hall, *From empire to commonwealth*, ch. 15.

- *a.* Lessons of the American Revolution.
- *b.* Durham report.
- *c.* Failure of Joseph Chamberlain's plan of imperial federation.
  - 1. Imperial preference; free-trade opposition in England; growth of dominion protective-tariff systems.
  - 2. Imperial conference.
  - 3. Imperial defense; failure of dominions to coöperate effectively.
- *d.* Influence of the World War.
  - 1. Dominions participate as individuals.
  - 2. Separately represented at the Peace Conference, 1919.
  - 3. Individual membership in League of Nations.
- *e.* Limitations of self-government.
  - 1. Restricted to colonies with small native population and predominance of Anglo-Saxon stocks.

(*iii*) Imperial conference, 1926.

- *a.* Dominions autonomous and equal with Great Britain; the latter merely a first among equals.
- *b.* Absence of imperial constitution for the commonwealth.
- *c.* Power of the "king in person" the only legal bond of unity.

ii. Crown colonies.

Self-government in the British Empire has been carefully limited to those regions where the white population has outnumbered the natives. There has been no disposition to extend the privilege to native peoples unskilled in Anglo-Saxon political usages. The empire owns in the tropics and elsewhere dozens of provinces. As western culture penetrates these places, there has been a growing restlessness under economic serfdom.

(*i*) Coaling stations and points of call, *e. g.*, Malta, Falkland Islands.
(*ii*) Trading stations, concessions to chartered trading companies for exporting natural resources, *e. g.*, Rhodesia.

(*iii*) Protectorates, valuable chiefly as sources of raw materials, *e. g.*, Malay States, British East Africa.
(*iv*) Egypt.
  a. Technically independent.
  b. Veiled tutelage.
  c. Economic and strategic importance.

QUESTIONS

1. Compare the Canadian and the United States federal systems. Do you think that the greater legal unity achieved by the former is an aid or a hindrance to rapid economic development?

2. From the experience of Australia is one justified in concluding that an advanced program of social legislation will remove labor troubles in a country and create social unity and a common policy of development in the interests of the whole community.

3. Compare the racial problems of South Africa with those of the United States. Which do you consider are the more difficult to solve, and how will the means of solution differ?

4. Do you think that the Imperial Conference has in fact dissolved the British Empire? Or has it, by removing legal and formal bonds, strengthened the underlying unity?

5. Do you believe that Canada's anomalous position, with economic interests bound up with the United States, but joined to England by race and strong ties of sentiment, is a source of strength or weakness to the British Empire? Consider what effects the new United States tariff may have on its position, particularly in view of imperial preference.

6. Is common allegiance to the king an adequate bond between the dominions and the mother country in view of their increasing divergence in economic interest? Could a president fulfill this function equally well?

7. Does the position of the empire promote or hinder the growth of world peace? Is it true to say that the position of the dominions in the League of Nations gives England an unfair influence there? In deciding this, consider the actual policies of the various dominions at league conferences.

iii. India.

Assignment thirty-two: India

* Paul Paustian, "India," *Syllabus*, 292–315.

Assignment thirty-three: India — Continued

* Paul Paustian, "India," *Syllabus*, 315–337.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPORARY INDIA

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I. Historical Introduction

Since we are primarily interested in a study of the political and economic problems of contemporary India, we shall have time to trace only in the barest outline the development of Indian history from its ancient past to the present. Commercial contact with India had been quite well established as early as the period of the Roman Empire. Prior to that time, Alexander the Great had pierced the Himalayan boundary of Hindustan by forcing his way through the Khyber Pass. Relics of that early invasion by the Greek armies have been and continue to be discovered in northwest India, where the spade of the British archeologists is now uncovering some of the ancient cities[1] of India. Trade with India was carried on chiefly by means of long and arduous overland transport before the development of more trustworthy methods of sea transport.

In 1497, Vasco da Gama successfully rounded the Cape of Good Hope and landed in Calicut, thus bringing the West into trading relation with the East by a sea route. The Portuguese were not slow in developing trading posts in India following the brilliant achievement of Da Gama. The sixteenth century reflected the dominance of the Portuguese pioneers in the trade with India. This domination, however, was soon eclipsed. The seventeenth century witnessed the development of Dutch dominance in commercial matters in India, but the advantage was not consolidated sufficiently to prevent the entry of two more powerful national groups, the French and the English, in the struggle for the control of the rich Indian market.[2]

The British, Dutch, French, and Portuguese had come to India primarily to trade. Trade requires peace, and peace requires for its insurance a stable government. Hence, the desire and necessity for a strong government to enforce peace, which would permit commerce, gradually changed the attitude of the national groups who were interested in trade into a keen desire to establish governmental control over the Indian peoples. It is interesting to note the development of this changing attitude of the British interests in India.

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[1] Taxila and Harappa in Northwest India.

[2] For detailed account of the history of these events, see V. A. Smith, *Oxford history of India;* V. Chirol, *India old and new.*

During the sixteenth century the British East India Company quietly established trading posts in Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta. In times of political chaos, the trading company was not averse to protecting its trade by means of force. Gradually, in the effort to enforce peaceful trading conditions, the East India Company assumed more and more of the functions and powers of a government. The territory surrounding its trading posts was gradually enlarged. Out of these enlarged "trading spheres of influence" there were developed by the East India Company the Presidencies of Madras, Bengal, and Bombay, still the three most important commercial centers. Very summarily stated, the British course in India might be described as follows: The British came to India during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, intent upon profitable trade; during the first half of the eighteenth century, confronted by the growing power of French interests and the French governmental influence in India, the East India Company struggled with the French for commercial supremacy and territorial dominance; later in the eighteenth century, British interests achieved dominating control over most of India. The nineteenth century was utilized by the British to consolidate their gains, to strengthen their commercial position in India, and finally to add the Indian Empire to its possessions. While the policy of the British traders appears not to have been specifically expressed nor carefully and studiously developed, the student of British domination in India can note three well followed principles by means of which this amazing conquest was achieved: (1) non-intervention in the social structure of the Indian peoples unless a neutral position was practically impossible and unprofitable; (2) support of the stronger contestant in the native group struggles, thereby gaining the good will and, incidentally, the fealty of the victor; (3) eventual but gradual conquest of most of India for the British Empire. By following a policy of expediency dictated by the situation at any given moment, the British traders gradually shifted their emphasis from purely commercial considerations to frankly imperialistic designs.

After Clive had decisively defeated Surajah Dowlah, the Nabob of Bengal, in punishment for the atrocity known as "the Black Hole of Calcutta," 1756, in which 123 men had been suffocated, the Nabob was forced to enter into an alliance with the English. Not until after the battle of Plassey, 1757, however, did the English gain a strictly governmental control over any portion of India. Anglo-Indian history did not attain even the semblance of unity until after the passage of the Regulating Act of 1773 and the appointment of Warren Hastings as the first Governor General of Bengal. Hastings' efforts were devoted to the organization of an administration over the territory which Clive had won. Hastings very early in his career as Governor General sought to increase the company's revenue by putting a tax on salt and opium. He desired to recompense the company for its expenses of government by levying taxes on articles of general consumption. It is interesting to note that since his day the salt tax has been constantly used as a source of governmental revenue. Cornwallis, of American Revolutionary War fame, followed Hastings in the rôle of Governor General in 1785. His régime is remembered today for his hasty solution of the land tenure problem in Bengal, known as "the permanent settlement" of land taxes in that province. The main factors in a "settlement" were the persons with whom the contract should be made, the amount of money demanded, the modes of collection, the penalties for default, and the term for which the arrangement should hold good.[1] By means of this "settlement" the British were able to record the ownership of land and to collect a tax from a specific individual at a specific rate, which was incidentally fixed as a permanent charge or rate. Landowners who were not prompt in the payment of the annual taxes were forced to sell their land at auction. This solution of the land tax problem in Bengal was probably as big a mistake as any Governor General in India has ever perpetrated. While land taxes in other portions of India are subject to periodic "settlement,"[2] the Bengal landowners' land taxes are fixed and have remained unchanged since 1786, in spite of the changing cost of administration and rising land values. A class of very wealthy landowners in Bengal has been developed.

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[1] V. A. Smith, *op. cit.*, 564.

[2] Land tax rates in other provinces are reviewed and revised at twenty- or thirty-year intervals.

In 1818, after a series of petty wars with various Rajput princes, British political supremacy was practically established in India. Under Lord Bentinck's "benevolent rule" two important limitations on Hindu social practice were established. *Sati,* the Hindu custom of burning the widow on the pyre of the deceased husband, was abolished by law in 1829. Another practice called *thuggee* was likewise abolished and made punishable by law in 1831. The thugs, devotees of the Hindu goddess *Kali,* practiced strangulation of travelers, in their eagerness to appease the bloodthirsty goddess. These two reforms which were forced on the Indian peoples by the British did not add to the popularity of the new government. Agitation began to be evidenced in favor of permitting Indians to participate more freely in British employment in positions of responsibility. In 1833 the renewal of the East India Company charter frankly accepted the changed status of the company from that of a trading organization to a governmental agency. In view of the governmental functions which it had gradually usurped, this new departure in the charter merely acquiesced in the *fait accompli.*

In 1835, by act of Parliament, English was declared to be the language of higher education in India. While the purpose of this act was primarily to enable the East India Company to develop more efficient clerks to be employed in its expanding development in India, it also made available to the students in all parts of India, thus educated, the literature of the English-speaking peoples. Before many generations had passed, the educated Indian was contemplating the meaning of the words "nationalism," "self-determination," "freedom," "independence," "democracy," and others of similar political and social import.

There followed a period of relative peace in the territories controlled by the British, making possible a concentration of attention and effort to the establishment of British power beyond the immediate boundaries of the conquered areas. Various Governors General attempted to make British influence paramount in Afghanistan, aiming to make of that country a buffer state to protect British interests in India against possible invasions of Russia, Persia, and the Afghans themselves. During

Lord Hardinge's régime, the Sikhs of the Punjab were routed in several small wars and the Punjab, the grain preserve of India, was annexed to the British territory. The Earl of Dalhousie (1848–1856) inaugurated a series of public works. Railroad construction was commenced, irrigation canals were projected, good roads, for military purposes, were planned. A neutral policy regarding Indian religious controversies was definitely formulated. A postal system and telegraph facilities were projected. The doctrine of lapse was introduced, whereby the British calmly stated that whenever a native prince left no heir to his throne, the British government would annex his state to British territory. Lord Dalhousie, though recognizing that the policy might lead to embarrassing situations, declared that for the sake of better government and the peace of British-Indian territory, such a policy was necessary. Suiting action to his expressed policy, he added Oudh and Burma to his realm during his period in control of British affairs in India. In 1854 the famous Educational Dispatch provided for elementary schools to be conducted in the local vernaculars and created the five great universities at Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Allahabad, and Lahore.

This period of rapid British expansion in India was suddenly interrupted by the mutiny of 1857–1858. The causes of this violent outbreak are to be found, to a large extent, in the changes which we have thus briefly reviewed. Indian opinion was seriously objecting to Lord Dalhousie's annexation policy based upon the doctrine of lapse. The reform measures which the British had instigated had created a growing alarm among the subject peoples. The Indian sepoy was discontented in general with conditions in the army under his British superiors. Finally, by a queer coincidence of native aversion to the use of grease on the cartridges used in their rifles, Hindu and Muhammadan soldiers found common cause for mutiny. [1]

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[1] "The introduction of the Enfield rifle . . . led directly to the explosion. An ill-considered regulation directed the sepoys to bite the end of the cartridge, and in January, 1857, reports were made that the sepoys believed the cartridges to be greased with cows' and pigs' fat for the express purpose of destroying their caste and making them all Christians. At first the alarm was believed by the Indian authorities to be entirely unfounded, but subsequent inquiry proved that the fat of cows or oxen really had been used at Woolwich, and that in consequence the men would have lost caste by biting cartridges so greased. The regulation demanding that the end of the cartridge should be bitten was rescinded, directions were given that ready-greased cartridges

Serious as the Sepoy Mutiny was, its influence was not seriously felt beyond the centers where Indian soldiers in considerable numbers were quartered, namely Calcutta, Lucknow, Cawnpore, and Delhi. The mutiny indicated the lack of unity among the peoples of India. Outside of the centers mentioned, the revolt against the British proved a matter of comparatively small interest. With the details of the mutiny we are here not concerned. Suffice it to say that this expression of revolt by the Indian sepoys created such an antagonistic attitude toward the East India Company that in August, 1858, Parliament passed an Act for the Better Government of India, and on November 1 of the same year, Queen Victoria issued her proclamation to the princes and peoples of India declaring that the rule of the East India Company was at an end and that henceforth India was to be governed in the name of and in behalf of the British Crown. Viscount Canning, the last of the East India Company Governors General, was appointed the first Viceroy and Governor General of India; the various civil servants of the old company were to be continued, subject to the supervision of the Viceroy; the political position and independence of the princes of the native states were to be respected; Britain renounced all desires for further extension of territory in India; amnesty to political prisoners taken during the mutiny was promised. The proclamation closed with the paragraph:

> When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate peaceful industry in India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer the government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people.[1]

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should not be issued, liberty being allowed to the men to make their own arrangements, and elaborate explanations and assurances were freely promulgated. But it was of no use at all. The terror had seized the minds of the whole army, and the men would not believe the assurances of their officers or the government." — V. A. Smith, *op. cit.*, 714.

To the Hindu nothing is more sacred than the cow, and if the cartridges were greased with cows' fat and the soldiers had bitten the cartridges thus greased, a sacrilege of the highest order had been committed. On the other hand, to the Moslem, nothing could be more degrading than to touch anything even remotely pertaining to a pig. If the greased cartridge which the Muhammadan soldier had been ordered to bite had been covered with pigs' fat, dire consequences and untold purification rituals would necessarily follow. In a later section further details regarding Hindu-Moslem attitudes will be examined.

[1] V. A. Smith, *op. cit.*, 730.

Under the conditions of the Better Government of India Act, India was to be governed by a Secretary of State (in London), appointed by the Crown, and the Viceroy representing the Crown in India, assisted by an appointed cabinet or council. The Viceroy, however, did not appoint his cabinet members. Thus the government was centralized and unified. The remnants of the East India Company's army were amalgamated with a newly founded army of India, a part of the Royal Service of the British Empire. In 1861 the India Councils Act augmented the Governor General's Council and the councils of Madras and Bombay by adding non-official members, European and Indian, who were appointed by the government. As indicated in the Queen's proclamation of 1858, the "doctrine of lapse" was abolished and the status of the native princes was definitely established.[1] The attitude of the Indian princes showed a marked change from that date. Thereafter, the British government in India could depend upon the princes for fairly sincere support. The princes themselves realized that their continued existence as petty rulers of their states depended upon the protection which the British alone gave them. This point is further stressed in a later section.

The period following the mutiny is replete with political, economic, and social changes, all pointing to the development of an efficient administration of the scattered Indian Empire by the British. Railroad construction was actively supported by the government, most of the railroads being built by British construction companies on the basis of "cost plus a percentage profit." Railways were built for strategic military purposes. The effectiveness of the plan can be visualized by a scrutiny of a railway map of India which shows the precision with which the important centers were connected with railroads. Highways were constructed for the same reasons, the grand trunk roadways of today witnessing to the skill with which the military engineers pushed the development of good roads between the great cantonment towns. Recurring famines called attention to the precarious living of the Indian peoples. An agricultural department was established by Lord Mayo, Viceroy in 1871. An irrigation department had been established a few years previously.[2]

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[1] Pending good behavior toward the British, however.

[2] For a graphic and well documented review of irrigation developments in one province, see my *Canal irrigation in the Punjab.* Columbia University Press, 1930.

The Marquis of Ripon, Viceroy from 1880 to 1884, inaugurated a limited provincial self-government. Freedom of the vernacular press was granted.

In 1885 the first Indian National Congress was convened in Bombay. It was attended by seventy-two liberal-minded, western-educated Indians who felt that the British government was not taking into consideration sufficiently the opinions, feelings, and aspirations of the Indian peoples. The Congress was organized chiefly under the leadership of Mr. Allan Octavian Hume. This National Congress was vested with no governmental powers whatever. It was important, however, in providing an organized, regularly meeting, discussion group, composed of Indians from all parts of the Indian Empire. As this Congress met in consecutive years, its members developed a steadily more radical point of view and gained increasing access to the Indian press. In 1907 Mr. B. G. Tilak, the leader of the extremist party, rallied the disgruntled elements of western-educated Indians in the Congress with his cry of *swaraj* and *swadeshi*,[1] two words destined to be utilized quite effectively in the later campaigns of M. K. Gandhi and his followers. Tilak was a reactionary Hindu who hated all reforms, especially those instigated by westerners, believed implicitly in the precepts and teachings of Hinduism, and sought to deflect India from the path which led to industrialization. He insisted that the Indian patriot must toil to restore Indian modes of life and civilization; that western civilization presented nothing of value to India and that patriots must be on their guard against its influences; that India ought to be truly Indian; that there was neither room nor need for Europeans in India; hence, it was a religious duty to get rid of all Europeans and all the evils which they had brought into India.[2] So seriously did the radicals, led by Tilak, threaten the control of the Nationalist Congress that, after a particularly violent session, in which moderates and radicals came to blows, the Congress session was broken up by the military police.

The radical views in the Congress had been formulated to express the growing dissatisfaction of educated Indians with British administration of India. They insisted that the educational system which Britain had foisted upon India was proving entirely inadequate to the needs of the Indian peoples. They objected seriously to the arbitrary partition of Bengal into two provinces for administrative purposes by Lord Curzon. That partition was looked upon by the nationalists as a British move to efface Bengali nationality and unity.[1] Perhaps another reason for this radical flare in 1907 was the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, resulting in a decisive victory by a small eastern nation over a white man's government. Up to this time, the Indian peoples seem to have taken the supremacy of the white man more or less fatalistically. After 1905 the East was convinced that the European governments were not impregnable and that they could be defeated. Riots occurred in almost every city of India. Anti-British processions and demonstrations were becoming increasingly common. British education of India began to show results, but in a manner which the framers of the educational policy had hardly expected. The native press became vociferous in its desire for self-expression. Democracy became an increasingly popular word in speech and in the press. Hence free speech and free press were curbed by governmental order. Public and secret meetings were prohibited. So insistent was the demand for reform and so loud the attack on British policy, that the Reform Bill of 1909, known as the Morley-Minto Reforms, was enacted.

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[1] *Swaraj* meaning "independence"; *swadeshi* meaning "homespun" or domestic goods.

[2] J. N. Farquhar, *Modern religious movements in India*, 363.

Briefly summarized, the Reform Bill of 1909 provided for provincial and central legislative councils as organs of public opinion, and a few additional offices were opened to Indians in the civil administration. But these legislative councils were at best but outlets for excited public opinion. They gave to Indians no legislative power. In 1911 King George visited India. To pacify outraged Indian opinion somewhat, he announced that Bengal should be restored to its original state (as to boundaries) and that the British capital of India should be removed from Calcutta to Delhi. By this action the British hoped to capitalize whatever feelings of pride existed in the traditional importance of Delhi as the ancient seat of Indian government.[2] For the time being, these concessions appeared to meet the demands of the majority of the educated Indians. In 1914, when the World War began, India was ready to support Britain on all fronts with men, money, horses, camels, trucks, and ambulances. From time to time during the war, the British announced reassuring statements to the Hindu and Muhammadan population of India in which future aims were promulgated. On August 20, 1917, came the Montague pronouncement that "the policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India is in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with the view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." This pronouncement was deemed necessary to quiet the fears of the nationalists, who were becoming restive under the long drawn out struggle and the reticence of Britain to show any marked tendency toward granting to Indians the rights and privileges which they felt entitled to receive.

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[1] H. V. Lovett, *History of the Indian nationalist movement*, 58.

[2] The British are now busily engaged in the construction of New Delhi, which is destined to become (if completed according to plan) one of the most beautiful and elaborate capital cities of the world.

Britain realized that in India there were some seventy-five million Muhammadans. Turkey was fighting on the side of Germany in the war. This created a delicate situation in which vast numbers of Moslems were fighting on opposite sides in the great conflict. Hoping to win the continued allegiance of the Indian Muhammadan people, the British government in India on November 2, 1914, had issued the following proclamation: "These holy places [Jerusalem and Mecca] and Jeddah will be immune from attack or molestation by the British naval and military forces so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to the holy places and shrines in question." On January 5, 1918, when Indian Moslem allegiance to the British crown was again wavering Lloyd George announced: "Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race." This proclamation served its purpose of winning the continued support of the Indian Moslems. When the war was over, these repeated assurances to the Indian Moslems were not forgotten by the followers of Allah's prophet. Another source of gratification to Indian Moslems was that President Wilson's Eleventh Point, which they took at its face value, announced on January 8, 1918, "that the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured of secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities now under the Turkish rule should be assured security of life and autonomous development."

Thus the stage was set for Britain's next move in defining its policy in India.

II. The Contemporary Scene

Between the signing of the Armistice and the final announcement of the Reform Bill of 1919 the situation in India changed considerably. The nationalist movement grew with amazing rapidity. During this period, leadership in the nationalist agitation was assumed by M. K. Gandhi. Parliament could no longer postpone the enactment of legislation to define British-Indian relationships. The old policies which had been changed but slightly since 1858 were no longer expedient; they were utterly lacking in appeal to the awakening Indian nationalists.

The Reform Bill was completed in final form in December, 1919. Its provisions were to become effective in 1921. Its chief provisions were:

1. Creation in India of a constitutional federation of provinces under the Crown.
2. Provision for larger councils, in both the legislative and the executive branches of the government.
3. In these councils, the elected members should outnumber the appointed members.
4. Election of members to councils by communities and not by general mass elections. In short, the councils were to be made up of "communal" representatives, *i. e.*, Moslem, Hindu.
5. Opening of higher offices in the Civil Service to Indians. Race was no longer to be a hindrance to promotion.
6. Establishment of dyarchical form of government — the British government in India to control and administer certain "reserved subjects," while to Indian ministers were to be given certain powers over "transferred subjects." [1]
7. The Viceroy reserved the right to veto any measure.
8. Periodically (every ten years) a commission appointed by the British Parliament was to study the progress of the reforms and suggest and advise further changes.
9. A council of princes was to be established to make possible an easily available and regularly meeting chamber where British officials in India could discuss problems of government pertaining to British-Native States policy.

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[1] Subjects reserved by the British were: defense; political matters; railways; posts and telegraphs; customs; income tax; salt tax; currency; the public debt; mines; central police; higher education; irrigation; land revenue; famine relief; and development of industries. Transferred subjects were: local self-government; medical administration; public health and sanitation; primary and middle vernacular education; roads, tramways, etc.; agriculture and fisheries; coöperation; and excise.

These reforms could not be put into operation immediately, so the British suggested that a two-year period be permitted to elapse, during which the elections could be held. The newly-to-be-formed councils, provincial and central, were to meet for their inaugural sessions in the spring of 1921. This delay added new zeal to the nationalist agitators, who stirred up a great deal of resentment against British rule in general and the half-hearted reform proposals in particular, keeping India in turmoil during the intervening period. Gandhi and his disciples went about preaching the gospel of non-violent non-coöperation among the masses. *Swaraj* and *swadeshi* were words constantly uttered by the nationalists of the Gandhi group. During this period the Gandhi spinning-wheel campaign and the proposed boycott of foreign goods were launched. The native press, quite overcome by the conflicting programs of counter movements and parties, grew violently verbose in its criticism of the British. So serious did this criticism become that the British passed the Rowlatt Act, which suspended all civil rights in any portion of India where political uprisings occurred, vesting the authority to restore peace in the British troops. Instead of aiding matters, the Rowlatt Act precipitated serious activities: in central India the "Moplah Rebellion" indicated the attitude of the people toward the police in British pay. This uprising was ruthlessly quelled by the free use of military force. On April 13, 1919, occurred the now famous "Amritsar Massacre," in which British troops, in command of General Dyer, fired upon an unarmed crowd of Indians who had gathered in a garden in the Sikh holy city of Amritsar. Some ten thousand people constituted this crowd, which had gathered in violation of an order prohibiting public meetings. Apparently, without warning, the troops fired into the unarmed crowd and marched away without caring for the dead and wounded, who numbered 379 and 1,200 respectively. This hasty action on the part of the British officer in charge of the troops greatly increased the opposition to British methods of government in India. Riots and more or less unruly demonstrations against the government occurred in Bombay, Madras, and practically every large city in India. During this period of intense excitement and bloodshed, the elections were conducted. In May, 1921, the Indian Central Legislative Assembly, the child of the 1919 Reform Bill, met at Delhi, the ancient Mogul capital of India.

The Central Legislative Assembly, the provincial assemblies, the Viceroy's Council of State, and the provincial governors' councils have been functioning under the powers conferred upon them by the Reform Act of 1919 since 1921. While it is not within the province of this sketch to give a detailed account of the progress achieved, certain conclusions abundantly supported by events of this period may be tentatively stated:

1. The central and provincial assemblies have as a rule been quite easily swayed by the spokesmen for the government and hence have not been very successful in achieving any striking reforms sponsored by Indian leaders.
2. Indian leadership has been developing very slowly. The constant temptation to seek the favor of the government rather than to represent and fight for his native constituency has prevented the assemblyman from fighting consistently for Indian as opposed to British interests.
3. Communal representation as the basis of election has tended to prevent that coöperation among the legislators which alone might make possible the enforcement of the Indian will in relation to the British government in India.
4. The British reservation of the right to veto any measure which, in the eyes of the Viceroy, imperils the interests of the state, militates against serious responsible legislation by the elected representatives of the various communities.
5. After all, the legislative assemblies have been given no real power. They are outlets for expressions of conflicting opinions devoid of administrative or executive responsibility.
6. The assemblies have not yet won the sincere support of the educated Indian public. As for the masses, it is probable that they have not yet discovered that such an institution as "incipient representative government" exists.

In compliance with the provisions of the Reform Act of 1919, Parliament appointed the first commission to review the progress achieved under the reforms in 1927. The controversy aroused over the personnel of that now famous Simon Commission is well known to readers of the press in all parts of the world. Since it was a parliamentary commission, it was entirely within the powers of Parliament to name whom it pleased. Indian opinion was incensed to discover that not a single Indian had been named as a member, *nor were any of the commission appointees conversant with Indian problems and affairs on the basis of first-hand experience in India.*

The terms of reference declared that this Statutory Commission should inquire into the working of the Indian constitution and should consider the desirability of establishing, extending, modifying, or restricting the degree of responsible government existing in India.

> When the Commission has reported and its report has been examined by the government of India and His Majesty's Government, it will be the duty of the latter to present proposals to Parliament. But it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to ask Parliament to adopt these proposals without first giving a full opportunity for Indian opinion of different schools to contribute its view upon them. And to this end it is intended to invite Parliament to refer these proposals to consideration by a Joint Committee of both Houses and to facilitate the presentation to that Committee both of the views of the Indian Central Legislature by delegations who will be invited to attend and confer with the Joint Committee and also of the views of any other bodies whom the Joint Parliamentary Committee may desire to consult.[1]

The Simon Commission visited India twice in pursuance of the task imposed upon it by Parliament. The degree of coöperation which the commission received in India was negligible. The Indian Central Legislative Assembly refused to appoint a committee to coöperate with the commission. Most of the provincial assemblies refused likewise. The reception accorded the commission in the various cities of India was, in general, quite hostile. In Lahore the writer witnessed the reception of the commission. A crowd of no less than ten thousand men and boys, bearing placards of black cardboard inscribed with non-complimentary slogans, lined the streets leading from the railway station to the governor's mansion. Some of the placards read, "Go back, Simon," "We don't want you, Simon," "Get out of India, Simple Simon," and "India for Indians," and there were many others of similar import. The commission's special train was heavily guarded throughout its tours of India. Several attempts were made to dynamite the train. Gandhi and his followers refused to coöperate in any way with the commission on its fact-finding mission. The publication of the commission's report was an event of great interest to India. It is at present doubtful whether the Central Legislative Assembly will appoint a committee to discuss the findings and proposals of the commission in London after the report has been issued. It is interesting to note that the Chamber of Princes of the various Native States alone coöperated in a whole-hearted manner with the Statutory Commission. This apparent conflict of attitudes between the ruling princes and the elected members of the legislative assemblies is significant. More will be said of this later.

In the meantime, various semi-revolutionary activities in widely scattered portions of India have been annoying the British administration. Bomb outrages are fairly common features of the daily press dispatches from India. In December the Viceroy's train was the object of a bomb attack near Delhi. In Lahore a bomb factory was discovered by the secret service of the government. In the same city two police officials, one a European, were recently murdered on the streets. Plots against the government have been uncovered with amazing regularity. Trials of conspirators, radicals, bomb-throwers, and revolutionaries are clogging the various courts in India.

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[1] *Indian year book, 1928.*

In the midst of such an atmosphere, the last annual session of the Indian Nationalist Congress convened in Lahore during the closing week of 1929. Its sessions were attended by veritable mobs. The meetings were held in a huge tent erected on the banks of the River Ravi just outside the city limits. The walls of the tent were decorated with banners bearing mottoes of which the following are examples:

> Freedom's battle once begun, bequeathed from sire to son, though baffled oft, is always won.
>
> Country first, religion next.
>
> World peace depends on India's freedom.
>
> Repression will put a nail in the coffin of the British Empire.[1]

The tenor of the congressional proceedings was stated by its president, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in his speech proclaiming the opening of the 1929 sessions. Extracts from his address are given below.

Speaking of the distrust and mutual suspicion which has so often characterized the attitudes of the various communal factions among the Indian peoples, he declared:

> Logic and cold reason are poor weapons to fight fear and distrust. Only faith and generosity can overcome them. I can only hope that the leaders of the various communities will have this faith and generosity in ample measure. What shall we gain ourselves or for our community if all of us are slaves in a slave country? And what can we lose if once we remove the shackles from India and can breathe the air of freedom again? Do we want outsiders who are not of us and who have kept us in bondage to be the protectors of our little rights and privileges, when they deny us the very right of freedom? . . .
>
> What will the Congress do? The conditions for coöperation [with the British] remain unfulfilled. Can we coöperate so long as there is no guarantee that real freedom will come to us? Can we coöperate when our comrades lie in prison and repression continues? Can we coöperate until we are assured that real peace is sought after, and not merely a tactical advantage over us? Peace cannot come at the point of the

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[1] *Civil and military gazette*, Lahore, India, January 1, 1930.

bayonet, and if we are to continue to be dominated over by an alien people, let us at least be no consenting parties to it.

If the Calcutta resolution holds, we have but one goal today, that of independence. Independence for us means complete freedom from British domination and British Imperialism. Having obtained our freedom, I have no doubt that India will welcome all attempts at world coöperation and federation and will even agree to give up a part of her own independence to the larger group of which she is an equal member.

The British Empire today is not such a group and cannot be so long as it dominates over millions of people and holds large areas of the world's surface despite the will of their inhabitants. India could never be an equal member of the Commonwealth unless imperialism and all it implies is discarded. The embrace of the British Empire is a dangerous thing. It is not and cannot be the life-giving embrace of affection freely given and returned. And if it is not that, it will be what it has been in the past, the embrace of death. . . .

We do appeal to Parliament and to the conscience of the world, and to them we shall declare, I hope, that India submits no longer to any foreign domination.

But let no one, least of all England, mistake or underrate the meaning or strength of our resolve. Solemnly, with full knowledge of consequences, I hope we shall take it and there will be no turning back. A great nation cannot be thwarted for long when once its mind is clear and resolved. If today we fail and tomorrow bring no success, the day after will follow and bring achievement. . . .

The Indian States, even for India, are the most curious relics of a bygone age. Many of their rulers apparently still believe in the divine right of kings — puppet kings though they be — and consider the state and all it contains, to be their personal property, which they can squander at will. A few of them have a sense of responsibility and have endeavored to serve their people, but many of them have hardly any redeeming feature. It is perhaps unjust to blame them, for they are the product of a vicious system, and it is the system that will ultimately go. . . .

India means the peasantry and labor, and to the extent that we raise them and satisfy their wants will we succeed in our task. And the measure of the strength of our national movement will be the measure of their adherence to it. We can gain them to our side only by espousing their cause, which is really the country's cause.

The only way to right it is to do away with the domination of any one class over another. . . .

Violence too often brings reaction and demoralization in its train, and in our country especially it may lead to disruption. It is perfectly true that organized violence rules the world today, and it may be that we could profit by its use. But we have not the material or the training for organized violence, and individual or sporadic violence is a confession of despair.

But if this Congress or the nation at any future time comes to the conclusion that methods of violence will rid it of slavery, then I have no doubt that it will adopt them. Violence is bad but slavery is worse. . . .

The old programme was one of the three boycotts — councils, law courts, and schools — leading up to refusal of service in the army and non-payment of taxes. When the national struggle is at its height I fail to see how it will be possible for any person engaged in it to continue in the courts or the schools. But I still think that it will be unwise to declare a boycott of the courts and schools at this stage. . . .

We must also make it clear that India will not accept responsibility for all the debts that England has piled on her.

We have now an open conspiracy to free this country from foreign rule, and you, comrades, and all our countrymen and countrywomen are invited to join it. But the rewards that are in store for you are suffering and prison and it may be death. But you shall have the satisfaction that you have done your little bit for India, the ancient, but ever young, and have helped a little in the liberation of humanity from its present bondage.[1]

In the sessions of the congress, debates on the many points involved in the president's address showed that the delegates were quite aware of the solemnity of the situation and the implications of the actions which they were contemplating. A portion of the delegates walked out and set up a "rump congress" because it could not agree with the majority position. Mr. Gandhi was still sponsoring with eloquence his program of non-violent non-coöperation. Finally a committee was appointed to draft an "Independence Day" resolution, and January 26, 1930, was fixed as Independence Day. The British paper from which the following front-page story of the declaration is quoted, on its editorial page lightly damned its content by classing it as "nothing more than a reproduction of the familiar Russian creed." That, incidentally, is a fairly representative attitude of the British press in India in its discussion of Indian nationalist aspirations. The Independence Day resolution follows:

> Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress President, has instructed all Provincial Committees that they should arrange to get the following resolution of the Working Committee translated into their respective provincial languages, and distribute it widely throughout the provinces. The President also asks that this resolution should be read at and explained to the meetings proposed to be held in connection with these celebrations, and that those present should be asked to signify their assent to it by a show of hands.
>
> We believe that it is the inalienable right of the Indian people, as of any other people, to have freedom to enjoy the fruit of their toil, and have the necessities of life so that they may have full opportunities of growth. We believe also that, if any Government deprives the people of these rights and oppresses them, the people have the further right to alter it or to abolish it.

India's Debasement

> The British Government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom, but has debased it economically, politically, culturally, and spiritually. We believe that India must sever the British connection and attain *purna swarajya*, or complete independence.
>
> India has been ruined economically. The revenue derived from our people is out of all proportion to our income. Our average income is seven pies [2] per day. Of the heavy taxes we pay, 20 per cent is raised from the land revenue derived from the peasantry, and 3 per cent from the salt tax, which falls most heavily on the poor. Village industries, such as hand spinning, have been destroyed, leaving the peasantry idle for at least four months in the year and dulling their intellect for want of handicrafts. Nothing has been substituted, as in other countries, for crafts thus destroyed.

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[1] *Civil and military gazette*, Lahore, India, January 1, 1930.

[2] Seven pies are equivalent to approximately three and one-half cents (.035).

The Customs and currency have been so manipulated as to heap further burdens on the peasantry. The British manufactured goods constitute the bulk of our imports. The Customs duties betray a clear partiality for the British manufactures, and the revenue from them is used, not to lessen the burden on the masses, but for sustaining a highly extravagant administration. Still more arbitrary has been the manipulation of the exchange ratio, which has resulted in millions being drained from the country.

POLITICAL

Politically, India's status has never been so reduced as under the British régime. No reforms have given real political power to the people. The tallest of us have to bend before foreign authority. The rights of free expression of opinion and free association have been denied to us, and many of our countrymen are compelled to live in exile abroad, and cannot return to their homes. All administrative talent is killed, and the masses have to be satisfied with petty village offices and clerkships.

Culturally, the system of education has torn us from our moorings and our training has made us hug the very chains that bind us spiritually. Compulsory disarmament has made us unmanly, and the presence of an alien army of occupation, employed with deadly effect to crush in us the spirit of resistance, has made us think that we cannot look after ourselves, or put up a defense against foreign aggression or even defend our homes and families from the attacks of thieves and robbers and miscreants.

THE MANDATE

We hold it to be a crime against man and God to submit any longer to the rule that has caused this disaster to our country. We recognise, however, that the most effective way of gaining our freedom is not through violence. We will, therefore, prepare ourselves by withdrawing, so far as we can, all voluntary association from the British Government and will prepare for civil disobedience, including non-payment of taxes.

We are convinced that if we can but withdraw our voluntary help, and stop the payment of taxes without doing violence, even under provocation, the end of this inhuman rule is assured. We, therefore, hereby solemnly resolve to carry out the Congress instructions issued from time to time for the purpose of establishing *purna swarajya*.[1]

At present, the campaign of non-payment of taxes is being promulgated by Gandhi and his followers. One of Gandhi's lieutenants has been arrested, and it proved a matter of no great surprise that the leader himself was again arrested.[2] But the movement is gaining adherence not only among the educated minority but also among the masses in the villages. British journals are calling for stern repressive measures to destroy the movement. In one district in Bengal where the peasants have refused to pay their taxes, the government is proceeding with measures to deprive the peasants of their land. One of the leading provincial governors of India, Sir Malcolm Hailey, stated before the Legislative Council of the United Provinces on February 20, 1930, that —

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[1] *Civil and military gazette*, Lahore, India, January 20, 1930.

[2] Mahatma Gandhi was arrested on May 5, 1930, after he had openly violated British law in leading volunteers in salt manufacture. At the time of his arrest Gandhi was preparing to lead his followers on a raid of one of the government salt depots.

> If Indian extremists started their proposed civil disobedience campaign, the government would use every legal means in its power to defeat it.

Thus, the lines are being drawn and issues being stated on which the struggle between the British and the peoples of India is to enter its next phase. As students of contemporary problems, we should find that struggle worthy of our most careful scrutiny and thought.

III. Indian Factors Complicating the Economic and Political Situation

India, bounded throughout its northern border by various ranges of the Himalayan Mountains and well protected on its other two sides by the sea, provided a vast isolated setting for the development of a distinct culture and civilization. Except for the Bolan and Khyber passes in the northwest, the territory was naturally isolated and well fortified by nature against invasions. Until the arrival of European traders and explorers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it is probable that India had never been attacked seriously from the sea. Indian history from ancient times is concerned with succeeding waves of invaders and conquerors who entered the vast expanse of Hindustan through those two gaps in nature's otherwise carefully constructed protective wall. Even today, those passes cause concern to the British government in India. Rumors of plots and plans to invade the northwestern provinces occupy a favored position in the daily news of India in the British press. Because of this threat of invasion of India, the British have endeavored, with some success, to build up a series of buffer states, like Afghanistan and Baluchistan, to protect the border from more serious stronger invaders. Within India, the many native states, protected and guaranteed an existence by the same British, successfully form a buffer between otherwise fairly unified nationalistically inclined groups. The northern portion of India has a semitropical climate; the southern half, a tropical climate. Its geographical features present a variety of conditions. There are mountains within whose ranges tower the loftiest peaks; plains of varying fertility; plateaus forbidding easy access; deserts which separate quite fertile regions; rivers teeming with Hindu bathers and sacred crocodiles; and much jungle — barren, waste, useless land.

India is a subcontinent rather than a country. It extends for two thousand miles from its southern tip to its Himalayan border. The base of the inverted triangle is similarly about two thousand miles long. The area of India is 1,805,332 square miles, of which 1,094,300 square miles are British provinces and 711,052 square miles are Indian states.

Slightly over one-third of the Indian peninsula is still under the rule of its native princes. Prior to 1858, as was shown in the previous sections, by means of the doctrine of lapse and also by superior martial force, the British won possession of the portion of India now designated the British provinces. The continued existence of these native rulers is one of the complicating factors in the efficient government of India as a unit. Queen Victoria's proclamation declared that the security and sovereignty of the then existing native states should be insured. That assurance of status has greatly aided the development of an attitude of coöperation with the British in their relations with the princes. But while the princes have been largely won over to the British point of view in relation to India as a whole, since the British practically subsidize and guarantee the continued existence of the native state as long as its ruler does not too flagrantly flaunt the privilege of ruling and his record of relations with the British remains satisfactory to the latter, the people of India have little respect for either the efficiency of the native rulers or their right to rule.

In traveling about India, it is evident that public works are greatly neglected in the native states when compared to those of British India. Property rights are precarious in some of the states. In Jaipur state, for instance, property rights are limited to tenancy privileges only, and even the latter may be curbed at the whim of the Maharajah. Foreigners are not permitted to buy property in that state. Even mission schools must be built only upon ground temporarily leased. On the expiration of the lease, in several instances which have come to the attention of the writer, the privilege of removing the material out of which the buildings were constructed was not given upon the state's refusal to extend the lease. In such a state there is but small incentive to tenants to attempt to improve their holdings. The result is that the native states are often characterized by poverty which is far more extreme than in British territory. Within the native state, the prince rules supreme. However, in most native states there is located a British resident who confers with the local native government on matters pertaining to "foreign relations." In this way, the British are constantly in touch with developments within the states. Since 1921, under the Reform Bill of 1919 the princes of India meet annually in Delhi as a "Chamber of Princes" to discuss policies of mutual interest. In this annual meeting of the princes the British government, as the predominant ruler in India, wields a decisive control over the princes' policies. It has become evident to the ruling native princes that they continue to enjoy the glories of the hereditary "right to rule" only because the foreign conqueror of India sees fit to permit them so to continue. Hence, they show but slight interest in programs which might prove unsatisfactory to the British. Some of the nationalists in British India even go so far as to charge the British with continuing to support the native rulers to have readily at hand an object lesson in inefficient government to present to critics of British policy in India.

The native states present a disturbing problem. Their rulers are not interested in a United India under Indian rule, because they would lose their positions as rulers. They are careful to oppose any nationalist agitation within their own borders. The people of India living outside of the native states look upon the natives of such states as foreigners. Thus the native states, in most cases quite surrounded by narrow strips of British territory, and easily entered by the British forces in case of serious political disturbances, present a territorial and political obstacle to Indian nationalist aspirations. Educationally, also, the people of the native states lag behind those living in British India. Industrially the comparison is even less complimentary to the native states.

The population of India in 1921 was 318,885,980, of which 247,003,293 lived in British India and the remaining 72,000,000 in the native states. Since 1872, when the population of India was 206,162,360, its population has increased by approximately 113,000,000. In 1901, the population of British India was 231,259,098. In 1921, it was over 247,000,000. Thus population in British India had increased by 16,000,000 in twenty years, in spite of the influenza epidemic of 1918–1919, which is estimated to have levied a toll of twelve million on British India. In 1921, the the average density of population per square mile for all India was 177; average density in British India was 226. The following table shows the population of India as indicated in the census reports of the years specified:

1872	206,162,360	1901	294,361,056
1881	853,896,330	1911	315,156,396
1891	287,314,671	1921	318,942,480

We have spoken briefly of the people of India. But it is quite incorrect to speak of the Indian people. Sir Herbert Risley insists that correct procedure requires us to speak of the Indian peoples. He enumerates seven distinct racial types easily distinguished by the traveler and student in India: the Turko-Iranian, found chiefly in the northwestern portion of India; the Indo-Aryan, occupying the Punjab and immediately adjacent areas; the Scytho-Dravidian, in the Mahratta country between the Rajputana desert and Bombay; the Aryo-Dravidian, occupying portions of Agra, Oudh, and eastern Rajputana; Mongolo-Dravidian, to be found in Lower Bengal and Orissa; the Mongoloid type, living in Nepal, Assam, and Burma; and the more strictly Dravidian type, occupying an area roughly extending from Ceylon to the lower border of the Ganges valley, pervading the whole of Madras, Hyderabad state, and the Central Provinces. In addition to these seven dominant types, there are innumerable mixtures and crosses of these and other subordinate types, so that it is quite impossible to discern where one group ends and the other begins. Indian races thus present to students of anthropology a decidedly interesting and inviting field for research.

These racial differences have probably aided in the development of a complex variety of languages. No less than two hundred languages are spoken in India.[1] The British government has been forced to carry on its administration in India in no less than one hundred languages. This variety of languages, the many racial groups, the vast expanse of the Indian territory, have combined to develop in India not one but many cultures, and have made national unity a practical impossibility thus far.

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[1] The 1921 census enumerates 220 separate and distinct languages spoken in various portions of British India.

In addition to the divisive forces which have been mentioned, we must take cognizance of the existence in India of many different religions. Buddhism and Jainism are native Indian products. Buddhism is now, however, extinct in India proper. Hinduism, that complex maze of many religious strivings and systems, developed in India. Islam and Christianity have been imported from abroad. Each of these religions has developed within India, and in some cases imported from foreign lands innumerable divisions and sects, so that the religious census of India presents a bewildering array of religions. There are no less than 114 different organizations from abroad stressing some particular sect or phase of Christianity in India! Hinduism, Sikhism, and Islam offer an even more fruitful variety of sects. Each of these religions tends to develop a "religious group consciousness" which keeps the peoples of India quite severely apart. The Hindu and Moslem communities have long been openly hostile to each other. A perpetual feud seems to exist between their respective followers. Only on great provocation can they forget their differences and coöperate for the same ends. The use of grease on the cartridges in 1857 gave them common cause to rebel against the British in the mutiny. When no such circumstance appears to fuse their conflicting interests, a tension and suspicion, which is easily upset, keeps each group on the alert in defense of some custom or tradition, and openly in search of some opportunity to annoy the opposing religious group. Hence, the constant temptation to the Hindus of leading their wedding processions, funerals, and religious spectacles past the mosques, accompanied by the playing of loud and unharmonious music. That procedure is always the precursor of a riot. In reprisal, the Muhammadans seem to find it almost impossible to locate their slaughterhouses in any portion of the cities except near the Hindu temples, or in the midst of a decidedly Hindu population. To slaughter a cow is the greatest sacrilege the Hindu can imagine. When he sees his Muhammadan neighbors thus flaunting their disregard for this tenet of the Hindu faith, the religiously super-sensitive Hindu, goaded beyond endurance by his physically more stalwart meat-eating countryman of the opposing faith, is likely to seek an equally drastic means of showing his disrespect for the enemy's faith. What better method could be devised than to capture a pig, belonging to the outcaste Hindus, hurling it over the walls of the mosque into the midst of the praying Moslems on a Friday noon? And again a riot is on. The police of the neutral British government in India, are busily occupied, keeping the two communities from each other's throats.

One of the most difficult and subtle institutions of Indian social life is caste. Caste is one of the oldest and still one of the strongest of Indian folkways. Sanctioned by the dominant religion (there are more than 216,000,000 Hindus) enforced by centuries of customary adherence, it presents a divisive force which neither Indian nor alien force has seriously disturbed. If caste is breaking down today, it is because of economic change which is working impersonally to undermine its strictures. Caste has undoubtedly been one of the forces which has made of the Indian peoples a complex conglomeration of mutually separate social groups. "The population is heterogeneous to an extent that needs actual experience to appreciate. It is no question of rich or poor, of town or country, of employer or employee; the differences lie far deeper. The population of a district or a town is a collection of different nationalities — almost different species — of mankind that will not eat or drink or intermarry with one another, and that are governed in the more important affairs of life by committees of their own. It is hardly too much to say that by the caste system the inhabitants of India are differentiated into over two thousand species of mankind, which in the physical relations of life have as little in common as the inmates of a zoölogical garden."[1] Caste, among orthodox Hindus, determines before birth a child's occupation, his dress, the food he shall eat, and the exact social status which he may acquire. Caste, when enforced, destroys almost every incentive which urges men to industry and thrift as a means of elevating their station in life. With such a vast number of groups which do not even recognize their common humanity, it is small wonder that no common language, tradition, religion, or nation has been evolved.

India is still predominantly an agricultural country. About 85 per cent of its population derives its livelihood directly from the soil. We have indicated the average population per square mile of British India as 226. Practically every available bit of land has been placed under cultivation. The following statistics, taken from the 1910 census report, shows the average density of population per square mile for a number of the more thickly populated areas of India:

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[1] *Century magazine*, November, 1922, page 149.

		Pop. per sq. mile[1]
Bihar	24,000,000	561
Bengal	45,000,000	578
Oudh	13,000,000	520
Agra	35,000,000	417
Travancore	3,500,000	452
Cochin	1,000,000	675

In the Punjab, one of the sparsely populated provinces of India, the average density of population in 1921 was 183 per square mile. But in that same province, the cultivated land available per capita in 1926–1927 was 1.41 acres. Evidently, the thickly settled districts of India are condemned to poverty and want by the insufficiency of the natural resources, on the one hand, and the extraordinarily high birth rate on the other hand. Insufficient land coupled with a growing population accustomed to redistributing the land equally among each of the surviving male heirs of the deceased father, fragmented scattered small holdings on which the peasant toils with crude wooden implements, are forces which necessitate a low standard of living. Sir Robert Giffen, writing on this subject in his *Economic inquiries and studies*, said:

> It appears from the most careful studies that whatever the number of people per square mile, there is very little new and fertile land to appropriate; that much soil has been appropriated during the last century of our rule, and that the population continues to grow so fast without any increase in the land revenue, or any other sign that land is being brought rapidly into cultivation . . . with signs on the contrary of exhaustion in agriculture and of an approach to the limits of production according to the means at the disposal of the population.[2]

The Malthusian theory of population is apparently supported by Indian experience. "The power of population is infinitely greater than the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man." We have seen that since 1872 the population of India has been increased by over one hundred million, and this mainly by the ordinary growth of population. Although accurate statistics in this matter are not available, it would require an optimist of the first magnitude to assert that the food resources of the Indian peoples had increased in like proportion. Thus the poverty of India appears to have been increased if measured in terms of the number of poverty-stricken persons suffering from insufficient nourishment and without an opportunity to produce additional wealth. It is probable that Britain has removed many of the natural checks to population by means of sanitation, irrigation, and the building of roads and railways — that she has made possible life or existence for a larger number but has not raised their standard of living appreciably. In fact, even in the more favored irrigated sections of India, increased irrigation, making possible more food production, tends soon to be overcome by an even more rapidly increasing population. With at least some reference to a study of the facts, the Indian nationalist can say that Britain has made possible an increased number of people who are now experiencing the misery and want of dire poverty.

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[1] While these figures relate to the situation in 1910, the latest census shows but slight change, and in each case the change is in the direction of an increased density

[2] *Economic inquiries and studies*, II, 19.

Indian students of economics are clamoring for assistance by the government in developing other means of earning a living to supplement agriculture. They condemn Britain's policy of exploitation, of repression of Indian native industries, and preferential treatment of British interests in India for fear of aiding in the development of powerful competitors for British manufacturers. Rightly or wrongly the British are blamed for India's dependence upon agriculture alone:

> It is countries which are predominantly agricultural which are subject to famines from time to time. . . . Railways and good roads have now relieved this difficulty to a great extent. . . . India has no diversity of industry; neither is she rich enough to buy large quantities of food from foreign countries, though in times of famine, exports of food grains stop and imports are stimulated. . . . The impecunious and thriftless peasantry of an agricultural country like India have no reserves to fall back upon to import food from abroad in famine times. . . . Hardly a year passes without its drought, scarcity, or famine in one part of the country or another. . . . The uncertainty of the peasant's position breeds pessimism and fatalism and demoralizes the whole population.[1]

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[1] V. G. Kale, *Introduction to Indian economics*, Poona, 1925, pages 252–253.

A summary of the Occupation Census of India returns[1] for 1921 follows:

Occupation	*Number of persons supported*
Pasture and agriculture	229,045,019
Fishing and hunting	1,607,331
Mines and quarries	542,053
Industry	33,167,018
Textiles	7,847,829
Dress and toilet	7,425,213
Wood	3,613,583
Food industries	3,100,361
Ceramics	2,215,041
Building industries	1,753,720
Metals	1,802,208
Chemicals, etc.	1,194,263
Hides, skins, etc.	731,124
Other industries	3,483,676
Transport	4,331,054
Trade	18,114,622
Army and Navy	757,954
Air force	1,033
Police	1,422,610
Public administration	2,643,882
Professions and liberal arts	5,020,571
Domestic service	4,570,151

The occupational census shows beyond dispute that there is small choice as to means of livelihood for the masses of the Indian population. That India has been a fruitful and convenient market for British manufactures and a source for certain raw materials needed by English producers is evident.

> The settlements, protectorates, and spheres of influence of European powers in Asia, Africa, and America, which are inhabited by backward races, are fields of economic exploitation, and attempts are made to keep them as preserves for the trade and industries of the mother country. . . . The tendency now is to draw together countries inhabited by people of the same race and bind them by ties of preferential tariffs. Large aggregates thus form customs unions and they trade freely among themselves, only penalizing the trade of foreign countries. . . . In England, tariff reform is to protect British industries against encroachments of foreign nations; dominions are to be linked with the mother country by preferential trade.[2]

Finding the inland duties an impediment to trade, the East India Company abolished them in the eighteen-forties, retaining low customs duties on imports and exports. Due to heavy Mutiny expenditures, the general tariff was raised from 5 per cent to 10 per cent. Finances having recovered, the import duties were gradually reduced until 1875 they were brought down to 5 per cent again, and a number of export duties were abolished. Import duties on cotton piece goods remained at 5 per cent from 1862. Due to the revolt of Lancashire, Government removed this duty in 1882 and for the next twelve years the Indian tariff consisted only of low duties on arms and munitions

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[1] *Indian year book*, 1928.

[2] V. G. Kale, *op. cit.*, 346.

> liquors, salt, opium, and petroleum. After 1882, only a light duty remained on rice exports. In 1894, the 5 per cent duty on machinery and steel and higher duties on tobacco and liquors were brought back. In 1896 an import duty on cotton was reduced to 3½ per cent and an excise duty of an equal rate was imposed on all cloth manufactured in Indian mills. . . . In 1919 the principle of discrimination in favor of countries in the British Empire, consisting of a rebate of two-thirds of the general 15 per cent duty was introduced. In 1924, protection on a considerable scale was adopted for India. . . . As a business proposition, imperial preference is not attractive to India, and it is on other grounds that it will have to be justified and recommended for acceptance.[1]

This excerpt from one of the contemporary economics texts written by an Indian professor of economics, shows that Indian students have become quite critical of British economic policy in India. The claim here made is that the tariff policy has been manipulated for the benefit of England rather than India. If space permitted, an even more serious case study could be made of the course of Indian currency control and manipulation since early in the nineteenth century.

The most interesting period of currency reform is that between 1892 and the present. India was one of the last countries to give up the silver standard. In 1892 the free coinage of silver rupees in India was stopped. By 1898 the rupee-sterling exchange ratio had been more or less established at Rs. 15 to the pound sterling. In 1913 the gold exchange standard was legally established. Within four years, it became evident that the new exchange ratio of Rs. 15 per £ could not be maintained because of the rapidly increasing price of silver in terms of gold, caused by the World War. In 1919 the exchange was legally fixed at Rs. 10 per £. That ratio was maintained for just under three months. From the middle of 1920 to the summer of 1926, rupee exchange was permitted to "find its own level," and in August of 1926 a new ratio of one shilling sixpence per rupee was introduced.[2] This change in the ratio of exchange between the rupee and the pound sterling in 1926, according to the nationalists, was a subtle move to make less effective the newly established customs duties on steel and other products imported into India. Furthermore, by raising the exchange ratio, it temporarily made the rupee's purchasing power abroad greater than before. This tended to increase imports of goods into India. At the same time, the higher exchange ratio penalized the export of Indian-produced goods, because it now took more pounds sterling or dollars than previously to purchase the same amount of tea or jute or cotton from India. The British-nominated members in the Central Legislative Assembly won the bare majority of eight votes for the new exchange ratio, on the plea that it would thereafter require fewer rupees to meet the annual "home charges" which need to be paid by India, in sterling in London. These "home charges" annually amount to about 35,000,000 pounds sterling. The nationalists insist that the British have manipulated the currency system of India in the interests of British, not Indian merchants. Suffice it to say that the currency problems loom large in the criticisms which Indians aim at British domination in the Indian Empire.

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[1] V. G. Kale, *op. cit.*, 380–381.

[2] See *Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance,* Calcutta, 1926, Vol. I, *passim.*

With the exception of steel and cotton textile manufacturing, practically all of the modern industrial developments in India owe their existence and pay tribute to British initiative and capital. The forty thousand miles of railroads have been constructed almost entirely by means of British capital. Most of the railways are now under government ownership and operation. Within a few years all of the Indian railway systems will be owned and operated by the government. It is interesting to note that a deficit from the operation of state controlled and operated railroads in India has occurred but twice since 1900; a deficit of Rs. 1,86 *lakhs* in 1908–1909 and a deficit of Rs. 9,10 *lakhs* in 1921.[1] The net earnings of the railroads have been over Rs. 155 *crores* during this thirty-year period under review. This indicates that Indian railroads have been a profitable venture for the government.

The British have constructed irrigation canals which now irrigate no less than 47,700,000 acres annually. Irrigation construction was made possible by means of British capital which has been entirely repaid out of the earnings of the irrigation system. In the Punjab where 13.6 million acres are canal irrigated, the government has earned a net return on its investment ranging from 3 per cent to 20 per cent per year. The average income per capita of the people of that province is about Rs. 45 per year (roughly $16.00 per year).[2]

It is estimated that British capitalists on private initiative have invested about Rs. 800 *crores*[1] in the jute, coal mining, tea plantations, and other large industries of India. In the adequate protection and continuance of property rights of this vast investment of private capital in India, to say nothing of the huge governmental investments in the public works, railroads, bridges, telegraph and telephone systems, harbors, and public buildings, will be found the strongest provocation for the continued British control of India. It is evident from this very cursory survey of industry in India that the preponderant share of industrial development, capital investment, and profits belongs to non-Indian capitalists.

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[1] A *lakh* of rupees is equal to 100,000 rupees or £7,500. A *crore* of rupees is Rs. 10 million, or 100 *lakhs*.

[2] See P. W. Paustian, *op. cit.*, chs. 6–7.

The tables on page 322 indicate the principal sources of revenue and heads of expenditure (Imperial and Provincial) since 1921–1922 in *lakhs* of rupees. In 1925–1926 and 1926–1927 the total revenues collected by the government of India and the provincial governments amounted to British Rs. 143,71,00,000 and Rs. 143,46,00,000 respectively. On the basis of an estimated British India population of some 250,000,000, the per capita tax from all sources would amount to between five and six rupees (about $1.75 to $2.10), which would seem like a very low tax per capita to an American student. But when it is realized that the estimated income per capita in India varies from a low of approximately Rs. 30 to a maximum of Rs. 100 per year, it will be seen that the taxes amount to from one-twentieth to one-fifth of the annual income of the average individual Indian. Small wonder, then, that the Indian nationalist and other students of Indian economic problems agree that the tax burden on the shoulders of the Indian tax payer is high in relation to his income. The following table indicates how each rupee of revenue was expended by the British imperial and provincial governments in 1925–1926:[2]

	Per cent		*Per cent*
Military Services	28	Superannuation allowances, pensions	3
Railways	13	Land Revenue	2
Police, Jails, Justice	10	Forests	1
Debt services	10	Irrigation	3
General Administration	6	Public Health	1
Civil Works	5	Other heads	13
Education	5		100

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[1] See V. G. Kale, *op. cit.*, 333.

[2] Figures taken from *India in 1926–27*, a Government of India publication.

SOURCES OF INDIAN REVENUE, 1921–2 TO 1926–7

Heads of revenue (net)	*1921–2*	*1922–3*	*1923–4*	*1924–5*	*1925–6*	*1926–7*
I. Land revenue P.......	28,53	30,37	30,31	32,58	32,67	32,52
II. Taxation						
Customs I............	33,75	40,64	38,98	44,98	46,96	46,57
Excise P.............	21,24	17,28	18,12	18,19	17,26	17,44
Salt tax I............	4,77	5,31	8,65	6,12	4,90	5,50
Opium I.............	1,27	1,92	1,66	1,62	2,03	3,33
Income tax I and P....	23,32	18,30	15,89	15,87	15,72	15,66
Stamps and registration	10,47	11,95	13,10	14,57	13,96	13,64
Total.............	94,82	95,40	98,81	101,37	100,98	102,20
III. Commercial services						
Railways I..........	−9,08	1,21	6,44	6,78	5,49	6,01
Posts and telegraph I..	−1,09	45	70	80	1,18	− 5
Irrigation P..........	− 48	1,45	1,12	1,15	1,23	34
Forests I and P.......	1,35	1,40	1,63	1,99	2,16	2,34
Total.............	−9,30	4,51	9,89	10,72	10,06	8,64
Grand total I, II, III.......	114,05	130,28	139,01	144,67	143,71	143,46

INDIAN EXPENDITURES, 1921–2 TO 1926–7

Heads of expenditure	*1921–2*	*1922–3*	*1923–4*	*1924–5*	*1925–6*	*1926–7*
I. Debt services I..............	14,88	15,00	14,16	15,27	14,12	12,66
II. Military services I...........	69,81	65,26	56,21	55,63	56,00	55,97
III. Civil works I and P..........	11,20	9,26	9,01	8,02	8,95	11,51
IV. Civil administration						
i. General admin. I and P..	10,96	11,22	11,30	11,83	13,09	11,55
ii. Justice, police, and jails I and P.................	18,80	18,72	17,78	18,02	18,09	17,46
iii. Superannuation I and P.	5,61	5,84	5,32	5,32	5,79	4,97
iv. Education I and P......	8,38	8,53	9,15	9,38	10,53	12,22
v. Medical and public health I and P...............	4,40	3,74	3,64	4,36	4,90	5,16
vi. Agriculture I and P.....	1,65	1,58	1,53	1,64	1,78	1,92
vii. Industries I and P......	36	39	37	95	1,28	1,31
viii. Scientific departments ...	1,14	93	87	79	84	93
ix. Ports and pilotage......	23	34	30	30	18	23
V. Famine relief I and P........	1,12	89	1,57	1,20	1,15	59
Grand total I, II, III, IV, V.......	148,54	141,70	131,21	132,71	136,70	136,48

NOTE. — I stands for "Imperial"; P for "Provincial." Tables from V. Anstey, *Economic development of India*, London, 1929, pages 542–543.

An analysis of the percentages given in this table and a study of the totals given in the preceding table will give ample scope for thought on the costs of government to India.

Education receives the support of the government to the extent of 5 per cent of the total revenues collected in India. The total amount spent on education in 1926–1927 was Rs. 12,22,00,000, amounting to less than one-half rupee, or about fifteen cents per capita. Less than 8 per cent of the people in British India are literate in the sense of being able to read in some language and to write their own name. In 1926, 10,510,000 pupils were undergoing instruction of some kind. Thus there were approximately 4.25 per cent of the total population exposed to some process of instruction. These students were distributed among the schools of the country as follows: in primary schools 7.8 millions; in secondary schools 1,72 millions; in special schools .29 millions; in universities .08 millions; in unrecognized institutions .62 millions.

> These figures are bad enough, but when it is remembered that very few primary school pupils proceed to the secondary stage, and that those who do not, have practically no opportunity for increasing or even preserving the little they have learnt in their few years at school and soon tend to lapse into illiteracy after leaving it, it must be evident that the amount of literacy among the common people is practically negligible.[1]

The writer can bear witness to the fact that in the Indian village the person who can read or write is still very much of a phenomenon. What chance is there for the dissemination of ideas and facts on sanitation, good government, better social arrangements, new methods of agriculture, or any other progressive programs in a country whose inhabitants are unable to read? The problem of nationalizing India, as well as the problem of governing her millions, is seriously complicated by the ignorance of her masses. In all India there were in 1926-1927 but 183,164 primary schools (most of them offering instruction similar to the first three years in our grade schools) and 10,837 high schools. At the top of the educational system there were in that year 303 colleges, most of them affiliated with one or other of the ten or twelve universities of the land. The problem of primary education is made more difficult by the customs of the land, which practically prohibit women from aiding in the education of the masses in schools. In five years of residence and travel in various parts of India, the writer failed to see even one Indian woman teaching in a village public school! The village schoolmaster is all too often a disillusioned university failed student who sought a government position but was unable to meet the competition of others better qualified. Hence, the instruction is mediocre and the equipment of the village schools appallingly meager. The educational situation gives the student of Indian problems pause for serious thought.

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[1] *India in 1926–27.*

In this section we have briefly reviewed a few of the pressing problems confronting the peoples of India. The vast extent of their country was indicated; the variety of races and languages was mentioned; the abject poverty was shown to be appalling; the state of the British industrial domination of the larger industries, the complete domination of the public utility developments, the profitable exploitation of some of the natural resources of the country were noted. All of these factors which have been mentioned coöperate to develop an abject, defeatist, fatalistic attitude in the minds of the subject peoples. Without a common bond of a truly national history to draw them together, quite innocent of a common ideal toward which they might strive, these Indian peoples, scattered over a subcontinent whose very extent but few of them appreciate, are groping blindly for a ray of hope. They are becoming cognizant of a common burden in the form of a foreign government which rules their very minutest life activities. Perhaps, in that growing hatred of oppression and in envy of the power of the governing foreign minority, India's communally distracted millions may find a common bond of interest and nationalism. But what they would do were they to succeed in overthrowing the oppressor has not yet been specifically suggested.

IV. The English Interest in India

The British came to India originally chiefly for purposes of trade. Their interest in trade has increased with the passing of the years. The importance of India to the United Kingdom as a market for British goods is indicated in the following table which gives in percentages the variations in the shares of the principal countries in the import and export trade of India since 1914:[1]

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[1] Figures for this table taken from the discussion of India's foreign trade in *India in 1926–27,* pages 188–209.

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF INDIA, 1914 TO 1925

Country	*1914*	*1919*	*1920*	*1921*	*1922*	*1923*	*1924*	*1925*
Imports from								
United Kingdom	56	51	61	57	60	58	54	51
Other parts of British Empire	9	10	5	10	7	7	8	8
Japan	10	9	6	5	6	5	7	8
United States	7	12	11	8	6	6	6	7
Java	8	9	4	9	8	8	6	6
Germany	1	0	2	3	5	5	6	6
Other foreign countries	9	9	10	8	10	13	13	14
Exports to								
United Kingdom	31	30	22	20	23	25	26	21
Other parts of British Empire	21	14	21	21	18	14	12	14
Japan	11	14	9	16	13	14	14	15
United States	12	15	15	10	11	9	9	10
France	4	5	3	4	5	5	5	6
Germany	1	0	3	7	7	7	7	7
Other foreign countries	20	22	27	22	23	26	27	27

For the year 1925–1926, the last year indicated in the table, the value of goods exported from India was Rs. 387 *crores*, while the imports were valued at Rs. 236 *crores*. When it is remembered that of the imports, 51 per cent came from the United Kingdom, and 21 per cent of the exports were sold to the United Kingdom, it is evident that the British interest in India is to a large extent measurable in terms of rupees. In addition to the large share of India's export and import trade which goes to or from Britain, the immense quantities of British capital invested in Indian industrial developments must be considered a further source of profit to the English in India. It is significant that the jute industry and the tea plantations, to mention but two of the leading export industries, are almost completely owned and controlled by British capitalists. Not only does the English balance of trade with India support the conclusion that in normal years it results in a decidedly favorable balance for mercantilistic England, but the British investments in India must take large amounts of "invisible items" out of India in the form of interest and dividends. It is not difficult to conclude from this brief study of the trade relationship of England to India that British domination of Indian trade has been and continues to be a profitable commercial and political venture. As long as that remains true, it is perhaps burdening one's optimism too severely to expect the withdrawal of Britain from its position of dominance in Indian political and economic relations. This favorable position of Britain in the economic development of India, perhaps for the benefit of the English, is all the more important to England since the war and its concomitant unhappy economic consequences for the British Isles. Were India to be suddenly lost to the British trading and manufacturing community, the lot of England's industrial population would become even more seriously hazardous than it has been during the post-war period. The sudden loss of the Indian market for British manufactured goods might perhaps prove a blow too serious to permit economic recovery. As Britain loses other markets in the world struggle for sources of raw materials and buyers for exports, India will probably be looked upon as an increasingly important and valuable economic asset for the English. However, in her present mood, India apparently does not relish the rule of supporting the economic prestige of her uninvited rulers. In a sense, it seems that India is necessary to the economic well-being of England. The vested interests represented by those whose savings have long since been invested in Indian commercial and industrial projects demand that Britain continue to control and govern India in order to protect private property rights which have been achieved under conditions of English rule. It is not difficult to see the English commercial point of view in relation to India.

While we shall not be able to discuss the importance of the Indian Civil Service, with reference to the possibilities which it offers to many adventurous and well educated young Englishmen to carve out an interesting political career in India, it is evident that this service has been an attractive opportunity for many. The Civil Service has been able to attract to its ranks many very well qualified men. Its remuneration to its servants has been generous. The Englishman in the Indian Civil Service has generally led a life of comparative ease in India. He has developed and built in most of the larger cities as honest a replica of England as possible under the conditions. In his clubs he has insisted upon fellowship only with his equals, which of course, until very recently, included only Europeans. In the minds of most of the Indian Civil Service men, the hope of a fairly early retirement on a liberal allowance in England provides the necessary incentive to keep them from leaving India without real cause. Frequent leaves of absence to England during the period of active service in India also help to reduce the sense of exile which long abode abroad, amidst oriental conditions, would otherwise engender. Good pay, relatively congenial work, occasional home-leaves, chances for promotion, early retirement, and generous holiday allowances in India have aided in making the Indian Civil Service a desirable goal for the Englishman of the educated classes seeking an interesting and profitable political career. However, it is well to remember that the very points which cause this service to appeal to the Englishmen are the ones to which the intelligent Indian takes exception. Indians have long been insisting upon a larger share in the remunerative governmental positions in India. These Indian Civil Service appointments have become the objects of frenzied competitive efforts by the educated Indian youths. The very fact that the pay is good, vacations generous, advancements possible, and retirements provided for, causes the Indian aspirant for the position to look with feelings of envy and dislike upon the foreigner who usurps the desired position. Sufficient has been said to suggest that herein lies another cause for unrest in India. But it needs also to be remembered that the traditions, the successes, and the high degree of efficiency which have been attained by the Indian Civil Service, combine to develop a "vested interest" of a type only slightly less tangible than that which we have noted exists among the British commercial and industrial classes in India. No British government will seek to withdraw from the political and economic control of India as long as such withdrawal will be accompanied by loss of prestige, increased unemployment among men well qualified to do constructive administrative work, and economic loss in the realm of commerce and trade. British commercial relations with India tend to strengthen the English demand for a stronger government in India, for, by, and on behalf of British traders and industrialists.

As was shown in an earlier section of this study, the Reforms of 1919 changed the administrative and legislative machinery of the Government of India somewhat. But the fact remains that the ultimate source of legislative and administrative power exists in England. The Secretary of State for India is the *liaison* officer between the Government of India and the British Parliament. It is true that the Viceroy of India is the personal representative of the King. But he too relies largely on the advice of the Secretary of State in London. If memory serves me correctly, no Secretary of State for India has yet been appointed who has had any first-hand experience and contact with Indian problems in India. No Indian Civil Servant has ever been given the opportunity of performing the functions of the Secretary of State for India. Nor is that office an elective position. It is not within the province of the people of India to aid in the selection of their Secretary of State. The long series of conflicts between the Government of India and the Secretary of State in London, relating to the adjustment of currency problems in India, serve to exemplify the difficulties involved in such a divided administrative procedure. Time and again in the currency disputes, from 1892 to 1927, the Secretary of State in London could not agree with the officials in charge of the actual administration of Indian affairs in India concerning the financial policy to be pursued. And all too often, in this dispute, the Secretary of State was able to dictate the policy which appeared to him to promise the greatest advantage to Great Britain. It is growing more evident with the passage of time that the seat of the ultimate Government of India resides in London. This separation of government from the actual scene of operations and carrying out of its governmental policies is the source of constant friction between Indians and the British government. As long as the Secretary of State wields the power which he now has, and is located in London, the Indian peoples will with difficulty present their plea for political change on a favorable basis to the British Parliament. The fact that the British Parliament is the legislative body with power to veto Indian legislative acts divorces responsible government by the elected representatives of the Indian peoples from any semblance of reality. However, looking upon India as a British possession, with an orientation of mercantilist economic-political theory as the background of one's thinking, what more logical political arrangement could be devised for the protection of and development of British economic and political interests in India than that of keeping the ultimate power of veto and administration in the hands of the Secretary of State for India *in London* and the British Parliament? Perhaps this policy will be continued as long as it is profitable to carry on along the present lines. But, in holding on to the point of doubtful marginal returns, politically and economically, Britain seems to be losing the opportunity of enlisting the willing and intelligent coöperation of the Indian peoples themselves in a long period program of enlightened governmental experimentation in the interests of all concerned. In the absence of such coöperation or, perhaps, flaunting the very thought of seeking such coöperation, Britain seems to the writer to be refusing the most important experiment of the present century for developing a workable acceptable political scheme on terms of equality and mutual respect between a great western people and a large mass of potentially powerful eastern peoples in the Indian Empire.

Finally, there is that strange, evasive, and yet all-pervasive attitude of the ruling race toward the subject peoples in India which causes so much friction in social relationships. East of Suez, the Britisher seems to adopt a changed view of his own importance. By the time Bombay is reached on the long voyage across the Arabian Sea, the "white man's burden" in the Orient seems to weigh heavily on the British official's shoulders. It is not our purpose to account for the presence of this attitude, nor to analyze its component parts. But few travelers in the East have failed to note its reality. The British have accepted what some term the "white man's burden" upon their own initiative in India. The strange conceit whereby racial superiority is glibly accepted on the faintest of premises in relation to the peoples of India is nothing short of amazing. The history of Anglo-Indian relations teems with instances supporting the contention that the racial antagonisms resting upon this easily accepted sense of superiority by the white man and his government have caused many of the difficult situations between governing and governed.

This study supports the thesis that British rule in India has been profitable to the English and that when it no longer offers profits sufficent to cover the risks and costs of the venture, it is probable that the "white man's burden" in the Indian Empire will be dropped with slight regrets. In spite of better sanitary conditions which the white man has brought to India, and notwithstanding the huge irrigation works which he has built to prevent Indian famines (and assure to Britain a fairly steady source of a small part of its much needed food grains), and despite the good roads, railways, and public works which the British have constructed in India as monuments to their constructive and administrative skill, the facts probably support the Indian nationalists' view that the subject peoples have gained less than the ruling race in this contact of East and West. On the basis of such a profitable arrangement, we need not wonder at the development of the arrogant psychology of ruling people.

V. Reforms Demanded by India: Some Tentative Conclusions

In the previous sections some of the contemporary problems confronting the Indian peoples have been briefly presented. The part which the British government has played in these matters has also been suggested. That contemporary India presents an amazing complex of difficult problems is of course obvious to the reader. It remains for us briefly to suggest what India's demands today are and then to weigh the possibilities and probabilities of their fulfillment.

As late as August, 1928, it appears that the members of the All Parties Conference[1] were still willing to consider the future political development of India in terms of "full dominion status." Some of its members objected to that phrase, so the conference recorded its allegiance to the attainment by India of "full responsible government." The change in the phrase is significant in showing the insistence of the educated Indians upon the attainment of a responsible government in fact and not merely in name or form. As was shown in the section relating to the 1929 Indian National Congress sessions, the demand for full dominion status has changed to a blunt insistence upon complete independence for India. While it is true that at the same time that the Indian National Congress was meeting at Lahore, in the Punjab, another group calling itself the Indian Liberal Congress, meeting in Madras, passed resolutions adhering to the full dominion status claim for India, it seems to be beyond question that nationalist leaders in India have pretty widely accepted the complete independence ideal. Acting upon that decision, the "declaration of independence" was duly issued and January 26 was celebrated as

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[1] This conference, a continuation committee of the Indian National Congress of 1927, met at Lucknow in July–August, 1928, to draw up a tentative Indian constitution. Since this committee was an unofficial group, possessing no legislative powers of any kind, its suggestions were not destined to carry much weight when submitted to the British government and the Simon Commission.

Independence Day. Hence, one of the things which India demands is complete independence from British rule. Perhaps this statement ought to be qualified by stating that educated Indians insist upon independence from Britain. Since over 90 per cent of the people of India are still illiterate, it would be surprising to find the masses cognizant of such a political ideal as independence. Other demands which have been made from time to time include —

More essential control of government expenditures by the elected representatives of the people.

More liberal extension of franchise.

More responsible posts in the Indian Civil Service to be opened to Indians who can qualify.

Indianization of the railway services.

An Indian army officered by Indians.

Legislative control over the movements and activities of the Indian army. No further use of the Indian army in extending or protecting imperial aims outside of India.

Establishment of schools and colleges to train Indian Civil Service candidates and Indian army officers in India.

Control of taxation and all matters pertaining to Indian finance to be vested in the legislatures elected by the people.

Abolition of the salt monopoly and the salt tax.

Prohibition of manufacture, purchase, sale, or possession of alcoholic liquors.

Civil Service salaries to be more definitely fixed to harmonize with the standard of living of the people whose taxes pay these Civil Servants. "It is notorious that the Indian administration today is top-heavy and the services are paid at a higher rate than anywhere else in the world, in spite of the grinding poverty of the country."[1]

The Secretary of State for India should be chosen with reference to his knowledge of Indian conditions obtained from actual contact with those problems and conditions during a period of service in India.

It is apparent that India is becoming quite outspoken in its demands for political and economic consideration by the British. It has, however, been shown in this brief paper that the obstacles in the way of immediate gratification of Indian demands for independence and economic freedom are many and serious. It seems clear to the student of Indian problems that whether Indian nationalism is victorious in setting up a new independent state, or whether the British remain stubbornly in possession of India, as seems to be their purpose, the problems which the British and the Indians have created in that section of the world defy solution by quick or easy methods. Evidently no quack nostrum will prove adequate for the disease at this late date.

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[1] *All Parties Conference Report*, Allahabad, 1928, page 97.

In 1899 Sir Robert Giffen recognized the delicate and complex nature of the problems by saying,

> It seems certain, then, that India for many years to come will be an increasingly dangerous problem for our statesmen to deal with — the more dangerous, perhaps, because any change in the character of the people, bringing with it an increased energy for production and increased strength of character together, will also bring with it a rise in the scale of living, tending to make the masses discontented instead of submissive to their lot. Whatever course events may take, our rule in India must apparently, for generations, become a problem of increasing difficulty.[1]

During the decades which have passed since Giffen wrote those words, events have certainly proved the correctness of his assertion. The British system of education in India, meager though it has been, has at least been successful in disturbing the attitude of submission of the Indian student group to its lot. Having tasted of the ideas of freedom and independence and economic adventure in western books during their study in the Indian universities, these students are restlessly discontented with things as they are and are impatient for a change.

However, the appalling poverty of the people, coupled with their illiteracy, makes revolution along conventional lines practically impossible. Hence we see a Gandhi dramatizing the situation and seeking to gain the adherence of the village masses to his program of non-violent civil disobedience and non-payment of taxes. Gandhi has marched wearily through some of the most desolate portions of India toward the sea to manufacture salt for his people in defiance of the British government's monopolistic control of salt production, import, and sale in India. Can Gandhi and the nationalist leaders win the coöperation of India's ignorant masses in this ambitious project of overthrowing the British? Poverty, illiteracy, racial antagonisms, religious suspicions, differences of language and culture, lack of a common history and common goal, the presence of native states still ruling over a third of the area of India — all of these and many more complex problems relating to caste, creed, status, etc., combine to make the success of the nationalist cause more difficult, if not impossible of attainment. Can the Hindus and Muhammadans unite and coöperate to win control of India for the Indians? Can the masses be fired with the zeal to overcome the British and then submit to and coöperate with an orderly government of, by, and for the Indian peoples? Will the Indian states ever be willing to cast in their lot with that of all India and create an Indian nation out of the widely scattered, culturally divided, racially disparate groups now composing the peoples of India?

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[1] Sir R. Giffen, *op. cit.*, II, 21.

What interest have other nations in the western world in this drama which is unfolding in India? Is the white man to drop his self-imposed "burden" and frankly admit that in the long run imperialism is perhaps economically unprofitable if perpetrated against an alien people? What is the intelligent solution of these difficulties?

The British in India control its wealth and wield political power backed up by military force. In the past they have largely relied on force to win their ends. But an awakening India presents a far more sinister problem. If India could be left entirely to herself, absolutely free from any intervention or meddling from without, to work out her own solutions to her own problems, it is possible that an Indian solution might emerge. But such a state of isolation appears fantastic today.

The solution, if such there be, will probably have to be one which takes into consideration the time element in goodly measure. It does appear as though India a few years ago presented to the British an opportunity for a great experiment in a humane, willing, coöperative effort for East and West to meet in a sincere effort at reaching an understanding and solution of their mutual difficulties and problems. During the war period, India appeared almost ready for her rôle in such a coöperative effort. But the British were either too busy or otherwise involved to take advantage of the psychology of the moment to launch the experiment on a basis acceptable to both sides. Whether such an opportunity will again appear remains to be seen.

For the immediate present, the nationalist movement does not seem dangerously potent; Gandhi and his followers, after all, present a rather hopelessly outnumbered band of visionaries impatient for the next act in the drama. On the other hand, Britain appears to be losing its grip on the situation in India and seems destined to find it increasingly difficult to make its control of that vast empire profitable, even on economic grounds. Apparently, the nationalist movement is doomed to failure so far as its immediate aims are concerned. At the same time effective British control of India seems to be weakening. Perhaps the stage is being set for the appearance of some new factor not at present recognized in the complex set of forces which have combined to becloud the issues involved. What that new factor will prove to be is beyond the imagination of the writer to guess. But a complex situation such as the one which has been developing in India during the last century and a half does not offer a sudden, transparent, conclusive, satisfactory, and easy way out. Perhaps a long process of education of East and West, each learning from the other, may be indicated. The present situation is too full of variables of unknown weights to permit the hazarding of an intelligent guess as to the ultimate outcome.

VI. The Simon Commission Report

The long-heralded Simon Commission Report was published in two ponderous volumes, appearing on June 9 and 23, 1930, respectively. The first volume was devoted entirely to a statement of the commission's findings during its two-year study of the contemporary scene in Indian political life. The second volume gives the recommendations of the commission on the future relationship between Great Britain and the peoples of India.

A brief summary of the most important and significant recommendations is presented below. In the light of the previous sections and especially in view of the last section entitled "Reforms Demanded by India," the hostile reception which has been accorded the publication of the report in India is not at all surprising. Hence it will not be necessary to indicate in detail how far the recommendations of the Simon Commission fall short of the hopes which even the most moderate reform propagandists had entertained for India.

The Simon Commission recommends:

1. A federation of Indian states developing, eventually, a constitution acceptable to the varied groups comprising the Indian Empire. However, this suggestion is presented as an ideal, the accomplishment of which will require an indefinitely long period of time.

2. The abolition of dyarchy in the provincial governments.

3. The sum total of the reserved and transferred subjects is to constitute the range of provincial administration. Thus, the provincial cabinets are to be unified and every member of each provincial cabinet is to be required to accept responsibility for the whole policy of the provincial government. Salaries of ministers in the provincial cabinets are not to be liable to reduction or denial *in toto* by a vote in supply by the

provincial legislature. Any vote of censure must in the future be one against the whole ministry and such a vote is to be carried only after due notice.

4. The governor of a province should be given power to direct that action contrary to the advice of his cabinet be taken (subject to the control and direction of the Governor General) for certain specified purposes:

(*a*) To preserve the safety and tranquillity of the province.
(*b*) To prevent serious prejudice to one or more sections of the community compared with other sections.
(*c*) To secure the due fulfillment of any liability of government not subject to the vote of the legislature.
(*d*) To secure the carrying out of any order received by the provincial government from the Government of India or the Secretary of State.
(*e*) To carry out any duties which may be statutorily imposed on the governor personally, such as duties in connection with some service questions and responsibility for backward tracts.

5. The provinces are to work out their own constitutions and eventually coöperate in the development of a federal constitution for all India.

6. Minorities are to be safeguarded by the retention of an impartial power residing in the Governor General and the governors of provinces.

7. Communal representation in the provincial legislatures and in the federal assembly is to be retained. Thus Europeans, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, universities, commerce and planting, and labor are to be assured representation in spite of their minority status in the population as a whole.

8. The immediate launching of a study to provide the basis for an enlargement of franchise from the present approximate 2.8 per cent of the population to 10 per cent.

9. The control of the army in India is to be retained by the British, for "the Governor General or the Governor, as the case may be, must be armed with full and ample powers. . . . We desire to give the fullest scope for self-government [*sic*], but if there is a breakdown, then an alternative authority must operate unhampered." . . . "We hold that for many years the presence of British troops, and British officers serving in Indian regiments, will be essential." The army is to continue to be the responsibility of the British Parliament under the immediate control and supervision of the Governor General and the Commander in Chief. The Central Legislature, as now, would not vote supply for the army; appropriations of revenue for its maintenance would be authorized by certificate of the Governor General.

10. A federal assembly of from 250 to 280 members, elected by the provincial legislatures, is recommended to take the place of the present Central Legislature. The fixed life of the federal assembly and the provincial legislatures is to be five years. Members of the Governor General's Council are to be ex-officio members of the federal assembly. The Governor General is to have power to nominate not more than twelve additional members from among the officials in India to insure the Government's point of view being adequately presented in the assembly. The federal assembly is to be permitted to vote on measures supplying funds for the carrying out of the functions of the Central Government as well as to devise plans for supplementing provincial funds from all-India revenues.

11. A Council of State, as at present organized, is to be retained. The Governor General is to be given the power to appoint his own cabinet members, however, in place of the present practice of having these officials appointed by the Secretary of State for India by warrant under the Royal Sign Manual. The Commander in Chief is no

longer to be a member of the Viceroy's Council. This Council is not to be responsible to the Indian Legislature in the same sense as a British Cabinet is responsible.

12. Unity in the Central Government is to be preserved at all costs. "The Governor General must be the actual and active head of the Government."

13. The power of initiating measures of taxation will rest as heretofore in the executive exclusively. "All such measures must be passed by the federal assembly and the Council of State which are to have full power to amend or reject any such measure, but where the Governor General considers its passing is essential for the safety, tranquillity, or interests of British India or any part thereof, he may certify the measure, which thereupon has all the force of law."

14. Superintendence, direction, and control over a provincial government should be exercisable by the Governor General in —

(*a*) Safeguarding the administration of "central subjects."
(*b*) Matters which, according to the Governor General, affect any other part of India.
(*c*) The supply of information on any subject.
(*d*) Raising loans.
(*e*) The employment of all-India services in the province.
(*f*) The safeguarding of imperial interests.
(*g*) Questions arising between India and other parts of the Empire.
(*h*) Implementing international obligations.

"The Secretary of State would of course be enabled to issue orders on provincial questions falling within the above indicated field."

15. Periodic reviews of India's progress in self-government are to be abolished.

16. The British Parliament will continue to be responsible for the gradual development of a constitution for India.

17. Burma should be separated from India immediately in order to permit it to develop its political form unhindered and unchecked by Indian movements.

18. "As regards the India Office, the Governor General in Council will remain in superintendence, direction, and constitutional theory under the control of the Secretary of State, and the extent to which this control is relaxed or falls into desuetude will depend upon future practice, and cannot be laid down in the statute."

It is hardly necessary to criticize the report. That it is reactionary in the extreme and cautious to a fault in limiting the sphere of experimentation in "nation building" is obvious. By increasing the autocratic power of the Governor General, the governors of the provinces and the Secretary of State, the Simon Commission proposes to strengthen Britain's hold on India. By their studied avoidance of even a reference to "dominion status" or "independence from Great Britain" the members of the commission indicated their disdain for the aspirations of the Indian nationalists. But perhaps this conservative commission realized the importance of India to the very existence of the British Empire and hence proposed a veritable military dictatorship over India.

Sir John Simon and his associates on the Statutory Commission apparently studied the Indian political scene as objectively as such a group of investigators could. On the basis of their study they recommend the adoption of a cautiously restricted program of procedure out of which is to flower India's political stability. Every student of the Indian problem of government must realize the essential validity of the commission's suggestion that India begin to work out its political creed in the provinces. The very disparity of the Indian peoples necessitates the separate solution of a great variety of local problems. It is not improbable that the provincial legislative bodies will prove to be the training ground for India's future statesmen. The rather abrupt manner in which the commission has implied the need for this "primary instruction and training in government" has aroused the ire of the educated nationalists. It is one thing to prescribe a helpful medicine for a patient; it is quite another thing to gain his coöperation in seeking to apply the remedy. A friendly grant of some of the less radical demands of the nationalists might well have prepared the way for a much more amiable round-table conference between Indian and British representatives than the present calculated recommendations of the Simon Commission have produced.

There is, however, no necessary correlation between the recommendations of a Royal Commission and the subsequent legislation of Parliament on the problems under review. It is probable that the Simon Commission Report will prove to be but a point of departure in future discussions on British-Indian relationships. Hence the action of Parliament may still prove far more conciliatory toward Indian aspirations than the report itself suggests. The future lies largely with Parliament.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the political divisions of India? How do these support England?
2. What are the religious divisions of India? How do these support England?
3. What is the economic status of India? What conflict exists between English and Indian prosperity?
4. What is the system of government now prevailing in India? What are the Indian criticisms of it? What are yours?
5. What are the chief elements of the Simon Report? Why do many Indians reject it?

Assignment thirty-four: The mandates in the Near East

* A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of international affairs*, I, 1–24.

(*e*) Mandates in the Near East.
  - i. Islamic world since the World War characterized by —
    - (*i*) Clash between eastern and western civilization.
      - *a.* New transportation facilities.
      - *b.* Rise of nationalism impatient with the old life.
        - 1. Moslem population in the "solid core" politically more important for Islam than "the fringe."
        - 2. New nationalism secular but fanatic.
        - 3. Defiance of Turkish nationals of dictated peace.
        - 4. Militantly offensive in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
    - (*ii*) Political changes.
      - *a.* Fall of Islamic dynasties and the end of the House of 'Uthman (Osman).
      - *b.* Rise of dictators.
      - *c.* Anticlericalism in Turkey.
      - *d.* Growth of religious indifference in Islamic world except where religious orthodoxy was politically profitable.
      - *e.* Abolition of Capitulations.
      - *f.* Elimination of minorities from Islamic states.
        - 1. Anatolian Armenians almost blotted out.
        - 2. Anatolian Greeks uprooted and transplanted.
      - *g.* Greco-Turkish Convention, January 30, 1923.
    - (*iii*) Mandatory power policies.
      - *a.* French support of minorities in Syria.
      - *b.* British lend support to Zionist Movement in Palestine.
    - (*iv*) Changing attitude of Islamic world.
      - *a.* Adopting western technique of warfare and economic organization and adapting western social customs.
      - *b.* Less emphasis on Holy Wars and more on conferences to decide issues.
      - *c.* New emphasis on social reform.

QUESTIONS

1. Briefly sketch the geographical territory included in the world of Islam.

2. Discuss the importance of the Moslem minority in the populations of China, India, U.S.S.R., and tropical Africa. How does this affect the political aspect of the Moslem peoples?

3. How did the Copts in Egypt evade elimination while other minorities in Islamic countries suffered transplanting or extinction? Does any other solution suggest itself to you?

4. Attempt a criticism of the fairly common policy of the mandatory powers of utilizing as mercenary forces certain minority groups in the Islamic world in their military operations against the majority. What effect had this policy on the prestige of the mandatory government? On the majority within the mandated territory? On the minority thus utilized?

5. Contrast and explain the policy of the mandatory powers and the Islamic

countries with reference to treatment of the minority groups under their governmental control.

6. In what sense has western influence on the Islamic world been destructive? What is your attitude toward this clash of cultures?

(*f*) Russia.

Assignment thirty-five: The Russian Revolution of 1917

* *Hayes*, II, 807–832, 473–487.

In our earlier readings on Russia, we attempted to present a picture of Russian life during the latter half of the nineteenth century, omitting practically all discussion of the political events of the period. We felt that there political details were of relatively little significance as compared with a broad picture of the Russian scene. For an understanding of the post-war situation, however, it is at least necessary to know that an abortive attempt at revolution was made in Russia during 1904 and 1905.

Our earlier readings pictured the rising tide of social unrest in Russia under the autocratic government of the Romanov dynasty. This unrest reached a climax as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905, which revealed the inefficiency and corruption of the tsarist régime. At this time, members of the nobility and of the rising middle class joined with the peasants and the new urban proletariat in demanding sweeping reforms of the old order. Uprisings in various parts of the country forced the tsar to make liberal concessions, and for a time it appeared as if Russia would pass swiftly and easily from autocracy to constitutional monarchy.

This early promise swiftly faded, however, as the tide of revolution ebbed and the forces of reaction began to reassert themselves. The *Duma*, or Parliament, established in 1905 with high hopes, was soon reduced by various restrictive measures to the status of an impotent debating society. In 1914, in fact, the autocracy of the tsar was once more practically supreme. The revolutionary movement, although repressed, remained very much alive and slowly growing in strength, awaiting an opportunity to reassert itself.

i. The Revolution of 1917.

* *Hayes*, II, 807–832.

(*i*) Political background.

a. The Revolution of 1905; its failure to achieve satisfactory reforms.

* *Hayes*, II, 473–487.

        - *b.* Stubborn stupidity of Nicholas II.
        - *c.* Growth of radical political parties, particularly the Menshevists and Bolshevists.
        - *d.* Inefficiency and corruption of tsarist government in conduct of war.
        - *e.* War-weariness of nation.
    - (*ii*) Outbreak of revolution, March, 1917.
        - *a.* Abdication of tsar.
        - *b.* Provisional government under Lvov.
        - *c.* Attempted constitutional reforms under middle-class régime.
    - (*iii*) Failure of middle-class government.
        - *a.* Russia totally unprepared for political democracy.
        - *b.* Disintegration of army and of internal administration.
        - *c.* Separatist movement of subject nationalities.
        - *d.* Growth of Bolshevist movement with promises of immediate and sweeping social reforms.
        - *e.* Kerensky's dictatorship — collapse of attempt to reorganize army and continue war.
    - (*iv*) Revolution of November, 1917.
        - *a.* Bolshevists under leadership of Lenin and Trotsky overthrow Kerensky government and take control.
        - *b.* Peace with Central Powers under humiliating treaty of Brest-Litovsk, March, 1918.
    - (*v*) Dictatorship of proletariat.
        - *a.* Soviet Constitution of July, 1918, permits control of Russia by Bolshevist minority.
        - *b.* Social revolution with destruction of capitalistic institutions and attempt to set up a communistic state.
        - *c.* Growth of internal anarchy and decline of production force Lenin in 1922 to adopt social compromise known as New Economic Policy.
    - (*vi*) Bolshevist Russia against the world.
        - *a.* Internal opposition to Bolshevism.
        - *b.* Allied attempts to invade Russia and crush Bolshevism.
        - *c.* Growth of internal unity under pressure of foreign attacks.
        - *d.* Collapse of interventionist movements.
        - *e.* Russia becomes a Federation of Soviet Republics, 1923.
        - *f.* Bolshevist dream of a world revolution gradually fades with collapse of communist movements throughout western Europe.
- ii. The reintegration of Russia.

QUESTIONS

1. What brought on the Russian Revolution of 1905? Why did it prove abortive?
2. Sketch the outline of Russia's participation in the World War.
3. Characterize the programs of Lvov, Kerensky, and Lenin.
4. Why did Lenin win?
5. What theoretical program did Lenin support? What promises of advantage did it make to various groups in the state?

Assignment thirty-six: Recent Russian policies, internal

* *Buell*, 240–268.

In the previous assignment we traced the rise to power of the Russian Bolshevists under Lenin and Trotsky. During the years immediately following the November Revolution of 1917 the chief task of the Bolshevist leaders was to secure their position against the attacks of external and internal foes. By 1921 this goal had been achieved. One by one the various interventionist movements had collapsed, and the danger of external aggression had gradually disappeared. Although many of the western powers, including the United States, continued to maintain diplomatic and economic embargoes against the Soviet government, Russia since 1921 has been left practically free to work out her own salvation.

Internally, the Bolshevists had achieved an almost unquestioned supremacy by a ruthless destruction of capitalist institutions and a wholesale extermination of the aristocratic and bourgeois leaders of the old régime. On the destructive side, Lenin's work had been successful and thorough. On the constructive side, however, he was forced by 1921 to admit that his policies had failed. It was one thing to sweep away all vestiges of the old order; it was something quite different to build out of the ashes a new and prosperous state.

Between 1918 and 1921 Lenin had attempted to build his state upon a basis of pure communism. As a result of this experiment, the economic life of Russia had undergone a steady process of disintegration and decay. The incentives to production under communism failed to work, and Russia merely lapsed back into a state of primitive barter. Under a policy of deliberate depreciation, the Russian currency soon became worthless. The railway system, upon which Russian economic life is peculiarly dependent, underwent a steady decline in efficiency.

In the cities, manufacturing production languished and fell off to but a small fraction of the pre-war level. In the country, the peasants, comprising the great bulk of the total Russian population, proved an insurmountable obstacle to communistic plans. Having obtained possession of the land for which they had hungered, the peasants became conservative and lost interest in the Bolshevist program. According to communistic theory, the peasants were to turn their crops over to the state and receive in exchange manufactured goods produced in the cities. The peasants soon discovered, however, that, while their crops were confiscated, the promised goods in exchange were not forthcoming; instead they were paid either in worthless paper money or in bills of exchange which they were unable to redeem in goods. Consequently they displayed an increasing unwillingness to sow and harvest their crops, and agricultural production suffered a steady decline. The agricultural situation reached a crisis in 1920 and 1921, when the country was confronted with serious famines as a result of crop failures combined with greatly reduced plantings.

By 1921, in fact, Russia was very close to a state of utter chaos and anarchy. Faced with this situation, Lenin realized the necessity of changing his tactics. The result was that social compromise known as the New Economic Policy (NEP). While maintaining the communist doctrines of Karl Marx as a distant ideal, Lenin abandoned the hope of achieving that goal all at once. Instead he undertook a "strategic retreat" to a position that can best be described as State Capitalism, halfway between the individualistic capitalism of western Europe and the pure communism of Marx. Under the new policy the recovery of Russia has been rapid, and it is to this later phase of the Bolshevist Revolution that we must now direct our attention.

iii. Recent history in Russia.

* *Buell*, 240–268.

(*i*) The Bolshevist Party — background of the Revolution of 1917.
  a. Early communistic societies in Russia.
  b. Origin and growth of the Bolshevist (Majority) Party.
    1. Development of a party machine and discipline.
  c. Formulation of the party program.
    1. Advocacy of a violent overthrow of existing institutions by the working classes.
  d. The Menshevik (Minority) opposition.
  e. Triumph of the Bolshevist party in the coup d'état of November, 1917.
    1. Establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
    2. Nationalization of factories and banks.
    3. The Bolsheviks, a small minority, confronted with the task of governing a vast unorganized majority.
(*ii*) The Soviet régime.
  a. The Third International, an ally of both the Communist government and the Soviet government.


All Russian Congress of Soviets
Once a Year
1 Delegate 125000 Inhab. of country and
1 Delegate 25000 Electors of city
Povincial Executive Committee
Not over 25
Moscow Leningrad
Not over 40
Provincial Congress of Soviets
Once a Year
Not over 300
2000 Electors
City Soviet
200 Electors
Union Of House Servants
Factory Union
10 000 Inhab.
County Congress of Soviets
Once a Year
Not over 300
200 Electors
Factory Soviets
County Town Soviet
County Executive Com.
2000 Inhab.
Union of House Servants
Factory Union
Village Township Congress of Soviets
Once a Year
Soviet of Villages
300 Inhab.
300 Inhab.
Soviet of Villages
District Executive Com.
100 Inhab.
100 Inhab.
Village
Village
Village
Village

Adapted from "Soviet Russia in the second decade" (John Day Company, New York.)

The Soviet elective system.

            - 1. A world-wide propagandist proletarian movement advocating direct action.
        - *b.* The Communist (Bolshevist) party, the dominant force in the Soviet government.
            - 1. Structure and membership of the party in contemporary Russia.
        - *c.* Sources of its power and vitality.
            - 1. Direct relation between the party and the government.
            - 2. Absence of effective political opposition.
            - 3. Rigorous party censorship over the press and the platform.
            - 4. The "reign of terror" from 1918 to 1921.
            - 5. Strict party discipline and loyal devotion of the members.
    - (*iii*) Structure of the Soviet government.
        - *a.* Local soviets, district congresses, congresses of the autonomous republics, the All Union Soviet Congress.
        - *b.* The Soviet Union, a federation of Soviet republics.
            - 1. Powers of the Soviet Union Congress.
            - 2. Investment of all legislative, executive, and administrative powers in the Congress.
        - *c.* The Central Executive Committee and the Praesidium.
        - *d.* Indirect system of representation of the individual voter.
            - 1. Limitations of the suffrage right in the interests of the wage earners.
            - 2. Preponderance of industrial workers' over peasants' representatives in the higher soviets.
    - (*iv*) Economic life under the Soviet régime.
        - *a.* Economic life from 1917 to 1921.
            - 1. Collapse of the industrial system under the application of communist economic theories.
                - (1) Breakdown of the transport and manufacturing industries.
                - (2) Inflation, rise of living costs, resort to barter.
                - (3) Effects upon agriculture and the peasants.
        - *b.* The New Economic Policy (NEP), 1921.
            - 1. Substitution of state capitalism for the economic phases of communism.
                - (1) Formation of state trusts, trading syndicates, and a new bank with reorganization of the finances and the currency.
                - (2) Concessions to the peasants.
            - 2. Economic rehabilitation and steady improvement under the NEP.
    - (*v*) Political problems in contemporary Russia.
        - *a.* The Stalin-Trotsky controversy.
        - *b.* The present régime under Stalin.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the economic and political doctrines of communism? Discuss some experiments in communism prior to the Russian.

2. What is the relation of the Communist Party to the Soviet government? What is the source of the former's strength?

3. Why was the Soviet compelled to depart from its strictly communistic economic attitude in 1921? Describe the principal features of the NEP. What have been its effects?

4. What is the Third International? What is the state of opinion in Russia as to Soviet aid for its propaganda?

5. What are the prospects at present for the endurance of the Soviet régime in Russia? For the spread of its influence?

iv. Russia and the world.

Assignment thirty-seven: Recent Russian policies, external

* *Buell*, 269–295.

(*i*) History of Soviet Russian foreign policy best understood in terms of two conflicting principles: Russian nationalism, and Russia's advocacy of a world revolution against capitalism.

(*ii*) First period of relations between Soviet Russia and other powers, 1917–1920.
  - *a*. Virtual diplomatic isolation of Russia.
  - *b*. World revolution, the primary objective of Russian diplomacy during this period.
    - 1. Support of nationalist movements in Turkey, Persia, and China.
  - *c*. Foreign intervention in Russia to overthrow the Soviet government.

(*iii*) Second period: resumption of diplomatic relations with Europe, 1920–1924.
  - *a*. De jure recognition of Russia by small Baltic states.
  - *b*. De facto recognition by Great Britain and Italy.
    - 1. Trade agreement of 1921 between Great Britain and Russia.
  - *c*. Repudiation of Russia's foreign debts, an obstacle to resumption of diplomatic relations by other nations.
  - *d*. Failure of the Genoa Conference to solve the Russian debt problem.
    - 1. Secret treaty of Rapallo between Russia and Germany, an outcome of the conference.
  - *e*. The United States opposes recognition on the grounds of Russia's repudiation of her foreign debts and her propagandist activities.

(*iv*) Third period, from 1924 to the present.
  - *a*. De jure recognition by Great Britain and most nations except the United States.
  - *b*. Russo-German relations, seriously threatened in 1924, become more friendly.
  - *c*. Russia's interpretation of the Locarno compacts as a movement to isolate her from western Europe.
    - 1. Her friendly overtures to Turkey.
  - *d*. Anglo-Russian diplomacy during this period.
    - 1. Strained relations from 1925 to 1927 over the propagandist activities of the Third International and of the Soviet government.

        2. Russian sympathy with the English general strike of 1926.
        3. Rupture of relations following the Arcos raid in May, 1927.
    - *e.* Lack of cordial relations between France and Russia during this period, due to the unsettled debt issue.
    - *f.* The Russian-Roumanian dispute over Bessarabia.
    - *g.* Relations between Russia and the League of Nations.
        1. Russia a non-participant in league discussions until 1923.
        2. The Vorovski murder.
        3. Reëntry of Russia into league conferences in 1927.
            - (1) The World Economic Conference of 1927.
            - (2) Russia's proposal for complete disarmament at the league Conference on Armaments in 1928.

QUESTIONS

1. Why did most European nations delay recognition of the Soviet government? What is the difference between de facto and de jure recognition?
2. What reasons are advanced by the United States for her continued refusal to deal with the Moscow government? Can this state of affairs continue indefinitely?
3. Trace the history of Anglo-Russian relations from 1921 to the present.
4. What are the bonds of sympathy between the Russian and the German governments? What treaties have strengthened these bonds?
5. Discuss the conflicting principles which determine the foreign policy of Russia.

(*g*) Italy.

Assignment thirty-eight: Italy

* *Buell*, 337–363.
Schneider, *Making the Fascist state;* Schneider and Clough, *Making Fascists.*

- i. The Fascists come to power.
    - (*i*) Mussolini, the socialist.
    - (*ii*) The Fascists organize.
    - (*iii*) Fascism *vs.* Bolshevism.
    - (*iv*) The march on Rome, 1922.
    - (*v*) The consolidation of power.
        - *a.* Electoral reform.
        - *b.* Aventine secession.
        - *c.* Suppression of the Masons.
        - *d.* Matteotti murder.
- ii. The Fascist Party.
    - (*i*) Political philosophy of the party.
    - (*ii*) Organization.
        - *a.* Grand Council.
        - *b.* The Fascio.
        - *c.* The Militia.
        - *d.* The Advance Guard.
        - *e.* Balilla.
- iii. Fascism and labor.
    - (*i*) Rossoni and syndicalism.

    - (*ii*) The corporate state.
        - *a.* The Confederations.
        - *b.* The Ministry of Corporations.
        - *c.* The Electoral Law of 1928.
        - *d.* Labor legislation.
- iv. Achievements of Fascism.
    - (*i*) Finance.
    - (*ii*) Economics.
    - (*iii*) Bureaucracy.
- v. The population question.
    - (*i*) Population statistics.
    - (*ii*) Emigration.
    - (*iii*) Birth rate.
    - (*iv*) Fascism's policy.
- vi. Fascism's foreign policy.
    - (*i*) Attitude toward Italians abroad.
    - (*ii*) Tunis, Savoy, Nice.
    - (*iii*) Spain.
    - (*iv*) Austria.
    - (*v*) Jugoslavia.
    - (*vi*) Hungary.
    - (*vii*) Albania.
    - (*viii*) The League of Nations.
- vii. South Tyrol.
    - (*i*) The policy of the Fascists.
    - (*ii*) The reaction of the Tyrolese.
- viii. The Vatican.
    - (*i*) The "Roman Question."
        - *a.* Law of papal guarantees, 1871.
    - (*ii*) Education.
    - (*iii*) The Vatican Accord.

QUESTIONS

1. What is the political philosophy of the Fascist Party? In what ways is it similar to the Soviet? What are the outstanding differences?

2. How does the Italian Chamber of Deputies differ from our Congress as to manner of election? Compare the power of Mussolini with that of the President of the United States.

3. Trace the changes in the policy of Fascism toward the control of industry from 1922 to the present.

4. What is the relation between the population problem of Italy and her foreign policy? How does Fascism regard the League of Nations?

5. What are the main features of the Lateran Treaties? How do they benefit both church and state? What portion of Fascist theory is absolutely incompatible with Catholic teaching?

(*h*) Germany and the eastern frontier.

Assignment thirty-nine: Germany and the eastern frontier

* *Buell*, 157–194.

- i. The old order disappears.
  - (*i*) The November Revolution (1918).
- ii. The founding of republican government.
  - (*i*) The People's Commissioners and the election of a Constituent Assembly (November 12).
  - (*ii*) Antagonism of Right and Left: political democracy or the dictatorship of the proletariat — Spartacism.
  - (*iii*) The Weimar Constitution.
    - *a.* Largely the work of moderate liberals.
    - *b.* Established parliamentary government on a broad democratic basis.
    - *c.* Novel provisions in the field of socializations.
      - 1. Representation of functional and economic interests.
    - *d.* Provisions relative to individual liberties, the church, etc.
    - *e.* Retention of federalism.
- iii. The rise of reaction.
  - (*i*) Attempts at counter-revolution, 1919, 1920.
  - (*ii*) Bavarian separatism; Kapp rebellion.
- iv. Economic and financial problems.
  - (*i*) Post-war inflation.
  - (*ii*) Stresemann and stabilization, 1923.
  - (*iii*) The Dawes Plan.
  - (*iv*) Stabilization and the election of 1924 and 1925.
- v. The eastern frontier problems.
  - (*i*) Danzig.
    - *a.* Historical and ethnic background.
    - *b.* Disposition by the Peace Conference.
    - *c.* Conflicts between the Danzigers and the Poles.
  - (*ii*) The Polish Corridor and East Prussia.
    - *a.* Ethnic and economic factors.
    - *b.* Agreement of April, 1921, relative to transit across the Corridor.
  - (*iii*) Memel.
    - *a.* Lithuania's interests and position.
  - (*iv*) Upper Silesia.
    - *a.* The plebiscite of 1921 and the compromise treaty.
    - *b.* Economic and other conflicts, 1925 ff.

QUESTIONS

1. Trace the disappearance of the monarchy and the rise of the German Republic. Discuss the outstanding features of the Weimar Constitution. Which political elements in Germany have attempted to overthrow the republican government?

2. How did Germany manage her economic and financial comeback? What were the achievements of the Stresemann ministry?

3. Present the case of Germany and that of Poland in the matter of Danzig. Why


GERMANY after the PEACE TREATY of 1919
DENMARK
Schleswig
NORTH SEA
Heligoland
Kiel
BALTIC
Ceded to Associated Powers
Niemen
Danzig
East Prussia
Hamburg
Bremen
Stettin
Ceded to Poland
Berlin
Hanover
Oder
Elbe
POLAND
Vistula
HOLLAND
Ruhr
GERMANY
Rhine
Cologne
Ceded to Belgium
BELGIUM
Leipzig
Dresden
Silesia
oFrankfurt
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
Ceded to Czecho-Slovakia
Luxemb'g
Saar Basin to France. (Plebiscite at end of 15 years.)
Ceded to France.
Danube
Munich
FRANCE
SWITZER^D
AUSTRIA
1914 frontiers of Germany
Territory lost by Germany...
"Free territory" of Danzig....
Plebescite areas...........
(Rivers Rhine, Danube, Elbe, Oder and Vistula internationalised.)
J.F.H.

does the League delay in solving the problem of the eastern frontier? How does this problem hinder the attainment of European peace?

4. In what way does the agreement of 1921 between Germany, Poland, and Danzig alleviate the trouble over the Polish Corridor? What would be the best solution of the question?

5. Why is Upper Silesia the principal source of contention between Poland and Germany? What is the present status of the territory? Why should the final settlement be based not altogether on ethnic considerations?

(*i.*) China.

Assignment forty: China

* Reading to be assigned.

See also *Ketelbey*, 486–525.

Assignment forty-one: China — Continued

* Reading to be assigned.

See also *Ketelbey*, 486–525.

(*j*) United States.

Assignment forty-two: The quest for normalcy

* *Beard*, II, 663–678.

André Siegfried, *America comes of age* — a dispassionate and penetrating analysis of post-war America from the viewpoint of a Frenchman; perhaps the most incisive and interesting commentary upon the United States by a foreigner since Bryce's *American commonwealth* in 1888.

To attempt to characterize in a few brief paragraphs the post-war history of a nation so vast in extent and so kaleidoscopic in its changes as the United States is indeed a presumptuous undertaking. It is obvious that we can do nothing more than indicate a few of the high lights of recent years. If the course ended at this point, such a survey would of course be grossly inadequate. Since most of the second year's work in Contemporary Civilization, however, is devoted to an analysis of the present social and economic life in the United States, it is sufficient merely to give her an impressionistic sketch of the post-war scene.

The outstanding result of the war for the United States was the startling change in our economic position as compared with the rest of the world. Instead of being confronted with national bankruptcy and economic demoralization as were the nations of Europe, this country discovered that its national wealth had actually increased during the years of fighting. As a result, the United States assumed the appearance of a vigorous young giant in a world of economic cripples. Before the war, American industry had been dependent for its development upon the surplus capital of Europe; at the close of the war, European industry found itself forced to borrow heavily from the United States. Consequently, surplus American capital amounting to many billions of dollars has been invested in foreign countries. Thus, with startling suddenness the position of the United States has been changed from that of a heavy debtor on international account to that of being one of the greatest creditor nations in the world.

The influence of this change has already begun to make itself felt in our international relations. At first, an immediate result of the war was a violent reaction in the United States against the idealism and international leanings of President Wilson. This reaction expressed itself in the overwhelming majority for Harding in the election of 1920, in the rejection of the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations, and in the generally expressed desire to return to our traditional policy of "isolation" and freedom from all entangling alliances. The force of hard economic fact, however, is proving stronger than the emotional ties of a tradition that has been outgrown. Since 1920 the United States has gradually emerged step by step from its position of proud isolation to a more active participation in international politics. The handwriting is now plainly on the wall, and, whether for weal or for woe, this country is destined in future years to play an increasingly important rôle in world affairs.

Another striking aspect of our changed economic status is the unprecedented prosperity that has made its appearance in this country since the war. Although it is beyond our present scope to discuss the causes of this phenomenal prosperity (this problem will be one of our main topics in the work of the second year), the fact of its existence and profound effects upon American life today cannot fail to impress the most casual observer. One aspect of the enhanced national wealth is seen in the great increase in the number of large fortunes. On reliable authority it is estimated that there are now approximately fifty thousand millionaires in the United States, or more than three times as many as in 1914. Moreover, this prosperity has not been concentrated solely in the hands of a wealthy minority, but has been widely diffused throughout most of the population. As compared with 1914, the real wages of industrial laborers show a sharp increase. In fact, most European visitors to the United States during the past few years have commented upon the well-fed, well-dressed appearance of the entire population, and the apparent complete absence of real poverty and destitution. At this feast of plenty, the only important note of discord has been sounded by the farmers. Plunged from the dizzy heights of an artificial war expansion into the disastrous depression of 1920–1921, American agriculture as a whole has presented a picture in recent years of economic distress as compared with the opulence of the cities.

Hand in hand with the reaction from the international ideals of Wilson there appeared after the close of the war a marked trend toward conservatism in regard to social and economic reform. This reaction, set into motion by fear lest the Bolshevist Revolution spread to the United

States, has since been stimulated by the very real prosperity of the country. As a result, economic liberalism lapsed into a state of innocuous desuetude from which it is only just beginning to show signs of recovering. Industrial democracy, about which so much was heard during the years of the war, was practically forgotten after 1920. Instead, we have witnessed a return in many cases to a strong, paternalistic control of labor by the leaders of business. For the time being at least, the industrial workers have shown little inclination to rebel against this change, because wages have been high and working conditions on the whole quite satisfactory.

All in all, post-war United States presents a scene of complacent well-being that verges upon smug self-satisfaction. It is an age in which we are apparently witnessing the complete triumph of machine technique and mass production along with the apotheosis of the practical man of affairs.

i. The return to normalcy.
  (*i*) Reaction against progressive principles of Roosevelt and Wilson.
  (*ii*) Unpopularity of Wilson régime at close of the war.
    a. Disillusionment with war ideals.
    b. Sympathy with Germany.
    c. Opposition to Great Britain.
    d. Reaction against liberal social and economic ideals of Wilson.
    e. Dislike of Wilson's autocratic methods.
  (*iii*) Overwhelming election of Harding in 1920.
ii. Harding's administration.

Assignment forty-three: The quest for normalcy — Continued

* *Beard*, II, 678–712.

  (*i*) Resort to principles of McKinley and Hanna in internal administration.
    a. Policy of getting the government out of business.
    b. Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922; highest protective tariff in history of country.
    c. Repression of organized labor by use of injunction.
  (*ii*) Foreign policies.
    a. Rejection of Versailles treaty and League of Nations.
    b. Separate peace treaties with Germany and Austria.
    c. Vague discussion of an "association of nations."
    d. Increasing tension in relations with Japan and Great Britain in Pacific Ocean.
    e. Washington disarmament conference, 1922 — limitation of capital ships — Four Power Pact.
  (*iii*) Scandals in cabinet: Fall, Daugherty, Denby.

iii. Coolidge's administration after death of Harding in 1923.
    (*i*) Program of economy in government and a free hand to business enterprise.

QUESTIONS

(For assignments forty-two and forty-three)

1. In the light of recent developments do you think that the program of normalcy was really profitable to American business?

2. How far have changed conditions made impossible the successful application to modern economic affairs of Hamiltonian principles?

3. Do you think that the repressive measures of Wilson and his successors against freedom of speech have been successful in promoting order or removing serious expressions of discontent? Do they involve the use of agencies generally inimical to the continuance of civil liberty?

4. Is it justifiable for the government to leave private enterprise unchecked if that will mean increased prosperity for the community? Does such a policy involve the death of democracy? If so, is it desirable that democracy should go?

5. Criticize the composition and functioning of the Supreme Court under the Harding régime? What, in your opinion, should be the function of that body? How far should it consider public opinion, and what should be its relation to social change?

6. How far did the Washington Conference settle the problem of the Far East from an American point of view? Examine the effect of our immigration policy on our relations with Japan, and consider whether it makes possible a permanent friendly relationship. If not, would a changed policy be desirable, in view of its possible influence on American life?

7. How far is a policy of isolation still possible for the United States? Is the amount of her present participation in world affairs adequate? Can such a position be permanent without grave harm to herself?

8. Compare the aims, methods, and results of idealistic and humanitarian opinion and business interests in relation to the foreign policy of the United States since the war. Estimate the influence each has had, and its value for future development.

9. Along what lines, if any, is it possible to find a solution to the conflicts between various interests which hamper the United States in its efforts to attain a united foreign policy. Do the compromises of the Harding and Coolidge régimes offer a solution? Can each question be decided as it comes up, or is a large and complex plan necessary?

10. In view of the great variety of conflicting interests in the United States, what would you suggest is the proper policy for the government in internal affairs? Is it to be achieved by greater conscious purpose and control or by *laissez faire?* What should be its relations to groups and their lobbyists?

2. Modern philosophies of nature and society.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, two main currents of thought colored the ideas of western civilization — the scientific tendencies of the Age of Reason, and the religious and artistic tendencies of Romanticism. On the one hand, the notions of eighteenth century social science, political economy, and politics were allied with the French revolutionary tradition and were shared by most of the liberals, especially in England. On the other, the great revival of interest in religion and art had influenced both the conservatives and those who wished to go further than complacent eighteenth century liberalism. Outside of the practical interests of the middle-class business men, however, the general intellectual attitude had been increasingly critical of the narrow science of the preceding century. In their outlook on life, most, even of the educated class, had come to relegate science to a minor place and to interpret the world primarily in the religious and moral terms popularized by the Romanticists.

By 1850, however, the strength of the reaction against science was almost spent. Men were ready to take an interest in the new scientific generalizations worked out during the preceding generations. Natural science itself had profited by the criticisms directed against it. It had realized the significance of explaining historical development and growth. The publication of Darwin's *Origin of species* in 1859 came at just the right time to provoke an intense interest, and the next generation saw a great movement to popularize all the fundamental ideas of nineteenth century science. Since that time both physical and biological science have grown greatly in prestige, and all contemporary thought has been colored by the attempt to assimilate the new notions.

The second great force felt by the intellectual life of the present has been the new environment created by industrialism, with all its attendant problems. It is only in the last generation that men have come to realize that the changes effected by modern scientific ideas will be accompanied by the even greater changes which urban conditions, mass production, and a mechanical civilization are forcing on us. We are all apt to attribute too exclusive an influence in changing our ideas to rational argument and proof, and to overlook the subtler but more profound changes caused by our material environment. It is probable that the city and the machine will alter the traditional beliefs and ideals of western civilization, when their full effect has been felt, far more radically than has the laboratory. These two sets of forces, natural science and industrialism, have been the causal factors back of contemporary outlooks on nature and society; since they have now been working for a century in a world whose ideas were organized on a religious, moral, and artistic basis, the philosophies of the recent past have been reflections of this conflict between the older religious and moral traditions and the new science and industrialism.

A. The world conceived as a process of growth and evolution.

Assignment forty-four: Evolution

* *Randall*, 454–469.
T. H. Morgan, *Critique of the theory of evolution* — the most balanced survey of the present status of biological evolution; *Evolution in modern thought*, in the "Modern Library" — excellent accounts of the influence of the idea of evolution; Bertrand Russell, *Philosophy*, chs. 9, 10, 11 — good brief account of contemporary physical theory; A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the modern world*, chs. 6, 7, 8 — description of the present-day revolution in physics.

During the nineteenth century, the method of explaining natural phenomena in terms of the behavior of simple elements — the method of mechanistic explanation — recorded an unbroken series of successes. Detailed investigation found further sub-elements necessary to explain the new phenomena brought to light. The molecule was analyzed into atoms, the atom was broken up into electrons; the fundamental laws describing the actions of these elements were mathematically formulated. The same method of mechanistic analysis was carried into biology and psychology. It was also applied to explain, not merely the present behavior of things, but their origins and development as well. The evolutionary theory in biology, which placed man himself squarely in the midst of nature as a natural product, was the most startling of these new generalizations. Down until 1895 natural science was largely working out the details of the method of Newtonian science and its vision of the world as a great machine. The elements had become more minute, their laws of behavior more complicated, and the notion of development had been made fundamental; but the process of evolution itself was explained in mechanical terms.

Since 1895, however, the investigations of physicists and chemists have brought to light further phenomena, like radioactivity, which have forced a modification of the method of mechanistic analysis, the orthodox scientific method from the days of Galileo down. It is now impossible to describe the behavior of our world of electrical energy by merely elaborating the Newtonian laws of motion. From 1859 to 1895 biology was the science that furnished most of the notions that changed men's beliefs. Today the center of interest has shifted back to physics and chemistry, which are undergoing a fundamental reconstruction. The biological notions of function and organization — above all, the insistence on the fundamental importance of time — have been taken over by physics and mechanics to explain phenomena inexplicable in terms of the older mechanistic principles. Today the unit of scientific explanation is no longer a simple element, like the atom or the electron, but a complexly organized field of electromagnetic energy. Modern science uses complicated systems of measurements to secure its data and its verifications, and into these measurements the precise determination of time enters as it did not in the older Newtonian science. What the scientist now observes is no longer a substance or thing, like the atom, but a series of happenings or events, and their mathematical correlation with other series of events. The basic generalizations of this post-Newtonian physics are expressed in the theories of relativity, which bid fair to revolutionize our science as greatly as did the theory of evolution in the nineteenth century. This new physics has at its disposal a much enlarged body of mathematical instruments and concepts, the fruit of the great growth of mathematical science in the last century; for mathematics has become more logically rigorous, more systematic, and more insistent on its status as a body of postulate systems rather than a set of axioms about the world. The ultimate effect of this reconstruction of the fundamental notions of physics upon the sciences of life and society is still to be determined; contemporary philosophers of science are attempting to work them out. But it is already clear that some of the basic generalizations of nineteenth century science, upon which many present-day philosophies have been built, like the "law" of the conservation of energy, the laws of thermodynamics, and the great principle of a thoroughgoing mechanistic determinism, may undergo drastic revision.

(*a*) Eighteenth century ideas of progress and evolution — Lessing, Buffon, Herder, Condorcet.

(*b*) The increased interest in the historical development of human institutions — rise of the idea of evolution in human affairs.

(*c*) The spread of a naturalistic uniformitarianism in every field.
  i. The method of mechanistic explanation universalized.
    (*i*) The unification of the fields of physics and chemistry.

- *a.* Fundamental generalizations — the conservation of energy, the laws of thermodynamics, Maxwell's equations for the action of an electromagnetic field.
- *b.* The further analysis of matter and energy — molecular and atomic theories, the electronic constitution of matter.

(*ii*) Mechanistic explanation in biology — the chemical interpretation.

(*iii*) Mechanistic explanations in psychology — William James, behaviorism, biological psychology.

ii. Mechanistic explanation applied to the origins of present forms.

Assignment forty-five: Evolution — Continued

* *Randall*, 469–481.

(*i*) Origin of solar system — nebular and planetesimal hypotheses.

(*ii*) Uniformitarianism in geology — Lyell and age of the earth.

(*iii*) Uniform development in biology — the theory of evolution.

- *a.* Eighteenth century speculation — Buffon, Lamarck, Malthus.
- *b.* The work of Darwin — the gathering of a mass of detailed evidence, and the theory of natural selection as a causal explanation.
- *c.* Theories of the causes of the evolution of species — Mendel, De Vries, Weismann — atomism in heredity and chance as explanations.

(*d*) The effect of the rapidly changing technique of applied science, of industrial advance, and of political and social revolution in popularizing the concept of development.

(*e*) Effect of the notion of development upon current intellectual background.

(*f*) The contemporary reconstruction of the foundations of physics and mechanics.

i. The new phenomena — radioactivity, the quantum theory of light, the special and general theories of relativity, theories of atomic structure. Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger.

ii. The reaction upon physics of biological notions — process, time, organization, function.

iii. Basic concepts.

(*i*) The reality of time and the importance of temporal measurements — the space-time continuum, relativity.

(*ii*) Events as units rather than substances.

(*iii*) Importance of organization — "misplaced concreteness" fallacy.

iv. Present-day philosophies of natural science — the development of concepts adequate to describe both physical phenomena and life.

QUESTIONS

(For assignments forty-four and forty-five)

1. Why did early thinkers on evolution associate the theory with progress?
2. What is uniformitarianism? Show the spread of this conception in geology, biology, and historical studies.
3. What is naturalism? With what other positions may it be contrasted? Why does naturalism appeal to some? why repel some?
4. What is mechanism? What are its strong and its weak points?
5. What is behaviorism? Is it a useful theory?
6. What are the effects of the notion of development upon present-day thought?

THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE IN MECHANICAL CONTROL

By Frederick E. Croxton

Assistant Professor of Statistics, Columbia College

B. Some practical accomplishments of contemporary science.
    (*a*) Mechanical.

Assignment forty-six: Some accomplishments of applied science
    * *Syllabus*, 358–377.

The story of the contemporary achievements of man is incomplete without reference to the devising of machinery and the more perfect utilization of natural resources. As indicative of this material progress, reference will be made to some of the more important developments in the fields of power, transportation, communication, and agriculture.

Power

For countless ages the power available to man was limited to what he could command of his own muscles, and later to what he could command of the energy of tame or semi-domesticated beasts. Grain was threshed by treading upon it, water was pumped by means of a curious paddle-wheel arrangement which, as the result of the application of a man's weight to the extended paddles, lifted a small amount of water; power for general purposes was provided by treadmills; drawing the plow, hauling, and carrying were privileges of either animals or men. These vital forces, though in use in some parts of the world at present, and while sufficient, presumably, to have built such enduring monuments as the pyramids, could supply but a pitiful fraction of our power needs of the present day. If every adult in the United States were to be put to work in eight-hour shifts, only about 2,300,000 horse power would be realized. This energy, trans-


CARTWRIGHT'S ENGINE, 1798

formed into electricity, would be sufficient to provide only one-seventh of the electrical power at present used in New York state.

The first step beyond the use of vital forces was doubtless the harnessing of wind or water to supply the necessary power for grinding grain or pumping water. A quite inexpensive source of energy is provided by the wind, but while much power may be obtained, it is far from constant in its supply. Water power, on the other hand, is often derived from a stream of steady flow; and when the flow is found to vary, it may be rendered constant by the construction of dams and reservoirs. At the present time it is estimated that water power is being used to develop something over 7,000,000 horse power in the United States and that if all of the available water power of the country were used, approximately 35,000,000 horse power could be developed.

In the latter part of the seventeenth century, steam engines were brought to such a stage of perfection that they could be used for pumping water from shallow mines. These early steam mechanisms possessed large cylinders and ill-fitting pistons propelled by steam at very low pressure. By devising machinery which could produce cylinders and pistons which were more truly round and by constructing boilers of greater efficiency than that of a teakettle, it was shortly possible to reduce the size of the engine and to increase its field of usefulness. Partly because of its ability to start under load, the steam engine is today the leading type of external-combustion engine, though for some purposes the high-speed steam turbine is proving more satisfactory. The internal-combustion engine, which derives its power from the combustion of fuel inside of the cylinder, represents a later development than does the external-combustion engine. The compactness of this type of prime mover has made possible our automotive industry and has been of much importance in the development of small electric light and power plants. The ordinary gasoline engine and its near relative, the gas engine, are too familiar to need explanation here. Suffice it to say that both of these are characterized by relatively high speed of operation and low starting power. The man who will develop an efficient internal-combustion engine which will have power to start under load without the use of gears may name his own reward. A recent development of the internal-combustion type is the Diesel engine, which operates without the usual


Ye Old Stage Coach

Courtesy of the General Motors Corporation.


A PRAIRIE SCHOONER

Courtesy of the General Motors Corporation impedimenta of carburetor and ignition, the explosion in the cylinder being induced by the compression exerted by the piston upon a gaseous mixture sprayed into the cylinder. The Diesel engine may be made in units producing thousands of horse power and is more compact and economical of fuel than is the steam engine.

The development of electric motors to the point where they could be applied commercially made it possible eventually to dispense with individual power plants of questionable efficiency and to operate machinery by means of current obtained from a central generating plant. The electric motor, like the steam engine, is capable of exerting great power in starting. This, coupled with the fact that each piece of machinery in a factory may have its individually controlled electric motor of proper size, thus dispensing with the myriads of belts and continually revolving shafts, explains why electricity is the favored form of power in many industries. Electricity possesses a great advantage over any other form of power available, in that it can be transmitted over great distances with but slight dissipation. It is because of this fact that it is possible for engineers to talk of "superpower," which envisages the production of electricity on a large scale near the coal mines, the transmission of the power to railroads and cities in the surrounding area, and the fullest possible utilization of the by-products of the coal.

TRANSPORTATION

In 1750 it was possible to travel from New York to Philadelphia in three days by means of stage and boat. John Mercereau advertised in 1771 that "The Flying Machine . . . sets off from Powles Hook [Jersey City] every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday morning for Philadelphia, and performs the journey in a Day and a Half." Today, whether we travel by rail or road, Philadelphia is but a few hours from New York.

It is a far cry from the early strap-iron rails, with their faculty of coming loose, curling up, and sometimes protruding through the floor of the coach, to the smooth and relatively safe rails of our present-day railroads; the great compound engines now in use resemble almost not at all the "Tom Thumb" of Peter Cooper which, in 1831, made a run of thirteen miles in an hour; the crude wagon-like coaches of early railroad history are not to be compared with the palatial Pullman cars of today.



To the PUBLIC.

THE FLYING MACHINE, kept by John Marcereau, at the New Blazing-Star-Ferry, near New-York, ſets off from Powles Hook every Monday, Wedneſday, and Friday Mornings, for Philadelphia, and performs the Journey in a Day and a Half, for the Summer Seaſon, till the 1ſt of November; from that Time to go twice a Week till the firſt of May, when they again perform it three Times a Week. When the Stages go only twice a Week, they ſet off Mondays and Thurſdays. The Waggons in Philadelphia ſet out from the Sign of the George, in Second-ſtreet, the ſame Morning. The Paſſengers are deſired to croſs the Ferry the Evening before, as the Stages muſt ſet off early the next Morning. The Price for each Paſſenger is *Twenty Shillings*, Proc. and Goods as uſual. Paſſengers going Part of the Way to pay in Proportion.

As the Proprietor has made ſuch Improvements upon the Machines, one of which is in Imitation of a Coach, he hopes to merit the Favour of the Publick.

JOHN MERCEREAU.

Courtesy of Professor A. E. McKinley.

Stagecoach advertisement, 1771.

The electrification of railroads is proceeding apace in many parts of the country. Not only are electric locomotives cleaner and less likely to set the country-side afire than those driven by steam, but the trains, when coasting, actually return current to the power house. It is one of our present concerns that this electricity, like other excess supplies of power, cannot be stored efficiently. It must be used at once or it is lost!

Steam, electricity, and gasoline have all been applied to run our automobiles. The steam-driven car, never very plentiful, is today a rarity. When the gasoline engine was an uncertain and more expensive mechanism to operate than it is today, there were large numbers of electric automobiles to be seen. Now they are few in number, and nearly all of these are commercial vehicles. The developments in the storage of electrical power have not kept pace with the developments of the internal-combustion engine.



Courtesy of The New York Central Railroad Co.

Early Steam Locomotive and Coaches.

The rapid growth of the automotive industry has been largely an American phenomenon. It is estimated that on January 1, 1928, there were 29,500,000 motor vehicles in the world, of which 23,000,000, or over 75 per cent, were in the United States. Of late years great strides have been taken in the development of transportation by means of motor busses, and there are in existence in the United States 7,100 companies operating 34,000 common carrier busses. In the development of motor bus transportation, the railroads and interurban traction lines have, until recently, largely either registered strong opposition or held aloof. The result has been that many interurban traction lines have been forced out of existence, and in many instances the railroads have felt keenly the competition of the busses. Developments of the present presage that in the not-too-distant future the aëroplane also may be an important carrier of persons and freight. It was perhaps largely with this in view that the Pennsylvania Railroad, together with representatives of the National Air Transport Company, the Curtiss Airplane and Motor Company, the Wright Aëronautical Corporation, the Ford Motor Company, and others, recently formed the Transcontinental Air Transport Company.



Data from United States statistical abstract.

Freight ton-miles (tons carried one mile) in the United States 1885–1926.



Data from National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, "Facts and figures, 1928."

Annual production of passenger automobiles and trucks, 1905–1927.

Developments on the water have been no less striking than on the land. The use of sails has grown so rare that large sailing vessels are seldom seen and the appearance of a "square-rigger" is occasion for extended comment.

No longer is it necessary to spend several weeks in crossing the Atlantic; our swiftest boats accomplish the passage in six days or less, and an eleven-day boat is referred to as a "tub." The application of the

Diesel engine to shipping has resulted in lower costs to the operator and increased cargo space. We are being repeatedly told by marine engineers that our speed on the water will be steadily increased and that our safety will be more certain.

COMMUNICATION

Primitive man had divorced the communication of ideas from the transportation of persons by means of his signal fires and drums. These, however, were neither rapid nor secret and, until well into the nineteenth century, communication was attained only in conjunction with transportation: messages and men were inseparable. In early America news spread so very slowly that Thomas Jefferson expressed serious doubts whether one nation could be formed out of the thirteen states which stretched along the Atlantic seaboard. It took three months for a letter to get from Boston to Georgia by land. Even as late as 1815 General Andrew Jackson fought the Battle of New Orleans in complete ignorance of the fact that the war had been concluded ten days previously. News from Europe was at least two months old when it arrived. In 1832 Morse conceived the idea of the telegraph, and in 1843 a tele-

THE HALF MOON

Courtesy of General Motor Corporation.

graph line was constructed between Baltimore and Washington. With the development of the telegraph, practically instantaneous communication between far-distant points became possible; but since messages were sent by means of a code of dots and dashes, its use for direct person-to-person communication was quite limited. Bell, in 1875, discovered the principle of the telephone, and shortly thereafter an apparatus was constructed to transmit speech by means of. an electric current. The telephone has today become an indispensable part of our everyday life, and the American Telephone and Telegraph Company estimates that 22 billion telephone messages are sent annually in the United States. As a comparative figure, it is stated that 15 billion messages are annually sent by letter. At the beginning of 1928 it was estimated that there were 31,000,000 telephones in the world, of which 18,500,000, or 60 per cent, were in the United States. New York City alone can boast of as many telephones as Asia, Africa, and Australia combined!


THIS MODEL OF BELL'S FIRST TELEPHONE IS A DUPLICATE OF THE INSTRUMENT THROUGH WHICH SPEECH SOUNDS WERE FIRST TRANSMITTED ELECTRICALLY, 1875

Courtesy of American Telephone and Telegraph Co.

Reproduction of Bell's original telephone, 1875.



When the key *A*, pivoted at *C*, is depressed to touch the contact point *B*, a current from the battery *D* flows along the wire which is wound around the iron spool *E*. The passage of the current along the wire on the spool causes it to exert a magnetic pull upon the iron lever *F*, which is under tension and pivoted at *G*. The lever moves downward until it strikes the end of the spool, which results in a clicking sound. Releasing the key allows the lever to fly upward and strike the pin *H*, making a second click. The time between clicks, controlled by the length of time the key is depressed, is interpreted as a dot or a dash, according to duration, and a code is built upon these dots and dashes.

Predicated upon the previous development of wireless telegraphy, speech was transmitted over appreciable distances without wires by the Arlington station in 1915, and radio broadcasting was begun in 1921. During the year 1927, commercial radio telephone service was established between all points in the United States and Great Britain. During that year also public demonstrations of television were given both by wire and by radio, and in May, 1928, the broadcasting of pictures by radio was begun.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture, too, has felt the effects of science and inventive genius. The scythe and cradle used by our grandfathers for cutting hay and grain have given way to the mowing machine and the binder. The flail, formerly used for beating the grain from its husk, has been abandoned in favor of the threshing machine. In later years the binder and the thresher have themselves been replaced by a combination of the two. This machine cuts and threshes the grain at one operation, finally delivering it in bags or to a wagon, ready to be ground or stored. Not only has the machinery of agriculture undergone a great change in recent years, but so also have the methods of farming. From the occasional use of manure and root crops and the first beginnings of the three-field system, we have progressed a great way. Today we have fertilizers of so many types that it virtually requires an expert to prescribe for a given soil. Special methods of preparing the soil have been developed, and the rotation of crops has been given much careful attention. As an example, the United States Department of Agriculture tells us that "Work carried on at the Pee Dee Experiment Station, at Florence, S. C., over a period of years shows that it is possible to grow peanuts, sweet potatoes, and a forage or hay crop in rotation with constantly increasing yields of these products and an apparent increase in soil fertility."[1]



Acres plowed in ten hours: *A*. 16 acres with a 25–30 h.p. gas tractor and eight 14-inch plows. *B*. 2.3 acres — one man and three horses.

In all of the description that has gone before, we are apt to think of the accomplishment as a whole and not realize that each step in the process of improved power production, transportation, communication, and agriculture has been made possible by the application of principles developed in the various sciences. Nor does any science stand alone. Principles developed in one field of work are constantly being supplemented and modified by the results of research in other lines. The unity of our scientific knowledge largely grows out of the complementary nature of the results achieved by the myriads of research workers in the various branches of scientific endeavor.

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[1] *Agricultural yearbook, 1925*, page 405.

RECENT PROGRESS IN MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH

By Peter Odegard

Professor of Government, Ohio State University

(*b*) Medical.

H. H. Moore, *Public health in the United States;* and H. H. Moore, *American medicine and the people's health;* Walter Libby, *The history of medicine;* Paul De Kruif, *Microbe hunters;* Vallery-Radot, *Life of Pasteur;* I. Rubinow, *Socialized medicine* (*Nation*, May 2, 1928).

Throughout the ages man has aspired to health. Without it he is miserable and ineffective; with it he can remake the world. From the days of the Egyptian priest-physicians to the present time, mankind has been fighting a desperate and determined battle with disease, but prior to the nineteenth century practically nothing was known concerning the causes and cure of human ills. During primitive times the demonic theory prevailed, as it does among primitive peoples today. Disease was thought to be produced by evil spirits. Under such a theory the medicine man and the priest were the health officers. Incantations, fetishes, mystic symbols, prayers, and fasting were used to frighten the demon away. Science was under bondage to magic, and man was left to the tender mercies of an enemy unseen and unheard, but deadly. Some progress had been made by the Egyptians, especially in the use of medicinal herbs and drugs. Hippocrates, the father of medicine, ridiculed the demonic theory, insisting on an empirical treatment, but the priest caste was not to be downed. The Arabs made important contributions, and the Persian, Rhazes (860–932), wrote treatises on smallpox and measles. In the thirteenth century, Hugh of Lucca and his son, Theodoric, made important advances in the art of surgery, insisting upon cleanliness and even making use of anesthetic sponges. In 1316 Mondino published a treatise on anatomy based upon actual dissection and observation. The University of Bologna became a center for anatomical research. In 1363 Guy de Chauliac published the *Chirurgia magna*, which stands as one of the greatest contributions to the development of surgery. He was familiar with narcotic inhalation as anesthesia; he advocated the early treatment of cancer, preferably with the knife; he gave an account of a Caesarian operation after the death of the mother; introduced the use of sugar in medicinal preparations; gave a careful description of the symptoms of leprosy; and during the Black Death of 1348 and 1360, worked with indefatigable energy in combating the pestilence. The greatest contribution to the science of anatomy up to his time was made by Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519). We still have his drawings of the human body, dissected by himself, and they are surprisingly accurate. Leonardo had planned an extensive book on anatomy which he never completed, and it was not until Andreas Vesalius in 1542 published his *De humani corporis fabrica* that anatomy was freed from the prepossessions of tradition. In 1616 William Harvey announced his theory of the circulation of the blood, and the way was prepared for modern physiology. John Hunter, Edward Jenner, and Sir Richard Owens make the eighteenth century important in the history of medicine by their researches in comparative anatomy.

But notwithstanding the increased knowledge of the structure and functioning of the human body, very little was known concerning the causes of disease. Epidemics and pandemics continued to destroy millions of lives. During the fourteenth century, Europe was swept by the so-called Black Death (bubonic plague), which carried off about one-fourth of the population. This plague reappeared in 1894 in Hong Kong and spread over a great portion of the world. In India from 1896 to 1917 it cost the lives of some ten millions of persons. In 1918–1920 the world was afflicted with an epidemic of influenza which in the United States directly affected over thirty million people and killed more than six hundred thousand of them. It was not until the researches of the bacteriologists in the nineteenth century had, in the germ theory, revealed the true cause of disease that any great advance was made in the direction of prevention. Although the Turks had used "matter" from the pustules of smallpox patients in inoculations against that disease, it was not until Jenner, about 1796, demonstrated the use of cowpox as a vaccine for human beings that any considerable progress was made.

The researches of William Budd and John Snow on Asiatic cholera and typhoid fever, those of Davaine and Koch on anthrax, and the illuminating experiments of Louis Pasteur on fermentation, anthrax, puerperal fever, and hydrophobia pointed the way to a scientific control of the causes of disease. In 1882 Koch announced the discovery of the micro-organism of tuberculosis, and, a year later, of the germs of Asiatic cholera, diphtheria, and tetanus. "While to Louis Pasteur belongs the high privilege of having been the founder of bacteriology, it was Robert Koch who definitely established it as a science."

In the face of popular ridicule, against the prejudices of the devout, and in spite of the scepticism of their contemporaries, these early pioneers of bacteriology have made possible the conquest of many of the dread diseases which throughout history have plagued humankind.

The widespread application of Jenner's cowpox inoculation has made smallpox one of the minor evils which distress the human race. Compulsory vaccination is now common in the United States, having been sustained by the United States Supreme Court in 1922. The death rate from smallpox in New York City in 1875 was over 120 per 100,000; by 1900 it had dropped to less than 20; and smallpox in that city has now practically disappeared. The annual death rate from smallpox in the United States today is .7 per 100,000. There is little doubt that much of the gain has been due to immunization through vaccination.

From 1702 to 1878 yellow fever appeared a hundred and twelve times in the United States, and, until recently, it has been one of the most feared epidemic diseases in the country. During the great epidemic of 1878 in New Orleans there were nearly thirty thousand cases and over eight thousand deaths. The epidemic cost New Orleans over $10,000,000 and the country at large not less than $100,000,000. Largely through the courageous and intelligent researches of Walter Reed, James Carroll, J. W. Lazear, and Aristide Agramonte in continuing the work of Carlos J. Finlay, we now know the cause of this disease and the methods by which it can be controlled. In 1900, deaths from yellow fever in Havana, Cuba, numbered over 300 per 100,000. In January, 1901, anti-mosquito measures were put into force, and by July the disease had practically disappeared, so that in 1902 no deaths were recorded from this cause. Had it not been for the measures of sanitation and mosquito destruction put into force by William C. Gorgas in the Isthmus of Panama, based upon the knowledge gained through bacteriological research, the Panama Canal would still be but a dream. As a result of the work of these men, the danger of yellow fever in the United States has been virtually eliminated.

Similarly typhoid fever, which from 1860 to 1880 was a major communicable disease, has now ceased to be a source of danger. As early as 1865, William Budd had pointed out that the disease was transmitted by the excreta of typhoid patients. The bacillus responsible for the disease gets into streams and sources of drinking water. The use of such water by a large number of people helps to explain the widespread destruction caused by typhoid. It is transmitted also by flies. Perhaps the chief sources of danger are an inadequate sewage disposal system and improper inspection of water supply. Typhoid may practically be eliminated, as indeed it is being, by proper sanitary and drainage systems. The death rate from this cause has fallen from 36 per 100,000 in 1900 to less than 8 in 1925. It is contagious as well as an infectious, disease, and hence isolation and care of afflicted persons is essential to really adequate control. We now have an effective vaccine, but any attempt to substitute general immunization for sanitation would be absurd.



Data from annual report of New York City department of health.

Annual death rate from diphtheria and croup per 100,000 population, New York City, 1870–1920.

In addition to smallpox, yellow fever, and typhoid, modern science has succeeded in discovering effective methods of control for cholera, typhus, tetanus, and bubonic plague. Great advances have been made in the cure and control of malaria, diphtheria, pneumonia, syphilis, gonorrhea, tuberculosis, hookworm disease, cancer, and pellagra, but much still remains to be done. What has been accomplished gives an earnest of what may be done if science can conquer superstition and overcome the obstacle of public penury. In the past three generations, science has added fifteen years to the average life span in Europe and

America. In the United States the death rate has been reduced from about 20 per 1,000 in 1880 to about 11 per 1,000 in 1925.

The major causes of disease and death in the United States are: diseases of the heart, pneumonia, tuberculosis, Bright's disease, cancer, apoplexy, influenza, and congenital debility and malformations, in the order named. In addition to these are colds, measles, scarlet fever, whooping cough, constipation, rheumatism, headache, mumps, and chicken pox, which annually afflict and disable millions of people, although few die of these latter ills.



Data from H. H. Moore, Public health in the United States.

Length of life in certain countries (average for the period 1901–1910).

When the war broke out, the nations of the world, forced to examine carefully their human resources, were astounded and alarmed at the numerous and widespread imperfections revealed. In the United States about three and a half million men, between the ages of eighteen and thirty, were examined. Out of every one hundred men, forty-seven were found to be defective, and twenty-one out of every hundred had to be rejected as unfit for military service. Thirty-four per cent were found to have defective feet, hands, or legs; about 12 per cent were suffering from defective hearing or sight; 4 per cent had hernia; 10 per cent suffered from diseases of the heart and arteries; 6 per cent from nervous and mental disorders; 8 per cent had defects of the nose, throat, skin, and teeth; and 10 per cent were afflicted with bad digestion and poor metabolism. About six out of every hundred had syphilis or gonorrhea, and an equal number were tuberculous. A more careful examination of approximately 225,000 persons by the Life Extension Institute of New York reveals over 51 per cent suffering from "advanced physical impairment, requiring systematic medical and surgical attention."

The economic loss involved in preventable sickness and death is well-nigh incalculable. It has been estimated that the loss of time and efficiency in American industry due to ill health alone is over three billions of dollars annually, and that at least one billion of this is preventable. The American people annually spend about $1,400,000,000 for physicians, nurses, hospitals, drugs, and patent medicines, to *cure* them of their ailments. Only $60,000,000, or 4.3 per cent of this total, is spent by Federal, state, municipal, and rural health agencies to *prevent* disease.

One of the most important problems confronting modern sanitarians is the high mortality and illness rates among young children. Out of every thousand children born in the United States, approximately ninety die before the age of four. The first year of life is the most critical. Infant mortality and health seem to have a direct relation to economic status. One obvious solution points to the necessity of higher economic standards. Aside from this, the following projects are suggested for fighting childhood ills: "prenatal clinics, instruction of expectant mothers in their homes, the regulation of the employment of such mothers engaged in industry, lying-in facilities, registration of all births, infant welfare stations, instruction of mothers in their homes regarding the care of babies, safeguarding the public milk supplies, laws for the prevention of infant blindness, pre-school clinics, physical and medical examination of children in schools with provision for the remedying of defects, physical education, . . . child labor laws, . . . and medical supervision of children in industries." (Moore, *Public health in the United States*, 111.)

Very little has been accomplished in the control of pneumonia and influenza, diseases of the heart and kidneys, narcotic drug addiction, diabetes, the common cold, hay fever and asthma, cancer, and constipation. But even here there is promise of ultimate success. F. G. Banting, of Toronto, in 1923 discovered that insulin, made from the pancreas of animals, would enable diabetic patients to assimilate the carbohydrates in food. The Federal government has embarked upon a program for the control and cure of drug addiction. A committee of the American Public Health Association is making a systematic study of pneumonia. Olitsky and Gates have isolated what seems to be the germ of influenza. Numerous organizations have been formed for the prevention and relief of heart diseases. Johns Hopkins Medical School has undertaken a thorough investigation of the common cold. Cancer yields but little, although experiments with radium treatment have not been without success.

Over $200,000,000 is spent annually in the United States for patent and proprietary medicines to cure real and fancied ills. Most of these nostrums are worse than worthless. In addition, millions of dollars are annually wasted on quack cures, including various forms of faith healing, chiropractic, and patent devices for curing everything from constipation to cancer. Blame, if it may be so denominated, for this state of affairs rests upon the medical profession, a penurious governmental policy, and public indifference. The rapidly rising, almost prohibitive costs of medical education and equipment and the rapidly increasing specialization of practitioners have resulted in a corresponding increase in the cost of medical service which makes it beyond the reach of millions of our people. Although we have about a hundred and fifty thousand licensed physicians and surgeons engaged in the private practice of medicine, large numbers of people receive very inadequate attention. Finding the fees charged to be more than they can pay, these people practice self-medication on a large scale or turn to charlatans of one sort or another. Michael Davis estimates that about 30 per cent of all confinements in the United States are attended by midwives, although there is only one training school under public control in the country – the Bellevue Hospital School of Midwifery. General practitioners, especially in rural areas, are few and frequently poorly equipped. Where a specialist is required, the general practitioner may do more harm than good. The consensus of informed opinion seems to be that the services of specialists and scientific equipment are needed in a much larger proportion of cases than now receive them. But the fees charged in such cases are considerably higher than those charged by the general physician.

The acquisitive society in which we live is in part responsible for incompetent and inadequate medical attention. Feeling the necessity for a large income in order to gain the respect and prestige that goes with it, the physician devotes most of his time to meeting as many patients as possible, with the result that very little time is left for research or study. As a consequence many of them contribute nothing to advance the standards of their profession and often do little good to their patients. Once a physician has his license to practice, he is legally entitled to perform any service from obstetrics to brain surgery, notwithstanding the fact that he may know nothing of the technique necessary. The layman, forced to choose, is left in the dark; and, unable to go to a high-priced specialist, he selects the next best, his judgment depending on rumor, display, and bluff. It is possible for some medical men who have a few very wealthy patients to maintain high standards of professional conduct and at the same time have leisure for study. These men, who receive outrageously high fees from their wealthy patients, give a good deal of their time to a study of the problems of health as presented in public hospitals and clinics. Hence it is that "the very rich and the poor" get the best medical attention.

The price of medical service to the average middle-class layman varies greatly with his locality, economic status, and ailment, but it is always high. The price of a good obstetrician is so high that many of our babies are virtually purchased on the installment plan. What does pneumonia cost? What a tonsilectomy? For the most part, what the traffic will bear; and the quality of service given is almost invariably in direct ratio to the ability of the patient to pay.

Obviously such conditions are bad. What is the remedy? Perhaps a greater socialization of medicine, either through increased governmental control or a virtual sovietizing of the medical profession. Already it is organized and institutionalized. Medical attention is being increasingly given in hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries, mostly privately owned or endowed. There are in the United States about 7,500 hospitals with over 800,000 beds, representing an investment of about $5,000,000,000.

Medical men do their most important work in these institutions. It is but a step then from institutionalization to socialization, when groups or governments will endow medical centers, schools, and practitioners to look after the needs of the people. By removing the tremendous burden of expense from the shoulders of the private doctor and placing it where it belongs, on society, it will be possible to bring the cost of medical attention within the means of the poorest citizen.

More attention should certainly be paid to preventive as distinguished from curative medicine. The great victories that have been won over smallpox, typhoid, hookworm, and yellow fever should give us the faith and courage to face our remaining enemies with stout hearts. Through coöperative effort we may go far toward relieving humankind of its greatest burden besides war — disease. It can be done if we will do as the Chinese are reputed to do – pay our scientists to keep us healthy, and penalize them when they do not.

More attention might with profit be paid to that frail sister of medicine, mental hygiene. There are in institutions in the country over 250,000 mentally diseased persons. How many are at large, one can only conjecture. How much crime, sickness, and death is due to neglect of the mental health of our people, we do not know. It is unquestionably very great. We are making a beginning, and most of the newer hospitals and medical centers have psychiatric clinics with trained psychiatrists in charge. Perhaps we may one day see the time when a "sound mind in a healthy body" will be more than a slogan.

C. The science of man in the growing world.

Assignment forty-seven: Methods in the social sciences

* *Randall*, 483–496.
H. E. Barnes, ed., *History and prospects of the social sciences* — excellent historical accounts; E. C. Hayes, ed., *Recent developments in the social sciences* — surveys of the present situation; W. F. Ogburn and A. Goldenweiser, *The social sciences and their interrelations* — a number of excellent studies.

The nineteenth century has seen the immense growth of interest in social science as the result of the complex problems presented by industrial civilization. The Age of Reason laid the foundations for modern theories of man and society, applying the mechanical, deductive methods and ideals of Newtonian physics to the aims of middle-class business men. During the last hundred years the model chosen has been successively the historical science of the Romanticists, the evolutionary science of the biologists, and the experimental concepts of the psychologists. At the same time the essential aims have been furnished by the three major social groups — the conservative agricultural interests, the business men, and the industrial proletariat. Down to the present generation, the usual method employed was to seize upon generalizations at the outset, taken from some other science, like biology, or from some limited body of data, and develop a deductive system therefrom. One system of social science after another was presented, following the winds of fashion in natural science and in social aspiration. By 1900 enough facts had been accumulated, even though they were usually embedded in speculative theories, to break down all the systems and theories. For the past two decades the major work of the social scientists has been to criticize all previous theories drastically and to pursue detailed investigations of limited subjects. Up to the present, very few valid generalizations have been formulated, although the methods of statistical investigation and careful field work promise much for the future. Measured by the standards of the natural sciences, it is doubtful whether anything properly called a social science exists as yet. Psychology and anthropology have developed the most critical methods, and their concepts and techniques are being applied in sociology, politics, economics, jurisprudence, etc. But it remains a serious question whether any verifiable and disinterested science of man and society can ever be worked out. Even in psychology



Data from Agricultural yearbook, 1927, page 195.

Number of coöperative marketing and purchasing associations among farmers in the United States.

and anthropology, many theories obviously apologetic, propagandistic, and unverifiable have a wide following. The best workers in these fields can at least expose the fallacies and inadequacies of these popular speculations.

(*a*) The search for an adequate method and set of concepts.
  i. The persistence of the eighteenth century mechanical, deductive method — the "analytical school."
    (*i*) The orthodox method of nineteenth century political economy, jurisprudence, and political science.
    (*ii*) Employed by the founders of sociology — A. Comte, H. Spencer, L. F. Ward.
  ii. The historical method of the Romanticists.
    (*i*) An account of the history of an institution as a sufficient scientific explanation of it.
    (*ii*) History as a force, not to be interfered with.
    (*iii*) Value in supplying new data, in an exact historical method, in accounting for the presence of contemporary forms, and in furnishing a sense of relativity and change.
    (*iv*) Danger in neglecting experimentally verifiable causes of change, in mimimizing the possibility of controlling change, and in looking to origins as a criterion of value.
  iii. The evolutionary and biological methods.
    (*i*) The historical method of the Romanticists, borrowing scientific terms rather than scientific methods.
    (*ii*) Theory of one simple line of evolution in society — disproved by mass of evidence.
    (*iii*) The comparative method in anthropology and sociology — its errors.
    (*iv*) Application of biological analogies — organismic theories, natural selection, "social Darwinism."
  iv. The influence of psychology.
    (*i*) The misuse of the most speculative psychological theories as the basis of social systems — instinct systems.
    (*ii*) Theory of the social nature of man, the social heritage, cultural change and lag, etc.
  v. The era of criticism of social theories in the light of detailed facts—appeal to experimental investigation, to statistics, and to functional analysis.

QUESTIONS

1. What is meant by the "deduction," the "induction" method in science generally and in human studies in particular?

2. What are the good features and the bad of the historical methods of the Romanticists? Why good, why bad?

3. What is the "one-line evolution" theory in history? Why is it indefensible?

4. What is the influence of psychology in historical investigation? Why good, why bad?

5. "Criticism in the light of detailed facts." Explain this description of some contemporary social study.

(*b*) The social sciences.

Assignment forty-eight: The sciences of man

* *Randall*, 496–516.

- i. The development of psychology.
    - (*i*) The rise of experimental and biological psychology.
    - (*ii*) The problem of the elements of human behavior.
    - (*iii*) The problem of the functioning of the integrated personality.
    - (*iv*) Psychoanalysis.
- ii. The schools of sociology.
- iii. The achievement of a critical method in anthropology.
- iv. The creation of a realistic, genetic, and experimental economics.
- v. Investigation in jurisprudence and political science.

QUESTIONS

1. What kinds of psychology are there? Give examples of their fields of interest and methods.
2. What does "the integration of a personality" mean? What are causes of breaks in the integration?
3. What purposes can psychoanalysis serve?
4. Give the newer attitudes and methods in the study of anthropology, economics, and law.

D. Human behavior.

Assignment forty-nine: Human behavior

* Storck, *Man and civilization*, 73–94.

A brief study of contemporary ways of understanding human behavior is here introduced, partly in our own personal behalf, since we shall probably lead a more self-directed and satisfactory existence if we understand ourselves, and partly because we shall be able to understand numerous contemporary tendencies in education, social estimates of good and bad, and public control through the functions of government, including law, if we have some appreciation of a few of the important and increasingly influential findings of the psychologists. A further interest is served in the study of human behavior because once we have gained some notion of the how and why of our own actions we can understand somewhat better (though still very imperfectly) the behavior of others, including the actors in the scenes of history that are past. As psychology develops from its present incompleteness, and doubtless frequently its present incorrectness, it seems likely that it will be of much greater use in advancing that complete living which we call the good life, whether that be personal or more broadly public and social.

One gain is already apparent. We are gradually, even though slowly, growing accustomed to the idea that our behavior is not a totally mysterious something which just is, and may not be looked at candidly and openly by ourselves and others with a view to seeing what may be done to bring about an improvement. There is happily growing in society a certain impersonal consideration of ourselves as complex organisms, differing from each other because of inheritance and environment, responding to all sorts of influences, and susceptible of diagnosis and treatment to bring out the good and get rid of or diminish the bad. We are used to treating cuts on our fingers rationally, and to keeping out infection. Sometime we shall be able to recognize cuts on our minds and spirits and get them prescribed for, too: and physiology and psychology and medicine with its newer developments in mental hygiene will be the chief agencies in the expansion of the science of man. The hope is that as they develop they may prevent as well as cure many of the human ills.

(*a*) General phases of human development.

* *Storck*, 73–94.

- i. The natural world one of constant change and interaction.
- ii. Man's conscious experience participates in this activity.
- iii. Man's consciousness as dependent on the nervous system.
    - (*i*) Elements of the nervous system — cells or neurones separated by gaps or synapses.
    - (*ii*) Parts of the nervous system.
        - *a.* Brain and spinal cord.
        - *b.* Incoming (sensory) nerves.
        - *c.* Outgoing (motor) nerves.
    - (*iii*) The unit of action — the reflex arc — the cycle of incoming, central, and outgoing activity, acting as a unit.
    - (*iv*) The more or less loose organization, even before birth, of these reflex arcs into functioning wholes.
    - (*v*) The central nervous system, composed of the brain and spinal cord and their more direct subsidiaries, one of the more complex of such organizations.
    - (*vi*) Partial independence of the autonomic nervous system — the system of primary importance in controlling breathing, blood circulation, sex processes, and the general emotional life — from the central nervous system.
- iv. The world of the child.
    - (*i*) A confusion from adult viewpoint, but itself not lacking in order.

        - (*ii*) The child in growing both builds up and breaks down — both processes being capable of leading to understanding and adjustment.
    - v. General features of mental development — the processes of developing into adulthood.
        - (*i*) The gradual ripening of the organism as it grows.
        - (*ii*) Activities which were once random become specifically effective.
        - (*iii*) Activities through habit formation become unified into the more or less effective pursuit of ends.
        - (*iv*) The range of activity widens.
        - (*v*) The central nervous system (and especially the brain) functions increasingly within the reflex arc.
    - vi. Types of behavior organizations. "In behavior the higher nervous centers of the brain are involved, action becomes more thoroughly integrated, the effects of past experience persist to alter the present situation, and purposes, desires, interests, and the like, make their appearance."
        - (*i*) The organization of knowledge.
        - (*ii*) The organization of uses.
        - (*iii*) The organization of enjoyments.
        - (*iv*) These three phases are all present together in actual behavior.

QUESTIONS

1. Explain the reflex arc and indicate the operation of its elements.
2. Explain the autonomic nervous system, show its relation of the central nervous system, and describe its functioning.
3. What is meant by behavior?
4. Explain the presence of "organization" within behavior.

(*b*) The early years.

Assignment fifty: The early years

* *Storck*, 95–115.

- i. The interests and powers of human beings tend to change more rapidly at some points in their development than at others.
- ii. The periods between these transition points have distinguishing characteristics.
- iii. Consequent division of early life into:
    - (*i*) Babyhood (to about the third year).
    - (*ii*) Childhood (from around three to about ten).
    - (*iii*) Boyhood and girlhood (to about fourteen).
    - (*iv*) Adolescence (from then till maturity).
- iv. Inventory of the baby's powers at birth.
    - (*i*) A very large number of neuro-muscular reflexes, *i. e.*, the capacity to make a large number of movements.
    - (*ii*) A somewhat circumscribed sensory and emotional equipment.
        - *a.* Watson's analysis of the latter into fear, rage, and "love."
- v. Some important phases of human development.
    - (*i*) Eye-hand coördination.
    - (*ii*) Learning to walk.

- (*iii*) Learning to talk.
  - *a.* The discovery that everything has a name.
  - *b.* The increasing control of speech by things, rather than by wish or feeling states.
  - *c.* Language can both widen and narrow the sphere of mental operations.
- (*iv*) Learning to count.
  - *a.* The importance of mathematics in our culture.
- (*v*) Development of power to inhibit movement in response to social demands.
  - *a.* The child's interest is necessarily centered in his own activities; but he must learn to make the activities accord with the behavior of others.
- (*vi*) Development of thought.
  - *a.* The birth of doubt in human experience.
  - *b.* The eventual disentanglement of persons, things, actions, qualities, and relations from the flow of experience.
- (*vii*) Development of the affective life.
  - *a.* Increase in the range of emotional response.
    - 1. Mechanism of the conditioned reflex, whereby phenomena associated with other phenomena capable of eliciting an emotional response themselves become capable of eliciting the response by virtue of the association.
  - *b.* Formation of sentiments, or relatively enduring emotion-clusters centering about some object.
  - *c.* Formation of complexes — of cravings which, denied direct expression, secure some form of indirect satisfaction.
  - *d.* Attention, or the focusing of experience.
  - *e.* The use of desires.
    - 1. Every reflex arc under stimulation a carrier of its own particular impulse.
    - 2. Desires arise when impulses are prevented from functioning.
  - *f.* Volition, or action against resistance for the realization of frustrated impulses.
  - *g.* Thinking itself can be regarded as an affective process.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the stages of life?
2. What are neuro-muscular reflexes?
3. Give a detailed account of the development of the "affective life," indicating especially the use of desires.

(*c*) Adolescence and maturity.

Assignment fifty-one: Adolescence and maturity

* *Storck*, 117–130.

- i. Contemporary taboos in regard to sex.
- ii. Its biological significance.
  - (*i*) Not everywhere necessary for reproduction.
  - (*ii*) Guarantees variability.

- iii. The sex history of human beings.
  - (*i*) Birth itself the result of a sexual process.
  - (*ii*) Sex as here used includes all the qualities which make a person a male or a female, and not merely organs and powers directly involved in reproduction.
  - (*iii*) Human experience has sexual components long before the ripening of specific sexual powers.
  - (*iv*) The usual line of development is from autoeroticism in the infant and young child, through interest in one's own sex in the older child, to normal (adult) heterosexual interests in the developed adolescent.
  - (*v*) Psychological and social difficulties resultant when this development is in any way frustrated.
  - (*vi*) The consequent need of sex education as a preventive and cure of sexual maladjustments.
    - *a*. The impossibility of preventing action and speculation on these matters, even in the very young.
- iv. A program of sex education.
  - (*i*) Personal hygiene — the proper care of the body, so that sex interests may not be initiated into a place of exclusive prominence in the round of life activities.
  - (*ii*) Physiological and biological knowledge — how men and women differ from each other, and how their organs function in relation to each other.
  - (*iii*) Sex training — the development of healthy notions of the place of sex in life, and of the individual's possibilities in relation to himself, his parent, and persons of the opposite sex.
  - (*iv*) Sex knowledge proper — the psychology and sociology of sex.
- v. Unconscious factors are still tremendously important, even in the lives of those who are happiest and most successful.

QUESTIONS

1. How have ideas regarding the consideration of the place of sex in life undergone a change in the last few years?
2. Why is the objective study of sex elements difficult?
3. What difficulties of adjustment are incident to sex maladjustments?

(*d*) The organization of the intellectual life.

Assignment fifty-two: The organization of the intellectual life

* *Storck*, 131–152.

- i. Thinking a complex organic process, centering principally in the brain, but capable of involving all parts of the body.
- ii. Important conditions of thinking.
  - (*i*) The stream of experiences — the unceasing flow of action and reaction wherever organisms are involved.
  - (*ii*) The pressure of affective states — the attention-compelling power of feelings.
  - (*iii*) "Recession of the stimulus" — reaction to stimuli before their explicit and complete appearance.

- iii. Analysis of the thought process.
    - (*i*) Eliciting of attention by some item in the stream of experiences.
    - (*ii*) Resultant changes in the stream of experiences, involving the redistribution of materials and some degree of disequilibration.
    - (*iii*) Resolution of this disequilibration through the emergence of some unifying item.
    - (*iv*) Action or expression flowing from these changes.
- iv. The two movements of thought — from data to meanings, and from meanings to data.
    - (*i*) The dependence of thought upon objective conditions.
- v. Autistic and purposive thinking — "thinking about" and "thinking out."
    - (*i*) Motivation of both by affective considerations.
    - (*ii*) Both are phases of nearly all good thinking, rather than distinct phenomena.
        - *a.* This is shown by an analysis of the processes of creation in science and the arts.
    - (*iii*) Neither satisfactory by itself.
- vi. Reflective thinking, a thought in the eulogistic sense.
    - (*i*) The need to know how to think correctly.
    - (*ii*) The need to desire to think correctly.
    - (*iii*) The escape from bias a task for a lifetime of unremitting endeavor.
- vii. Attributes of good thinking.
    - (*i*) Clarity — though not necessarily simplicity.
    - (*ii*) Consistency — a quality very different from stubbornness.
    - (*iii*) Agreement with the facts — with whatever constitutes the subject matter of the thinking in question.
    - (*iv*) Significance — the avoidance of the merely trivial.
- viii. What thought can do.
    - (*i*) It can give us knowledge.
    - (*ii*) It can help us to control the future and the absent.
    - (*iii*) It can confirm us in our actions.
        - *a.* Rationalization — the process of finding reasons for something done on irrational grounds.

QUESTIONS

1. Explain "recession of stimulus" and show its place in thoughtful behavior.
2. Give an analysis of the thought process.
3. Distinguish between autistic and purposive thinking.
4. Describe in some detail the attributes of good thinking.

(*e*) Personality and character in the developed individual.

Assignment fifty-three: Personality and character

* *Storck*, 153–176.

- i. Personality — the whole sum of a person's reactive life.
- ii. Individuals differ from each other in the degree of presence of specific traits.
    - (*i*) Tendency of these differences to cluster around a type or mode.

        - (*ii*) The continuity of variations — where a large number of persons are measured with respect to a trait and the measures arranged in order of magnitude, the gaps between any two measures are not great.
        - (*iii*) In nearly all cases the averages of two groups measured with respect to the same quality will differ less from each other than most members of either group will differ from the average of their group.
        - (*iv*) Many qualities are *correlated* — *i. e.*, as the magnitude of one of the qualities rises, those of the other qualities also vary. The variation can be measured with mathematical formulae.
    - iii. Descriptive survey of personality traits.
        - (*i*) Physique.
        - (*ii*) Motility — phases of the active or motor life.
        - (*iii*) Emotionality — phases of the life of feeling.
        - (*iv*) Intellectual equipment.
        - (*v*) Attitudes toward self.
        - (*vi*) Social attitudes.
    - iv. Fields for the further study of personality.
        - (*i*) The influence of heredity.
        - (*ii*) The processes of mental development.
        - (*iii*) Study of artists and works of art.
        - (*iv*) Investigations into the influence of social structures and standards.
        - (*v*) Physiological research — and especially glandular physiology.
        - (*vi*) Abnormal psychology as an index to normal personality.
    - v. The whole man in action is a changing synthesis (and an ever incomplete synthesis) of many factors.

QUESTIONS

1. What is variation? What is the continuity of variation?
2. What is correlation? Why is the study of correlated traits important?
3. What are some of the more important classifications of personality traits? Can we overcome these traits?
4. Why is abnormal psychology studied for light on normal psychology?

E. Religion in the growing world.

Assignment fifty-four: Religion in the growing world

* *Randall*, 519–534.
J. T. Shotwell, *The religious revolution of today* — the process of secularization in modern society; A. C. McGiffert, *Rise of modern religious ideas*, Bk. II — the best account of the intellectual factors in contemporary religion.

- (*a*) Causal factors in the present religious situation.
    - i. The growth of scientific knowledge.
    - ii. The growth of the faith in science and the scientific habit of mind.
    - iii. The influence of new philosophies on the interpretation of the religious tradition — Romantic idealism, evolutionary naturalism.
    - iv. The growth of secular faiths and interests.
        - (*i*) Relegating religion to a place of minor importance.

    - (*ii*) Substituting secular religions, like nationalism or communism, for the traditional religions.
    - (*iii*) Transforming religious traditions — the social gospel.

(*b*) Opposition to the new world as conflicting with religious traditions.

- i. Protestant reaffirmation of the dogmatic theologies of the Reformation, as modified by the eighteenth century evangelical movement.
    - (*i*) Early opposition to evolution and "science falsely so called," together with insistence on the literal interpretation of the Bible.
    - (*ii*) Later rise of Fundamentalism in reaction against modernizing tendencies.
- ii. Catholic reassertion of the dogma of the church as divinely revealed, and of the absolute authority of the church.
    - (*i*) Pius IX and papal infallibility, 1870.
    - (*ii*) Opposition to liberal and scientific tendencies — *Syllabus of errors*, 1864.
    - (*iii*) Condemnation of modernism — *Pascendi gregis*, 1907.
    - (*iv*) Conflict of church and state in Catholic Europe.
        - *a.* Catholic insistence on authority of church, and Catholic ecclesiastical and political interests.
        - *b.* Clericalism primarily a social, not a theological issue.
        - *c.* Accentuated by conflict with secular nationalism — German *Kulturkampf*, Italian capture of Rome, French Ultramontanism.
        - *d.* Cardinal importance of the control of education.
- iii. Growth of Anglo-Catholicism — the Oxford Movement.
    - (*i*) The appeal of authority, beauty, and sacramentalism.
    - (*ii*) The social program of the Anglo-Catholics.
    - (*iii*) The prayer book question in England.

QUESTIONS

1. The interest in religion and the belief in religion are both affected by science and social factors. Describe the factors and their effects.
2. How do orthodox Protestantism and Catholicism react to evolution, and why?
3. Clericalism is called a social issue. Explain.
4. What are the beliefs of the Anglo-Catholics? How do they differ from Roman Catholics?

(*c*) Effect of scientific thought and industrial conditions in the more or less conscious development of a new form of religion — liberal Christianity or Modernism.

Assignment fifty-five: Religion in the growing world — Continued

* *Randall*, 535–552.

- i. At first negative, destroying traditional beliefs and philosophies, later taken as a liberation from outworn ideas.
- ii. Definite abandonment of parts of the religious tradition.
    - (*i*) Historical attitude toward religion — higher criticism, originating in eighteenth century Germany, applied new historical methods to the Bible, and destroyed belief in its literal inspiration.

- (*ii*) General acceptance of mechanistic science.
  - *a.* Belief in miracles abandoned — eighteenth century rationalism.
  - *b.* Literal account of creation abandoned — Genesis taken as poetic mythology.
  - *c.* God as a scientific principle abandoned — watchmaker God of Enlightenment discarded.

iii. New approach and emphasis in religion.
- (*i*) God found in the world and its process, acting through natural law, and most clearly revealed in man.
  - *a.* Influence of monistic philosophy of the Romantic Idealists opposed to classical dualism of the natural and supernatural.
  - *b.* Approach to religion and God through the soul of man — faith and mysticism, the religious experience.
- (*ii*) Rise of monistic evolutionary theologies — immanence, creative evolution, humanism.
  - *a.* Necessitates reinterpretation of old theological terms and problems — salvation, incarnation, virgin birth, etc.
  - *b.* Relations between God and man no longer external — man potentially divine, not fallen; needs awakening, not miraculous transformation.
- (*iii*) New ethical theism — God conceived as the ideal or final cause; religion, as "morality tinged with sentiment"; the social gospel, the realization of the kingdom of God on earth; the "religion of Jesus" as emphasizing individual worth, brotherhood, service, love of mankind.
- (*iv*) Aesthetic naturalism — religion primarily poetry, enshrining past ideals; emphasis on ritualism, art beauty; "religion a form of aesthetics."
- (*v*) Theology and doctrine relegated to a secondary place — minimizing of the intellectual element in religion; religion and science in harmony because concerned with entirely different realms.

iv. Effect on Protestantism — neglect of traditional sectarian lines based on earlier theological controversy, real divisions forming between Fundamentalism and Modernism, social conservatism and social radicalism.

(*d*) Strong trend toward church union through acceptance of common program of action.
- i. Catholic Modernism, emphasizing Catholic organization.
- ii. Social Catholicism, liberal programs of social control.

(*e*) Rise of multitude of more radical religious organizations.

QUESTIONS

1. Describe the historical attitude toward religion.
2. How do the mechanistic, scientific attitudes affect the theological teachings about physical happenings?
3. What is the mystical approach to religion and God?
4. What are some religious "reinterpretations"?
5. Trace the growth of the idea of man's perfectibility as opposed to his depravity.
6. Define and illustrate ethical theism, and esthetic naturalism. What are their strong and weak points?

F. The nature of science.

Assignment fifty-six: The nature of science

* *Storck*, 387–418.

(*a*) Science has a history.
  i. Hellenistic scientists, c. 300 B.C. — c. A.D. 300. Euclid, Archimedes, Ptolemy.
  ii. The beginnings of modern science — Roger Bacon, thirteenth century.
  iii. The sixteenth and seventeenth century scientists — Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Harvey, Boyle, Huygens.
  iv. The later developments of science.
  v. Science not a part of all culture patterns.
(*b*) The aim of science.
  i. Generalized and systematized description of natural phenomena.
  ii. Laws show trends and seek ideal cases.
  iii. Forces characteristic experiences and conclusions.
(*c*) The methods of science.
  i. Controlled observation of natural phenomena under coöperative conditions for the purpose of obtaining exact (and preferably mathematical) statements regarding natural phenomena.
    (*i*) Mathematics possesses generality and system.
    (*ii*) Mathematics not interested in existence; science is.
    (*iii*) Many studies scientific in interest depend only slightly on mathematical foundation.
  ii. Science depends on directed and controlled observation.
  iii. Science uses instruments as bridge between observation and experiment.
    (*i*) Development of instruments has conditioned growth of science.
  iv. Science depends on hypotheses — imagined explanations of a given state of affairs which are used to guide observation and research.
    (*i*) Experimental hypotheses whose validity can be tested.
    (*ii*) Organizing hypotheses which are usually unverifiable.
  v. Science rests on the combined endeavors of many scientists.
(*d*) The functions of science.
  i. Gratification of the desire to know.
  ii. Gives a sense of order to the inquiring mind.
  iii. Seeks causes and so understands and controls change in man and the world.

QUESTIONS

1. Are the statements of science general or specific? If general how can they be used for the control of the specific?
2. Is a law an existence or a formula of the nonexistent?
3. Why is controlled observation a necessity in science?
4. Why is mathematics of prime importance in the scientific handling of data?
5. Explain experimental hypothesis and organizing hypothesis.
6. Explain the non-utilitarian functions of science.

G. Philosophic reactions to nineteenth century science.

Assignment fifty-seven: Philosophic reactions to nineteenth century science

* *Randall,* 555–578.

R. B. Perry, *Present philosophical tendencies; Present conflict of ideals* — excellent popular accounts of the reaction to science; John Dewey, *Reconstruction in philosophy* — admirable historical survey from the naturalistic point of view.

The Romantic movement of the first half of the nineteenth century was inspired chiefly by religious, moral, and artistic interests. The philosophies that came out of it interpreted the world as a whole in religious and human terms. Into such an intellectual atmosphere science gradually forced its way after the middle of the century. Thus the chief intellectual problem confronting the thinkers of the last two or three generations has been the adjustment of these human and religious interests to the new world that natural science was revealing. Although the particular sciences refrained from much speculation, men impressed by their fruits inevitably tried to generalize from their findings. They built up a picture of the world that seemed very different from the traditional conceptions of religion, a world governed by fixed laws which operated without reference to the hopes and desires of men. The theory of evolution seemed to place man himself as an accidental product of the workings of a great cosmic machine. It was doubtful whether man and his interests had any cosmic importance. Certain of the more speculative theories of nineteenth century physics, like the second law of thermodynamics, seemed to predict the ultimate disappearance of the human race as our world grew colder. The lower and not the higher forces of nature, as judged from man's viewpoint, seemed to have the last word. Science had placed men in an alien world, in which there appeared little or no room for man's traditional religious and moral hopes. In enlarging upon the notion of this "alien world," men drew heavily upon those basic scientific generalizations that are today being most drastically criticized and revised. But it seemed to most of the nineteenth century thinkers that the world they must live in if they accepted science, as they were being forced to do, would involve a profound readjustment of their religious and moral beliefs. The making of this adjustment became the great problem from which philosophizing started.

Three characteristic attitudes found expression. Those emotionally committed to the older religious tradition, so recently reinforced by the

Romanticists, recoiled in despair and terror. Those of somewhat stronger fiber boldly accepted some of the new scientific ideas, hoping to find in the world of evolution a substitute religious and moral faith to take the place of the old faith they still craved. Finally, those who had grown up in this new scientific world and had neither emotional attachments to the old one nor the need to find similar emotional attachments somewhere else were able to accept the new universe as their natural environment and as furnishing the materials from which to build a satisfying human life. When a more adequate science began to modify the narrow doctrines of the nineteenth century and to depict a world not nearly so alien to human interests, this naturalistic attitude won wide adherence. But from 1859 on, there have always been men just awakening to the significance of the findings of science, who have repeated these characteristic attitudes. These three positions — despair in the face of the new, enthusiastic and one-sided adherence to it, and critical acceptance of both older and newer values and beliefs — have been the typical reactions whenever a new body of ideas has similarly forced itself on men's attention. They seem to be repeating themselves today as men who have grown up in the older civilization are coming to face the new world of industrialism.

(*a*) The picture of the "alien world" generalized from nineteenth century science — the chief conflicts with traditional ideas.
  i. Irrelevance of personal immortality.
  ii. No permanence for the human race — second law of thermodynamics.
  iii. Mechanical determinism — no moral freedom of the will.
  iv. No Friend behind phenomena — no scientific concept of a Creator.
  v. No cosmic sanction for traditional moral standards.

(*b*) Disillusionment and despair in the face of the alien world.
  i. Philosophic pessimism — Schopenhauer.
  ii. Consolation sought in beauty — the ivory tower of art: Walter Pater, Ernest Renan, Anatole France, George Santayana.
  iii. Hedonism — "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die."
  iv. Promethean defiance of the mechanistic world — Huxley, Russell.
  v. Escape into philosophic idealism — the Romantic tradition.

QUESTIONS

1. Why do men call the world "alien"?

2. If men arise in a world, adjust themselves to it, partly control it, at least understand it, is it still alien? Defend your answer.

3. To disillusion and despair, what consolations and escapes exist? Characterize each.

(*c*) Glorification of the evolutionary world.

Assignment fifty-eight: Philosophic reactions to nineteenth century science — Continued

* *Randall*, 578–591.

- i. Faith in the inevitability of progress — Herbert Spencer, Marx.
- ii. Confidence in creative evolution — growth for the sake of more growth: Bergson, Dewey.
- iii. New evolutionary ethics — Nietzsche.

(*d*) Contemporary philosophic naturalism.

- i. Return to Greek naturalism — Santayana.
- ii. Baconian naturalism — Dewey.

QUESTIONS

1. State the positions on progress held by Spencer and by Marx. Are there any evidences which tend to invalidate their theories?
2. Explain creative evolution.
3. What is the Nietzschian ethics? Why does it appeal to so many young people? In its essence Nietzschian doctrine makes supreme demands: explain this statement.
4. Distinguish between the naturalism of Santayana and that of Dewey.

H. Social ideals in the evolutionary world.

Assignment fifty-nine: Social ideals in the evolutionary world

* *Randall*, 594–620.

H. E. Barnes, "Social reform programs and movements," in *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1919 ed. — illuminating general survey; Lewis Mumford, *Story of Utopias*, chs. 10, 11, 12 — thoughtful analysis of actual social ideals; Bertrand Russell, *Proposed roads to freedom* — the more radical programs of social reconstruction.

(*a*) Contrasting types of social ideal.

- i. Absolutistic and utopian — completely formulated pictures of the ideal society.
- ii. Relativistic and pragmatic — dealing with specific problems in the light of general principles subject to experimental revision.

(*b*) Middle-class ideals.

- i. The mind of the middle class.
- ii. Social ideals of individualistic industrialism — what is actually aimed at by the majority today: "Coketown" and the country house.
- iii. Liberal interest in social reform and welfare legislation.
  - (*i*) German state socialism.
  - (*ii*) The philosophy of English neo-liberalism and American progressivism — "The New Freedom."
- iv. Religious and humanitarian programs of reform.
  - (*i*) Social Catholicism — De Mun, *L'Action libérale*, Von Ketteler, Moufang, Leo XIII.
  - (*ii*) Protestant programs of social reform — the social gospel.

QUESTIONS

1. What lure has the absolutistic picture of reform? What lack, the pragmatic program?
2. What lack has the absolutistic practice, what lure the pragmatic practice?
3. Why do so many people feel Randall's treatment of middle-class ideals to be unfair?
4. What is the "social gospel"? What basis is there for calling it Christian?

(*c*) Working-class ideals.

Assignment sixty: Social ideals in the evolutionary world — Continued

* *Randall*, 620–638.

- i. To obtain a living — subsistence and security.
- ii. To rise and achieve success — imitation of the Avenue.
- iii. To raise the general standard of labor through organization.
  - (*i*) To secure higher wages under better conditions.
  - (*ii*) To exercise positive control over industry — industrial democracy.
- iv. Collectivistic visions and programs.
  - (*i*) State Socialism and Marxism.
  - (*ii*) Communism.
  - (*iii*) Democratic control of industry — Syndicalism, Guild Socialism.
  - (*iv*) The program of the British Labour Party.

(*d*) International ideals.

- i. Patriotic nationalism.
  - (*i*) Where independence has been secured, bellicose militarism, primarily economic and conservative.
  - (*ii*) Continuance of 1848 liberal nationalism in subject nationalities.
- ii. Cosmopolitanism.
  - (*i*) Of financial and business interests — "international bankers," imperialistic exploitation of the East.
  - (*ii*) Of the workers — the "International."
- iii. Internationalism.
  - (*i*) Liberal and moderate, emphasizing peace schemes and devices — the League of Nations.
  - (*ii*) Pacifism and non-resistance — the outlawry of war.

QUESTIONS

1. "Working-class programs in the United States have generally been for business bargaining, not for industrial democracy." Comment on this statement.
2. Define State Socialism, Communism, Syndicalism, Guild Socialism.
3. Give a sketch of the history of the "Internationals."
4. What have the comparative standards of living and of education existing between nations to do with the peace of the world?

3. Art in the contemporary world.

Assignment sixty-one: Art in the contemporary world

* Meyer Schapiro, "Art in the contemporary world," *Syllabus*, 392–419.

Assignment sixty-two: Art in the contemporary world — Continued

* Schapiro, *Syllabus*, 419–439.

MODERN ART

By Meyer Schapiro

Lecturer in Fine Arts, Columbia University

Art in the contemporary world.

A. Barnes, *The art in painting;* C. Bell, *Art; Since Cézanne;* R. Fry, *Vision and design; Transformation; Cézanne;* A. Hildebrand, *The problem of form;* J. Meier-Graefe, *Modern painting;* Le Corbusier, *Towards a new architecture;* L. Mumford, *Sticks and stones;* L. Sullivan, *The autobiography of an idea;* W. H. Wright, *Modern painting.* The Avery and Fine Arts libraries contain numerous monographs which reproduce photographs of the works of modern architects, sculptors, and painters. These should be consulted, if only for the illustrations.

PAINTING

Modern painting shows so great a diversity of styles that to account for all of them would require the most involved and lengthy analysis. Not only have all the developments of the nineteenth century survived today in the conservative followers of each innovation, but there has been interplay and adoption by some traditions of elements of their former opponents. And besides, where the innovation has not been a specific technique, but a general theory that suggested unlimited solutions of a problem, we observe today all the variety implied in its application.

It is unnecessary, however, to trace the history of each contemporary manner to understand the whole of modern art. For all the varieties of realism and abstraction, of modernity and archaism, depend upon two changes in nineteenth century art. In the nineteenth century the realistic use of color was greatly extended by the Impressionists; and by other painters, forms hitherto judged by their truth to fact, sentiment, or classic models, were modified willfully in the interest of pure design. It was the interaction of these two practices with the more accessible remains of past traditions that produced modern arts.

It was primarily in France that these changes took place; but without the convergence of earlier Italian, Flemish, Dutch, Spanish, English, and even Oriental arts in this country, they could hardly have occurred in their actual form. In the last hundred years France resumed a dominant position in European art such as she had not held since the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The Impressionists, led by Monet and Pissarro, were landscape painters who worked outdoors and were passionately attached to the reproduction of sunlight and atmosphere. They developed a systematic method for rendering the fugitive aspects of nature by the juxtaposition of carefully observed tints in small separate strokes which transcribed the play of sun, local color, and reflected lights of sky, earth, and adjacent objects. This method permitted the rapid painting which could alone record transient colors and reflections, and achieved a truth, brilliance, and vibration unobtainable by conventional means. Earlier landscapes had usually been painted indoors and were limited to stereotyped trees and sky of uniform green and brown tones. The precise relations of light, shadow, and reflection had not been studied, and only the most generalized aspects of nature were rendered.

Their marked contrast with Impressionist methods is well illustrated in Monet's practice of painting the same haystack or cathedral on a dozen different canvases, each recording another moment of sunlight. In this search for the subtler play of light, there appeared new color schemes and unsuspected harmonies and variety in the familiar objects of nature. These seemed strange and impossible when first exhibited, and it was not until almost twenty years later that the works of the Impressionists were accepted.

Their doctrine and method were not entirely original, but it was the Impressionists who exploited past suggestions most thoroughly and gave modern art a new appearance. Their immediate sources were the paintings of the Englishmen, Constable and Turner, which Monet and Pissarro had seen in England in 1871, where they had sought refuge from military service. Constable (1776–1837), in painting an area of green, had divided it into several green tones and achieved a richness and vibrancy new in the landscape painting of his day. Turner (1775–1851), more interested than Constable in the poetic aspects of sunlight and mist, had unsystematically, where accurate representation demanded it, divided his color into tiny juxtaposed tones. Like the Impressionists he painted light by broken color, but unlike them he sometimes preserved a clearer definition of objects and limited his themes to grandiose and picturesque effects. For the Impressionists, any scene, any moment of the day, was a fit subject.

The visit to England encouraged Monet and Pissarro in their devotion to the painting of brilliant sunlight which had already occupied them in the eighteen-sixties. But the roots of French Impressionism were much deeper than this single encounter. Almost fifty years before, the Frenchman, Delacroix, having seen the outdoor-painted works of Constable and Bonington, employed divided tones and a richer palette in consequence. His own romantic passion for the exotic and brilliant, his studies of Rubens and of Venetian art of the sixteenth century, his travels in north Africa, and personal observation of optical phenomena, had led him independently to enliven color by the use of complementary tints in light and shadow. But he was primarily a figure painter; landscape was accessory to his work; and it was more the influence of his recorded ideas, his unconventional daring, and his experimenting nature than his works themselves that survived in Impressionism. The step to outdoor painting had already been taken in the eighteen-thirties by Corot, Diaz, Theodore Rousseau, and others, who constituted the Barbizon school. Whereas earlier landscape painters composed their pictures at home, in the studio, from notes of the field and sketches of single trees and clouds, following traditional precepts of uniform color, precise drawing, and a formulated composition, the Barbizon men sought to confront nature directly. They substituted brighter greens and grays for the usual browns. They chose smaller, more intimate scenes and at the same time restricted their observation to poetic glades and countryside, only rarely approaching the problems of light that were to occupy the Impressionists. In the early sixties two outdoor painters, Boudin and Jongkind, had rendered landscapes with more consistent fidelity to actual light than the Barbizon men, but without the brilliance of the Impressionists, whom they probably influenced. At this period the painters Courbet (1819–1877) and Manet (1832–1883) had preached a thorough realism — the first, from sociological convictions as to the superior significance of immediately contemporary objects; the second, in more personal reaction from the academic painting of the day and in support of his own artistic method, which represented common objects under a familiar, unstereotyped lighting. Manet had tried to raise the tonality of painting by eliminating shadow and by diffusing the light on his indoor single-figure subjects in a broad, flat area of bright color. The example of these two men further encouraged the Impressionists to build up an art of precise observation in which the subject had no literary or sentimental reference, but served as a field for the colorful play of sunlight.

In the Japanese prints, which became known to Europe in the third quarter of the century, Monet found not only decorative schemes that pleased him, but an absorption in the artistic possibilities of every kind of weather and viewpoint in landscape, entirely congenial to his own aspirations. Although the Japanese landscapes were conventional in color and drawing, their novel design and freedom of subject had a direct influence on French painting.

But the Impressionists' attitude toward nature was itself ancient. It is found in the paintings of the Greco-Roman period, especially at Pompeii and Rome. Literary accounts of classic paintings, now destroyed, mention effects of sunlight and shadow that seem to us particularly modern. One late-classic method, called "illusionistic" by modern scholars, rendered the figure as if seen at a distance, not by a precise contour, but by adjacent strokes of contrasting color. Form was conceived as an unstable, shifting product of a changing light, rather than a permanent entity known to us by more than one sensation.

In the classic world, of which the art was so preoccupied with the human figure, landscape painting had achieved an independent existence shortly before the beginning of our era. Examples in Pompeii and Rome exhibit color and drawing modern in appearance. But these pictures preserved some mythological context, however subordinate to the natural setting, and a perspective and composition more imaginative than actual. The observation of light was not carried to the same refined point as in the nineteenth century, nor was the use of divided color as systematic and as thorough.

With the dissolution of classic arts the human figure again became the chief if not the only object of representation; the external world was reduced to a simple conventional background or was totally suppressed. But the "illusionistic" technique and manner of observation survived in separate details of the rendering of human figures and their isolated accessories. The art of the Byzantine Empire, from the fifth to the fifteenth century, abounds in them, especially in the miniature paintings of religious and profane manuscripts.

In the fifteenth century, realistic perspective and deep space appeared in western painting — the result of a long evolution. Cast shadows, neglected for almost a thousand years, were rendered once more. In the desire to promote depth, distant objects were occasionally represented as actually seen — blurred and formless. But objects in the foreground, independent of a particular light, retained the sculptural solidity and firmness of outline attributed to them by vision, touch, and extended inference. The observation of nature was subordinate to the requirements of formal composition and religious symbolism.

In the later sixteenth century and the seventeenth, the smooth gradations and tight linear contours which defined forms were broken in favor of intensified movement, accented contrasts of light and shadow, richer color, more rapid execution, and variety of texture. Painting thus became more visual. But although the rigid line disappeared, it yielded to as arbitrary an accented and elusive contour, of which the colors followed no exact observation of nature. Painters, working from models, chose an illumination which revealed as clearly as possible the whole amplitude of underlying forms.

In the small landscapes of Velasquez (1599–1660), however, the attitude is precisely that of the Impressionists; his painting of the Medici gardens may be hung beside any of their works. But in his larger compositions, the landscapes are subordinate to the figures and are more conventional, although full of subtle observation of light. It was the exigency of a rapid sketch that imposed on him, in the smaller works, a more thoroughly consistent Impressionist method. Likewise in a small winter landscape in Cassel by his contemporary, Rembrandt, the striking contrast of shadow and light, and the indefiniteness of forms, are prophetically modern.

The general tendency of seventeenth and eighteenth century painting is toward this interest in light and in free handling and rapid brushwork. But it is primarily in the works of men who are not landscapists that the most radical departures to Impressionism occur. Heads painted by Hals (1584–1666) and Brouwer (1605–1638) are renderings of light rather than of forms as solid and as definite as statuary, such as earlier art had created. Some paintings by the Spaniard, Goya (1746-1828), show a complete dissolution of form by light and atmosphere; and in the

"Shrimp Girl," by Hogarth (1697–1764), this attitude has so far invaded portraiture as to suggest that the artist has reproduced a momentary glimpse of his subject, rather than a patiently scrutinized model.

In all these works the color preserves a traditional range of tones, usually low in key. The Impressionism is more manifest in the attitude to form and subject than in the imitation of the precise effects of brilliant light; it is restricted to those moments in which the play of light and shadow produces the colors of their conventional palette.

Side by side with these forerunners of Impressionism, there was cultivated throughout seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, in landscape and academic figure painting, another style which maintained precise drawing, continuous linear contours, sculpturesque figures, and a uniform color, usually marked by brown shadows. The excavation of Pompeii and Herculaneum in the middle of the eighteenth century, the publication of the ruins of Greece and Rome, and the profoundly classical bias of esthetics and literary education at this period, sustained this manner, suggesting even closer dependence on classical subjects and the newly discovered models. In Germany, Winckelmann, Lessing, and Goethe expounded the principles of classic beauty on the basis of Hellenistic works and inferior Roman copies. Thus Greco-Roman sculpture became the model of academic art; the earlier style was hardened and formalized still further, until pictures seemed drawn rather than painted. Winckelmann, who incorrectly supposed that classic sculpture was unpainted, even questioned the tastefulness of colored paintings. In France this style, of which the leading exponent was David (1748-1825), became official under the French Revolution, which found in the manners, history, and arts of the Roman Republic symbols of its own desires and virtues. It dominated the instruction in the art schools of Europe throughout the nineteenth century, provoking numerous reactions in favor of medieval, Renaissance, and other non-classical models.

If the Impressionists seem novel in France, it is because they are in reaction from a contemporary school of correct, classic drawing. But seen in the light of earlier painting, they are the extenders of traditional methods to a greater variety of landscape and illumination and to the complete abolition of sentimental or narrative content.

Impressionism, in turning attention to light and the exact conditions of our vision of form, carried to a new completeness an old tradition of European realism. The ancient East (Egypt, Sumeria, Assyria, Asia Minor) had rendered man in fixed images that were meticulous aggregates of ideas of his separate limbs in a few attitudes. Greece had obtained a view of his isolated, idealized body in all positions and described it with anatomical accuracy. The Hellenistic world had extended this search to actual as well as ideal individuals and had located them in deep space. But this space was composite and imaginary; it lacked the generalized precision of a scientific or even empirical perspective. It corresponded to actually perceived space and light, as the Egyptian figures to actual beings. The later Middle Ages and the Renaissance renewed the observation of the human body in unconscious parallel to Greek practice. But the intervening development of architecture with more intricately articulated spaces, defined by repeated members that formed receding and converging vistas, the superior optical science of the Arabs and late medieval Europe, and the experimental and speculative nature of medieval and Renaissance crafts, produced a scientific perspective in Renaissance painting. Further observation discovered the light by which form had been revealed, and eventually the multiplicity of the latter under varying illumination. In the nineteenth century, Impressionism devoted itself to those illuminations and atmospheric effects in which form was almost completely disintegrated and bright color alone survived.

Impressionism suggested an utter dependence on the immediate appearance of nature and discouraged the synthetic and intellectual processes of earlier painting. Each period had employed combinations of forms, of which the elements were derived from nature, but the whole from imagination. With the increase in realism, the number of imitated elements came to dominate the arbitrariness of combination, until the conception of a picture aimed to reproduce the effect of an actual vision. With the Impressionists and their immediate forerunners, who painted directly from the subject, not the effect but the actual vision was sometimes rendered.

In Impressionistic art, mountains lost their ruggedness, houses their geometrical compactness, trees and shrubbery their well attested substance. The rapid technique of Impressionism, its subjection to light and to evanescent surfaces, excluded the formal concerns of Renaissance painting. The latter demanded a greater knowledge of shapes, an independence of transient effects, and a willful subordination of all appearances to a preconceived design. Renaissance arts, though so addicted to anatomical description, composed figures rather than copied them literally. They were the pretext and source of elaborate rhythms and constructions, analogous to the pillars, moldings, arches, and ornament that articulate and enliven the otherwise dull framework of architecture. Supposedly realistic representations of haze or misty atmosphere in Renaissance paintings seem entirely imaginative when set beside those of Monet. In the first, the atmosphere is a means of suggesting depth and defining the recession of solid objects by a variable sharpness of contour; in the second it is a realistically transcribed phenomenon, a particular event, which dims form, limits depth, and casts an interesting gray tonality, unknown in Renaissance painting, over the unorganized elements of the landscape.

The Impressionists were too sensitive to color to neglect design altogether. In some of their paintings the surface is divided into two or three patterned areas of contrasting color. Design is here felt as a casual simplification, as a device for increasing the decorative value of color; linear rhythm is hardly cultivated, and voluminous form is absent. Unity was achieved by the common light which filled every corner of the picture. Thus, while eliminating formal design almost completely, Impressionism suggested a new field of design in pure color combinations, derived immediately from nature.

The academic painting of the day, although a product of industrious observation of the past, showed even less power of design. It taught composition as one of its canons; but composition consisted of the grouping of the figures in some simple scheme, like a triangle, without any pervasive rhythmical character, and did not preclude disordered shapes and inharmonious combinations of purely illustrative detail. A greater attention was given to accuracy in the rendering of the human figure and to the gesture, expression, textures, and literary subject matter of paintings. If the Impressionists showed a limited order and solidity, and brilliant color, their academic opponents displayed an abundance of disordered forms in dull tones.

But parallel to the development of Impressionistic informality, complex, three-dimensional design had also known a reawakening. After the middle of the seventeenth century, it had become rare, perhaps because of the wonderful complexity of its practice by the best masters of this and the preceding period and the distracting accumulation of naturalistic detail. The changes of later seventeenth and eighteenth century painting were mainly changes in content and technique, rather than in form.

In the nineteenth century, however, the older tradition began to re-arise. Ingres (1780–1867) gave to the cold, stiff precision of academic drawing more suppleness of contour and some conscience regarding order. But his application was inconsistent, being more successful in his drawings and paintings of single figures than in large groups. Constable, who prided himself on his realistic approach to nature, nevertheless differed from his contemporary landscapists in the more artistic arrangement of the parts of his pictures. A few paintings of the poet Blake (1757–1827) show a simplification of form and a search for harmonious line, independent of literal fact. In France, Géricault (1791–1824) and Delacroix (1799–1863), breaking with academic art, realized the value of design as an expressive factor in the dramatic compositions their romantic natures craved.

Delacroix's concern with form was self-conscious and eclectic. He studied the Venetians and Rubens (1577–1640) and copied their compositions; from them he learned to create rhythmical contours and to diversify form by the arbitrary use of light and shade. The caricaturist Daumier (1810–1879), retaining the traditional yellowish and brown tones of earlier art, painted homely contemporary scenes of public and domestic life (unlike Delacroix, a leader of the romantic movement, who preferred subjects drawn from literature, history, and the life of oriental peoples); but on this realistic observation he imposed powerful imagined contrasts of light and dark, in which detail was lost and from which the solid volumes of the figures emerged in clear order as in the paintings of Rembrandt, who had inspired him. Among the works of the Barbizon painters, Corot's figure paintings, drawings, and landscapes are unique in their artistic coördination of pictorial elements, elsewhere literal or poetized without great regard to unity of shapes. Courbet, a friend of





Ingres, Virgil reciting the Aeneid, Brussels Museum.
Delacroix, The Twenty-eighth of July, 1830, Louvre.

the anarchist Proudhon, was publicly occupied with the proclamation of realism as the end of modern art. But this realism was most apparent in the subject-matter of the paintings. He was as interested in the design as in the content of his pictures, which today appear less shocking than to his contemporaries, and even conventional in color and drawing. In the disposition of his figures, who were taken from the poorer classes of the day, he did not follow their accidental appearance or the exact colors of nature, but selected and represented shapes with a fine sense of the values of line, mass, and light and shade. Like Delacroix and Daumier, this revolutionist was profoundly influenced by earlier painting, especially by the Dutch and Spanish masters of the seventeenth century, who were also interested in the artistic possibilities of contemporary life. Another Frenchman, Manet, equally radical in his attitude to subject-matter, but also concerned with problems of lighting, texture, and the technique of imitation, was not purely realistic. From the ordinary vision of a single figure with an irregular, elusive outline and broken surfaces in a vague or confused space, he abstracted a clear and striking contour, defining a simple, bright pattern on a dark background.

This modern return to the ideals of classic and Renaissance art reached its highest point in two disciples of Impressionism, Cézanne (1839–1906) and Renoir (1841–1919). They were members of the early Impressionist group, but gradually modified their practice, adapting its richer use of color and study of light to the creation of form. Both studied the older Renaissance arts, especially of Rubens and the Venetians; both were influenced by Delacroix, and painted large figure compositions as well as landscapes.

Cézanne restored the solidity that too literal an attention to bright light had withdrawn from objects. He represented them in a generalized light without indication of a specific source, and did not permit sunlight to confuse or corrode substance. This he achieved, not by precise drawing or by reversion to older methods of monochromatic light and shade, but in utilizing the Impressionists' revelations of color. He applied their definition of form as sunlight, shadow, and reflection to create solid volumes. Observing that in nature local color underwent modifications on receding and advancing planes, he arbitrarily employed these observed ranges of color to model volumes, and analyzed cylindrical, con-





Monet, Gare Saint-Lazare, Paris.
Cézanne, Provence landscape.

ical, or spherical surfaces of curved objects into minute planes which he colored according to their position on the object and in the three-dimensional space of the picture. Depth, the movement of planes, the forms of objects, were thus inseparable from their color.

Beside its function in the creation of form, this color was itself the source of rich harmonies, more intricate and diversified than those of the Impressionists.

Cézanne was not content with the effect of solidity for its own sake. He wished to compose natural forms in the manner of the Renaissance masters, but with the colors that the Impressionists had first introduced, and with a more intimate fusion of the color and the forms. He organized still life (fruit, pottery, flowers) into monumental groups in which every line, surface, and mass was designed as part of a harmonious system, organic in the perfection and indispensability of each element. He worked likewise with landscape and the human figure, which he represented in movement and repose. Except in certain erotic themes, which attracted his youth and his old age, he was indifferent to the practical meanings or associations of the subject and sought only the possibilities of coherent visual combination. He usually simplified shapes, bending them to rhythmical schemes, and distorted for the sake of design. He thus achieved compositions as satisfactory as those of the best Renaissance painters, but with a beauty and conception of color peculiar to himself.

Renoir achieved a similar perfection of color and design. But his work shows less detachment from life and a greater interest in health, joyousness, and sensuality, which accord perfectly with his most abstract artistic interests. For he loved continuous wavy lines, rounded forms, soft textures, and warm flesh colors. In his earlier works, the surfaces were flat, and the solidity of objects unaccented. Though he employed Impressionistic color, he often defined his objects by sharp contours. Later he softened the outlines and suggested the full weight and relief of figures by modeling them, independent of a particular illumination, in bright color, with the highest lights placed on the most prominent or salient points of the body. His compositions contain longer, more sinuous lines than Cézanne's, in which angularities and breaks are more evident. Renoir's volumes are uniformly rounded; his color is warmer, and softer in transitions of planes. Cézanne's still-life, landscape, and



Renoir, 1909, Gangnat collection, Paris.



Matisse.

figure groups possess an austerity, ruggedness, and weight in contrast with Renoir's easier, informal manner.

Besides Cézanne and Renoir, another Frenchman, Seurat (1859–1891), had applied Impressionist methods in finely organized compositions with definite shapes in rhythmical sequence. He wished to purify Impressionism by formulating its technique and giving it a scientific basis. Influenced by a reading of contemporary physicists (including Professor Rood, of Columbia), he applied the divided tones of the Impressionists, unmixed, on the canvas in dots of equal size, in the hope that greater truth to nature and brilliance would result from the optical fusion of the colors, which included contrasting complementaries. Instead of a green tone, Seurat applied dots of blue and yellow. The uniformity of these dots, their regular and laborious application, effected a mosaic of contrasting colors, but failed to achieve either the brilliance or the accuracy of Impressionist painting. But Seurat, though concerned with light, was less an Impressionist than Signac, who employed this same method. The study of light was for Seurat a means of obtaining unity and richness of color; his method, a simplification of process. His most serious problem was of pure design, which he also tried to reduce to a few principles. His pictures are essentially studio compositions, long and carefully pondered, rather than rapid outdoor sketches, like Monet's. He contrived great figure paintings, of a classic suavity of line, with extreme detachment from the overtones of gesture or incident. They are marked by a plastic and linear neatness, without insistence on the volume or finer details of musculature, and possess an air of abstraction in the most precisely drawn parts. This is due to the equal distinctness of all details and the perfection of design, which permits no disturbing accentuation.

Van Gogh (1853–1890), a follower of the Neo-Impressionists or Pointillists, as Seurat and Signac were called, applied their method without its exacting regularity. He could not do otherwise, for he was governed in his painting by an intense desire for personal expression, which produced in a brief period several hundred pictures, impetuously painted, bright in color, agitated in line, with trees, clouds, figures, and flowers, in restless movement, sometimes in harmonious sequence, but not always carried to a perfect conclusion. He sought in painting concrete equivalents of his own emotional disturbance. The colors and forms in his pictures





Seurat, Bathers, 1883–1884.
Daumier, Café scene.

were to him symbolical of his own moods; these were more often tortured, ecstatic, and uncertain, and did not favor the detachment or resolution which undertakes problems like Cézanne's and Renoir's. But his unhappy personal history and the energetic freedom of his works have attracted to him numerous modern painters; the exponents of Expressionism in Germany hail him as a newly discovered father.

His friend Gauguin (1851–1903) was equally ill at ease, but his art, unique in modern painting, is one of suave, untroubled decoration. His earliest pictures are Impressionistic; his later, though retaining bright color, are the result of a totally different method and conception of art. The study of primitive arts, to which he had been led by a nostalgia for simplicity and the idyllic self-sufficiency of tropical savages, turned him away from the realistic imitation of light to compositions in which intense color is applied in flat unbroken areas, and the figures are enclosed by simple, well-defined, schematic contours. His best works represent the life of the Tahitians, among whom he spent several years.

Matisse (1869—), in similar reaction from Impressionism, developed an even richer and more subtle decorative style. Like Gauguin, he was influenced by primitive art. But whereas Gauguin also conceived of simplicity as a moral quality and as a subject-matter of art, for Matisse it is an artistic means alone — the result of a process which abstracts from the confusion of shapes and colors beheld in nature those best fitted to form an artistic unit. He employs brilliant color in most unexpected combinations, and distorts the outlines of figures both for novelty of shape and for harmonious design. Although he acquired from Persian miniatures the patterning of some of his surfaces and the practice of a zoned perspective in which figures in different planes in depth are of equal size, and superposed rather than foreshortened, he is also a product of Impressionism. His use of brilliant color is an extension of the method of the Impressionists. The latter, perceiving reflections of reds, violets, and orange in a green object, indicated them by small touches of these colors; but Matisse gives such observation an emphatic expression in whole areas of bright color. Like the Impressionists, he paints swiftly, with little regard for smoothness of surface and neat transitions, and sometimes divides his tones. His subjects are usually little modeled, flat, and pervaded by sunlight. Where he suggests solidity, it is rather





Van Gogh, Street in Arles.
Gauguin, Tahitians.

by accentuation of the contour than by light and shade or by color, as in Cézanne.

The Spaniard, Picasso (1881 —), whose name is frequently linked with Matisse as a leader of contemporary unacademic European painting, has had a great influence on the ideas of artists. In his work, color is usually secondary to form, and is more tonal than of contrasting hues. In his earliest paintings, he was much preoccupied with circus and café figures, which he rendered in flat patterns, as in the works of Toulouse-Lautrec (1864–1901), or with a simplified modeling. Later he studied the works of the great Spanish master, El Greco (c. 1540–1614), who had been copied by Cézanne, and was prompted to elongation and distortion of the figure and to a more intensified rhythmical movement. The desire to accentuate the purely formal elements and to minimize representational aspects led him finally to paint in a method called "Cubist." In this style, which had been preceded by another, strongly influenced by African Negro sculpture — an art of arbitrarily proportioned, distorted, symmetrical figures, with a geometrical simplicity in all the parts — human and other forms were decomposed into sharply divided planes, in angular sequences, with only few curves. To heighten the effect of abstraction, several views of the same figure were sometimes rendered adjacent to each other, or overlapping, so that the entire surface of a part was represented in a series of adjoining planes. With the consequent disintegration of the subject, imitated and associative elements became negligible, and attention was fixed upon the geometrical design. Color was reduced to grays and browns, so that plastic and linear order might function undistracted. In some Cubist works of Picasso and his followers, intricate pattern rather than solid form was created; a group of objects was assembled, distorted, and rendered in flat areas, as if pasted on the canvas. When the Cubists felt the need for diversifying their surfaces, materials of different color and texture were applied to form the picture. The intention — to create an art purely abstract — was not, however, achieved. Recognizable objects served as the basis of each composition; their analysis into arbitrary geometrical schemes only rarely produced designs as satisfying as those of works in which natural forms had been more frankly utilized. For one thing, fluent contour was destroyed, and the multiplication of planes became a pedantic exercise, with little more than a novel decorative effect, which was soon appropriated in scenic design and in some fashionable industrial arts. The movement, begun in 1909, was less evident in 1920, and is now limited to a small group of painters.[1] Picasso, who produced several beautiful Cubist works, has since modified his style. He has returned to representation, painting large figures, monumental in aspect, of exaggerated muscularity and weight, but simple in outline. He has introduced subjects, sometimes idyllic and sentimental, as in his earliest works; but his independence of realistic form and desire for abstraction persist in the various distortions and simplifications that characterize his recent works. His color, however, has remained accessory, and unaffected by the results of Cézanne, Renoir, and Matisse.

At the same time that Cubism was developed in France, a group in Italy called "Futurists," led by a writer, Marinetti, announced a reaction from classic Italian traditions, berated the academies, the museums, and an especially burdensome antiquity, and urged an art truly modern in its illustration of movement, which was considered the specifically modern feature of contemporary life. But this representation was not literal; it hoped to suggest movement by assembling on one canvas all our impressions and associations with the particular motion, and by employing abstract forms relevant to them. Thus a running dog was given twenty legs, and a dance was a confusion of small intersecting figures, musical symbols, and restless lines. Several of the Futurists practiced Cubist methods, and some Cubists were animated by a similar concern for the expression of movement.

This view also passed, yet not without some influence on both painting and criticism. Like Cubism, it constituted another step away from realistic representation; it insisted on personal and untrammeled creation; it encouraged a complete freedom in subject-matter, and at the same time an unconcern for orderliness and design in art, contrary to other contemporary doctrines. The notion that a modern art is one devoted to some particular modern phenomenon has since acquired a great vogue — in literature, music, and decoration, as well as in painting.

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[1] Two Americans, Russell and MacDonald-Wright, observing the abstract character of design even in works dedicated to natural shapes, supposed that in the construction of such designs by purely geometrical forms alone, by so applying color that depth, solidity and movement would be suggested without dependence on real objects and space, the final step in the purification of painting could be achieved. All recognizable subject was eschewed; form and color alone preoccupied the painters. Their works, exhibited in 1913, showed a poverty of invention and a simplicity unsatisfying beside the abundance and variety of abstract rhythms and concentration of form in painters who drew so frankly on nature as Cézanne and Renoir. MacDonald-Wright has since turned to the color-organ as a field for experiment in the attainment of his end.

So unexpected and unfamiliar was Futurist painting and so shocking the literary pronouncements that accompanied it that the name "Futurist" became a synonym of "queer" or "freakish" and "unintelligible," and was applied indiscriminately to all of modern art that distorted the human form or presented a strange appearance.

Since the beginning of this century, German painters have asserted complete and vigorous expression of moods and personality, by whatever forms and colors, as the end of art. Colors, distorted line, specific rhythms, became symbolic of mental states. Instead of an approximation to a visible world, an artistic account of an interior one was the prime object; and any shape, realistic or imagined, could be invoked at the painter's discretion. Earlier German traditions of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, in which highly emotional religious expression and distorted forms were common, are seen as spiritual ancestors of the present movement, and as guarantees of its national character and its esthetic dignity. In the best of the Expressionist painters the motifs chosen for representation are designed and ordered as in modern painters who have not the same impulse toward poignant autobiography in pictures. But the design acquires a particular personal quality because of the accentuation of shapes, which have meaning also as the subject of the painting and as an embodiment of the artist's mood.

It is common in modern art that values other than those of form and color are attached to paintings by the artists themselves, and that the innocent procedure of representation or design, of which only a few details are consciously imposed, is rationalized as an enterprise of more profound personal or universal significance. The design of a work is so complex, even in the simpler flat compositions, that a full cognizance and conscious choice of all the relations that subsist between shapes (and of the shapes themselves) on the part of the artist are even more unlikely than an exhaustive analysis of them by the most patient and astute critic. Observation of children and untrained adults who produce



Picasso, Factory, Horta de Ebro.
Russolo, Dynamism of an automobile. — Futurist.

simple but harmonious works of art reveals a creativeness of which the success depends upon no formulated notions of the nature of esthetic purpose, and only the slightest conscious preoccupation with the abstract elements of design. This is paralleled by the almost total absence of reference to problems of the organization of forms in the traditional literature of the arts of painting and sculpture, even in periods when such organization has reached a very great complexity and is manifestly self-conscious. Problems of technique, representation, and symbolism are those most usually discussed.

The avowed doctrines of artists are not always clear accounts of their practices; the most fanatical advocate of realism may distort and idealize, whereas the academic canon of composition has been unproductive for over three hundred years. It is only before the most intricate designs and before obviously formalized schemes that our judgment of conscious planning is plausible — but only if limited to the more apparent evidences of purpose. Since the greater part of harmonious relations within a work do not enter separately the consciousness of either the artist or the admirer, it is not at all strange that the former's explanations of his aim should so often insist on non-esthetic aspects of the results. The romantic position of the artist in modern society — poor, but glorious — his intimate sense of *ex nihilo* creation, the great historic prestige of his profession, the philosophic identification of his activity with science, religion, and morals, encourage him to uncritical, unsystematic formulations, presented in essentially poetic manner, in which his personality, or soul, and misapprehended metaphysical concepts, are the center of his labors with the brush.

The development of modern painting was not in a straight or single line. Having inherited numerous traditions readily accessible in museums, some painters of the nineteenth century knew a freedom unparalleled in earlier times, and drew readily upon sources congenial to their own aims. No period in the history of art was more conscious of its past than the nineteenth century, which produced so many highly original artists. The absence of the older atelier or shop system, with its more rigid practices, the painter's independence of fixed religious themes or traditional designs, the discredit into which a long unproductive academic manner had fallen, the facility of travel, museums, books, exhibits, and the intercourse of his fellows — all these gave the artist greater liberty in forming a personal style.

Thus, the painting of the nineteenth century does not illustrate a gradual evolution of one style, but shows a series of individuals who diverge in different ways from existing forms, which remain more or less stable throughout this time. Although affected by the work of men immediately preceding, they do not arise from them alone, but depend even more on a remoter past. Each step is associated with one or two individuals, whose development is intensely personal and isolated from most of contemporary art. Thus David studied the Romans; Ingres, the Greeks and Raphael; Delacroix, the Venetians and Rubens; Daumier, Rembrandt; Manet, the Spaniards, Velasquez and Goya; Monet, the Japanese and the English; Renoir, Rubens; Cézanne, Poussin, and El Greco and the later Italians; Picasso, El Greco, and Negro sculpture; Matisse, the Persians, and the Pacific savages; Gauguin, the primitive Italians. And at the present day, the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Chinese, and the Byzantines are employed as models, as well as Ingres, Delacroix, Cézanne, and Renoir.

These changes were not without effect on academic painting. Delacroix alone had a great influence in liberating drawing and color from formalism and reintroducing the methods of the late Renaissance. Manet affected portrait and still-life painting. The Impressionists imposed their technique on all modern art, which has also profited by its color. It loosened the tight academic handling, promoted rough surfaces and rapid execution, and eliminated the vast quantity of purely illustrative detail that formerly encumbered painting. Academic exhibits have changed from brown to more joyous colors. Cézanne has turned the modern Impressionists to solidity and composition. And even the theater has tended to substitute simple or abstract settings for its older realistic contrivances.

At the same time a desire for decorativeness has entered academic painting. In the nineteenth century Puvis de Chavannes (1824–1898) felt a need for mural paintings that preserved the flatness of the wall and agreed with its architecture. He limited the color range to gray tones, simplified his figures, and grouped them in formalized aggregates, but never attained the rhythm and decorative spacing he sought. Later academic decoration follows him as a great master.

The consciousness of design as a thoroughly pervasive feature in a work of art appears throughout the nineteenth century. It was a common belief of estheticians, who could not, however, clearly disentangle its meaning from other values of sentiment, naturalism, or religious expression. Critics who were aware of its presence as a distinctive factor in Renaissance art were, nevertheless, uncritical in attributing it to nineteenth century artists in whom it was almost totally lacking, and in failing to recognize it in the works of Delacroix, Cézanne, and Renoir.

Earlier painters of the nineteenth century who imitated classic or Renaissance arts were misled by externals and by adventitious elements. They were moved by the works but gave an incomplete explanation of their emotion and imposed a contemporary limitation on a fundamentally remote art. Thus the Pre-Raphaelites thought that the simplicity of the fifteenth century and earlier painters of Italy consisted of a naïve truthfulness and a poetical subject-matter; in consequence of their theory, they assembled much disorganized matter, conscientiously observed and united by a story or sentiment, on large canvases. Likewise in Germany, the Nazarenes mistook the piety and fresco technique of some Renaissance painters as the cause of their artistic appeal.

A peculiarity of modern painting is the enormous extension of the traditions it has consulted. Comtemporary painters are influenced by the most remote and diverse arts. As soon as design was seen as the problem, the artists turned for inspiration to those primitive arts in which design was clearest. Thus Negro, archaic Greek, Egyptian, early medieval, Persian, and old American arts were studied by sophisticated Europeans and copied. The growth of archeology, museums, travel, and photography made all these works available; but the attitude of modern artists made them more significant and esthetically accessible. But this cultivation of exotic arts is not new in the modern world. Since the early eighteenth century, European thought, fashions, and literature have been concerned with the exotic; and decoration and architecture of the past hundred and fifty years have been subject to changes in which now Gothic, now Chinese, now Romanesque and Byzantine forms were used. But what is distinctively recent is the inclusion of savage representational arts in our traditions of painting. These wood carvings, once curious as the idols of inferior people, have won the devotion of modern artists and are as sought after as the works of classic European art.

At the present day the finest modern painting comes from France, some of it the product of Spaniards, Italians, Russians, and men of other nations who have settled there. They are distinguished by unique personal styles of great variety, rather than by individual versions of a common style (as in the Renaissance), and have their hosts of followers. They possess in common only the acknowledged love of design and abstraction which are embodied in highly distinctive visions of the real world. It is no longer felt that a naturalistic art is incompatible with significant form. On the contrary, the richest possibilities exist for them in the visible world, and the latter is cultivated, not for its associations but as a storehouse of shapes and suggestive visual experience, which the artist can freely modify or distort. Lest design be too obvious or simple, the artist welcomes detail, precision of rendering, and informality of viewpoint.

The development of both realism and design has made subject-matter less and less important. Only a few academic and religious painters represent historic, mythical, or pious incidents. Portraits, landscapes, marines, and urban scenes are the most common subjects. A great proportion of modern canvases depict the immediate surroundings of the artist — sometimes himself and his friends, his studio, his fruit and pottery, the view from his window, and his model in a hundred different poses.

At one time technical dexterity was an important value, and paintings presented smooth, highly polished surfaces, on which a multitude of minute details was apparent. On nearer inspection, even more details appeared; whereas on the canvases of the Impressionists, on closer approach, the landscape was resolved into rough shapeless patches of no particular beauty. But the Impressionist, in imitating precisely the elusive effects of light by a new and rapid technique, in turn suggested a new dexterity, which for some painters has become an end in itself. The association of this technique with lack of structure and solidity led to a reaction, and at the present day numerous painters practice a meticulous and probing manner with smooth surfaces, precise detail, and careful consideration of shapes, all subject to notions of order and form.

But for most artists, technique and surfaces are subordinate to design, and while they may be cultivated to give an additional attraction to the works, no special value is attributed to a distinct method of execution, apart from its adequacy to an artist's particular use of form and color. Hence the works of amateurs, naïvely painted, are no longer rejected as the products of incompetence; and distorted or unnatural shapes are judged in terms of their relations to a whole artistic conception, rather than to an exterior object in nature, which has been imperfectly copied.

Throughout the nineteenth century there existed in the provinces, and even in the large cities of Europe and America, painters without formal training in the schools and independent of the particular academic traditions of the day who worked as "amateurs" in a manner so lacking in the contemporary virtues of professional art as to seem quaint, child-like, and "primitive." In recent years the emergence of design as more significant than accurate imitation, and the enjoyment of past archaic arts, have encouraged such "private" artists to exhibit their works, and have even led more sophisticated painters to copy them. In his earliest paintings, before he went to art school, the writer Samuel Butler was a modern primitive. The best known of such painters is the French customs collector Henri Rousseau. He was not so far removed from contemporary painting as to lack space, solidity, perspective, and the actual forms of nature. He differed from it in the naïveté of his realism, which scrupulously included the forms of separate leaves, and in the sharp clarity of all details. He simplified the human figure like earlier primitives and, like them, saw nature in striking silhouettes, in simple rhythmical schemes, and in a generalized light which assured a perfect definiteness of form.

Distortion in modern art, which is so puzzling or repulsive to those who associate beauty with the accurate representation of nature, has more than one cause. In some painters it is a sacrifice of visual truth to linear design; in some it is an imaginative conception akin to the greater height or inhuman proportions of heroic figures or idealized types in classic and Renaissance art, as well as the symbolic deformations in religious art, expressions of power and sanctity; in some it is a representational device, a means of accentuating the salient peculiarities of individual objects, as in caricatures; in others it is a contrivance to suggest some emotion — a pathetic fallacy, which makes all lines of a scene relevant to one idea. By many artists, it is cultivated for its own sake as a means of creating new worlds of form, strange creatures, and as a playful indulgence, akin to grotesquerie. In some works, it is an attempt to acquire the appearance of modernity, which is conceived as a value; in some it is a craving for originality. In general, its practice has become widespread, in reaction from academic teaching, as a sort of repentance for past sins of insignificant literalness in representation. The imitation of archaic and primitive art is also a source of deformation, and the emergence of modern archaic artists who distort unconsciously is likewise important to observe.

This new independence of a literal realism, which photography has helped discredit, has led to a revaluation of the arts of children and of primitive peoples, and has modified the systems of instruction. For design is a universal solvent, applicable to historic arts formerly neglected as archaic, savage, unskillful, childish, and exotic. It permits a fresher attitude toward primitive, Egyptian, Asiatic, and medieval arts, and points to the unity of artistic impulses in all times and places.

SCULPTURE

The character of sculpture precludes a development entirely similar to that of modern painting. For it is an art of three dimensions, in which form is not an illusory projection on a flat surface, but is attained by actual modeling of a solid object; its chief theme is the isolated human figure, which suggests no atmosphere or particular enclosing space; and since the late Renaissance it has renounced the use of color (which the classic and medieval sculptors had applied as decoration or to accent form), partly because of a mistaken idea of the practices of classic art. In consequence, the last refinements of western realism, such as the Impressionists' imitation of forms, indefinite in sunlight, have no exact parallel in sculpture. But in several important respects the sculpture of the last hundred years underwent changes analogous to those of painting. The imitation of nature was carried farther than in previous centuries, to include renderings of ignoble and contemporary individuals with all the accidents of gesture, drapery, and expression; while sculptors, dissatisfied with the literal representation of ephemeral and unorganized natural forms, returned to older conceptions of monumental design, and created in a more arbitrary fashion. As in painting, past modes were closely copied; and the elaborate technique and the anatomical learning acquired in several hundred years were abandoned in favor of primitive methods. But neither of these tendencies included artists as gifted as Cézanne and Renoir, or produced works comparable to the best sculpture of the past.

Like painting, sculpture from the seventeenth to the present century was dedicated to religious, erotic, poetical, historic, and symbolic subjects. Portraits were common, and genre figures were sometimes represented. The sculpture of a period reflected various political changes and the tendencies of the other arts. Under the Revolution and Napoleon, it followed heroic and Roman modes in France; during the Romantic movement it chose more exotic and recent literary subjects; in the mid-century, influenced by social protest and philanthropy, it celebrated the peasant and the laborer. But the forms remained essentially the same.

The nude human figure, accurately or ideally rendered, was the dominant motif. Whereas in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the relief and the figure in the round were usually engaged to an architectural structure, the later Renaissance and modern periods tended to cultivate the isolated figure in the round. At the same time, especially in the nineteenth century, the sculptor ceased to carve directly in stone, but constructed clay models which were reproduced in stone by a workman. When the problem was of a statue or relief in an architectural context, the latter was hardly consulted, and its design was often flagrantly violated by unsubordinate, unarchitectonic carvings. But even detached figures, intended for the open air, often lacked the clarity of outline and simple, easily distinguished mass that are essential to an isolated monument. Clay sculpture did not presume a solid block, to be trimmed into a desired form, but clothed an armature of rods with the necessary limbs. The use of clay models had become inevitable when, in the Renaissance, realism grew so thorough and the observation of anatomy so minute that a sculptor would not attack the stone without a preliminary study. This increase in realistic content was associated with a change in design, from simple symmetrical or static constructions to asymmetrical figures in action, more complexly articulated, with rotating axes. At first, such animated conceptions were limited to bronze and to relief sculpture. When applied in the round to stone, they caused marked indentation of contour and a gradual abandonment of simple block forms. But in the work of Michelangelo "the presentation of an object fills its space unit as compactly as possible, avoiding all unoccupied space. . . . Outreaching gestures and far-extending limbs are banished as diffuse; while, within his concentrating imagination, bodily movements originate which, without loss of space or energy, occupy as little space as possible. Pressed close to the torso, they fill out the block completely, involving everywhere a turning and bending of joints." [1]

His followers, however, were less restrained; the unified block was less manifest in their work, and Michelangelo's means, musculature and gesture, became ends in themselves. The diffuse conceptions encouraged the use of clay, until finally clay alone was the sculptor's material, even when a simple block was intended.

The traditions of sculpture from the sixteenth century to the present day have been mainly classic and Renaissance. But these are so varied within themselves, because of their own long developments, that the imitation of different phases of antiquity could alone justify the greatest diversity of result. Classic sculpture, from the seventh century B.C. through the Roman period, parallels closely the medieval and later sculptures of western Europe, and even includes retrospective and eclectic movements similar to those of the last hundred years. The idea "classic" has itself undergone change of meaning in modern times in accordance with contemporary standards of beauty, which selected from known Greek and Roman works those most clearly exemplifying the local or momentary attitude. The discoveries of archeologists provided a more extensive comparative material, but did not in themselves affect the valuation of classic art. Thus, under a predominantly realistic western mode, archaic Greek art was regarded as a preparatory stage of technical struggle, anterior to perfection, and without artistic interest, because of its inaccuracies of anatomy and stiffness of pose. But recent sculptors, who place abstract design above the imitation of nature, not only regard archaic Greek works with a more favorable eye, but consign the succeeding periods to the status of decadence. The admirers of Greek sculpture have not always analyzed completely the qualities admired; and obvious attendant traits, such as rigidity of posture, regular folds, smooth surfaces, and the lack of facial expression and of anatomical truth, have been faithfully reproduced without the achievement of corresponding effects. Modern "classicism" has been more literary and archeological than artistic. It has copied classic themes and figures rather than classic qualities, except in those works which imitated the most realistic products of late Hellenistic and Roman art.

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[1] Hildebrand, *The problem of form* (English translation, 1907), 1630.

Modern academic art was "classical," not in the requirement of a thorough orderliness, penetrating every detail and every relation, but in so far as the subjects were noble, ideal, or pagan, the forms smooth and clear, and the whole figure in repose. This neo-classicism was in part a reaction from the informal, disorderly, and in some respects more artistic sculpture of the baroque and rococo practice of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As in painting, it coincided with archeological discoveries and a renewed passion for the ancient world.

But antiquity also furnished models of movement and informality, so that throughout the modern period, in continuation of both ancient and Renaissance traditions, more energetic, restless, and emotional subjects were also cultivated. These could represent the same themes as the "classicist," but differed from the latter in their irregular surfaces and contours, in the strong play of light and shade, and in the richness of musculature and line. Although both styles were committed to accuracy of representation, the first idealized, and the second chose subjects and movements which permitted elaboration of musculature or textures, and complex forms that contrast with the simplicity and definiteness of the first. The second approached Impressionism, since momentary aspects of nature are more abundant in movement, play of light and shade, and variety of form than are our generalized abstracted concepts. When emancipated from a mythological or heroic subject-matter, this manner could eventually find, in the imitation of vulgar types and the imperfections of everyday bodies, surfaces minutely broken, lines of infinite complexity, and the suggestion of vibrant living flesh.

The treatment of drapery or hair in the two styles affords an illustration of their divergent methods. The "classic" garment was so disposed that regular, parallel, and concentric lines resulted, with grooves of about equal depth or gradation, and so arranged that the underlying body was well exposed and its main contours preserved. Or, if it covered the figure completely and obscured its structure, this was only the better to express notions of pagan dignity and grandeur by the ample envelope of a traditional robe. But in the other, the drapery was in itself a means of emotional expression. It could abolish all sense of the body's structure; it could fall in contrasting deep and shallow folds, in straight and curved lines; by fluttering ends, overlapping, and irregularity, it could create intense movement that illustrated astutely the emotional disturbance or activity of the figure and the actual incident portrayed. Likewise the hair was in one style neatly combed or simplified, and in the other, carved in casual, irregular, often shapeless masses.

Similar divisions were known in the Hellenistic world, contemporary with the landscape paintings described above. Then too, a conservative school reverted to the simplicity and clear forms of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., while another, more inventive and recent, exploited the human figure for its tiniest alternation of bump and hollow and violent movement. At the same time, there was developed in relief sculpture the representation of space by means of landscape, buildings, and secondary figures placed behind the main subjects in lesser salience. The observed vagueness of remoter objects in misty or clouded atmospheres was utilized to situate objects of relief sculpture in a receding order and to suggest great depth on a thin slab of metal or stone. Later Italian sculptors, of the fifteenth century, carried this technique, called "stiacciato" (squashed), even farther than the classic, combining with atmospheric devices those of a superior science of linear perspective. In modern times, this pictorial technique, which sought to approach the effects of painting, was less cultivated; but it provided an additional impulse to realistic observation and Impressionism.[1]

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[1] There was still another source of Impressionism in the practice of metal sculpture, whether beaten or cast. The higher reflecting surfaces of polished metals provoked a

In both conceptions of sculpture, the shapes were subject to orderly arrangement by the best masters. Thus the medieval, Greek, Egyptian, and Far Eastern examples, alike naturalistic, of the first, more definite and simple type of sculpture, were beautifully organized; the contours, studied for more or less complex, uninterrupted rhythmical lines; the planes, related in expressive contrasts; and the whole mass of the figure, designed to produce a compact, simple block. The sculpture of figures, asymmetrical, and with bodily movement in three dimensions, was a later development; but it was at first a source of more diversified rhythms and complex design, comparable to that of the paintings of the High Renaissance. When limited to a simple block, greater strength resulted, and the abundance of movement and forms generated was only intensified by the limited space.

But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sculptors who followed past procedure were less attentive to these problems of form. A concern with representation and surface effects and deeply planted habits of realistic rendering and conventional design forestalled the naïve and unconscious production of simple rhythms and order, which appear in the works of both primitives and modern untrained men. They evolved no harmonious conception of form as in their forerunners. The classicists were conventional, dry, and idealistic; the more impressionistic and baroque, literal and disordered. The differences between sculptors of this period are differences in technical perfection, in anatomical knowledge, in originality in conception of subject-matter, in skill in portraiture, in grace and charm of surface, and in minor qualities of design.

The use of clay only fostered this tendency toward formlessness, though it was not the cause. It facilitated a purely imitative manner, permitting a more minute realism and movement than the refractory

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play of light and shade which could easily imperil the clarity and definiteness of painstakingly observed forms. In medieval and Renaissance works, this is sometimes the case. Here the Impressionist effect is not an imitation of nature, but results from the creation of an object which is changing or unstable in form, because of its surface The multiplication of dents, breaks, bumps, and hollows, was often sought in order to increase the colorful play of light on metal. But sculptors like Rodin and Epstein cast, in bronze, clay models the surfaces of which have not been smoothed but retain the marks of the technical process of clay composition. The bronze surface is consequently so irregular that metallic luster is less apparent, complexity of detail increased, and the effect of forthright realism, as of a cast from the living body, much heightened.



Matisse, Plaster figure.



Rodin, Balzac.

stone. This is especially evident in the works of Daumier, Degas, and Rodin.

Daumier's sculptures were unique in their time as thoroughly realistic statuettes of contemporary figures in modern clothes. They announced the art of the second half of the century and much of recent work. The clay was not smoothed, but preserved all the accidents of manipulation, which had their counterparts in the roughness of the human types rendered. Degas, a skillful painter of Parisian life, associated with the Impressionists in the freedom of his subject-matter and in his acute observation of moving figures, rather than in the use of divided tones and bright color, reproduced figures of dancing girls in clay, and carried realism to the point of dressing the nude statuettes in actual clothes.

The sculptors Rude (1784–1855) and Carpeaux (1827–1875) were likewise concerned with the figure in motion. Rude was sufficiently close to traditional baroque art to employ devices of linear repetition to enhance action and the impression of great energy and to preserve strong musculature and gesture for plastic and dramatic effect. But whereas Rude exploited military and patriotic themes (as in the reliefs of the Arch of Triumph in Paris), Carpeaux was devoted to more graceful and feminine movements, of idealized physical types. His groups are more picturesque than plastic, including much illustrative detail, unordered movement, and gesture, and show a complete unconcern for the total monumental effect in their shagginess of contour and lack of design.

Rodin (1840–1917), who seemed so revolutionary to his own generation, practiced a style within the tradition defined by the works of Daumier, Rude, and Carpeaux. Though the foremost master of his day and a man of great skill, he rarely, if ever, handled stone, but elaborated in the softer material the most tortured conceptions and delicate as well as infinitely broken surfaces. He was essentially a baroque sculptor, for whom extreme minuteness of observation provided an equally complex movement or play of light and shade. He chose subjects, usually symbolic or literary, that permitted dramatic treatment and striking contrasts of line. Unrestrained by academic conventions, he rendered vulgar as well as heroic and beautiful bodies. His distortions were usually motivated by human deformity and a desire for dramatic effect, rather than by purely artistic considerations. Even in portraits, the conception of the model was subordinate to this desire. His work is at bottom literary, unintellectual, formless, and disorganized, and achieves its effect more by remarkable accuracy in the portrayal of living objects and in the accenting of violence, movement, emotion, and the suggestive vagueness of shapes in some unconventional symbolic themes than by the means of the masters he so venerated and copied. He stood, however, in marked contrast to the academic sculpture of the day, which was monotonously classic and uniform in its surfaces, subjects, and figure types, and dedicated to a prettified idealism. He suggested a fresher manner, though as inartistic, and, in the freedom of his combinations, helped modify a stagnant tradition.

A reaction from realistic methods was inevitable, and appeared throughout Europe at the same time — in the last years of the nineteenth century. It usually took the form of imitation of the archaic sculptures of Greece, Egypt, and medieval Europe, which were extremely simple, arbitrary, and designed. A similar step had been taken in the ancient world, at the beginning of our era, when sculptors copied Greek works of the sixth century B.C. But in both cases only superficial aspects of archaism were achieved, and they are properly termed "archaistic" rather than archaic. The archaistic figures were rigid, simple, stylized, and geometrical, but lacked the refinement and pervasive orderliness of the genuinely archaic works. Separate details were as in the contemporary, more realistic art. Other sculptors, like Mestrovic, imitated the contortions and powerful musculature of Michelangelo and imposed on them various features drawn from archaic arts. In Germany the movement was led by Hildebrand (1847–1921), who had a profound insight into the esthetics of sculpture; but this insight was limited to its intellectual exposition in an excellent book, *The problem of form* (1893). He asserted the insignificance of subject-matter and accurate imitation of nature, defined the sculptor's problem in terms of vision, material, technique, and our perception and knowledge of form, and taught a return to direct labor in stone, polychromy, the subordination of sculpture to architectonic design, and arbitrariness of proportion. His own work, however, was only an imperfect illustration of his doctrines; beside the very works he condemned and those he praised, it appears as only more restrained and refined examples of modern classicism.

Maillol (1861—), without the philosophical and optical inquiries of Hildebrand, came nearer, by an instinctive approach, to the fine end indicated by the latter. At first a painter and a designer of tapestries, he now carves massive nude figures, of a truly classic simplicity and order, without archaistic affectations; the forms are selected for the attainment of repose and monumental design. In his best works, he manifests the love of abstraction and solid form without sacrifice of the linear and surface richness of nature, common in contemporary painters. Numerous sculptors in France, Germany, and England practice a related style, though independent of Maillol; embodying monumental effects, accented plastic relations, and rhythmical line in representations of the nude figure.

In the early twentieth century, the African and Polynesian carvings, which had attracted the painters, were also copied by the sculptors and further promoted a tendency toward geometrical abstraction. Even Cubism had its sculptural analogues in the works of men like Lipchitz (1891—), who reduced figures to prismatic blocks arranged, like complex buildings, in three dimensions, and composed equally abstract reliefs of flat, superposed objects, instruments, and geometrical forms. The Roumanian, Brancusi, achieved genuinely archaic effects in simplifying human forms, and finally limited his sculpture to the play of highly polished, purely geometrical solids.

ARCHITECTURE AND DECORATION

Architecture, which, of all the arts, is most closely bound to technology and practical uses, was, in a century of great wealth, material progress, and change in ideas, the most conservative and devoted to the past. No age witnessed more extensive building than the nineteenth century; no age borrowed so readily and showed such slight powers of architectural invention. The industrial revolution created new functions in building — in factories, offices, warehouses, and vehicles. The consequent regrouping of populations in large cities demanded tenements, public structures, and churches. Democracy added schools and hospitals. Increased wealth called for impressive façades as rich as the owners. The exaltation of the state, current nationalism, and the strongly devotional tenor of patriotic sentiments found imposing monumental expression.

It was but natural that recent wealth and power should deck themselves with the ornaments of more accredited, traditional aristocracies. Although interrupted by Gothic, Romanesque, and more exotic fashions,[1] the architecture of nineteenth century Europe and America was predominantly "classic." It followed Greek and Roman styles of building and those Renaissance types which copied antiquity. Travel, archeology, engraved reproductions, photographs, and measured drawings of ancient buildings made classic forms accessible to modern architects. The training of the architect was in the ancient orders; magnificence of planning, grandeur of elevation, and luxurious classic ornament were the criteria of perfection in building. As in painting and sculpture, the prize students of architectural schools were sent to Rome to complete their studies.

With all its self-consciousness as to the nature of architectural beauty and the many examples of past perfection still visible, the nineteenth century produced numerous monstrosities of design, a great mass of mediocre buildings, and no works comparable to the models copied. Only in some purely industrial buildings, works of engineering, did newer functions and technique determine new forms. But these solutions were disregarded by designers of other buildings as more mechanical than artistic, and outside the conventional province of architecture.

The copying of past arts is not in itself the cause of architectural decay. It may also be its consequence or an attendant phenomenon. Earlier and more fertile periods have similarly exploited the past. Romanesque builders copied classic, Byzantine, and Muhammadan forms; Byzantine architecture combined Near Eastern and Hellenistic motifs; the Muhammadans utilized actual classic and Christian remains in their buildings, and copied Persian, Byzantine, and Mesopotamian constructions; some American Colonial buildings reproduced the engravings of English architectural books of the eighteenth century; and in the Renaissance, the imitation of classic art was a matter of personal pride.

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[1] In the last years of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth century, Roman architecture governed European and American taste; in the mid-nineteenth, the Greek and the Gothic; in the later nineteenth, Greek, Romanesque, Gothic, and Renaissance styles disputed the field. In the twentieth century, besides all these, Georgian, Colonial, Mission, Moorish, Egyptian, and Mudejar are consulted, and even Aztec is not absent. The façades of Fifth Avenue dwellings and shops illustrate clearly the retrospective fashions and idiosyncracies that have dictated modern architectural design.

But in these periods the adoption of past designs was free and artistic. It did not check inventiveness. It served to enrich an already fertile and independent style. Unlike modern times, not a whole style was transposed, but the details borrowed were harmoniously incorporated in the local structure. Modern copying has been wholesale, insensitive, and weak. Although it had long been taught — since the Renaissance — that the specific beauties of architecture inhered in proportions, massing, interval, the rhythmic treatment of receding and salient surfaces and of repeated structural or applied members, and the refined distribution of ornament, in the nineteenth century the separate parts of ancient buildings were abstracted for use in modern designs apart from the original context and relations, and without a transformation of them to fit a new position. Thus the heavy entablatures of low temples were placed on high modern buildings, and huge stone columns were engaged to brick walls with abundant fenestration. Besides, the ornament usually lacked the subtlety or strength of the model; it was eventually staled by constant insensitive reproduction, appearing in the same mechanical fashion on the façades of banks and tenements. In this misuse of the past and neglect of the unique possibilities suggested by newer contemporary functions in building, inventiveness was discouraged, and the whole attention of the designer was devoted to speaking an ancient language, of which the vocabulary was entirely familiar to him, but of which he lacked the graces of fluency and style. The elements of classic architecture had come to constitute a rhetoric of building, which, without the original content and unity, was pompous and vain.

The subservience of an "age of reason and progress" to past styles awakened serious criticisms throughout the century. Some found a solution in substituting Gothic for classic models, and others in replacing Gothic by Romanesque. But it was not until the last years of the nineteenth century that new ways were definitely suggested. The invention of steel construction and reinforced concrete, the growth of skyscrapers and enormous industrial building complexes, designed by engineers, showed the way. In America, Louis Sullivan (1856–1924) urged the creation of a style in which the new demands of material, technique, and function should determine the design. He accented the vertical lines of the girders and the upper and lower stories of high buildings. For decora-



Maillol.



Brancusi.

tion he devised a system of plant ornament which, in its resemblance to medieval forms and in its mediocrity, illustrated the traditional attachments of this genuine iconoclast and prophet. His love of powerful masonry, heavy, round arches, and arabesque ornament in low relief, shows his dependence on the Romanesque style introduced in America by Richardson in the eighteen-eighties. At the Chicago Exposition of 1893 his work was a lone exception to a reinstated classicism. He had few followers in a generation which was entirely committed to past forms and covered skyscrapers with classic members and Gothic designs.

One able disciple, Frank Lloyd Wright (1869 –), continued his work. Wright's labors have been mainly on private dwellings, although his Larkin factory, in Buffalo, and Unity Temple, in Oak Park, Illinois, are among the best works of modern architecture. His homes are of extreme simplicity, usually low-lying, long buildings, with far-projecting flat or low-pitched roofs, with little if any carved ornament. The walls are bare, free of intricate moldings, and enlivened by fenestration, color, the light and shade of projecting roofs, deep porches, and prismatic supports. Flowers, trees, and shrubbery, planted in profusion about his buildings, are an additional means of decoration. In Europe, where, independent of Sullivan and Wright, similar ideas were current, the work of Wright has been more esteemed than in his own country.

The European movement toward a new style had been suggested in the middle of the century by writers like Viollet-le-Duc and Semper. Its first appearance in the nineties was only half-hearted, for it included much traditional design and was, despite its best intentions, eclectic, and produced little that is of interest today. It employed steel and concrete, but subordinated them to older conceptions of architecture, and evolved no forms proper to the new materials and technique.

It is only in the last ten years that the reaction, initiated by Sullivan, has become more significant and productive, in both the United States and Europe. But it still governs only a small part of actual construction. The increased height of buildings, their adjunction on narrow streets, and the commercial and impermanent character of building enterprise, have led to a limitation of ornament and to the frank exposure of hundreds of similar windows on broad, flat walls. But the decoration of lower and upper stories remains traditional and insensitive; and the



Shelton Hotel, New York: Arthur Loomis Harmon, architect.



Larkin Soap Factory, Buffalo, New York: Frank Lloyd Wright, architect.

superposition of block masses, in which lie great possibilities of beautiful design, is only beginning to be cultivated. The simplicity of recent buildings is in most cases neither consistent nor effective, expressing more often a poverty of imagination and a submission to economic requirements rather than an artistic mastery of them. The design of small houses, however, has known a greater improvement, and it is in this field that the more radical of European and American architects have achieved fine results.

Two theories of architecture govern the design of modern buildings. One school in America and Europe discovers architectural beauty in the frank expression of structural relations, undisguised by traditional ornament. The function, the locality, the materials, the processes of construction, determine the shape, surfaces, openings, and proportions of the building. The architect's problem is to unite the elements provided by these factors into a harmonious and "truthful" design. In a perfectly "truthful" construction, the technical necessities, if clearly expressed or exposed, determine characteristic surfaces, clear articulation, and harmony of line and mass. The program of these architects excludes ornament almost completely. For them, the variety of materials, the play of light and shadow, the contrasts of geometrically regular surfaces, provide a sufficient and superior decoration. A profound disgust with the servile use of traditional ornament and the eccentricity and weakness of original modern designs lies at the bottom of this ascetic view. The desire to equal the precision and power of mechanical creations, of which the sharpness of contour and smoothness of surface are obscured by no functionless additions, has been a powerful motive. The bridge or aëroplane, the efficient machine, is the ideal of these architects; our grain elevators and engineering works are considered by them our most artistic creations, however innocent were their designers of esthetic purpose; and the pyramids of dynastic Egypt are invoked in comparison.

For the academic school, the same considerations of line, mass, and rhythm are the architectural problem. But these values do not depend upon structure. They are rather a design of the artist, who applies them on the framework of the building as the painter assembles figures on the canvas. The elements of beauty are already determined. They are the historic styles of ornament, the orders and moldings peculiar to classic or medieval art, and the formulated rules for their composition. Material factors will not suffice to produce an interesting or harmonious design, especially in city buildings, which are of simple, prismatic form and contain a monotonous checkerboard of similar and equally spaced windows. Structure can determine only the most primitive and elementary design, of great strength but without delicacy. Even the supposedly "truthful" Gothic and Greek buildings incorporate purely traditional and functionless elements, explicable only as artistic conventions. A human desire for delightful surfaces and rich ornament is as important a motive in building as shelter or other practical uses.

In practice, however, few architects are thoroughly committed to either doctrine. The Shelton Hotel, of which the imposing effect springs from the simple, tower-like masses and bare surfaces, is weakened by medieval arcades and ornament in its upper and lower stories, while the horizontal beams of its metal skeleton find no equal external expression. In the Woolworth Building, the flamboyant Gothic ornament follows the main lines of the structure, whereas the United States Army Supply Base in Brooklyn, by the same architect, is unornamented and of geometrical simplicity. Perhaps only a few Europeans, like Le Corbusier and Mendelsohn, are consistently structural. In America, except in industrial architecture, some decoration is usually imposed; and even academic procedure is at times influenced by the other school and by the inevitable suggestions of structure, to accent geometrical forms and to simplify. The zoning law, economic necessities, and a growing taste for abstract design have given tall American buildings a characteristic face. But the eclecticism of the nineteenth century still rules, and the work of architects shows the greatest diversity and little inventiveness in design.

Like architecture, the decorative arts suffered an almost universal decay. Except where domestic crafts lingered and non-professional workers produced industrial objects, decorative design was very poor in quality. The ornament of buildings imitated ancient works, as the buildings themselves and the agencies which diffused a variety of historic styles among architects were equally, if not more effective in transmitting their decoration. Works of foreign handicraft had since earliest times been objects of commerce in Europe. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such products appeared in greater number in the markets. They were valued not only for their beauty, but as curios and as romantic evocations of exotic cultures, and determined current fashions of dress and interior decoration. The particular significance attached in literature and history to certain periods and places was transferred to their furniture and ornament; so that, for some people, a true church could only be Gothic; a dining hall was most fitly arranged in the manner of Henry II; a salon, in the style of Louis XV; a garden was Italian or Chinese; a bathing establishment, Muhammadan; and a public library, Greek or Roman. When new forms were invented, they tended toward eccentric elaboration, and were so short-lived that a gradual development of style by the refined selection and judgment of successive generations was unknown.

The superior machinery of this age reproduced in unlimited quantities designs so contrived. It permitted the cheap application of the richest and most intricate ornament in many materials. It exported its products to less civilized regions and modified primitive art, taste, and industry. It so increased the amount of ornament, in the effort to attract purchasers, that few objects of utility remained without scrolls and bright flowers.

In most industries, design and execution were the work of separate individuals. But this fact does not account for the poverty of the result. For the craftsman, who worked in old tools and traditional ways, and had become isolated because of the machine, as an "art craftsman," produced objects hardly superior, and manifested a like decay. Decorative sculptors plied their craft as in earlier centuries, with a similar skill but unartistic result. Even before machine production had become usual, ornament had already deteriorated, not only in the larger cities of western Europe, but in the Far East and in parts of the Arab-speaking world, which preserved their ancient traditions of handicraft. The history of the printed book, which is one of the oldest machine arts in Europe, and in which the same factors of division of labor, the separation of design and execution, and rapid mass production have been operative for over four hundred and fifty years, illustrates a like deterioration. Even *formal* styles of handwriting in Europe and the Near East are inferior to those of earlier times as pure calligraphy; and our public inscriptions (funerary, commemorative, and official) are weak copies of Roman or Gothic letters.

This condition has long been recognized and discussed, and has even





Canadian grain elevator.
United States Army Supply Base, Brooklyn, New York: Cass Gilbert, architect.

been the subject of numerous experiments. The most commonly suggested remedy has been a return to handicraft; but with a few sporadic exceptions, such practices in modern times have produced little of artistic worth. Perhaps the creations of children and amateur craftsmen have been the best products of such movements. They have made professional craftsmanship unique, self-conscious, esthetic, luxurious, and above mere usefulness. The vogue of bric-a-brac has thrived upon such labors; and the specialized practice of interior decoration has encouraged them and isolated their vases, furniture, hangings, and lamps, as precious nuclei of domestic scenic arrangements. One distinguished French architect, in despair, has urged the abandonment of all ornament and the use of machine-made objects, which are more beautiful in their simplicity, perfection of workmanship, and fine surfaces, like our ships and automobiles.

The efforts of William Morris to revive handicraft are well known. There were similar movements on the continent, terminating in what was called "L'Art Nouveau." In France, Germany, and Austria, the decorative arts were intensively cultivated, schools and workshops were founded, and a long instruction in design administered.

The earliest products of these schools were affected and faddish; we will hardly employ them today. They were expensive, often useless, and characterized by an excessive use of curved lines and slender forms. Their contemporary successors aim at a greater simplicity; under the influence of painting, sculpture, and architecture, they distort more freely, employ more brilliant color, and devise geometrical patterns which recall the paintings of the Cubists. Presuming that good art must reflect contemporary life, some designers try to suggest movement, confusion, and the parts of machines; whereas others create austere combinations, static and simple. There is also a tendency to design undecorated furniture and pottery, which are beautiful by virtue of their structure alone, as in the works of some contemporary architects and as in the best of modern clothes. So great is the value placed upon originality, and so much are these works discussed, exhibited, reproduced, and saluted, that the development of a modern style, in the sense of the ancient ones we so zealously collect, is unlikely. However artistic, they are subject to rapid changes of fashion, partly stimulated by the competition of manufacturers. The imitation of past arts survives, and the exploitation of cheap tropical hand labor and of machine workers of central and eastern Europe further limits a native style. For beside the excellent creations of a few modern designers and some unspoiled machines, there are as many, if not more, products of both craftsmen and machines, of great variety and ugliness.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the principal differences between Renaissance painting and that of the Impressionist school as to design and color?
2. What lack in Impressionist painting is relieved by the art of Cézanne? What means does he use to accomplish this end?
3. Why do Cubists paint in that manner? Describe the stylistic changes in the art of the chief representative of the Cubist school?
4. Why did the nineteenth century produce no single dominant style in painting? In what particulars does the position of the artist in twentieth century society differ from his place during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance?
5. What is the significance of distortion, so widely practiced in modern painting?
6. What are the distinguishing characteristics of the art of Rodin? Why is the work of Maillol so much finer?
7. What were the artistic results of wholesale copying of classic models in nineteenth century architecture? Discuss some of the counteracting influences at the end of the century.
8. Explain the theory of functionalism in architecture. To what sort of building is it most applicable?
9. What is the nature of the compromise to which most modern architects adhere? Give your opinion as to the success or failure of the method in several New York City buildings.
10. Justify or refute the following statement: "The level of artistic taste in the United States has declined tremendously during the past century."
11. How have the decorative arts suffered under modern conditions? What hopeful signs in the use of decoration are perceptible at present?

4. Education.

A. Transmitting the heritage.

Assignment sixty-three: Education

(*a*) The function of education in contemporary society.

* John Dewey, *Democracy and education*, 49–62, 94–116; E. P. Cubberley, *Syllabus of lectures on the history of education*.

The consideration of education has deliberately been reserved as a final subject in this section. This is appropriate, since in any society educational activities and techniques would seem to indicate much of what the people of an age think of themselves and of their institutions. In selecting certain items of their heritage for purposes of conscious transmission to the younger members of their group, they indicate their sense of the value and importance of these items. There are, to be sure, many elements in any educational content which are not consciously selected, but merely included by traditional acceptance. On the other hand, in singling out other aspects of life as dangerous or objectionable, they similarly manifest their valuation of these sides of their social heritage. Moreover, precisely in their treatment of the young we may well discern their estimate of human nature and their attitude toward its development.

It is clear that in many societies education, in the sense in which it is conventionally understood today, might hardly appear at all. In such groups there might be no, or very little, elaborate procedure for the transmission of knowledge or skills or techniques, apart from the actual putting into practice of items of information or of the special function under consideration. The development of a complicated and elaborate system of education is a comparatively recent thing and one which is itself largely determined by the exigencies of modern life and more especially by the development of modern science and of modern industrial organization as well as, to a lesser degree, by the insight into human nature which modern psychology affords.

It might be profitable to review in some detail the procedures by means of which any social group inevitably transmits those items of common sense, opinion, and accepted technique which it regards as important in the pursuit of its routine activities. In this connection would be considered not only methods of living and of getting a living, but also those customs and conventions which are regarded as no less important, as well as whatever procedures might be acceptable through which innovations and novel discoveries could enter into the life of the group.

Every social group must obviously have all of these aspects, though the particular form which they take varies much from instance to instance. As more special and elaborate educational devices enter into the social picture, they will usually not be unrelated to such considerations as are listed above, though the degree of their relevance may often be comparatively slight. Furthermore, those for whom more specialized educational opportunities or requirements are available will be chosen in accordance with the particular needs or desires of the group, whether for purposes of special functions (as in the training of a priestly caste) or as a mark of social distinction and evidence of special powers and advantages.

Thus, among the Greek people, whereas of course a rich store of inheritance might be said to have been available to many, education in the sense of special schooling was limited both in the subject-matter which was deemed appropriate and in the group for whom it was available. The intimate connection of specialized educational facilities with the interests and needs of the medieval church provides another illustration, though even within medieval society certain institutions which performed specific educational functions persisted, and others — for example, universities — were allowed to develop outside the immediate influence of ecclesiastical control. The Renaissance, with its conscious ideal of human nature developed to the utmost degree in as many directions as possible, gave to considerations of appropriate discipline and training new and increased attention, albeit the opportunities for such training might be limited to a small part of aristocratic society.

It was only with the growth of the power of the middle classes that the emphasis upon education and educational opportunities for the many became apparent. The insistence upon the fullest measure of such opportunities for themselves and their offspring led the bourgeoisie to seek to utilize such learning as was available and became increasingly available through the use of the printed page. However, it is not until the eighteenth century, with its conception of an indefinite human progress made possible through the application of science and the utilization of the new knowledge in human affairs, that education, in the sense in which we are disposed to think of it today, comes to the fore.

It is evident that the changes in point of view which have marked the nineteenth century would both alter the conception of education and give to it a unique importance. In a changing world, educational indoctrination might seem to some more than ever important, while to others it would appear as but preliminary to securing that change and improvement which we call progress. Again, the very complexity of modern society and the recognition of the coexistence of numerous ways of living have tended to modify the nature of our educational procedures. In the third place, the growth of the democratic idea has carried with it the demand for universal educational opportunities, a demand which the working classes in all countries have been quick to urge with a view to their own advantage. Indeed, the conception of educational opportunities for all has for the first time included in "all" the notion of extensive educational opportunities for females as well as for males.

The development of elaborate educational institutions and methods, as distinguished from the general procedure by which any group trains its younger members, has certainly been made necessary by the increasing complexity of modern society. But this has also involved certain definite disadvantages. At least, the educational procedures of simpler societies have been fairly closely related to the actual needs and interests of these groups. On the other hand, a great deal of what has passed for education in modern society seems to have little such relationship and to be rather the sterile continuance of traditions which at one time were doubtless relevant to the situations in which they arose, but which seem to have lost relevancy to the present situation. Moreover, the particular conception of human nature which has been current at one time or another has limited the notion of education to a type of training which is by no means all-inclusive. For instance, the exigencies of the classroom situation are perhaps largely responsible for the conception of education as exclusively a matter of intellectual indoctrination, and it has been only with a growing realization of the importance of non-intellectual factors, emotional, esthetic, etc., that a more adequate notion of education seems now to be possible. Finally, the belief that a single type of education can be made available and useful for all types of human beings appears to be giving way to newer schemes of training, varied and more adequate to the needs of different types of personality.

(*b*) The meaning of education.
  i. The general and inevitable process of transmitting the social heritage.
  ii. The special and deliberate process of inculcating —
    (*i*) Skills and techniques.
    (*ii*) Attitudes.
    (*iii*) Information.
  iii. The instrument for eliciting powers and ability of members of the community, especially of the young, and for securing their continued development.
(*c*) The need for education.
  i. The human young only partially equipped for life by nature and inheritance.

    - ii. The existence of the accumulated knowledge of the past.
        - (*i*) Many situations new to the individual are familiar to the race.
        - (*ii*) Vast amount of information requires specialization and development of technique for mastery.
            - *a.* Recent acceleration in accumulation of knowledge.
        - (*iii*) Tendency to accumulation of knowledge not always applicable to current needs.
    - iii. Opportunities for extensive development of individual tendencies through education.
        - (*i*) Psychological tendencies subject to modification.
        - (*ii*) Education provides opportunities for growth.
        - (*iii*) Dangers of "stereotyping," etc.
- (*d*) The aims of education.
    - i. Training of native human powers for the performance of necessary and desirable functions.
    - ii. Transmission of information.
    - iii. Development of individual skills and power of judgment.
    - iv. Development of individual capacities of enjoyment and accomplishment.
    - v. Strengthening social coherence by organizing various activities.
    - vi. Strengthening social coherence by developing sense of responsibility to the group and to other individuals.
    - vii. Improvement of human situation by discovery of new truth and control of nature.
    - viii. Improvement of human nature.
- (*e*) The instruments of education.
    - i. Agencies of education in contemporary civilization.
        - (*i*) In the education of the young — the home; nursery schools and pre-school groups; schools, primary and secondary, public and private, ecclesiastical and secular; camps; clubs, etc.
        - (*ii*) In adult education — colleges and vocational institutes; the vocations; trade unions; workers education classes; parental education and child-study organizations.
        - (*iii*) In general education — the Press; libraries and museums; theaters; churches, etc.
- (*f*) Education as a means of social development.
    - i. The maintenance and refinement of social standards.
        - (*i*) The preservation of standards in —
            - *a.* Achievement and values of the past.
                - 1. Artistic achievements.
                - 2. Science and philosophy.
                - 3. Statesmanship.
                - 4. Work of social and moral leaders.
                - 5. Religions.
            - *b.* Encouragement of continuance of desirable traditions.
        - (*ii*) The extension of appreciation in society by —
            - *a.* Providing more adequate training — fitting individual needs and capacities.
            - *b.* Wider "cultural" education.
            - *c.* Creative experience — manual and artistic.
            - *d.* Wider contacts of diversified cultures.
    - ii. The contrasts of social ideals.
        - (*i*) Absolutist and relativist.

(*ii*) Puritan and pagan.
(*iii*) Provincial and cosmopolitan.
(*iv*) Individualist and collectivist.
(*v*) Aristocratic and democratic.
(*vi*) Conservative and radical.

QUESTIONS

1. Education gives knowledge and right to promote activity of a creative sort. Criticize our educational system on both counts.

2. Weigh against each other the dangers of conservative repetition of the past and radical experiments and departures from the accepted. How may education affect both, and also further the middle way?

3. Specify certain aims of educations and comment on the effectiveness of their realization.

4. What are the instruments of education?

5. Show how education adjusts itself to fit into any one of a variety of social ideals and social groupings.

SCHEDULE OF ASSIGNMENTS

Section of Syllabus	*Title of Work*	*Pages*
First Semester		
I. INTRODUCTION		
1. Nature and aims of the course	* *Syllabus*	1–6
2. The culture concept	* Storck, *Man and civilization*	28–47
3. Geography and history	* Robert Carey, "Geography and history," *Syllabus*	9–33
II. WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1200–1400)		
4. Political life in the Middle Ages	* Irving W. Raymond, "Political life in the Middle Ages," *Syllabus*	34–65
5. Medieval agriculture	* Knight, *An economic history of Europe to the end of the Middle Ages* or * Waters, *An economic history of England* or * Gras, *History of agriculture*	167–197 32–51, 101–120 78–96, 98–99
6. Medieval commerce and industry	* *Knight* or * *Waters*	199–226 51–80
7. Nationalism and economic change	* *Knight*	226–253
8. The Christian epic	* John Herman Randall, Jr., *The making of the modern mind*	9–20
9. The vocation of the scholar	* *Randall*	20–22, 92–102
10. The world of the common man	* *Randall*	23–36
11. The chief end of man	* *Randall*	38–49
12. The medieval system	* *Randall*	49–68
13. The medieval system — *Continued*	* *Randall*	68–80, 102–105
III. FACTORS OF CHANGE IN THE MIDST OF THE OLD (1400–1600)		
14. Discoveries and their effects	* Carman, *Social and economic history of the U. S.*, I	1–17

Section of Syllabus	*Title of Work*	*Pages*
15. Discoveries and their effects — *Continued*	* Knight, Barnes, and Flügel, *Economic history of Europe in modern times*	297–327
	or * Gillespie, *History of Europe*	81–102
	or * Clive Day, *History of commerce*	141–160
16. The Renaissance	* *Randall*	111–121
17. The Renaissance — *Continued*	* *Randall*	121–141
	* *Syllabus*	90–94
18. Sixteenth century political forms	* *Syllabus*	94–100
	* C. J. H. Hayes, *Political and social history of modern Europe*, I	3–23
19. The Reformation	* *Syllabus*	100–103
	* *Randall*	143–169
20. The Reformation, special phases	* H. L. Friess, "Notes on the Reformation," *Syllabus*	104–114
21. Sixteenth century political organization and political theory	* *Syllabus*	115–119
	* *Randall*	181–188
22. The emergence of natural science	* John Herman Randall, Jr. "Note on the science of the Renaissance," *Syllabus*	120–128
	* *Randall*	203–224

IV. WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

23. The political and economic scene in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries	* *Hayes*, I	209–230
24. Louis XIV, undisputed monarchy, nationalism, and international law	* *Hayes*, I	235–257
	* *Randall*	194–201
25. The emergence of new powers	* John H. Wuorinen, "The emergence of new powers in seventeenth century Europe," *Syllabus*	136–157
26. The struggle for constitutional government in England	* *Hayes*, I	261–293
27. Colonies and empires	* *Carman*, I	17–41
	* *Randall*	192–194
28. Conflict of interests	* *Carman*, I	193–227

Section of Syllabus	*Title of Work*	*Pages*
29. The alienation of the colonies	* *Carman*, I	227–263
30. Revolution and independence	* *Carman*, I	265–305
31. Peace after revolution	* *Carman*, I	305–330
32. The new intellectual world	* *Randall*	226–248
33. Sir Isaac Newton	* *Randall*	253–266 273–279
34. The science of society	* *Randall*	308–321
35. The science of business	* *Randall*	321–332
36. The science of government	* *Randall*	334–364
37. The ideals of the Age of Reason	* *Randall*	365–385
38. The religion of reason	* *Randall*	282–306
39. The romantic protest	* *Randall*	389–421

V. WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND THE NINETEENTH

40. The French Revolution, the first stage	* *Syllabus* * *Ketelbey*	188–193 46–79
41. The French Revolution, the second stage	* *Ketelbey*	79–111
42. The aftermath of the Revolution	* *Hayes*, II * *Hayes*, I	1–14, 28–41 517–519
43. The commercial and industrial contest between England and the continent	* Hammond, *The rise of modern industry*	38–65
44. Changes in agriculture and in the old industrial system	* *Hammond*	81–109
45. Mechanical control and social irresponsibility	* *Hayes*, II * *Hammond*	69–79 190–209
46. Europe from the Revolution to 1848	* *Ketelbey*	156–178 (Omit 165–166)
47. Europe from the Revolution to 1848 — *Continued*	* *Ketelbey*	178–190 (Omit 184–185)
48. Philosophy supports conservatism and liberalism	* *Randall*	423–444
49. The unification of Italy, 1850–1870	* *Ketelbey*	211–231
50. The unification of Germany, 1850–1871	* *Ketelbey* * *Hayes*, II	231–243 186–204

VI. GROWING AMERICA

51. The struggle for control	* *Carman*, I	330–361
52. The struggle for control — *Continued*	* *Carman*, I	361–400
53. Social and cultural life about 1800	* *Carman*, I	401–440
54. Social and cultural life about 1800 — *Continued*	* *Carman*, I	440–497
55. Two generations of western frontiersmen	* *Carman*, I	499–539

Section of Syllabus	*Title of Work*	*Pages*
56. Two generations of western frontiersmen — *Continued*	* *Carman*, I	539–573
57. The rise of the industrial revolution	* *Carman*, II	Pages to be assigned
58. The rise of the industrial revolution — *Continued*	* *Carman*, II	" " " "
59. Merchants and shippers	* *Carman*, II	" " " "
60. Merchants and shippers — *Continued*	* *Carman*, II	" " " "
61. Pioneers and the Trans-Mississippi	* *Carman*, II	" " " "
62. Pioneers and the Trans-Mississippi — *Continued*	* *Carman*, II	" " " "
63. Democratic vistas	* *Carman*, II	" " " "
64. Democratic vistas — *Continued*	* *Carman*, II	" " " "
65. The growth of sectional rivalry	* *Carman*, II	" " " "
66. The growth of sectional rivalry — *Continued*	* *Carman*, II	" " " "

Second Semester

VII. THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

1. Great Britain, political development	* *Hayes*, II	277–307
2. Great Britain, economic development	* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel*	499–524
3. Great Britain, economic development, agriculture	* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel*	439–456
4. France, political development	* *Hayes*, II	331–367
5. France, economic development	* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel*	579–594
6. France, economic development — *Continued*	* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel*	594–608
7. Germany, political development, [illegible]	* *Hayes*, II	397–426
8. Germany, economic development	* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel*	526–545
9. Germany, economic development — *Continued*	* *Knight, Barnes, and Flügel*	546–563
10. Russia, 1801–1914	* *Hayes*, II	37–41, 452–487
11. Austria-Hungary, Italy	* *Hayes*, II	426–435, 163–175, 367–378
12. The United States, the triumph of business enterprise	* Beard, *Rise of American civilization*, II	191–198, 204–210
13. The rise of the labor movement	* *Beard*, II	211–248
14. The revolution in agriculture	* *Beard*, II	254–284
15. Expansion	* *Beard*, II	350–362, 365–376, 379–382

	Section of Syllabus	*Title of Work*	*Pages*
16.	The Gilded Age	* *Beard*, II	383–416 426–429
17.	Increasing social control	* *Beard*, II	538–545 550–577
18.	Increasing social control — *Continued*	* *Beard*, II	578–587, 593–608
19.	Modern imperialism	* Harry Elmer Barnes, *World politics in modern civilization*	187–211
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